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PRINCETON,  N.  J. 


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Purchased  by  the  Hamill  Missionary  Fund. 


Division 


Section  * 


T 1.7  86 

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Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/cubaintervention00robi_0 


CUBA  AND  THE  INTERVENTION 


CUBA 

AND  THE 

INTERVENTION 

ALBERT  G.  ROBINSON 


r 


New  York 

Young  People’s  Missionary  Movement 
Of  the  United  States  and  Canada 
1910 


Copyright,  1905,  by 

LONGMANS,  GREEN,  AND  CO. 

All  Rights  Reserved 


The  Plimpton  Press  Norwood  Mass. 


PREFACE 

Within  the  limits  of  a single  volume,  it  is  impossible  to  do  more 
than  to  touch  in  brief  and  general  outline  the  incidents  and  ex- 
periences which  I have  here  sought  to  cover.  The  work  is  there- 
fore suggestive  rather  than  exhaustive.  Experiences  whose  full 
recital  would  require  a volume  are  necessarily  dismissed  with  a 
few  pages  of  comment.  Volumes  might  be  filled  with  the  story  of 
each  year  of  the  intervention.  The  first  four  chapters,  serving  as 
an  introduction  to  the  major  purpose,  are  easily  capable  of  expan- 
sion into  other  volumes;  while  the  brief  review  of  Cuba’s  experience 
as  an  independent  republic  dismisses  in  a few  words  an  abundance 
of  material  for  still  other  volumes. 

My  information  regarding  the  period  of  American  intervention 
in  Cuba  comes  primarily  and  mainly  from  personal  experience  as  a 
student  of  the  situation.  My  visits  to  the  island  were  made  in  the 
capacity  of  a newspaper  correspondent  and  magazine  writer  whose 
work  and  interest  were  limited  to  observation,  investigation,  and 
analysis  of  conditions  and  processes,  in  their  details  and  their  in- 
fluences. 

I arrived  in  Havana  on  January  4,  1899,  three  days  after  the 
transfer  of  Cuba  to  American  control,  and  remained  in  the  island 
for  four  months,  visiting  the  principal  cities  and  making  such  study 
as  was  then  possible  concerning  the  welfare  of  the  peasantry  in 
rural  areas.  In  September,  1901,  I returned  from  a trip  of  sixteen 
months  in  the  Philippines  and  South  Africa,  where  I was  sent  to 
study  and  to  report  the  activities  of  war  and  the  initial  steps  of  re- 
construction. In  November,  of  that  year,  I again  went  to  Cuba,  to 
follow  in  detail  the  work  of  the  Constitutional  Convention,  and  to 


PREFACE 


note  the  processes  and  the  results  of  American  administration  in 
the  island.  I remained  until  May  of  the  following  year.  In  March, 
1902,  I returned  for  a third  visit,  during  which  I was  a spectator 
and  student  of  the  establishment  and  of  the  opening  steps  of  Cuban 
government.  I thus  saw  the  beginning,  the  middle,  and  the  end- 
ing, of  the  period  of  intervention. 

During  these  visits,  my  chief  aim  and  object  was  to  watch  the 
situation  from  the  Cuban  rather  than  from  the  American  point  of 
view.  Unlike  so  many  who  visited  the  island  I did  not  limit  my 
observations  to  the  view  presented  from  the  windows  of  the  Palace 
in  Havana.  That,  through  official  reports  and  through  the  major 
portion  of  the  news  reports,  I could  have  had  almost  as  well  in 
Washington  or  in  New  York  as  in  Havana.  Nor  did  I accept 
official  statements  as  necessarily  accurate  and  final.  I sought  con- 
tact with  Cubans  to  obtain  their  opinions,  and  met  many  Spaniards 
from  whom  I obtained  other  opinions.  Many  in  both  groups,  to 
which  I may  add  a third,  that  of  the  many  officers  of  our  Regular 
Army  stationed  in  administrative  positions  throughout  the  island, 
were  and  still  are  among  my  personal  friends.  I count  myself 
fortunate  in  that  I secured  from  many  in  these  different  groups  a 
personal  trust  and  confidence  which  led  them  to  talk  with  me  with 
entire  freedom  and  honesty. 

My  correspondence  for  the  publications  which  I represented,  and 
others  to  which  I was  an  occasional  contributor,  was  at  all  times 
unhampered  and  unrestricted  by  any  editorial  or  managerial  policy. 
I was  free  to  tell  what  I saw  and  to  make  my  own  comments  on  it. 
In  the  preparation  of  this  book  I have  paid  no  further  attention  to 
that  published  correspondence  than  has  been  desirable  and  neces- 
sary to  refresh  my  memory  regarding  special  incidents  or  events, 
and  to  obtain  special  figures.  The  volume  is  not  in  any  way  a 
compilation  of  that  correspondence,  but,  with  the  possible  excep- 
tion of  an  occasional  paragraph,  consists  entirely  of  newly  written 
matter,  all  experiences  of  the  time  being  weighed  in  the  scales  of 
later  developments.  Yet  I have  seen  little  or  nothing  to  alter 
materially  the  opinions  and  convictions  formed  during  the  im- 
mediate time. 


PREFACE 


I submit  the  work  with  a full  realization  that  some  of  its  views 
and  some  of  its  statements  may  come  perhaps  as  a surprise  to  many, 
perhaps  as  an  offence  to  others.  To  many  it  will,  I believe,  fur- 
nish the  key  to,  and  the  explanation  of,  features  in  that  complex 
situation  which  they  have  hitherto  been  unable  clearly  to  under- 
stand. If  I shall  have  accomplished  that,  and  if  I have  contributed 
anything  which  shall  make  for  a better  and  a clearer  understand- 
ing of  those  “relations  which  ought  to  exist  between  Cuba  and  the 
United  States,”  I shall  feel  that  my  work  has  not  been  done  in 
vain. 

Albert  Gardner  Robinson. 

(“A.  G.  R”) 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PACE 

I Cuban  Discontent 1 

II  War  and  Its  Results 17 

III  The  Revolution  of  1895  31 

IV  America’s  Past  Attitude 50 

V The  Year  of  the  War 66 

VI  Conditions  on  Jan.  1,  1899  84 

VII  The  First  Year  of  Occupation  ....  100 

VIII  The  First  Year  of  Occupation — Continued  1 19 
IX  The  Second  Year  of  Occupation  . . . 139 

X The  Second  Year  of  Occupation — Continued  157 
XI  The  Third  Year  of  Occupation  ....  172 

XII  The  End  of  the  Intervention  ....  188 

XIII  The  Constitutional  Convention  . . . 207 

XIV  The  Question  of  “Relations”  ....  224 

XV  Effect  of  the  Platt  Amendment  . . . 243 

XVI  Acceptance  of  the  Platt  Amendment.  . 258 

XVII  Struggle  for  Tariff  Concessions  . . . 278 

XVIII  Industry  and  Commerce 294 

XIX  Law  and  Justice 304 

XX  Various  Questions 319 

XXI  Cuba  Libre  y Indf.pendiente 346 

I ndex 355 


CUBA  AND  THE  INTERVENTION 


: 


'Th.t-  »" 
,<rc  t 


Chapter  I 

Lv  r.Afi,  - r 

CUBAN  DISCONTENT 

The  Island  of  Cuba  became  a Republic  as  an  indirect 
result  of  revolt  against  a system  of  government  which  was 
deemed  oppressive,  and  as  a direct  result  of  American  in- 
tervention in  Cuban  affairs.  It  is  probable  that,  without 
the  American  intervention,  Cuba’s  revolt  of  1895  would 
have  failed  as  did  its  predecessors.* 

Contrary  to  a prevailing  belief,  Cuba  has  not  been  a land 
of  revolutions.  Its  history  offers  no  parallel  with  that  of 
Ilayti  or  Santo  Domingo,  or  with  that  of  the  Central  and 
South  American  Republics.  Revolts,  local  in  character, 
have  played  their  part  in  Cuba’s  experience,  but  the  history 
of  the  Island  shows  no  general  or  national  uprising  until 
that  of  1895.  The  most  important  and  extensive  of  these 
revolts  was  the  Ten  Years  War  (1868-1878),  entirely  an 
affair  of  the  eastern  provinces.  The  revolt  of  1895  was 
nationalized  by  what  may  be  called  artificial  conditions. 
It  is  an  important  fact,  though  generally  overlooked,  that 
repressive  economic  laws  have  been  in  every  case  the  pro- 
voking cause  of  Cuban  revolt.  Unlike  those  of  her  neigh- 
bors in  Latin  America,  Cuba’s  insurrections  have  never 
been  the  outcome  of  purely  political  conditions.  Nor  have 
they  ever  been  the  result  of  individual  ambition. 


2 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


Spain’s  colonial  policy  was,  in  every  instance,  the  cause 
of  Cuban  revolt.  In  that  policy,  she  violated  a funda- 
mental principle  of  government.  She  assumed  that  the 
subject  existed  solely  for  the  benefit  of  the  sovereign.  In 
establishing  her  colony  she  sought  only  her  own  financial 
advantage.  Other  colonizing  countries  learned,  through 
experience,  the  folly  of  such  a policy.  Spain  never  learned 
it,  and  has  now  lost  her  insular  possessions. 

Three  factors  have  contributed  to  Cuba’s  frequent  pro- 
tests and  occasional  revolts.  These  are: 

First.  Undue  trade  restrictions; 

Second.  An  arbitrary  and  unscientific  system  of  taxation; 

Third.  Retention  of  all  government  and  of  political  pat- 
ronage in  the  hands  of  Spaniards,  to  the  exclusion  of 
Cubans. 

To  these  causes  may  be  traced  a large  measure  of  the 
long-existing  Cuban  disaffection.  To  them,  also,  may  be 
attributed  Cuba’s  failure  to  attain  that  position  in  the 
world  to  which,  because  of  her  natural  resources,  her 
people  rightly  aspired. 

At  the  very  beginning  of  Spain’s  colonial  history,  closely 
restrictive  laws  were  promulgated  for  the  regulation  of  com- 
merce with  and  between  her  colonies.  In  1503,  a royal 
ordinance  established  the  Casa  de  la  Contratacion,  or  House 
of  Commerce,  at  Seville.  This  body  was  empowered  to 
grant  licenses,  to  despatch  fleets,  and  to  regulate  and  con- 
trol Spanish  colonial  trade,  of  which  it  held  an  exclusive 
monopoly.  In  1717,  the  institution  was  transferred  to  the 
port  of  Cadiz.  The  colonial  trade  was  thus  confined  to  a 
single  Spanish  port.  Further  restrictions  prohibited  both 
intercolonial  trade  and  trade  with  any  country  other  than 
Spain.  For  a period  during  the  seventeenth  century,  such 
trade  was  made  an  offence  punishable  by  the  death  of  the 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


3 


trader,  and  the  confiscation  of  the  property  involved.  As  a 
natural  result,  smuggling  became  an  established  institution. 

For  the  first  fifty  years  of  Cuba’s  history,  Santiago  was 
the  only  port  on  the  Island  through  which  merchandise 
could  be  either  imported  or  exported  without  violation  of 
the  law.  With  the  establishment  of  Havana  as  the  capital 
of  the  Island,  that  city  became  the  sole  port  officially  recog- 
nized for  over-sea  trade.  This  condition  held  until  the 
close  of  the  eighteenth  century,  with  the  exception  of  the 
brief  term  of  British  occupation  (1762-1703),  during  which 
Havana  was  made  an  open  port.  The  limitation  was 
removed  by  a royal  order,  issued  in  1801,  by  which  the 
Island  ports  were  opened  to  foreign  trade,  subject  only  to 
the  general  conditions  of  world  commerce.  This  system 
lasted  only  a few  years.  In  1809,  foreign  commerce  was 
again  prohibited. 

Much  difficulty  was  encountered  during  the  early  years 
of  the  nineteenth  century  in  the  enforcement  of  prohibitive 
laws  against  a trade  which  had  become  fairly  established, 
and  no  little  opposition  was  manifested  by  the  Island  people. 
A new  policy  was  then  adopted,  less  harsh  in  its  appearance 
but  almost  equally  restrictive  in  its  results.  It  took  the  form 
of  a discriminating  tariff,  applied  to  both  imports  and  ex- 
ports. That  continued,  subject  only  to  sundry  modifica- 
tions from  time  to  time,  until  the  execution,  in  1891,  of  the 
reciprocity  treaty  with  the  United  States.  That  treaty 
lasted  for  three  years  only.  It  proved  a marked  benefit  to 
Cuban-American  commerce,  though  detrimental  to  Spanish 
trade.  With  the  termination  of  the  treaty,  in  1894,  there 
came  a reversion  to  the  system  of  discriminating,  differential, 
and  special  tariffs  in  favor  of  trade  with  the  peninsula  as 
against  that  of  all  other  countries. 

4 he  second  of  these  factors  in  Cuban  discontent  was  the 


4 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


scheme  of  taxation.  It  was  an  unscientific  system.  Con- 
trary to  a prevalent  idea,  the  taxation  of  real  property,  had 
it  been  honestly  effected,  would  have  given  no  ground  for 
reasonable  complaint.  Such  property  was  assessed  upon 
its  rental  value,  and,  in  normal  times,  a fair  and  honest 
assessment  imposed  upon  real  property  in  the  city  of  Havana, 
a tax  which  amounted  to  less  than  $12  on  the  $1000  of 
fee  value.  This  included  State  tax,  municipal  tax,  and 
expense  of  collection.* 

The  tax  upon  country  estates  was  a variable  institution 
depending  upon  the  location  of  the  property,  its  product, 
and  its  facilities  for  marketing  its  product.  For  an  average 
illustration  it  may  be  said  that  an  estate  producing  $100,000 
worth  of  sugar,  having  fair  facilities,  in  location  and  means 
of  transportation,  for  marketing  its  product,  would  bear  a 
tax  of  about  $1,500  per  annum.  An  increase  or  reduction 
in  its  output,  or  in  the  market  value  of  its  output,  met  a 
corresponding  increase  or  reduction  in  the  amount  of  the 
tax.  A farm  producing  a crop  of  the  value  of  $1,000  for 

*The  basis  was  as  follows: 

State  tax,  twelve  per  cent  on  three-quarters  of  the  rental  value;  municipal 
tax,  a sum  equal  to  eighteen  per  cent  of  the  State  tax,  or  a little  over  two  per 
cent  on  three-quarters  of  the  rental  value;  and  five  per  cent  of  the  total  of 
the  two  added  to  them  for  the  expense  of  collection.  Thus,  a property 
having  a fee  value  of  $10,000  would  be  taxed  as  follows: 


Property  value  $10,000.00 

Rental  (say)  1,000.00 

Tax  imposed  upon  (J  rental)  750.00 

12  per  cent  on  $750  (State  Tax) 90.00 

18  per  cent  on  $90  (Municipal  Tax) 16.20 

5 per  cent  Collection  Tax  on  $106.20  5.31 


Total  Tax $111.51 


By  special  act,  municipalities  were  permitted  to  impose,  from  time  to  time, 
an  extraordinary  tax,  known  as  the  surtax,  which  raised  the  munic  ipal  rate 
from  eighteen  per  cent  to  twenty-three  per  cent  of  the  amount  of  the  State 
tax.  An  exception  was  made  in  the  case  of  so  called  “fincas  rusticas"  or 
rural  lands  within  the  municipal  limits.  These  bore  a total  rate  of  less 
than  two  and  on-half  per  cent  of  the  rental  value,  or  about  one-seventh  of 
the  sum  imposed  upon  the  fincas  urbanas. 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


.5 


the  year,  would  be  taxed  in  the  vicinity  of  $20  or  $25.  Idle 
or  non-productive  land  paid  no  tax.  The  assessment  was 
made  by  a commission  duly  appointed  by  law  under  the  de- 
partment known  as  the  Hacienda,  practically  the  Treasury 
Department.  Justly  imposed,  these  taxes  are  not  to  be  re- 
garded as  burdensome.  The  notably  objectionable  feature 
of  the  system  lay  in  its  unequal  application.  Favoritism 
and  bribery  played  active  parts  and  led  to  much  acrimoni- 
ous controversy. 

While  it  may  be  admitted  that  taxation  upon  real  property 
was,  on  the  whole,  fairly  reasonable,  no  such  claim  can  be 
advanced  regarding  another  department  of  direct  taxation. 
This  laid  burdens  upon  the  individual,  upon  the  necessary 
articles  of  daily  consumption,  and  upon  all  departments  of 
industry.  The  cedula  dc  vecindad  was  a graded  certificate 
of  citizenship,  abolished  at  the  beginning  of  the  American 
occupation.  The  conaumo  dc  ganado  was  a tax  upon  all 
dressed  meat  sent  out  from  the  slaughter  houses.  In 
Havana,  this  tax  was  fixed,  by  a law  of  1890,  at  four  and 
one-quarter  cents  per  kilo  (about  two  and  one-fifth  lbs). 
There  were  also  taxes  upon  the  slaughtering  of  cattle,  which 
was  made  a special  privilege,  and  the  exclusive  right  to 
slaughter  was  sold  to  the  highest  bidder.  Both  tax  and 
bonus  were,  necessarily,  added  to  the  market  price  of  the 
meat. 

There  were  special  taxes  upon  fuel  and  upon  building 
material,  upon  farm  produce  brought  to  market  and  upon 
horses  used  for  pleasure  driving,  upon  railways  and  upon 
country  stage  lines.  There  were  professional  taxes  upon  law- 
yers, doctors,  and  brokers,  and  industrial  taxes  upon 
carpenters,  shoemakers,  and  masons.  Few  were  exempt 
from  some  form  of  special  direct  taxation.  In  cities,  there 
was  a tax  upon  all  forms  of  public  amusement,  upon  public 


6 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


balls,  and  upon  theatrical  entertainments,  upon  cock- 
fighting,  and  upon  public  concerts.  Specially  stamped 
official  paper,  costing  from  thirty-five  cents  to  $37.50  per 
sheet,  was  imperative  for  all  legal  documents,  wills,  deeds, 
and  papers  in  civil  suits.  The  price  per  sheet  varied  accord- 
ing to  the  character  of  the  document  and  the  value  of  the 
property  involved. 

In  large  measure,  the  system  of  taxation  was  arbitrary, 
depending  upon  the  whim  of  the  authorities,  or  upon  their 
immediate  requirements,  official  or  personal.  Abuse  in 
the  application  of  these  laws  was  flagrant,  and  antagonism 
was  inevitable.  Corruption  was  reduced  to  an  effective 
system. 

While  Cubans  participated  to  some  extent  in  the  ma- 
chinery of  government,  such  participation  depended  pri- 
marily upon  their  co-operation  with  or  subordination  to 
the  will  and  the  purposes  of  the  Governor  General.  In 
the  earlier  days,  the  influence  of  the  church  authorities  was 
strongly  manifest,  but  in  the  later  years  it  became  less 
potent.  At  no  time  has  it  dominated  as  it  has  in  the  Philip- 
pine Islands. 

The  administrative  system  of  the  Island  as  a whole  con- 
sisted of  a Governor  General,  an  appointee  of  Madrid; 
Provincial  Governors,  appointed  by  the  Governor  General, 
to  whom  they  were  responsible  and  by  whom  they  were 
subject  to  removal  at  any  time;  a Diputacion  Provincial, 
in  each  province,  elected  by  popular  vote  and  holding 
office  for  four  years;  and  Comisiones  Permanentes,  com- 
posed of  five  members  of  the  Diputacion  Provincial  in 
each  province,  selected  by  the  Provincial  Governor.  The 
municipal  system  has  varied  from  the  direct  appointment 
of  the  Alcalde,  or  mayor,  by  the  Governor  General,  to  a 
somewhat  limited  elective  system. 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


7 


From  the  time  of  the  appointment  of  Diego  Velazquez 
as  Governor  of  the  Island,  in  1512,  until  the  termination  of 
Spanish  sovereignty  at  noon  on  the  1st  day  of  January, 
1899,  a period  of  387  years,  Cuba  had  136  administrators 
under  their  different  titles  of  Lieutenant  Governor,  Governor 
General,  Captain  General,  and  Provisional  Governor. 
This  gives  an  average  term  of  service  of  a little  less  than 
three  years.  From  the  appointment,  Nov.  14,  1859,  of 
Lieut.  Gen.  Francesco  Serrano,  Duke  de  la  Torre,  until 
the  American  occupation,  a period  of  thirty  years,  Cuba  was 
presented  with  no  less  than  thirty-eight  of  these  representa- 
tives from  Spain,  with  an  average  term  of  service  of  a little 
less  than  ten  months  each.  Six  of  these,  however,  are  given 
as  “Provisional.” 

The  frequent  change  in  the  head  office  involved  frequent 
changes  in  the  subordinate  positions,  and  a constant  dis- 
arrangement of  the  whole  political  machinery.  Under 
conditions  of  such  governmental  uncertainty,  neither  con- 
tent nor  due  prosperity  could  be  looked  for  among  the  people. 
Lucrative  posts,  or  posts  which,  under  the  prevailing  system, 
could  be  made  lucrative,  were  generally  held  by  Spaniards 
who,  by  service  or  by  influence,  obtained  recognition  from 
the  crown.  Cuba  and  Cuban  offices  were  regarded  as  a 
rich  pasture  into  which  impecunious  Spaniards  could  be 
turned  for  their  financial  fattening.  It  is  natural  that  a 
goodly  number  of  Cubans  should  have  developed  an  am- 
bition to  graze  in  the  same  rich  pasturage,  and  that  they 
became  envious  and  discontented.  They  felt  that  the 
grazing  land  was  a field  in  which  they  had  some  proprietary 
right  and  interest,  and  that  the  millions  of  pesos  which  were 
transported  to  Spain  by  these  temporary  Spanish  officials, 
came  largely,  as  they  doubtless  did,  from  Cuban  pockets. 
The  whole  system  of  Spanish  Colonial  Government,  where- 


8 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


ever  it  has  existed,  has  tended  strongly  to  inspire  the  governed 
with  ambition  for  the  spoils  of  office.  This  was  inevitable, 
and  desire  for  political  office  is  epidemic  in  all  the  lands 
over  which  Spain  has  held  dominion.  It  is  no  reflection 
upon  the  patriotism  of  other  Cubans  to  say  that,  in  some 
of  these  Cuban  revolts,  agitators  have  been  concerned  whose 
chief  motive  was  to  do  for  their  own  pockets  that  which 
they  had  seen  so  many  Spaniards  doing  for  theirs. 

Each  of  these  circumstances  has  played  its  part  in  such 
revolts  as  are  recorded  in  Cuba’s  history.  But  a broad 
patriotism,  a genuine  desire  for  independence  and  a larger 
political  life,  with  broadened  trade  facilities,  improved 
educational  advantages,  and  a more  important  place  in  the 
life  of  the  world,  have  been  manifest  in  all  of  Cuba’s  petty 
revolts  and  more  extensive  insurrections. 

The  first  recorded  outbreak  of  any  moment  occurred  in 
1717.  At  that  time,  the  trade  in  Cuban  tobacco  was  a 
monopoly  of  the  Spanish  Crown.  The  government  owned 
warehouses,  and  fixed  the  market  price  of  the  product. 
It  may  easily  be  imagined  that  little  regard  was  shown  for 
the  profit  or  welfare  of  the  growers.  The  attempt  of  Cap- 
tain General  Roja  to  enforce  the  conditions  imposed  led 
to  an  outbreak  attended  by  rioting,  and  resulted  in  the 
temporary  withdrawal  of  Roja. 

After  that,  a time  of  comparative  peace  and  general 
acquiescence  followed  until  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  There  were,  during  the  period,  some  disturbances 
among  the  blacks  of  Oriente,  and  the  English  occupation, 
1762-1763,  was  not  without  its  influence  and  results. 

In  fact,  it  is  quite  within  bounds  to  say  that  few  periods 
in  the  entire  history  of  the  Island  have  been  so  fruitful  of 
both  good  and  ill  to  Cuba  and  the  Cubans  as  this  short 
term  of  English  occupation.  The  seed  then  sown  by  Eng- 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


9 


land,  in  the  form  of  a broader  trade  policy,  developed  in 
the  dim  light  of  protest  and  in  the  darkness  of  revolution, 
until,  one  hundred  and  forty  years  later,  Cuba  determined 
for  herself  the  trade  relations  which  she  was  to  maintain 
with  the  other  nations  of  the  world.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  opening  of  Cuba’s  commercial  gates  to  the  traffic  of 
the  world,  even  for  so  brief  a period,  brought  her  vast  re- 
sources and  her  valuable  products  to  the  knowledge  of  a 
world  which  could  make  them  available  and  give  them 
value.  Prior  to  that  event,  Cuba’s  interests  were  almost 
exclusively  an  affair  of  the  colony  and  the  mother  country. 
Following  it,  the  nations  of  the  larger  world  became  ever 
more  and  more  actively  concerned  in  the  commercial  possi- 
bilities of  the  Island.  The  struggle  for  the  larger  life  was 
protracted,  but  in  that  struggle  lies  the  key  to  Cuban  revolt. 

Reforms  in  trade  conditions  were  demanded  from  time 
to  time,  and  the  demands  met  with  varying  measure  of  suc- 
cess. But  the  active  principle  of  Spain’s  colonial  policy 
remained,  and  reform  and  relief  were  no  more  than  nominal. 
The  Spanish  Constitution  of  1812,  which  followed  the 
Napoleonic  War  of  1808,  granted  to  Spain’s  American 
Colonies  a representation  in  the  Cortes  at  Madrid.  In 
effect,  this  cession  of  political  rights  was  practically  a dead 
letter.  The  reopening  of  Cuban  ports  to  foreign  commerce, 
in  1818,  was  followed  by  a brief  period  of  commercial  and 
industrial  activity.  Spam  quickly  took  advantage  of  this 
condition  to  enforce  an  increase  in  her  revenues. 

The  successful  revolution  in  South  America,  under  Simon 
Bolivar,  in  1823,  extended  its  influence  to  the  Island  of 
Cuba.  Under  the  general  auspices  of  an  organization  known 
as  the  Soles  de  Bolivar,  conspiracy  extended  throughout 
a large  part  of  the  Island,  though  its  centre  was  in  Matanzas. 
Its  leader  was  Jose  Francisco  Lemus,  and  among  its  active 


10 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


members  was  Jose  Maria  Heredia,  the  Cuban  poet.  The 
insurrection  was  suppressed,  and  Lemus  and  many  others 
were  arrested  and  deported.  Much  bitter  resentment  was 
aroused,  and  a period  of  disturbance  ensued. 

The  next  uprising  of  any  note  was  that  of  1828,  known  as 
that  of  the  Black  Eagle  {El  Aguila  Negra),  an  association 
whose  headquarters  were  in  Mexico.  In  1825,  Ferdinand 
VII  issued  a royal  order  which  gave  to  the  Governor  General 
of  Cuba  almost  absolute  authority  in  the  Island.  Secret 
organization  for  political  propaganda  became  the  order  of 
the  day,  and  the  society  of  the  Black  Eagle  was  among  the 
more  prominent  of  these  bodies.  The  enlarged  powers 
of  the  local  government  contributed  to  the  ready  suppression 
of  these  conspiracies,  but  the  principle  involved  and  the 
methods  pursued  by  the  authorities  served  only  as  fresh 
ground  for  antagonism. 

About  this  time,  there  appeared  in  England  certain  politi- 
cal influences  whose  purpose  was  English  control  of  Cuba. 
This  became  a source  of  serious  and  active  agitation  on  the 
Island  where  it  encountered  a strong  opposition.  The  in- 
cident also  involved  the  United  States  in  a diplomatic  con- 
troversy which  lasted  for  a number  of  years.  It  was  this 
incident  which  led,  almost  directly,  to  the  enunciation  of 
the  so-called  Monroe  Doctrine,  though  the  general  proposi- 
tion of  that  doctrine  had  been  laid  down  in  earlier  adminis- 
trations. 

A revolution  in  the  Peninsula,  that  of  La  Granja,  in 
1836,  was  the  occasion  of  disturbance  in  Cuba,  though 
the  active  parties  were  in  reality  the  Governor  General,  Don 
Miguel  Tacon,  one  of  the  ablest  and  strongest  men  whom 
Spain  has  ever  sent  to  the  Island,  and  one  of  his  subor- 
dinates, General  Lorenzo,  commanding  the  department  of 
Santiago.  General  Lorenzo  sided  with  the  seemingly  trium- 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


11 


phant  Progressistas  of  the  homeland,  and  proceeded  to  put 
into  effect,  without  the  authorization  or  the  approval  of  his 
superior  in  office,  the  principles  of  the  Spanish  revolutionary 
party.  By  virtue  of  the  supreme  authority  vested  in  the 
Governor  General  by  the  order  of  Ferdinand,  in  1825, 
General  Tacon  at  once  undertook  the  suppression  of  the 
movement  inaugurated  by  General  Lorenzo  in  the  eastern 
department,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a menace  to  the 
peace  of  the  Island  and  a danger  to  Spanish  interests.  Lo- 
renzo lost  through  failure  to  take  advantage  of  a critical 
opportunity,  and  returned  to  Spain  to  seek  a vindication. 
Dire  punishment  fell  upon  many  who  had  supported  and 
followed  him.  Men  of  wealth  and  position  paid  the  penalty 
of  imprisonment  or  exile.  Some  went  into  voluntary  exile. 
General  Tacon  did  much  for  Cuba  during  his  administra- 
tion of  the  affairs  of  the  Island,  but  it  would  appear  that  his 
course  established  a precedent  for  the  absolutism  of  many 
of  his  successors. 

Of  Cuba  during  the  latter  part  of  the  first  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  a Cuban  writer  of  that  period  said: 

“ In  a state  of  agitation  in  the  public  mind,  and  disorder  in  the 
government,  with  the  political  passions  of  Spaniards  and  Cubans 
excited ; the  Island  reduced  from  an  integral  part  of  the  monarchy 
to  the  condition  of  a colony,  and  with  no  other  political  code  than 
the  royal  order  conferring  unlimited  power  upon  the  chief  authority; 
the  country  bowed  down  under  the  weighty  tyranny  of  two  military 
commissions  established  in  the  capitals  of  the  eastern  and  western 
departments;  with  the  prisons  filled  with  distinguished  patriots; 
deprived  of  representation  in  the  Cortes;  the  aijimlamicnlos  pro- 
hibited the  right  of  petition;  the  press  forbidden  to  express  the  state 
of  public  opinion;  closed  the  administration  of  General  Don  Miguel 
Tacon  in  the  Island  of  Cuba,  the  most  calamitous,  beyond  a question, 
that  this  country  has  suffered  since  its  discovery  by  the  Spaniards.” 


12 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


In  1848,  a conspiracy  was  inaugurated  in  the  Cienfuegos 
district.  This  was  speedily  crushed,  and  many  of  its  leaders 
punished  after  the  customary  method.  Its  chief  leader, 
Narciso  Lopez,  escaped  to  the  United  States  -where  he  be- 
came the  central  figure  in  a movement  for  the  liberation  of 
Cuba.  His  supporters  were,  in  the  main,  Cubans,  some  of 
them,  like  himself,  in  exile.  They  wrere  more  than  a little 
aided  by  Americans  and  American  sympathy.  In  1849, 
a filibustering  expedition  was  organized,  but  its  execution 
was  frustrated  by  the  .vigilance  of  the  American  authorities. 
Undaunted  by  this  experience,  Lopez  organized  another 
expedition,  in  1850.  This  sailed  from  New  Orleans,  and 
landed  650  men  at  Cardenas.  It  was  claimed  at  the  time 
that  the  Island  was  ripe  for  general  revolt,  and  only  lacked 
a leader  and  a central  organization  around  which  supporters 
might  rally.  The  expedition  was  a dire  failure.  The  people 
failed  to  respond,  and  even  the  filibusters  deserted  in  num- 
bers to  the  side  of  the  Spanish  forces.  Lopez  escaped  to 
Key  West.  He  was  arrested  in  Savannah,  but  was  released 
in  response  to  a popular  demand. 

In  1851,  Lopez  made  a third  attempt.  Correspondence 
from  the  Island,  and  expressions  of  sympathy  in  the  United 
States,  assured  him  of  support.  On  Aug.  2,  1851,  he  again 
sailed  from  New  Orleans  at  the  head  of  a filibustering  ex- 
pedition. The  band  numbered  some  four  hundred  poorly 
armed  men,  many  of  whom  were  Americans,  most  of  whom 
were  doubtless  little  other  than  military  adventurers.  A 
landing  was  effected  at  Playitas,  near  Bahia  Honda,  some 
fifty-five  miles  west  of  Havana.  An  engagement  followed, 
in  which  the  invaders  were  greatly  outnumbered,  and, 
though  their  fire  was  disastrously  effective,  they  were  forced 
to  seek  refuge  in  flight.  Colonel  Crittenden,  of  Kentucky, 
with  a party  of  Americans  under  his  command,  was  cap- 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


13 


tured  and  taken  to  the  Fortress  of  Atares,  behind  the  City 
of  Havana.  There  they  were  shot  by  order  of  the  Spanish 
authorities.  Lopez  pushed  his  way  toward  the  interior, 
but  was  captured  and  taken  to  Havana,  where  he  suffered 
death,  by  garrote. 

In  the  initial  number  of  the  New  York  Times,  issued  on 
Oct.  18,  1851,  there  appeared  a review  of  the  Lopez  incident. 
The  following  extracts  from  that  article  present  a contem- 
poraneous opinion  of  the  experience: 

“Our  readers  have  undoubtedly  made  themselves  familiar, 
through  the  public  journals,  with  the  history  and  result  of  the  late 
invasion  of  Cuba.  We  shall  not,  therefore,  repeat  them. 

“The  issue  of  this  attempt  will  probably  prevent  any  new  one, 
for  some  years  to  come.  Nothing  can  be  clearer  than  the  fact 
that,  for  the  present  at  least,  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba  do  not  de- 
sire their  freedom.  This  has  been  made  so  evident  by  the  fearful 
hostility  which  Lopez  encountered  from  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Island,  from  the  first  hour  when  he  first  landed  upon  their  coast, 
that  any  new  invader  will  require  conclusive  evidence  of  their 
favorable  disposition,  before  he  will  trust  himself  among  them.  . . . 

“The  opinion  has  very  widely  prevailed  that  the  Cubans  were 
grievously  oppressed  by  their  Spanish  rulers,  and  that  the  severity 
of  their  oppression  alone  prevented  them  from  making  some  effort 
to  throw  it  off.  The  presence  of  an  armed  force  in  their  midst, 
however  small,  ready  to  start  the  battle  against  their  tyrants,  it  was 
supposed,  would  summon  them  by  thousands  to  the  standard  of 
revolt,  and  convert  the  colony  into  a free  republic.  These  state- 
ments have  been  made  upon  high  authority,  and  repeated  and  be- 
lieved for  years  past.  Men  high  in  office,  men  who  had  lived  in 
Cuba  and  were  supposed  to  be  familiar  with  the  sentiments  of  its 
people,  have  uniformly  represented  that  they  were  ripe  for  revolt, 
and  desired  only  the  presence  of  a small  military  band  to  serve  as 
a nucleus  for  their  force.  . . . 

“Believing  that  the  Cuban  population  would  aid  them,  Ameri- 


14 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


can  adventurers,  never  too  scrupulous  as  to  the  nature  of  the  enter- 
prises which  attract  their  minds,  enlisted  and  were  ruined.  They 
found  no  aid.  Not  a Cuban  joined  them.  They  were  treated  as 
pirates  and  robbers,  from  the  first  moment  of  their  landing  until 
their  destruction  was  accomplished.  Nor  could  they,  nor  did 
they,  expect  any  other  treatment  in  case  of  failure.  Even  if  a 
revolution  had  been  in  progress  there,  they  would  have  been  rebels 
and  would  have  been  treated  as  such.  They  ceased  to  be  Ameri- 
can citizens  the  moment  they  set  out,  as  invaders,  for  the  shores 
of  Cuba.  They  became  amenable  to  Spanish  law,  and  they  ex- 
pected to  meet  its  vengeance  if  they  failed  to  overthrow  it.  As 
there  was  no  revolution  there  — as  the  people  of  Cuba  did  not 
wish  their  aid  and  joined  the  government  against  them  — they 
were  invaders,  waging  war,  on  their  own  responsibility,  upon  the 
Spanish  authorities.  Their  own  government  was  at  peace  with 
Spain;  and  their  conduct  was,  therefore,  criminal  at  home  as  well  as 
in  Cuba.  They  violated  American  law,  as  well  as  the  laws  of  Cuba.” 

But  the  disastrous  failure  of  the  Lopez  expeditions  was 
not  due  to  Cuban  satisfaction  with  or  indifference  to  the 
existing  conditions.  It  was  probably  due  to  a lack  of  con- 
fidence in  either  the  man  or  his  methods.  Although  Cuba 
was  ripening  for  revolt,  the  movement  was  premature. 
Among  the  Cubans  of  that  time,  there  was  one  whom  the 
Cubans  now  call  the  Immortal  Saco.  The  following  para- 
graph appears  in  a personal  letter  written  by  him  during 
the  year  1846.  The  accuracy  of  its  prediction  falls  little 
short  of  prescience.  His  statement  of  the  conditions  and 
results  of  the  Ten  Years’  War  could  have  been  made  with 
no  greater  accuracy  at  the  end  of  that  struggle  than  it  was 
twenty-two  years  before  its  outbreak.  The  document 
from  which  this  is  taken  is  unquestionably  authentic: 

“The  tyranny  of  our  mother  country,  to-day  most  acute,  will 
have  this  result  — that  within  a period  of  time  not  very  remote 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


15 


the  Cubans  will  be  compelled  to  take  up  arms  to  banish  her;  but  I, 
who  see  the  danger  of  mv  country,  would  judge  myself  most  blame- 
worthy if  I did  not  show  it  or  seek  to  avert  it  as  far  as  lies  in  my 
power.  Hither  will  come  war  and  all  of  the  Island  will  not  re- 
spond; I hold  it  for  certain  that  Havana  will  remain  almost  indif- 
ferent and  with  her  the  adjoining  districts,  while  in  the  part  given 
over  to  revolution  commerce  will  be  annihilated,  the  country 
estates  will  be  destroyed,  the  smaller  towns  will  be  burned,  and 
assassinations  will  be  committed  in  the  name  of  military  executions; 
property  will  be  confiscated,  whole  families  will  emigrate;  when 
all  is  mourning,  solitude,  and  terror,  the  cities  and  towns  of  the 
Occident  will  gain  in  riches,  contributing  much  to  sustain  the 
Spanish  troops  in  the  regions  in  revolt,  while  the  Cuban  army 
which  sacrifices  itself  for  the  country  will  perish,  because  the  revolu- 
tion being  considered  a failure  abroad  will  not  secure  resources; 
nakedness,  hunger,  and  disease  will  induce  the  least  robust  persons 
and  those  of  the  greater  prestige  to  desire  and  accept  whatever 
terms  the  mother  country  may  offer  to  them.  So  it  will  be  for  the 
first,  the  second,  and  the  third  time,  perhaps,  before  that  support 
is  gained  through  which  the  Cubans  will  triumph  in  the  Palmyra 
of  the  New  World.  I approve  revolution,  but  not  as  I show  you 
because  thus  it  will  result.  The  day  in  which  I throw  myself  into 
a revolution  it  will  not  be  to  ruin  my  country  or  to  dishonor  myself, 
but  only  to  secure  the  existence  and  the  happiness  of  her  sons.” 

Writing  of  Cuba,  in  1854,  the  traveller  historian,  M.  M. 
Ballou,  said:  “Cuba  is  at  present  politically  in  a critical  and 
alarming  condition,  and  the  most  intelligent  natives  and 
resident  foreigners  live  in  constant  dread  of  a terrific  and 
sanguinary  convulsion.”  Then  followed  a period  of  general 
unrest,  discontent,  and  protest,  in  which  the  slavery  question 
played  an  important  part.  This  lasted  until  the  outbreak 
of  the  so-called  Ten  Years  War,  in  1808.  Though  all  of 
these  disturbances  were,  in  their  outward  seeming,  of  a 
political  nature,  their  underlying  cause  was  economic. 


16 


CUBAN  DISCONTENT 


Political  revolt  was  the  weapon  with  which  Cuba  sought 
relief  for  her  economic  woes.  National  independence  may 
have  been  the  object  of  a few.  It  was  not  then  desired  by 
the  great  mass  of  the  people. 


Chapter  II 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 

Throughout  the  period  which  elapsed  between  the 
conspiracy  of  the  Soles  de  Bolivar,  in  1823,  and  the  out- 
break of  the  Ten  Years’  War,  in  1868,  Cuba  was  in  a state 
of  almost  continual  ferment  with  occasional  local  revolts. 
Effort  and  demand  for  the  removal  of  the  limitations  im- 
posed upon  Cuban  commerce  and  the  profits  of  Cuban  in- 
dustry by  restrictive  tariffs  and  excessive  taxation,  met  with 
little  else  than  political  jugglery,  vague  assurances,  and 
unfulfilled  promises. 

In  1865,  a number  of  prominent  Cubans  organized  a 
party  whose  definite  aim  and  purpose  was  relief  from  oppres- 
sive economic  conditions.  This,  necessarily,  could  only 
be  effected  through  reform  in  political  conditions.  It  was 
a period  of  no  little  prosperity,  notably  in  the  line  of  Cuba’s 
chief  industry,  the  production  of  sugar.  The  output  was 
steadily  increasing,  and  prices  for  the  commodity  ruled 
fairly  high,  being  more  than  double  those  of  the  present 
day.  Yet  the  times  were  seriously  disturbed  and  a spirit 
of  discontent  was  dominant  in  the  Island. 

During  the  same  year,  1865,  the  Spanish  queen,  Isabella  II, 
appointed  a commission  for  the  investigation  and  considera- 
tion of  questions  concerning  political  reform  in  the  Island. 
Cuba  was  called  upon  to  send  delegates  to  appear  before 
this  commission  with  a presentation  of  the  grievances  of 
the  Cuban  people.  The  requests  submitted  by  these  dele- 


18 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


gates  included  the  establishment  of  a constitutional  insular 
government,  freedom  of  the  press,  the  right  of  petition  and 
assembly,  the  right  of  Cubans  to  hold  office  in  Cuba,  and 
Cuban  representation  in  the  Spanish  Cortes.  Many  Cubans 
had  come  into  intimate  contact  with  their  great  neighbor 
on  the  north,  and  had  imbibed  the  spirit  of  republicanism. 
Spain,  following  her  established  policy,  gave  no  heed  to 
these  desires,  and  disregarded  the  signs  which  were  even 
then  clearly  visible.  As  Cuba  held  the  position  of  “the 
under  dog  in  the  fight,”  and  because  of  Spain’s  manifest 
unfairness  and  frequent  injustice  and  cruelty  to  the  people 
of  her  colony,  the  sympathies  of  the  American  people  were, 
at  that  time,  as  they  were  thirty  years  later,  decidedly  with 
the  Cubans.  But  it  would  be  to  lose  the  true  perspective 
to  picture  the  Spanish  people,  nationally,  as  a race  of  de- 
mons trampling  upon  the  natural  rights  of  a race  of  Cuban 
saints.  It  is  seldom  that  either  party  to  such  a controversy 
is  wholly  right  or  wholly  wrong.  The  situation  is  probably 
portrayed  with  accuracy  in  a letter  written  some  years  later 
by  Hamilton  Fish,  Secretary  of  State  in  the  Cabinet  of  Presi- 
dent Grant,  to  Caleb  Cushing,  Minister  to  Spain.  Refer- 
ring to  this  period,  in  a letter  under  date  of  March  1,  1876, 
Mr.  Fish  says: 

“ Abuses  and  wrongs  which  would  not  be  tolerated  in  the  Penin- 
sula have  been  allowed  and  are  perpetrated  in  the  Island. 

“The  administration  of  law  has  been  substantially  subordinated 
to  military  force;  offences  against  the  government,  whether  really 
committed  or  only  suspected,  have  been  punished  at  the  will  of 
military  officers  or  under  the  forms  of  military  courts,  and  the 
Island  has  been,  in  fact,  governed,  even  in  times  of  peace,  by  martial 
law. 

“Exactions  by  way  of  taxes,  imposts,  and  contributions  have 
been  onerous  and  oppressive,  so  much  so,  in  fact,  as  to  make  it 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


19 


often  questionable  whether  the  possession  of  property,  with  the  risks 
attendant  upon  its  cultivation,  would  not  result  in  loss.  These 
exactions  have  been  governed  by  no  fixed  rule,  are  enforced  by  an 
arbitrary  power  in  the  Island,  and  large  proportions  fail  to  reach  the 
public  treasury,  or  to  contribute  in  any  measure  to  the  support  of 
the  government,  but  are  directed  to  private  purposes. 

“Public  positions  are  held  by  persons  sent  by  Spain  to  the  Island, 
who  are  wanting  in  interest  in  the  welfare  of  Cuba,  and  who  resort 
thither  for  the  mere  purpose  of  pecuniary  profit,  intending  to  return 
to  Spain  as  soon  as  their  avarice  is  satisfied.  General  report  and 
belief  speak  loudly  of  corruption,  and  a large  number  of  public 
officers  are  charged  with  securing  profit  from  their  positions. 

“Oppressive  commercial  regulations,  injurious  to  trade,  discrimi- 
nating directly  against  Cuba,  enhance  the  price  of  commodities. 
Fines  imposed  upon  vessels  for  trivial  offences,  and  large  exactions 
by  way  of  consular  fees  for  clearances  of  vessels  destined  for  her 
ports,  discourage  trade  and  commerce  and  tend  to  place  the  Island 
at  a serious  disadvantage.” 

The  indifference  of  the  Spanish  Government  to  such  a 
situation  in  her  most  valuable  colony,  and  her  neglect  to 
render  justice  to  colonists  who  were  quite  disposed  to  be 
loyal  under  any  rational  system  of  government,  led  to  an 
almost  inevitable  result.  Revolt  followed. 

On  the  10th  of  October,  1808,  Carlos  Manuel  Cespedes 
and  his  associates  raised  the  cry  of  Cuban  independence  at 
Yara,  in  the  Province  of  Puerto  Principe.  On  the  10th  of 
April,  18G9,  there  was  proclaimed  the  constitution  of  the 
Cuban  Republic.  During  the  intervening  months,  there 
was  considerable  fighting,  though  it  was  largely  in  the 
nature  of  guerilla  skirmishing.  The  Spanish  Minister  of 
State  asserts,  in  a memorandum  issued  to  Spain’s  repre- 
sentatives in  other  countries,  under  date  of  Feb.  3,  1870, 
that  at  the  outbreak  of  the  insurrection  Spain  had  7,500 
troops,  all  told,  in  the  Island  of  Cuba.  According  to  the 


20 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


statement  of  General  Sickles,  then  Minister  to  Spain,  this 
number  was  increased  by  reinforcements  of  34,500  within 
the  first  year  of  the  war.  The  accuracy  of  this  information, 
however,  has  been  questioned. 

Prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  so-called  Republic,  the 
affairs  of  the  insurrection  were  in  the  hands  of  an  Assembly 
of  Representatives.  On  Feb.  26,  1869,  this  body  issued  a 
decree  proclaiming  the  abolition  of  slavery  throughout  the 
Island,  and  calling  upon  those  who  thus  received  their 
freedom  to  “contribute  their  efforts  to  the  independence 
of  Cuba.”  During  the  opening  days  of  April,  1869,  the 
Assembly  met  at  Guiamara.  On  the  10th  of  that  month 
a government  was  organized,  with  a president,  vice-presi- 
dent, general-in-chief  of  the  army,  secretaries  of  depart- 
ments, and  a parliament  or  congress.  Carlos  Manuel  Ces- 
pedes  was  chosen  as  President,  and  Manuel  de  Quesada  as 
General-in-Chief.  A Constitution  was  adopted.  Senor 
Morales  Lemus  was  appointed  as  minister  to  the  United 
States,  to  represent  the  new  Republic  and  to  ask  official 
recognition  by  the  American  Government. 

The  government  which  the  United  States  was  asked  to 
recognize  was  a somewhat  vague  institution.  The  insur- 
rection, or  revolution,  if  it  may  be  so  called,  at  this  time 
consisted  of  a nominal  central  government,  chiefly  self- 
organized  and  self-elected,  and  various  roving  bands,  proba- 
bly numbering  some  thousands  in  their  aggregate,  of  men 
rudely  and  incompletely  armed,  and  showing  little  or  nothing 
of  military  organization  or  method.  It  is  probable  that 
the  new  Cuban  Republic  was  not  inaccurately  described  in 
a letter  from  Senor  Lopez  Roberts,  the  Spanish  Minister 
in  Washington,  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Fish,  under 
date  of  April  5,  1869.  He  said: 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


21 


“The  rebels  have  no  communication  with  each  other;  they 
occupy  no  place  as  a centre  of  operations;  nor  have  they,  in  the 
whole  Island,  a single  town,  a single  village  or  hamlet,  nor  even  a 
point  on  the  coast,  where  they  might  collect  their  forces  and  date 
their  orders  and  proclamations;  but  they  fly  from  our  troops  and 
never  offer  battle,  except  when  forced  to  do  so;  and  their  only  mode 
of  warfare  is  to  apply  the  incendiary  torch  to  estates,  thus  reducing 
to  ashes  and  ruins  the  whole  wealth  of  the  Island,  if  not  prevented 
by  Spanish  soldiers.” 

The  statements  of  this  extract  are  not  fully  supported 
by  facts.  Like  all  Cuban-Spanish  wars  and  warfare,  the 
destruction  of  property  was  a common  procedure,  and 
there  was  much  that  came  little  short  of  brutal  murder. 
But  this  applies  to  the  methods  of  both  of  the  contending 
parties.  The  reduction  of  the  “whole  wealth  of  the  Island 
to  ashes  and  ruins”  is  distinctly  a Spanish  figure  of  speech. 
The  great  wealth  of  the  Island,  then  as  now,  lay  in  the 
western  districts.  At  no  time  during  the  whole  term  of 
the  war  did  the  insurrection  touch  that  section.  It  was  an 
affair  of  the  eastern  provinces  of  Santiago  and  Puerto  Prin- 
cipe and  the  central  province  of  Santa  Clara. 

Some  of  the  methods  employed  for  the  suppression  of 
the  insurrection  were  not  unlike  those  adopted  by  General 
Weyler  in  the  later  war.  At  Bayamo,  on  April  4,  1869, 
Count  Valmaseda,  the  Spanish  Commandant  of  that  dis- 
trict, issued  the  following  proclamation: 

“1.  Every  man,  from  the  age  of  fifteen  years  upward,  found 
away  from  his  place  of  habitation,  who  does  not  prove  a justified 
reason  therefor,  will  be  shot. 

“2.  Every  unoccupied  habitation  will  be  burned  by  the  troops. 

“3.  Every  habitation  from  which  no  white  flag  floats,  as  a signal 
that  its  occupants  desire  peace,  will  be  reduced  to  ashes. 


22 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


“4.  Women  who  are  not  living  at  their  own  homes,  or  at  the 
homes  of  their  relatives,  will  collect  in  the  town  of  Jiguani,  or  at 
Bayamo,  where  maintenance  will  be  provided.  Those  who  do  not 
so  present  themselves  will  be  conducted  forcibly.” 

But  the  revolution  displayed  a marked  degree  of  tenacity 
in  its  special  area,  and  assumed  such  proportions  that,  on 
June  29,  1869,  Secretary  Fish  took  the  matter  up  with 
General  Sickles,  who  was  then  United  States  Minister  to 
Spain.  Under  that  date,  Mr.  Fish  wrote  as  follows: 

“The  condition  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  excites  the  most  serious 
concern.  For  more  than  nine  months  a civil  conflict  has  been 
raging  there  that  gives  no  promise  of  a speedy  termination;  a con- 
flict marked  with  a degree  of  fierceness  and  excess  on  either  side 
rarely  witnessed  in  later  ages,  and  threatening,  if  continued,  to  work 
the  desolation  and  destruction  of  the  wealth  and  the  resources  of 
the  Island.” 

The  letter  proceeds  with  a brief  review  of  the  reasons 
for  special  interest  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  in  the 
affairs  of  Cuba,  and  leads  up  to  a tender  of  the  good  offices 
of  the  United  States  in  effecting  a termination  of  the  war. 
This  was  expressed  as  follows: 

“After  much  consideration  and  a careful  survey  of  the  question 
in  all  its  relations,  this  Government  has  arrived  at  the  conclusion 
that  it  is  its  duty  to  exert  its  friendly  influence  to  bring  this  unhappy 
strife  to  a close.  Duty  to  its  own  citizens  and  to  their  large  property 
interests,  jeopardized  by  the  continuance  of  the  war,  the  necessity 
of  maintaining  quiet  within  its  borders  now  seriously  disturbed  by 
the  continued  strife  carried  on  so  near  its  borders  — our  friendship 
for  Spain,  one  of  the  earliest  and  oldest  of  our  allies,  with  whom  no 
interruption  of  friendly  relations  has  occurred  since  our  entrance 
into  the  family  of  nations  — our  sympathy  for  the  Cubans,  who  are 
our  neighbors  — all  alike  impel  the  Government  to  this  course. 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


23 


“The  President  therefore  directs  you  to  offer  to  the  Cabinet  at 
Madrid  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of 
bringing  to  a close  the  civil  war  now  ravaging  the  Island  of  Cuba, 
on  the  following  bases: 

“1.  The  independence  of  Cuba  to  be  acknowledged  by  Spain. 

“2.  Cuba  to  pay  to  Spain  a sum,  within  a time  and  in  a manner 
to  be  agreed  upon  by  them,  as  an  equivalent  for  the  entire  and 
definite  relinquishment  by  Spain  of  all  her  rights  in  that  Island, 
including  the  public  property  of  every  description.  If  Cuba  should 
not  be  able  to  pay  the  whole  sum  in  cash,  the  future  payments,  by 
installments,  are  to  be  adequately  secured  by  a pledge  of  the  export 
and  import  customs  duties  under  an  arrangement  to  be  agreed  upon 
for  their  collection,  in  trust,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  both  the 
principal  and  interest  of  those  installments  until  their  final  discharge. 

“3.  The  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  Island  of  Cuba. 

“4.  An  armistice  pending  the  negotiations  for  the  settlement 
above  referred  to.” 

This  letter  was  followed  by  another,  under  the  same 
date,  in  which  there  occurs  the  following: 

“You  will  notice  that  the  proposal  contained  in  your  instruction 
No.  2 (that  from  which  the  above  quotations  are  taken)  is  expressed 
to  be  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  to  a close  the  civil  war  now  ravaging 
the  Island.  While  this  expression  is  not  designed  to  grant  any  public 
recognition  of  belligerent  rights  to  the  insurgents,  it  is  nevertheless 
used  advisedly,  and  in  recognition  of  a state  and  condition  of  the 
contest  which  may  not  justify  a much  longer  withholding  of  the 
concession  to  the  revolutionary  party  of  the  recognized  rights  of 
belligerents.  Should  the  expression  therefore  be  commented  upon, 
you  will  admit  what  is  above  stated  with  reference  to  it,  and  may 
add,  in  case  of  a protracted  discussion,  or  the  prospect  of  a refusal 
by  Spain  to  accept  the  proffered  offer  of  the  United  States,  that  an 
early  recognition  of  belligerent  rights  is  a logical  deduction  from  the 
present  proposal,  and  will  probably  be  deemed  a necessity  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States,  unless  the  condition  of  the  parties  to  the 
contest  shall  have  changed  very  materially.” 


24 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


This  proposition  was  duly  submitted  through  the  proper 
diplomatic  channels,  and,  on  August  13,  General  Sickles 
cabled  to  Secretary  Fish  as  follows: 

“ President  of  Council  authorizes  me  to  state  that  the  good  offices 
of  the  United  States  are  accepted.  He  suggests,  informally,  for 
your  information,  four  cardinal  propositions  that  will  be  acceptable, 
if  offered  by  the  United  States,  as  the  basis  for  a convention,  the 
details  to  be  settled  as  soon  as  practicable: 

“1.  The  insurgents  to  lay  down  their  arms. 

“2.  Spain  to  grant  simultaneously  a full  and  complete  amnesty. 

“3.  The  people  of  Cuba  to  vote  by  universal  suffrage  upon  the 
question  of  their  independence. 

“4.  The  majority  having  declared  for  independence,  Spain  to 
grant  it,  the  Cortes  consenting:  Cuba  paying  satisfactory  equivalent 
guaranteed  by  the  United  States.” 

Special  stress  was  laid  upon  the  proviso  that  the  insur- 
gents lay  down  their  arms.  Diplomatic  negotiations  fol- 
lowed, lasting  for  about  four  weeks,  when  General  Sickles 
notified  Secretary  Fish  that  the  Spanish  Government  held 
that  acceptance  of  the  “ bases  proposed  by  the  United 
States  was  out  of  its  power;  that  the  mediation  of  any  nation 
in  a purely  domestic  question  was  wholly  incompatible 
with  the  honor  of  Spain;  that  the  permanent  committee  of 
the  Cortes,  representing  all  shades  of  politics,  had  unani- 
mously voted  that  the  independence  of  Cuba  was  inadmis- 
sible as  a basis  of  negotiation;  and  that,  by  the  terms  of 
the  Constitution,  no  measure  could  be  taken  without  the 
consent  of  the  Cortes  that  might  result  in  any  alienation  of 
Spanish  territory.”  On  September  28,  the  offer  of  the 
United  States  was  officially  withdrawn. 

Meanwhile  the  strife  continued.  Large  numbers  of  re- 
inforcements from  the  Peninsula  enabled  Spain  to  confine 
its  activities  to  the  eastern  provinces.  The  commerce  of 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


25 


the  Island  was  not  greatly  disturbed,  for  the  reason  that 
the  great  producing  and  commercial  centres  lay  to  the  west- 
ward. But  within  its  area,  the  war  was  conducted,  upon 
both  sides,  in  relentless  fashion  with  widespread  destruction. 
The  special  need  of  the  insurgents  was  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion. This  feature  and  the  efforts  to  supply  the  need  were 
the  occasion  of  protracted  and  complicated  negotiations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Spain. 

A Junta  had  been  organized  in  New  York.  Money  was 
raised  and  filibustering  expeditions  were  essayed  with  vary- 
ing success.  The  Spanish  Minister  in  Washington,  Senor 
Lopez  Roberts,  filed  frequent  complaints  which  were  duly 
investigated  and  dealt  with  where  suitable  evidence  was 
found.  A considerable  number  of  vessels  were  charged, 
probably  with  justice,  with  being  engaged  in  filibustering 
expeditions.  The  most  notable  case  was  that  of  the  steamer 
Virginius  which  sailed  from  New  York  in  October,  1870, 
with  clearance  papers  for  Curacoa,  carrying  a cargo  of 
breadstuffs,  saddlery,  and  clothing.  She  appears  to  have 
cruised  between  various  ports  in  the  Caribbean  Sea  until  her 
capture,  on  Oct.  31,  1873,  upon  the  high  seas,  by  the  Spanish 
ship  Tornado.  When  captured,  she  had  on  board  155 
people,  nominally  as  crew  and  passengers.  These  were 
taken  to  Santiago,  where  fifty-three,  many  of  them  Americans, 
were  summarily  shot.  This  act  led  to  a conference  between 
Secretary  of  State  Hamilton  Fish  and  Rear  Admiral  Polo 
de  Bernabe,  the  Spanish  Minister.  The  investigation  which 
followed  determined  that  the  Virginius  carried  the  American 
flag  in  violation  of  the  maritime  laws  of  the  United  States. 
It  was  held  that,  by  the  seizure,  Spain  had  offered  no  offence 
or  insult  to  the  American  flag.  The  ship  was  ordered  to 
New  York,  where  necessary  papers  for  a libel  suit  were  to 
await  her  arrival.  American  naval  officers  and  a crew 


26 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


were  ordered  to  Bahia  Honda  to  take  possession  of  the 
vessel  and  proceed  to  New  York.  This  was  done,  but  the 
ship  and  her  machinery  were  in  exceedingly  bad  shape, 
and  she  foundered  in  a heavy  gale  near  Cape  Fear,  thus 
closing  the  incident  so  far  as  the  ship  was  concerned. 

But  another  feature  remained.  This  was  the  question  of 
indemnity  for  that  which  Caleb  Cushing,  the  American 
Minister  to  Spain,  in  his  letter  to  the  Spanish  authorities 
denounced  as  “a  dreadful,  a savage  act,”  “the  inhuman 
slaughter  in  cold  blood  of  fifty-three  human  beings,  a large 
number  of  them  citizens  of  the  United  States,  shot  without 
lawful  trial,  without  any  valid  pretension  of  authority, 
and  to  the  horror  of  the  whole  civilized  world.”  Nineteen 
of  the  victims  were  British  subjects  and  England  also  ad- 
vanced claims  for  indemnity.  She  reached  her  conclusion 
of  the  matter  more  expeditiously  than  did  the  American 
authorities.  In  August,  1874,  Spain  agreed  to  the  demands 
of  England  but  managed  to  delay  actual  payment  until 
December  14.  On  March  2,  1875,  Spain  agreed  to  pay  to 
the  United  States  “the  sum  of  $80,000  for  the  purpose  of 
relief  of  the  families  or  persons  of  the  ship’s  company  and 
passengers”  of  the  steamer  Virginius.  Meanwhile  the  in- 
surrection made  but  little  headway,  and  Spain  was  unable 
to  bring  it  to  an  end. 

In  an  official  letter,  dated  April  18,  1874,  Secretary  Fish 
says:  “It  is  now  more  than  five  years  since  the  uprising, 
and  it  has  been  announced,  with  apparent  authority,  that 
Spain  has  lost  upward  of  80,000  men,  and  has  expended 
upward  of  $100,000,000,  in  effort  to  suppress  it;  yet  the 
insurrection  seems  to-day  as  active  and  as  powerful  as  it 
has  ever  been.”  Spain’s  losses  among  her  troops  were  not 
due  so  much  to  the  casualties  of  war,  as  they  were  to  the 
ravages  of  disease,  especially  the  yellow  fever. 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


27 


The  process,  in  which  both  parties  would  appear  to  be 
about  equally  culpable,  of  destroying  property  and  taking 
life  when  occasion  offered,  proceedings  which  are  hardly  to 
be  dignified  by  the  name  of  war,  continued  until  the  be- 
ginning of  1878.  General  Martinez  Campos  w^as  then 
Governor  General.  Maximo  Gomez  was  the  recognized 
leader  of  the  insurgents.  Between  these  two  men,  there 
was  effected  that  which  is  known  as  the  Treaty  of  Zanjon, 
on  Feb.  10,  1878.  The  preamble  to  the  Articles  of  Capit- 
ulation reads  as  follows: 

“ The  people  and  the  armed  forces  of  the  Central  Depart- 
ment, and  the  armed  groups  from  other  departments,  having 
met  in  convention  as  the  only  fit  means  of  terminating,  in  one 
sense  or  another,  the  pending  negotiations,  and  having  con- 
sidered the  propositions  submitted  by  the  Commander-in-chief 
of  the  Spanish  army,  determined  on  their  part  to  propose 
amendments  to  said  propositions  by  presenting  the  following 
Articles  of  Capitulation,”  etc.,  etc. 

These  Articles  provided  for:  The  political  and  adminis- 
trative organization  of  Cuba;  pardon  for  political  offences; 
freedom  of  persons  under  indictment;  amnesty  for  de- 
serters; the  emancipation  of  the  coolies  and  slaves  serving 
in  the  rebel  ranks;  free  transportation  for  those  desirous 
of  leaving  the  Island. 

Spain  claims,  and  with  some  reason,  that  she  went  beyond 
the  bounds  of  these  provisions.  The  question  of  slavery 
had  been  in  active  agitation  for  many  years.  A decree  of 
18(J8  provided  emancipation  for  all  children  born  of  slave 
mothers  after  September  17  of  that  year.  An  act  of  July, 
1870,  gave  freedom  to  slaves  who  had  served  under  the  Span- 
ish flag,  those  who  had  reached  sixty  years  of  age,  and  those 
who  belonged  to  the  State.  An  act  of  Feb.  13,  1880,  gave 


28 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


freedom  to  others,  and  the  decree  of  Oct.  17,  1886,  declared 
the  system  of  slavery  forever  extinct  in  Spanish  dominions. 

There  is  a marked  discrepancy  between  Cuban  and 
Spanish  statements  concerning  the  fidelity  with  which  the 
promises  made  at  the  time  of  the  capitulation  were  carried 
out.  By  a proclamation  of  March  24,  1878,  full  amnesty 
was  granted  to  all,  even  to  Spanish  deserters  who  served  in 
the  insurgent  army.  During  the  years  following  the  sur- 
render, the  municipal  laws,  the  Constitution,  and  the  legal 
codes  in  force  in  Spain  were  extended  to  the  Island.  Under 
the  Constitution,  Cubans  were  granted  the  privilege  of 
“peaceable  assembly.”  The  Constitution  also  carries,  prac- 
tically, a “ Bill  of  Rights,”  suffrage,  freedom  of  worship, 
freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of  the  press,  the  right  of  peti- 
tion, and  eligibility  to  all  public  offices.  Provision  was 
made  for  Cuban  representation  in  the  Spanish  Cortes. 
This  is  the  Spanish  claim.  The  notably  weak  point  in  the 
concessions  lies  in  the  decree  of  June  9,  1878,  defining  the 
powers  and  duties  of  the  Governor  General.  His  powers 
were  virtually  supreme.  The  decree  declares  that: 

“The  Governor  General  is  the  highest  official  representing  the 
National  Government  in  the  Island  of  Cuba.  He  is  the  delegate 
of  the  Ministers  of  the  Colonies,  of  State,  of  War,  and  of  the  Navy. 
He  has,  moreover,  as  vice-royal  patron,  the  powers  inherent  in  the 
patronship  of  the  Indies,  agreeably  to  the  papal  bulls  and  the  laws 
of  the  Kingdom.  His  authority  extends  over  all  that  conduces  to 
the  maintenance  of  the  public  peace,  the  preservation  of  the  terri- 
tory, the  execution  of  the  laws,  and  the  protection  of  life  and 
property. 

“He  is  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the 
Island,  and  controls  the  forces  on  land  and  sea,  subject  to  the  army 
and  navy  regulations.  All  the  other  authorities  of  the  Island  are 
subordinate  to  him.” 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


29 


The  Cuban  argument  is  set  forth  in  a letter  from  Tomas 
Estrada  Palma,  to  Richard  Olney,  Secretary  of  State,  under 
date  of  Dec.  7,  1895.  The  causes  of  the  revolution  of  1895, 
he  gives  as 

“ Substantially  the  same  as  those  of  the  former  revolution,  lasting 
from  1868  to  1878,  and  terminating  only  on  the  representation  of 
the  Spanish  Government  that  Cuba  would  be  granted  such  reforms 
as  would  remove  the  grounds  of  complaint  on  the  part  of  the  Cuban 
people.  Unfortunately  the  hopes  thus  held  out  have  never  been 
realized.  The  representation  which  was  to  be  given  to  the  Cubans 
has  proved  to  be  absolutely  without  character;  taxes  have  been 
levied  anew  on  everything  conceivable;  the  offices  in  the  Island  have 
increased,  but  the  officers  are  all  Spaniards;  the  native  Cubans  have 
been  left  with  no  public  duties  whatsoever  to  perform,  except  the 
payment  of  taxes  to  the  government  and  blackmail  to  the  officials, 
without  privilege  even  to  move  from  place  to  place  in  the  Island 
except  on  the  permission  of  governmental  authority. 

“Spain  has  framed  laws  so  that  the  natives  have  substantially 
been  deprived  of  the  right  of  suffrage.  The  taxes  levied  have  been 
almost  entirely  devoted  to  the  support  of  the  army  and  navy  in 
Cuba,  to  pay  interest  on  the  debt  that  Spain  has  saddled  on  the 
Island,  and  to  pay  the  salaries  of  the  vast  number  of  Spanish  office- 
holders, devoting  only  $746,000  for  internal  improvements  out  of 
the  $26,000,000  collected  by  tax.  No  public  schools  are  within 
reach  of  the  masses  for  their  education.  All  the  principal  industries 
of  the  Island  are  hampered  by  excessive  imposts.  Her  commerce 
with  every  country  but  Spain  has  been  crippled  in  every  possible 
manner,  as  can  readily  be  seen  by  the  frequent  protests  of  ship- 
owners and  merchants. 

“The  Cubans  have  no  security  of  person  or  property.  The 
judiciary  are  instruments  of  the  military  authorities.  Trial  by 
military  tribunal  can  be  ordered  at  any  time  at  the  will  of  the 
Captain  General.  There  is,  besides,  no  freedom  of  speech,  press, 
or  religion.” 


30 


WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS 


Thus  runs  the  Cuban  tale,  and  it  is  evident  that  many 
thousands  of  Cubans  believed  the  facts  to  be  as  stated  by 
Sehor  Palma.  So  believing,  and  after  waiting  for  full 
development  and  trial  of  Spanish  purposes,  war  was  again 
declared  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  desired  freedom 
in  all  the  departments  of  life.  It  is  asserted  that  the  Ten 
Years  War  cost  Spain  $700,000,000  and  more  than  200,000 
lives.  Its  successor  was  to  cost  her  more  money,  more  lives, 
and,  at  last,  her  insular  possessions. 


Chaptek  III 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 

Spain’s  fulfilment  of  the  conditions  of  the  Treaty  of 
Zanjon  was  an  appearance  rather  than  a fact.  It  is  true 
that  the  Spanish  Constitution  in  its  entirety  was  extended 
to  Cuba,  and  that  the  Spanish  law  of  civil  procedure  and  the 
Spanish  civil  code  were  put  into  effect  in  the  Island.  Other 
reforms  and  improvements  were  also  inaugurated.  But 
it  is  also  true  that  Cuban  conditions  and  burdens  remained 
with  little  or  no  real  alleviation. 

Another  important  factor  appears  in  the  Cuban  experience 
of  this  period.  For  a number  of  years,  the  Island  had  been 
faced  with  the  competition  of  European  bounded  sugars  in 
the  marketing  of  her  chief  product.  The  production  of 
beet  sugar  in  Europe  increased  from  200,000  tons,  in  1850, 
to  3,841,000  tons,  in  1894.  Prices  were  greatly  reduced,  and 
the  profits  of  Cuban  planters  were  heavily  cut.  As  a gen- 
eral rule,  the  Cuban  planter  is  a man  who  desires  to  make 
money  in  order  that  he  may  have  money  to  spend,  rather 
than  that  he  may  have  money  with  which  to  make  more 
money.  He  was  called  to  face  conditions  which  demanded 
improvements  and  economies  in  his  business.  Ilis  earlier 
experience  had  not  qualified  him  to  cope  with  such  con- 
ditions, and  a measure  of  economic  distress  resulted.  This 
followed  notwithstanding  the  advantages  secured  during 
the  period  of  reciprocity  with  the  United  States.  After  the 
manner  of  his  kind,  in  Cuba,  as  elsewhere,  the  planter 


32 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


looked  to  his  government  to  establish  political  conditions 
which  would  relieve  his  economic  distress.  He  might  quite 
as  well  have  looked  to  the  moon.  Spain  wras  not  in  Cuba 
for  the  purpose  of  encouraging  either  extravagance  or 
profits  in  the  business  of  Cuban  planters.  The  revolt 
followed,  chiefly,  as  a result  of  Spain’s  failure  to  do  her 
part  in  improving  the  economic  situation  in  her  West  Indian 
colony. 

As  has  been  already  stated,  the  promises  of  the  Treaty 
of  Zanjon,  effected  between  General  Martinez  Campos  and 
General  Maximo  Gomez,  were  only  nominally  fulfilled, 
and  Cuba’s  condition  was  still  far  from  satisfactory  to  the 
Cuban  people.  A certain  measure  of  political  reform  had 
been  conceded,  but  Cuba  was  still  under  the  domination 
of  what  was  virtually  a military  autocracy. 

The  cancellation  of  the  Reciprocity  Treaty,  in  1894,  and 
the  consequent  decrease  in  the  price  of  sugar,  resulted  in 
a further  limitation  of  industrial  prosperity,  if  not  in  a 
measure  of  industrial  distress.  Had  the  government  been 
conducted  with  a view  to  the  rights  and  the  interests  of  the 
Cuban  people,  both  economic  distress  and  political  unrest 
might  have  been  averted.  It  is  difficult  to  realize  Spain’s 
blindness  to  the  situation.  It  is  even  more  difficult  to  under- 
stand it.  The  great  mass  of  the  Island  people  were  still 
fairly  loyal  to  the  mother  country,  and  desired  no  absolute 
separation  from  her.  All  that  was  asked  by  the  majority 
was  regard  for  their  political  rights,  and  consideration  for 
their  economic  welfare.  Political  parties  had  been  organ- 
ized wThose  aims  were,  in  the  main,  not  widely  divergent, 
though  they  failed  utterly  to  harmonize  either  their  interests 
or  their  actions.  Autonomy,  though  somewhat  vaguely 
defined,  was  the  aim  of  the  greater  number.  Had  that 
autonomy  which  was  proclaimed  when  too  late,  in  Novem- 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


33 


ber,  1897,  been  proffered  and  effected  in  November,  1894, 
there  is  every  reason  for  belief  that  the  subsequent  history, 
not  only  of  Cuba  but  of  the  United  States  as  well,  would 
have  been  vastly  changed.  The  wrar  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States  would  have  been  indefinitely  postponed,  if 
not  entirely  averted.  But  Spain  persisted  in  her  indifference 
to  Cuba’s  highest  interests,  and  revolution  followed. 

During  February  and  March,  1895,  local  uprisings  occurred 
in  the  eastern  part  of  the  Island.  These  were  quickly  sup- 
pressed and  some  of  the  leaders  were  deported  to  Spain’s 
penal  colonies.  The  inauguration  of  the  insurrection  of 
1895  was  the  work  of  a few  men.  Their  work  was  effectively 
accomplished,  and,  until  the  outbreak,  a remarkable  degree 
of  secrecy  was  maintained.  The  authorities  believed  that 
a movement  was  on  foot,  but  were  unable  to  locate  its  centre 
or  to  obtain  sufficiently  compromising  evidence  against 
those  who  were  suspected  of  being  engaged  in  it. 

.Jose  Marti  was  the  animating  spirit.  By  personal  visits 
and  by  correspondence  he  put  himself  into  communication 
with  some  of  those  who  had  been  prominent  in  the  Ten 
Years’  War.  He  visited  Maximo  Gomez  at  his  home  in 
Santo  Domingo,  where  that  spirited  old  revolutionist  had 
betaken  himself  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Zanjon. 
Gomez  was  offered,  and  accepted,  the  command  of  the 
proposed  army  of  liberators.  Antonio  Maceo,  a mulatto, 
the  ablest  and  most  daring  of  Cuban  military  leaders,  gladly 
accepted  a command  and  held  himself  in  readiness  to  return 
to  Cuba  when  summoned.  The  Cuban  Junta,  with  head- 
quarters in  New  York,  was  in  charge  of  Estrada  Palma. 
An  effective  working  organization  was  established. 

The  date  set  for  a general  uprising  was  the  24th  of  Feb- 
ruary, but  the  response  on  that  date  was  not  widespread 
by  reason  of  a lack  of  arms.  Yet  it  appeared  with  such 


34 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


force  that,  on  the  27th,  the  Spanish  authorities  declared 
martial  law  in  Matanzas  and  Santa  Clara  provinces,  and 
a period  of  eight  days  was  given  for  the  surrender  of  the 
insurgents  with  promise  of  pardon.  Several  local  upris- 
ings and  skirmishes  occurred  prior  to  the  arrival  on  the 
Island  of  the  recognized  leaders  of  the  insurrection.  One 
of  these  was  at  Ybarra,  in  Matanzas  province.  Others 
occurred  in  the  provinces  of  Santa  Clara  and  Santiago. 
These  were  readily  suppressed  by  the  Spanish  authorities, 
who  then  became  seriously  alarmed. 

The  insurrection  made  rapid  headway  under  the  leader- 
ship of  local  commanders,  and  reinforcements  for  the  garri- 
son in  Cuba  were  hurried  across  from  Spain.  Martinez 
Campos,  who  had  effected  the  conclusion  of  the  Ten  Years’ 
War,  was  sent  out  as  Governor  and  Captain  General.  It 
was  realized  that  an  active  war  was  imminent,  and  Spain 
took  measures  to  meet  it. 

The  movement  in  Santiago  was  under  the  leadership  of 
Bartolome  Maso,  an  influential  planter  in  the  vicinity  of 
Manzanillo.  On  April  1,  Antonio  Maceo,  his  brother 
Jose,  and  other  leaders  landed  at  Duaba  and  took  the  field. 
On  April  11,  Jose  Marti,  Maximo  Gomez,  and  others  arrived 
on  the  Island.  Engagements  soon  became  a matter  of  daily 
occurrence,  and  Campos  realized  that  he  had  a formidable 
opponent. 

Meanwhile,  the  Island  was  alive  with  political  movement. 
Numerous  political  parties  were  in  existence,  representing 
varying  shades  of  political  opinion  and  political  ambition. 
Out  of  the  peace  of  1878,  there  had  grown  two  definite 
parties,  the  Liberal  and  the  Union  Constitutional.  Fac- 
tions had  broken  off  from  these  and  organized  as  Autono- 
mists, Liberal  Autonomists,  Conservatives,  Reformers,  and 
others  which  had  little  or  no  importance.  None  of  them  was 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


35 


revolutionary.  The  revolutionary  party  was  the  insurrection. 
Numerically,  it  was,  at  this  time,  probably  no  more  than  a 
small  minority,  a focus  toward  which  or  from  which  those  of 
other  parties  would  turn,  according  to  the  developments  of 
the  revolt.  In  his  able  work  on  this  period,  Mr.  Charles 
M.  Pepper  says:*  “Torch  and  machete  make  short  work 
of  constitutional  agitation.  They  are  not  the  weapons  of 
political  parties.  When  they  were  resorted  to  it  was  a 
question  whether  they  would  convert  the  Autonomists  into 
recruits  or  into  enemies  of  the  faith  that  proclaimed  its 
doctrines  by  war.”  Many  who  sympathized  with  the  in- 
surrectos  hesitated  to  become  active  participants  in  the 
movement.  Some  were  swept  into  it  by  the  processes  of 
war.  Others  remained  inactive  though  yielding  such  ma- 
terial aid  as  was  possible  for  them.  These  became  known 
as  the  Pacifico.s. 

At  its  inception,  althoqgh  the  leadership  of  the  revolu- 
tionary movement  included  among  its  numbers  not  a few 
Cubans  of  prominent  social  and  financial  position,  its  rank 
and  file,  the  fighting  force,  was  composed  chiefly  of  a some- 
what irresponsible  element,  largely  negro  and  mulatto  field 
hands,  with  little  or  no  stake  in  the  country,  and  nothing 
to  give  or  lose  except  life.  With  the  growth  and  success  of 
the  movement,  many  of  the  better  and  more  responsible 
classes  became  openly  identified  with  it,  though  an  undue 
number  of  these  insisted  upon  and  only  served  on  receiving 
commissions  as  field  or  line  officers.  Later  on,  a certain 
number  became  known  as  Heroes  of  the  Blockade,  because 
their  patriotism  awoke  to  enthusiastic  activity  only  after 
the  serious  fighting  was  over,  and  the  Island  became  block- 
aded by  American  war  ships.  Naturally  the  motives  which 
led  to  participation  in  the  movement  were  varied  and  com- 
*“  Tomorrow  in  Cuba,”  page  23. 


36 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


plex.  Marti  was  a patriot,  a poet,  and  a dreamer.  Maximo 
Gomez,  once  a petty  officer  in  the  Spanish  army,  a native 
of  Santo  Domingo,  had  dreamed  impracticable  dreams  of  a 
united  West  Indian  Republic.  Maceo’s  motive  was  per- 
haps a compound  of  patriotism  and  a love  for  the  excite- 
ment of  war,  and  a hatred  of  Spain.  Among  leaders  and 
among  followers,  there  was  genuine  patriotism,  love  of  coun- 
try, desire  for  freedom  and  national  independence.  There 
was  also  hatred  of  Spanish  government  and  Spanish  gov- 
ernors, personal  ambition,  love  of  war  and  love  of  the  glory 
which  comes  from  war,  the  hope  of  gain,  and  the  desire  for 
preferment. 

Immediately  upon  landing,  Jose  Marti,  the  acknowledged 
head  of  the  revolutionary  element,  issued  a call  for  the 
selection  of  representatives  to  form  a civil  government. 
Before  this  could  be  effected,  Marti  met  his  death,  on  May 
19,  in  an  engagement  which  occurred  while  he  and  Gomez, 
with  some  three  hundred  men,  were  seeking  to  pass  the 
cordon  established  by  General  Campos  between  the  prov- 
inces of  Santiago  and  Puerto  Principe.  His  death  was  a 
severe  blow  to  the  Cubans,  but  it  in  no  way  checked  the 
movement.  Gomez  passed  the  cordon,  and  organized  an 
army  in  Puerto  Principe. 

The  constituent  assembly,  summoned  by  Marti,  met  at 
Jimaguayu,  in  Puerto  Principe  province,  on  Sept.  13,  1895. 
It  consisted  of  twenty  members,  representing  nearly  all 
parts  of  the  Island.  Its  purpose  was  the  organization  of  a 
Cuban  Republic.  On  the  16th,  it  adopted  a constitution, 
and  on  the  18th  elected,  as  President,  Salvador  Cisneros 
Betancourt,  and  as  Vice  President,  Bartolome  Maso. 
Secretaries  and  sub-secretaries  were  duly  chosen  and  all  were 
formally  installed.  Maximo  Gomez  was  elected  General- 
in-chief  of  the  Army,  with  Antonio  Maceo  as  Lieutenant 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


37 


General.  Tomas  Estrada  Palma  was  chosen  as  delegate 
plenipotentiary  and  general  agent  abroad,  with  headquar- 
ters in  New  York. 

Both  civil  and  military  organizations  were,  for  a time, 
crude  and  somewhat  incoherent.  It  was  a movement 
which  could  only  succeed  by  success.  Arms  and  money 
were  lacking.  The  civil  government  was  little  else  than  a 
necessary  form.  Action  lay  with  the  military  and  with  the 
Cuban  Junta  in  the  United  States.  The  first  real  battle 
of  the  war  occurred  at  Peralojo,  near  Bayamo,  in  Santiago 
Province,  about  the  middle  of  July.  The  leaders  of  the 
opposing  forces  were  Antonio  Maeeo  and  Governor  General 
Campos,  in  person.  The  victory  lay  with  Maeeo,  and 
Campos  barely  eluded  capture.  The  fighting  continued, 
with  varying  success,  until  the  time  of  America’s  active  in- 
terference. As  it  is  not  my  purpose  to  wrrite  a war  history,  I 
touch  these  points  only  in  outline.  The  wrar  came  and  its 
determination  is  familiar  to  all. 

Patriotism,  desire  for  national  independence,  and  per- 
sonal ambition,  were,  undoubtedly,  factors  in  the  precipita- 
tion of  the  war.  Its  underlying  cause,  like  that  of  its  pre- 
decessors, is  undoubtedly  to  be  sought  in  the  general  dis- 
content and  unrest  created  by  governmental  action  which 
imposed  heavy  burdens  upon  the  industries  of  the  Island, 
and  at  all  times  retarded  its  economic  development.  It  is 
probable,  if  not  certain,  that  the  desire  of  the  great  majority 
was  a larger  economic  life  with  greater  national  and  indi- 
vidual prosperity,  rather  than  separation  from  the  mother 
country  for  any  political  reasons. 

While  the  insurrection  was  taking  on  a more  definite 
shape  and  increasing  the  area  of  its  operations,  in  its  be- 
ginning largely  confined  to  the  eastern  end  of  the  Island, 
the  country  at  large  and  the  principal  cities  were  racked 


38 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


with  political  turmoil  which  grew  out  of  the  movement. 
The  different  parties  charged  each  other  with  responsibility 
for  the  insurrection,  and  parties  divided  into  factions.  The 
Union  Constitutionals  supported  the  Spanish  Government, 
and  forced  the  Autonomists  into  public  declaration  of  a 
similar  attitude.  Had  this  party  antagonism  raged  less 
furiously,  it  is  certain  that  there  would  have  been  fewrer 
exiles,  and  self-exiles,  and  fewer  accessions  to  the  insurgent 
ranks.  Many  were  still  so  far  loyal  to  Spain  that,  while 
desiring  reform  and  demanding  autonomy,  they  had  no 
desire  for  a complete  separation. 

This  type  of  lukewarm  loyalty  became  the  subject  of 
suspicion  and  the  object  of  attack.  Many  were  practically 
driven  from  the  country,  and  others  were  virtually  forced 
into  participation  in  the  insurrection,  because  unable  longer 
to  halt  between  two  defined  opinions,  and  unwilling  longer 
to  confide  in  Spain’s  many  unfulfilled  promises  to  her  Island 
colony.  Some  of  those  who  remained  were  summarily 
arrested  and  deported,  without  trial,  to  Spanish  penal  in- 
stitutions. Such  rigorous  measures  made  enemies  rather 
than  friends  for  the  government,  and  resulted  in  further 
accessions  to  the  insurgent  cause.  Large  numbers  of  such 
accessions  came  from  a more  respectable  element  than  that 
which  had  originally  formed  the  majority  of  the  insurrecto 
party.  The  weight  of  an  iron  hand  might  be  borne,  though 
with  many  protests,  so  long  as  hope  of  better  things  remained. 
The  blow  of  the  iron  hand  was  not  to  be  endured.  But  the 
insurrection  secured  its  greatest  numerical  strength  through 
other  causes  and  as  a direct  result  of  its  own  operations. 
The  idea  is  attributed  to  Maximo  Gomez.  Hopeful  or 
hopeless  as  he  may  have  been  regarding  the  outcome  of 
active  war,  he  declared  that  if  Spain  would  not  give  up 
Cuba  to  the  Cubans,  the  Cubans  would  themselves  render 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


39 


the  Island  so  worthless  and  desolate  a possession  that  Spain 
could  not  afford  to  hold  it.  In  furtherance  of  this  idea, 
there  was  issued  the  following: 

General  Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  Liberation, 

Najasa,  Camaguey,  July  1,  1895. 

To  the  Planters  and  Owners  of  Cattle  Ranches: 

In  accord  with  the  great  interests  of  the  revolution  for  the 
independence  of  the  country  and  for  which  we  are  in  arms: 

Whereas,  all  exploitations  of  any  product  whatsoever  are  aids  and 
resources  to  the  Government  that  we  are  fighting,  it  is  resolved 
by  the  general  in  chief  to  issue  this  general  order  throughout  the 
Island,  that  the  introduction  of  articles  of  commerce,  as  well  as 
beef  and  cattle,  into  the  towns  occupied  by  the  enemy,  is  absolutely 
prohibited.  The  sugar  plantations  will  stop  their  labors,  and 
those  who  shall  attempt  to  grind  the  crop  notwithstanding  this 
order,  will  have  their  cane  burned  and  their  buildings  demolished. 
The  person  who,  disobeying  this  order,  will  try  to  profit  from  the 
present  situation  of  affairs,  will  show  by  his  conduct  little  respect 
for  the  rights  of  the  revolution  of  redemption,  and  therefore  shall 
be  considered  as  an  enemy,  treated  as  a traitor,  and  tried  as  such  in 
case  of  his  capture. 

Maximo  Gomez, 

The  General  in  Chief. 

Notwithstanding  this  preliminary  warning,  many  con- 
tinued their  productive  operations.  This  led  to  a more 
definite  step,  expressed  in  the  following  terms: 

Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  Liberation, 

Territory  of  Sancti  Spiritus,  Nov.  6,  1895. 
Animated  by  the  spirit  of  unchangeable  resolution  in  defence 
of  the  rights  of  the  revolution  of  redemption  of  this  country  of 
colonists,  humiliated  and  despised  by  Spain,  and  in  harmony  with 
what  has  been  decreed  concerning  the  subject  in  the  circular  tinted 
the  1st  of  July,  I have  ordered  the  following: 


40 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


Article  I.  That  all  plantations  shall  be  totally  destroyed,  their 
cane  and  outbuildings  burned,  and  railroad  connections  destroyed. 

Article  II.  All  laborers  who  shall  aid  the  sugar  factories  — 
these  sources  of  supplies  that  we  must  deprive  the  enemy  of  — 
shall  be  considered  as  traitors  to  their  country. 

Article  III.  All  who  are  caught  in  the  act,  or  whose  violation 
of  Article  II  shall  be  proven,  shall  be  shot.  Let  all  chiefs  of  opera- 
tions of  the  army  of  liberty  comply  with  this  order,  determined  to 
unfurl  triumphantly,  even  over  ruin  and  ashes,  the  flag  of  the 
Republic  of  Cuba. 

In  regard  to  the  manner  of  waging  the  war,  follow  the  private 
instructions  that  I have  already  given. 

For  the  sake  of  the  honor  of  our  arms  and  your  well-known 
courage  and  patriotism,  it  is  expected  that  you  will  strictly  comply 
with  the  above  orders. 

M.  Gomez, 

General  in  Chief. 

To  the  chiefs  of  operations:  Circulate  this. 

Immediately  upon  the  heels  of  the  order,  there  came  the 
following  proclamation : 

Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  Liberation, 

Sancti  Spiritus,  Nov.  11,  1895. 

To  Honest  Men,  Victims  of  the  Torch: 

The  painful  measure  made  necessary  by  the  revolution  of  re- 
demption drenched  in  innocent  blood  from  Hatuey  to  our  own 
times  by  cruel  and  merciless  Spain  will  plunge  you  in  misery.  As 
general  in  chief  of  the  army  of  liberation  it  is  my  duty  to  lead  it 
to  victory,  without  permitting  myself  to  be  restrained  or  terrified, 
by  any  means  necessary  to  place  Cuba  in  the  shortest  time  in  pos- 
session of  her  dearest  ideal.  I therefore  place  the  responsibility 
for  so  great  a ruin  on  those  who  look  on  impassively  and  force  us 
to  those  extreme  measures  which  they  then  condemn  like  dolts  and 
hypocrites  that  they  are.  After  so  many  years  of  supplication, 
humiliation,  contumely,  banishment,  and  death,  when  this  people. 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


41 


of  its  own  will,  has  arisen  in  arms,  there  remains  no  other  solution 
but  to  triumph,  it  matters  not  what  means  are  employed  to  accom- 
plish it. 

This  people  cannot  hesitate  between  the  wealth  of  Spain  and  the 
liberty  of  Cuba.  Its  greatest  crime  would  be  to  stain  the  land  with 
blood  without  effecting  its  purposes  because  of  puerile  scruples 
and  fears  which  do  not  concur  with  the  character  of  the  men  who 
are  in  the  field,  challenging  the  fury  of  an  army  which  is  one  of 
the  bravest  in  the  world,  but  which  in  this  war  is  without  enthu- 
siasm or  faith,  ill  fed  and  unpaid.  The  war  did  not  begin  February 
24;  it  is  about  to  begin  now. 

The  war  had  to  be  organized ; it  was  necessary  to  calm  and  lead 
into  the  proper  channels  the  revolutionary  spirit  always  exag- 
gerated in  the  beginning  by  wild  enthusiasm.  The  struggle  ought 
to  begin  in  obedience  to  a plan  and  method  more  or  less  studied, 
as  the  result  of  the  peculiarities  of  this  war.  This  has  already 
been  done.  Let  Spain  now  send  her  soldiers  to  rivet  the  chains 
of  her  slaves;  the  children  of  this  land  are  in  the  field,  armed  with 
the  weapons  of  liberty.  The  struggle  will  be  terrible,  but  success 
will  crown  the  revolution  and  efforts  of  the  oppressed. 

Maximo  Gomez, 

General  in  Chief. 

Such  measures  are  severe,  but  they  are  by  no  means 
unusual  in  time  of  war.  The  step  resulted  in  the  general 
suppression  of  Cuban  industry,  and  in  widespread  dev- 
astation. Productive  industry  was  paralyzed  and  thou- 
sands of  producers  were  deprived  of  employment.  Many 
who  doubtless  would  have  remained  at  work  had  their 
work  continued,  in  their  idleness  and  its  resultant  poverty, 
joined  the  ranks  of  the  insurgent  army.  Upon  this  feature 
rests  the  assertion  of  our  opening  chapter,  that  the  successes 
of  the  revolution  of  1895  were  largely  due  to  what  may  be 
called  artificial  conditions.  Many  who  joined  the  Cuban 
army  did  so  not  so  much  from  particular  desire  to  join  it, 


42 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


or  from  motives  of  special  patriotism,  as  because  the  con- 
ditions of  the  war  left  them  nothing  else  to  do. 

That  which  is  known  as  Oriente,  the  eastern  section  of 
the  Island,  was  the  birth  place  of  the  revolt  of  1895,  as  it 
had  been  of  that  of  1868.  An  interesting  feature  is  offered 
in  the  fact  that,  to-day,  many  people  of  the  central  and 
western  districts  date  occurrences  from  the  “invasion.” 
Incidents  or  events  are  said  to  have  occurred  before  or  after 
the  “invasion.”  Inasmuch  as  the  Spanish  language  is 
prone  to  accurate  definition  of  shades  of  meaning,  it  is  in- 
teresting to  note  their  use  of  this  word  in  this  connection. 
If  asked  what  was  the  “ invasion  ” and  who  were  the  “ in- 
vaders,” they  reply  that  it  was  the  westward  sweep  of  the 
insurgent  forces  under  Gomez  and  Maceo.  The  “ in- 
vaders ” were  their  fellow  country-men,  and  the  “ invasion  ” 
was  the  march  of  the  army  of  liberation.  A natural  in- 
ference from  this  fact  is  that  a large  part  of  the  Island  was, 
originally,  either  in  ignorance  of  the  movement,  or  not  in 
active  sympathy  with  it.  But  the  torch  of  the  destroying 
insurrectos  became  a beacon  light  around  which  many 
rallied  and  became  “ invaders,”  or  it  became  a brand  whose 
burning  drove  them  into  the  ranks  of  the  army.  It  is  hardly 
to  be  said  that  the  Cuban  revolt  of  1895  was,  in  its  essence, 
a great  national  uprising,  although  it  came  to  be,  as  a result 
of  the  methods  employed  upon  both  sides  of  the  line,  a 
widely  popular  movement.  It  had  at  all  times  more  sup- 
porters than  participants. 

Notwithstanding  an  enormous  reinforcement  of  his  troops. 
General  Campos  could  make  no  headway  against  his  op- 
ponents. His  available  force,  consisting  of  regulars  from 
Spain,  and  of  local  volunteers,  is  said  to  have  numbered 
nearly  200,000  men  at  the  close  of  1895.  The  force  op- 
posed to  him  at  any  one  time  cannot  with  safety  be  estimated. 


TIIE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


43 


The  best  evidence  would  seem  to  indicate  that  General 
Gomez  was  the  nominal  commander  of  a regular  army  and 
an  irregular  force  whose  numbers  might  have  been  from 
30,000  to  40,000.  Figures  thus  used  are,  however,  some- 
what deceptive. 

The  general  situation  was  not  greatly  unlike  that  of  the 
South  African  war  of  a few  years  later.  The  larger  force 
was  a long  way  from  Spain,  its  base  of  supplies  and  rein- 
forcement; it  had  cities  and  lines  of  communication  to  pro- 
tect and  defend;  and  it  was  obliged  to  carry  with  it  a con- 
siderable supply  train  for  field  operations  at  any  distance 
from  its  central  camps.  It  was  also  heavily  cumbered  with 
a military  mechanism  which  is  ill  calculated  to  encounter 
such  a force  as  that  to  which  it  was  opposed.  The  smaller 
force  was  at  home;  it  was  active,  mobile,  unhampered  by 
wagon  trains;  it  lived  on  the  country  among  a people  in 
more  or  less  active  sympathy  with  it;  was  burdened  with  no 
military  traditions,  and  with  few  military  restrictions.  It 
knew  the  movements  of  its  opponents,  and  struck  or  moved 
away  at  will.  With  the  issue  doubtful,  it  rarely,  if  ever, 
stood  for  a pitched  battle.  These  conditions  develop  a 
war  which  is  to  be  worn  out  rather  than  fought  out. 

For  the  first  time  in  Cuba’s  history,  a revolution  became 
national.  The  spirit  of  revolt  and  its  activities  extended 
from  Cape  Antonio  on  the  west  to  Cape  Maisi  on  the  east. 
Havana  was  in  a state  of  political  ferment.  Gomez  was 
busily  engaged  in  his  work  of  rendering  the  Island  a useless 
and  expensive  possession  which  Spain  could  not  afford  to 
maintain  or  retain.  Martial  law  was  proclaimed  in  the 
western  districts.  The  City  of  Havana  was  the  Spanish 
stronghold  in  the  Island  as  well  as  the  seat  of  government. 
The  Spanish  residents,  the  Reformists,  and  the  few  Cubans 
who  remained  loyal  to  Spain,  were  terrified  by  the  presence 


44 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


of  General  Gomez,  with  an  insurgent  army,  within  ten  miles 
of  the  city.  They  lost  confidence  in  General  Campos  and 
demanded  his  recall.  The  government  at  Madrid  accepted 
his  resignation,  in  January,  1896. 

The  successor  of  General  Campos  was  Valeriano  Weyler, 
known  to  the  Cubans  as  “ The  Butcher.”  He  had  served 
in  Cuba,  first  as  Colonel  and  later  as  a Brigade  Commander, 
during  the  Ten  Years’  War,  and  his  military  methods  were 
not  forgotten.  Soon  after  his  arrival,  General  Weyler  put 
into  effect  a system  which  gave  him  a world-wide  notoriety. 
He  adopted  the  infamous  system  of  reconcentration  which, 
under  his  supervision,  became  a process  of  direct  starvation 
of  the  Island  people,  men,  women,  and  children. 

The  Cubans  themselves  really  initiated  the  system  of 
concentration  as  well  as  that  of  destruction.  To  clear  the 
country  in  which  the  insurgents  were  operating,  all  Spaniards 
and  Spanish  sympathizers  were  ordered  by  the  Cuban  com- 
manders to  betake  themselves  to  the  cities  and  larger  towns 
which  were  occupied  by  Spanish  garrisons.  Gomez  also 
sought  to  force  the  Cuban  people,  especially  the  women  and 
children  and  men  who  were  incapable  of  bearing  arms,  into 
the  recesses  of  the  hills,  where  they  might  maintain  them- 
selves without  danger  of  attack  by  or  interference  from  the 
Spanish  troops.  Weyler  retaliated  and  introduced  a more 
effective  and  much  less  humane  system.  The  original  order 
of  rceoncentration  was  issued,  Feb.  16,  1896,  in  the  follow- 
ing terms: 

“Don  Valeriano  Weyler  y Nicolau,  Marquis  of  Teneriffe, 
Governor  and  Captain  General  of  Cuba,  General  in  Chief  of  the 
Army,  etc.,  desirous  of  warning  the  honest  inhabitants  of  Cuba, 
and  those  loyal  to  the  Spanish  cause,  and  in  conformity  to  the  laws, 
does  order  and  command: 

Article  I.  All  inhabitants  of  the  district  of  Sancti  Spiritus  and 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


45 


all  the  provinces  of  Puerto  Principe  and  Santiago  de  Cuba  will 
have  to  concentrate  in  places  which  are  the  headquarters  of  a 
division,  a brigade,  a column,  or  a troop,  and  will  have  to  be  pro- 
vided with  documentary  proof  of  identity,  within  eight  days  of 
the  publication  of  this  proclamation  in  the  municipalities. 

Article  II.  To  travel  in  the  country  in  the  radius  covered  by 
the  columns  in  operation,  it  is  absolutely  indispensable  to  have 
a pass  from  the  mayor,  military  commandants,  or  chiefs  of  de- 
tachments. Anyone  lacking  this  will  be  detained  and  sent  to 
headquarters  of  divisions  or  brigades,  and  thence  to  Havana,  at 
my  disposition,  by  the  first  possible  means.  Even  if  a pass  is  ex- 
hibited, which  is  suspected  to  be  not  authentic  or  granted  by 
authority  to  persons  with  known  sympathy  toward  the  rebellion, 
or  who  show  favor  thereto,  rigorous  measures  will  result  to  those 
responsible. 

Article  III.  All  owners  of  commercial  establishments  in  the 
country  districts  will  vacate  them,  and  the  chiefs  of  columns  will 
take  such  measures  as  the  success  of  their  operations  dictates  re- 
garding such  places  which,  while  useless  for  the  country’s  wealth, 
serve  the  enemy  as  hiding  places  in  the  woods  and  in  the  interior. 

Article  IV.  All  passes  hitherto  issued  hereby  become  null  and 
void. 

Article  V.  The  military  authorities  will  see  to  the  immediate 
publication  of  this  order. 

Valeriano  Weyler. 

In  his  message  of  December,  1897,  President  McKinley 
said  of  this  system:  “It  was  not  civilized  warfare;  it  was 
extermination.  The  only  peace  it  could  beget  was  that  of 
the  wilderness  and  the  grave.”  America  was  deluged  with 
tales  of  appalling  distress  and  misery.  An  appeal  was 
issued  for  money  and  supplies  for  the  relief  of  the  suffering 
and  the  destitute.  A Cuban  relief  committee  was  organ- 
ized. A generous  response  was  made  to  the  appeal,  and 
needed  supplies,  provisions,  and  medicines  were  forwarded 


46 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


and  distributed,  largely  through  the  agency  of  the  Red 
Cross  Society. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  carefully  weighed 
the  question  of  a recognition  of  Cuba’s  right  to  independence, 
and  of  her  right  to  recognition  as  a belligerent.  In  1875, 
after  seven  years  of  war  in  Cuba,  President  Grant  decided 
that  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Cuba  wTas  im- 
practicable and  indefensible,  and  that  the  recognition  of 
belligerence  was  not  warranted  by  the  facts  according  to 
the  tests  of  public  law.  Following  this  and  other  prece- 
dents, President  McKinley,  in  his  message  of  December, 
1897,  regarded  such  recognition  as  unwarranted  and  in- 
advisable. 

Weyler  failed,  as  had  been  predicted  by  Campos,  to  end 
the  struggle  by  military  operations.  He  also  failed  to  end 
it  by  a policy  which  was  denounced  and  condemned  by  the 
whole  civilized  world.  The  Island  was  a wilderness  and  a 
graveyard.  The  bohios  of  the  pacificos  and  the  costly  villas 
of  wealthy  planters  alike  shared  in  the  general  destruction. 
That  which  the  army  of  Gomez  left  standing,  the  soldiers 
of  Weyler  destroyed.  Industry  was  paralyzed.  The  Island 
was  fast  becoming  the  worthless  possession  which  Gomez 
threatened  to  make  it. 

The  assassination  of  the  Spanish  Premier,  Canovas  del 
Castillo,  led  to  the  organization  of  a new  ministry  at  Madrid 
with  Praxades  Sagasta  at  its  head.  This  was  in  the  fall  of 
1897.  Weyler  was  recalled,  and  Gen.  Ramon  Blanco,  a 
man  of  widely  different  type,  was  sent  out  as  his  successor. 
One  of  General  Blanco’s  first  acts  after  his  arrival  was  the 
issuance  of  a proclamation  which  greatly  modified  the  re- 
concentration order.  But  the  baneful  results  of  the  system 
were  beyond  palliation  by  official  orders.  Permission  to 
return  to  their  homes  and  their  labor  was  of  little  use  to 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


47 


those  who  were  too  weak  to  walk,  often  too  weak  to  move. 
Blanco’s  motive  was  humane,  but  the  work  of  his  predeces- 
sor had  been  only  too  effectual. 

A new  political  policy  was  adopted  by  Spain.  By  a 
royal  edict  of  Nov.  25,  1897,  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  were 
granted  autonomous  government.  A decree  was  issued 
which  established  universal  suffrage  and  political  equality, 
and  which  applied  to  the  islands  the  electoral  laws  of  Spain. 
This  step  was  doubtless  taken  as  a result  of  the  pressure 
brought  to  bear  by  the  administration  of  the  United  States. 
But  it  came  too  late.  The  Autonomists  welcomed  it  and 
urged  its  acceptance.  But  the  revolutionary  element  had 
gone  too  far,  had  suffered  too  much,  had  succeeded  too  well, 
for  any  withdrawal.  There  was  also  a qualifying  clause, 
“The  supreme  government  of  the  Colony  shall  be  exercised 
by  a Governor  General.”  Self-government  was  only  nomi- 
nal with  a Tacon,  or  a Polavieja,  or  a Weyler  holding  the 
power  of  veto  and  the  authority  of  a military  chief.  But  a 
form  of  autonomous  government  was  organized.  The  con- 
ditions existing  on  the  Island  turned  it  into  little  other  than 
a travesty. 

During  all  this  time  America  was  busy  in  Madrid,  urging, 
protesting,  and  diplomatically  threatening.  The  insurgent 
government  demanded  recognition  of  belligerent  rights  at 
the  hands  of  the  United  States.  Though  many  may  have 
desired  it  and  some  may  have  expected  it,  it  is  to  be  noted 
that  the  “government  in  the  woods,”  as  it  has  been  called, 
never  asked  jar  American  intervention.  That  came  through 
other  channels. 

It  was,  at  the  time,  and  still  is  an  open  question  whether 
the  United  States  was  cither  wholly  wise  or  entirely  justified 
in  refusing  to  concede  the  rights  of  belligerents  to  the  Cubans. 
In  the  face  of  the  facts  of  the  situation,  it  is  not  to  be  doubted 


48 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


that  a state  of  war  existed,  notwithstanding  the  claim  of 
Spain  that  Cuba’s  rebellion  was  no  more  than  an  insurrec- 
tion. Under  the  date  of  Dec.  7,  1895,  in  a letter  to  Richard 
Olney,  then  Secretary  of  State,  Senor  Estrada  Palma  sub- 
mitted the  following  “ as  the  duly  accredited  representative  ” 
of  the  Cuban  government: 

“In  the  name  of  the  Cuban  people  in  arms  who  have  fought 
singly  and  alone  against  the  monarchy  of  Spain  for  nearly  a year, 
in  the  heart  of  a continent  devoted  to  republican  institutions,  in  the 
name  of  justice,  in  the  name  of  humanity,  in  the  name  of  liberty, 
petition  you,  and  through  you  the  government  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  to  accord  the  rights  of  belligerency  to  a people  fighting 
for  their  absolute  independence.” 

Concurrent  reports  in  the  American  Congress  proposed  the 
granting  of  those  rights,  but  no  definite  action  was  taken. 
The  United  States,  although  filled  with  expressions  of  pity 
and  sympathy  for  the  struggling  and  suffering  Cubans, 
held  aloof  but  gave  warning  of  possible  intervention.  The 
American  Government  remained  in  what  President  Cleve- 
land, in  his  message  of  December,  1896,  called  an  “expectant 
attitude.” 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  ample  ground  existed  upon 
which  the  United  States  would  have  been  warranted  in 
granting  the  Cuban  petition  submitted  through  Senor 
Estrada  Palma,  and  endorsed  by  the  American  Congress. 
But  the  step  was  deemed  “inexpedient,”  and  action  was 
waived.  While  it  is  manifestly  impossible  to  say  just  what 
would  have  been  the  result  of  such  a recognition  of  the 
Cubans  and  their  “government  in  the  woods,”  it  is  of  in- 
terest to  note  that  in  the  report  of  the  Senate  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  (Report  No  885,  Fifty-fifth  Congress, 
Second  Session)  under  date  of  April  13,  1898,  there  appears 
the  following:  “It  is  believed  that  recognition  of  the  bellig- 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1895 


49 


erency  of  the  insurgents  in  Cuba,  if  it  had  been  given  season- 
ably, when  it  was  suggested  by  concurrent  resolutions  to 
that  effect  passed  by  Congress  (January  and  February, 
189G),  would  have  insured  the  speedy  termination  of  the 
war  without  involving  the  United  States  in  the  contest.” 
Whether  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  was  right  or  wrong, 
wise  or  unwise,  it  had  at  least  the  merit,  if  it  be  a merit  under 
such  circumstances,  of  consistency. 


Chapter  IV 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 

It  is  quite  in  order  at  this  point  to  review  the  question  of 
the  right  of  the  United  States  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of 
Cuba,  and  the  attitude  of  that  country  toward  the  Island  in 
other  days. 

The  legal  right  of  any  country  to  interfere  in  the  domestic 
affairs  of  any  other  country  is  by  no  means  clearly  deter- 
mined. Pomeroy,  in  his  work  on  International  Law, 
states  (p.  242,  et  seq .):  “How  far  the  right  of  intervention 
legitimately  extends,  under  what  circumstances  it  may  he 
invoked,  to  what  extent  it  may  be  carried,  are  questions 
which  have  given  rise  to  much  discussion  — questions  that 
have  never  been  authoritatively  settled,  and  perhaps  never 
will  be  settled.”  The  proffer,  through  diplomatic  channels, 
of  what  is  known  as  the  “good  offices”  of  a nation,  with  the 
object  of  effecting  a cessation  of  hostilities  and  the  establish- 
ment of  peace  in  another  nation,  is  a recognized  procedure. 
This,  however,  is  a very  different  matter  from  direct  and 
armed  interference.  Upon  this  point,  authorities  differ 
regarding  the  precise  line  of  demarkation  between  war- 
ranted and  unwarranted  intervention.  Justification  is  recog- 
nized for  a limited  measure  of  interference  for  the  support 
of  existing  treaty  relations  and  for  the  protection  of  the 
person  and  property  rights  of  foreign  residents  in  countries 
disturbed  by  war.  This  is  instanced  in  the  landing  of 
American  marines  on  the  isthmus  of  Panama  in  November, 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


51 


1901,  and  even  in  the  presence  of  the  Maine  in  Havana 
harbor  at  the  time  of  her  destruction.  Such  action  does  not, 
however,  include  any  right  of  active  participation  upon 
either  side  of  an  existing  conflict.  It  is  only  a protective 
measure  though  it  may  lead  to  more  direct  action. 

The  eminent  French  statesman,  M.  Guizot,  advanced 
the  opinion  that  only  in  the  case  of  extreme  need  of  self- 
preservation  is  there  justification  in  international  morals  for 
an  armed  intervention.  Wheaton,  in  his  “Elements  of  In- 
ternational Law,”  defines  the  recognition  of  belligerent 
rights  by  saying: 

“It  is  certain  that  the  state  of  things  between  the  parent  state 
and  insurgents  must  amount  in  fact  to  a war  in  the  sense  of  inter- 
national law  — that  is,  powers  and  rights  of  war  must  be  in  actual 
exercise  — otherwise  the  recognition  is  falsified,  for  the  recognition 
is  a fact.  The  tests  to  determine  the  question  are  various. 

Among  the  tests  are  the  existence  of  a de  facto  political  organization 
of  the  insurgents,  sufficient  in  character,  population,  and  resources, 
to  constitute  it,  if  left  to  itself,  a State  among  the  nations,  reasonably 
capable  of  discharging  the  duties  of  a State;  the  actual  employment 
of  military  forces  on  each  side,  acting  in  accordance  with  the  rules 
and  customs  of  war,  such  as  the  use  of  flags  of  truce,  cartels,  ex- 
change of  prisoners,  and  the  treatment  of  captured  insurgents  by 
the  parent  State  as  prisoners  of  war.” 

Wheaton  also  says: 

“Until  the  revolution  is  consummated,  whilst  the  civil  war 
involving  a contest  for  the  government  continues,  other  States  may 
remain  indifferent  spectators  of  the  controversy,  still  continuing  to 
treat  the  ancient  government  as  sovereign,  and  the  government 
de  facto  as  a society  entitled  to  the  rights  of  war  against  its  enemy; 
or  may  espouse  the  cause  of  the  party  which  they  believe  to  have 
justice  on  its  side.  In  the  first  case,  the  foreign  Stule  fulfils  all  its 


52 


AMERICA  S PAST  ATTITUDE 


obligations  under  the  law  of  nations;  and  neither  party  has  any 
right  to  complain,  provided  it  maintains  an  impartial  neutrality. 
In  the  latter,  it  becomes,  of  course,  the  enemy  of  the  party  against 
whom  it  declares  itself,  and  the  ally  of  the  other;  and  as  the  pristine 
law  of  nations  makes  no  distinction  in  this  respect  between  a just 
and  an  unjust  war,  the  intervening  State  becomes  entitled  to  all  the 
rights  of  war  against  the  opposite  party.” 

Vattel  declares  it  permissible  to  succor  a people  oppressed 
by  its  sovereign.  He  says  (Book  II,  Chap.  IV,  p.  157) ; “ As 
to  those  monsters  who,  under  the  title  of  sovereigns,  render 
themselves  the  scourges  and  the  horror  of  the  human  race, 
they  are  savage  beasts  whom  every  brave  man  may  justly 
exterminate  from  the  face  of  the  earth.”  Wheaton,  Blunt- 
schli,  and  Mamiani,  all  concede  the  right  of  other  nations 
to  aid  an  oppressed  race. 

In  his  message  of  April,  1898,  Mr.  McKinley  took  a 
broader  and  probably  more  rational  ground.  He  justifies 
American  intervention  in  Cuba  upon  the  following  grounds: 

“First.  In  the  cause  of  humanity  and  to  put  an  end  to  the 
barbarities,  bloodshed,  starvation,  and  horrible  miseries  now  exist- 
ing there,  and  which  the  parties  to  the  conflict  are  either  unable 
or  unwilling  to  stop  or  mitigate.  It  is  no  answer  to  say  this  is  all 
in  another  country,  belonging  to  another  nation,  and  is  therefore 
none  of  our  business.  It  is  specially  our  duty,  for  it  is  right  at  our 
door. 

“Second.  We  owe  it  to  our  citizens  in  Cuba  to  afford  them 
that  protection  and  indemnity  for  life  and  property  which  no 
government  there  can  or  will  afford,  and  to  that  end  to  terminate 
the  conditions  that  deprive  them  of  legal  protection. 

“ Third.  The  right  to  intervene  may  be  justified  by  the  very 
serious  injury  to  the  commerce,  trade,  and  business  of  our  people, 
and  by  the  wanton  destruction  of  property  and  devastation  of  the 
Island. 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


53 


“ Fourth,  — and  which  is  of  the  utmost  importance.  The 
present  condition  of  affairs  in  Cuba  is  a constant  menace  to  our 
peace,  and  entails  upon  this  Government  an  enormous  expense. 
With  such  a conflict  waged  for  years  in  an  island  so  near  us  and 
with  which  our  people  have  such  trade  and  business  relations, 
when  the  lives  and  liberty  of  our  citizens  are  in  constant  danger 
and  their  property  destroyed  and  themselves  ruined  — where  our 
trading  vessels  are  liable  to  seizure  and  are  seized  at  our  very  door 
by  war  ships  of  a foreign  nation,  the  expeditions  of  filibustering 
that  we  are  powerless  to  prevent  altogether,  and  the  irritating 
questions  and  entanglements  thus  arising  — all  these  and  others 
that  I need  not  mention,  with  the  resulting  strained  relations,  are 
a constant  menace  to  our  peace,  and  compel  us  to  keep  on  a semi- 
war footing  with  a nation  with  which  we  are  at  peace. 

In  view  of  these  facts  and  of  these  considerations,  I ask  the  Con- 
gress to  authorize  and  empower  the  President  to  take  measures 
to  secure  a full  and  final  termination  of  hostilities  between  the 
Government  of  Spain  and  the  people  of  Cuba,  and  to  secure  in  the 
Island  the  establishment  of  a stable  government,  capable  of  main- 
taining order  and  observing  its  international  obligations,  insuring 
peace  and  tranquillity  and  the  security  of  its  citizens  as  well  as 
our  own,  and  to  use  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  as  may  be  necessary  for  these  purposes.” 

It  is  of  important  interest  to  note,  at  this  point,  the  fact 
that  this  message  makes  no  mention  of  Cuban  indepen- 
dence. Three  issues  were  possible  — reform  of  the  Spanish 
system  of  government  and  the  establishment  of  autonomy 
in  the  Island;  Cuban  independence;  or  annexation  to  the 
United  States.  No  one  of  these  was  considered.  The 
primary  ground  of  American  intervention  was  the  conser- 
vation and  protection  of  American  interests.  The  United 
States  had  declined  to  recognize  the  government  established 
by  the  insurgents,  and  had  wuived  definite  action  upon 


54 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


their  claim  to  recognition  as  belligerents.  Her  services  as 
mediator  had  been  duly  tendered  to  the  Government  at 
Madrid,  through  diplomatic  channels. 

This  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  was  en- 
tirely consistent  with  the  history  of  her  past  relations  with 
the  Island  of  Cuba.  For  nearly  a century  the  United  States 
had  realized  the  possibility  of  a time  when  her  active  inter- 
ference in  Cuban  affairs  might  become  a necessity  for  the 
defence  and  protection  of  American  interests,  both  in  the 
Island  and  at  home.  Two  features  were  prominent.  One 
was  the  ever-recurring  possibility  that  the  Island  of  Cuba 
might  pass  under  the  control  of  some  other  power  than 
that  of  Spain;  the  other,  the  importance  of  Cuba  in  its 
various  relations  to  the  United  States. 

Yet  the  existence  of  European  colonies  on  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic  was  a fact  which  could  never  be  ignored.  In  1803, 
Louisiana,  which  had  passed  from  Spanish  into  French 
possession,  was  purchased  from  France.  In  1808,  Thomas 
Jefferson  deprecated  the  transfer  of  Cuba  from  Spanish 
possession  to  that  of  any  other  country.  A year  later,  he 
considered  the  possibility  of  American  acquisition  of  Cuba. 
For  many  years,  England’s  possible  acquisition  of  territory 
in  the  West  Indies  was  an  active  feature  in  American  diplo- 
matic relations.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  anticipated 
by  President  Madison’s  message  to  Congress  on  Jan.  3, 
1811,  in  which  he  said  that  “the  United  States  could  not  see 
without  serious  inquietude  any  part  of  a neighboring  terri- 
tory in  which  they  have  in  different  respects  so  deep  and  so 
just  a concern  pass  from  the  hands  of  Spain  into  those  of 
any  other  foreign  power.” 

It  was  the  question  of  Cuba’s  future  which  led,  almost 
directly,  to  the  enunciation  of  that  Monroe  Doctrine  of 
1823,  which,  though  an  unwritten  law,  has  stood  and  still 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


55 


stands  as  the  dominant  force  in  America’s  attitude  toward 
her  tropical  and  sub-tropical  neighbors.  The  earlier  half 
of  the  last  century  is  notably  replete  w ith  diplomatic  nego- 
tiation and  with  expression  of  America’s  attitude  toward 
her  Island  neighbor.  At  the  time  of  the  effecting  of  the 
Spanish-American  treaty  of  1795,  Spain  sought  to  draw 
the  United  States,  with  France,  then  in  possession  of  Louisi- 
ana, into  a compact  guaranteeing  to  Spain  her  continued 
possession  of  her  West  Indian  colonies.  This  was  declined 
upon  the  ground  that  the  United  States  desired  to  avoid 
the  entanglement  of  its  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of 
European  politics.  The  Latin-American  disturbances  of 
the  Monroe  period  elicited  an  enunciation  of  the  views  held 
at  that  time.  President  Monroe’s  attitude  is  expressed  in 
that  “Doctrine”  which  bears  his  name.  On  April  23, 
1823,  John  Quincy  Adams,  then  Secretary  of  State,  wrote 
to  Mr.  Nelson,  Minister  to  Spain: 

“These  islands  (Cuba  and  Porto  Rico),  from  their  local  position, 
are  natural  appendages  to  the  North  American  continent,  and  one 
of  them,  Cuba,  almost  in  sight  of  our  shores,  from  a multitude  of 
considerations,  has  become  an  object  of  transcendent  importance  to 
the  commercial  and  political  interests  of  our  Union.  Its  command- 
ing position,  with  reference  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  West 
India  seas;  the  character  of  its  population;  its  situation  midway 
between  our  southern  coast  and  the  Island  of  St.  Domingo;  its  safe 
and  capacious  harbor  of  Havana,  fronting  a long  line  of  our  shores 
destitute  of  the  same  advantage;  the  nature  of  its  productions  and 
its  wants,  furnishing  the  supplies  and  needing  the  returns  of  a 
commerce  immensely  profitable  and  mutually  beneficial  — give  it 
an  importance  in  the  sum  of  our  national  interests  with  which  that 
of  no  other  foreign  territory  can  be  compared,  and  little  inferior  to 
that  which  binds  the  different  members  of  this  Union  together. 
Such,  indeed,  are,  between  the  interests  of  that  Island  and  this 


56 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


country,  the  geographical,  commercial,  moral,  and  political  rela- 
tions, formed  by  nature,  gathering,  in  the  process  of  time,  and  even 
now  verging  to  maturity,  that,  in  looking  forward  to  the  probable 
course  of  events,  for  the  short  period  of  half  a century,  it  is  scarcely 
possible  to  resist  the  conviction  that  the  annexation  of  Cuba  to  our 
Federal  Republic  will  be  indispensable  to  the  continuance  and 
integrity  of  the  Union  itself.” 

In  the  same  year,  Thomas  Jefferson  wrote: 

“I  have  ever  looked  on  Cuba  as  the  most  interesting  addition 
which  could  ever  be  made  to  our  system  of  States.  The  control 
which,  with  Florida  Point,  this  Island  would  give  us  over  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  and  the  countries  and  isthmus  bordering  on  it,  would 
fill  up  the  measure  of  our  political  well-being.  Her  addition  to  our 
confederacy  is  exactly  what  is  wanting  to  advance  our  power  as  a 
nation  to  the  point  of  its  utmost  interest.” 

As  Secretary  of  State,  Henry  Clay  wrote,  in  1825: 

“ If  the  war  should  continue  between  Spain  and  the  new  republics 
(of  South  America),  and  those  islands  (Cuba  and  Porto  Rico)  should 
become  the  object  and  theatre  of  it,  their  fortunes  have  such  a con- 
nection with  the  prosperity  of  the  United  States  that  they  could  not 
be  indifferent  spectators;  and  the  possible  contingencies  of  such  a 
protracted  war  might  bring  upon  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  duties  and  obligations  the  performance  of  which,  however 
painful  it  should  be,  they  might  not  be  at  liberty  to  decline.” 

In  1829,  Mr.  Van  Buren,  as  Secretary  of  State,  wrote  to 
Mr.  Van  Ness,  the  American  Minister  to  Spain: 

“The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  always  looked  with 
the  deepest  interest  upon  the  fate  of  those  islands,  but  particularly 
of  Cuba.  Its  geographical  position,  which  places  it  almost  in  sight 
of  our  southern  shores,  and,  as  it  were,  gives  it  the  command  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  West  India  seas,  its  safe  and  capacious 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


57 


harbors,  its  rich  productions,  the  exchange  of  which,  for  our  surplus 
agricultural  products  and  manufactures,  constitutes  it  one  of  the 
most  extensive  and  valuable  branches  of  our  foreign  trade,  render 
it  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  United  States  that  no  change 
should  take  place  in  its  condition  which  might  injuriously  affect 
our  political  and  commercial  standing  in  that  quarter.” 

In  1837,  Mr.  Stevenson,  the  American  Minister  to  Eng- 
land, reported  an  interview  with  Lord  Palmerston,  in  the 
following  terms: 

“I  proceeded  to  give  a brief  explanation  of  the  geographical 
relation  of  these  islands  (Cuba  and  Porto  Rico)  to  the  United  States, 
and  the  consequences  that  would  be  likely  to  follow  their  separation 
from  the  dominion  of  Spain.  That  the  possession  of  Cuba  by  a 
great  maritime  power  would  be  little  else  than  the  establishment  of 
a fortress  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  commanding  both  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  and  Florida,  and,  consequently,  the  whole  trade  of 
the  Western  States,  besides  deeply  affecting  the  interests  and  tran- 
quillity of  the  southern  portion  of  the  Union.  That,  under  such 
circumstances,  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  United  States 
could  remain  indifferent  to  the  destiny  of  Cuba,  or  its  separation 
from  Spain.  ...  I felt  justified  in  saying  frankly  to  his  lordship 
that  it  was  impossible  that  the  United  States  should  acquiesce  in 
the  transfer  of  Cuba  from  the  dominion  of  Spain  to  any  of  the  great 
maritime  powers  of  Europe;  that  of  the  right  of  the  United  States 
to  interfere  in  relation  to  these  islands,  I presumed  there  could  be 
little  doubt;  that  whilst  the  general  rule  of  international  law  which 
forbids  the  interference  of  one  State  in  the  affairs  of  another  was 
fully  admitted,  there  were  yet  exceptions  to  the  rule,  in  relation  to 
the  laws  of  defence  and  self-preservation,  which  all  nations  acknowl- 
edged, and  that  the  present  was  precisely  such  a case.” 

In  1840,  Secretary  of  State  Forysth  wrote  to  Mr.  Vail, 
representing  the  United  States  in  Madrid; 

“The  United  States  have  long  looked  with  no  slight  degree  of 


58 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


solicitude  to  the  political  condition  of  the  Island  of  Cuba.  Its 
proximity  to  our  shores,  the  extent  of  its  commerce  with  us,  and  the 
similarity  of  its  domestic  institutions  with  those  prevailing  in  por- 
tions of  our  own  country,  combine  to  forbid  that  we  should  look 
with  indifference  upon  any  occurrences  connected  with  the  fate  of 
that  Island.  . . . Should  you  have  any  reason  to  suspect  any  design 
on  the  part  of  Spain  to  transfer  voluntarily  her  title  to  the  Island, 
whether  of  ownership  or  possession,  and  whether  permanent  or 
temporary,  to  Great  Britain  or  any  other  power,  you  will  distinctly 
state  that  the  United  States  will  prevent  it  at  all  hazards,  as  they 
will  any  foreign  military  occupation  for  any  pretext  whatever.” 

Upon  the  basis  of  prevalent  rumors  that  British  influences 
were  at  work  to  convert  Cuba  into  a “black  military  re- 
public” under  British  protection,  Daniel  Webster,  as  Secre- 
tary of  State,  wrote  to  Mr.  Robert  B.  Campbell,  United 
States  Consul  at  Havana,  under  date  of  Jan.  14,  1843: 

“The  Spanish  Government  has  long  been  in  possession  of  the 
policy  and  wishes  of  this  Government  in  regard  to  Cuba,  which  have 
never  changed,  and  has  been  repeatedly  told  that  the  United  States 
never  would  permit  the  occupation  of  that  Island  by  British  agents 
or  forces  upon  any  pretext  whatsoever;  and  that  in  the  event  of  any 
attempt  to  wrest  it  from  her,  she  might  securely  rely  upon  the  whole 
naval  and  military  resources  of  this  country,  to  aid  her  in  preserving 
or  recovering  it.” 

On  June  17,  1848,  James  Buchanan,  Secretary  of  State, 
wrote  to  Mr.  R.  M.  Saunders,  the  American  representative 
at  Madrid,  a letter  of  considerable  length  and  of  similar 
tenor  to  the  foregoing.  The  following  extracts  are  of  special 
pertinence: 

“In  the  possession  of  Great  Britain,  or  any  strong  naval  power, 
it  (Cuba)  might  prove  ruinous  both  to  our  domestic  and  foreign 
commerce,  and  even  endanger  the  Union  of  the  States.  The 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


59 


highest  and  first  duty  of  every  independent  nation  is  to  provide  for 
its  own  safety;  and,  acting  upon  this  principle,  we  should  be  com- 
pelled to  resist  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  by  any  powerful  maritime 
State,  with  all  the  means  which  Providence  has  placed  at  our 
command.” 

“ If  Cuba  were  annexed  to  the  United  States,  we  should  not  only 
feel  relieved  from  the  apprehensions  which  we  can  never  cease  to 
feel  for  our  own  safety  and  the  security  of  our  commerce,  whilst  it 
shall  remain  in  its  present  condition,  but  human  foresight  cannot 
anticipate  the  beneficial  consequences  which  would  result  to  every 
portion  of  our  Union.”  “Under  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  Cuba  would  become  the  richest  and  most  fertile  island,  of 
the  same  extent,  throughout  the  world.”  “Desirable,  however,  as 
the  possession  of  this  Island  may  be  to  the  United  States,  we  could 
not  acquire  it  except  by  the  free  will  of  Spain.  Any  acquisition  not 
sanctioned  by  justice  and  honor,  would  be  too  dearly  purchased.” 

In  a letter  dated  Dee.  1,  1852,  Edward  Everett,  Secretary 
of  State,  wrote  to  the  Comte  de  Sartiges,  officially: 

“The  opinions  of  American  statesmen,  at  different  times,  and 
under  varying  circumstances,  have  differed  as  to  the  desirableness 
of  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  by  the  United  States.  Territorially  and 
commercially  it  would,  in  our  hands,  be  an  extremely  valuable 
possession.  Under  certain  contingencies  it  might  be  almost  essen- 
tial to  our  safety.  Still,  for  domestic  reasons,  on  which,  in  a com- 
munication of  this  kind,  it  might  not  be  proper  to  dwell,  the  President 
thinks  that  the  ineorporation  of  the  Island  into  the  Union  at  the 
present  time,  although  effected  with  the  consent  of  Spain,  would  be 
a hazardous  measure;  and  he  would  consider  its  acquisition  by  force, 
except  in  a just  war  with  Spain  (should  an  event  so  greatly  to  be 
deprecated  take  place),  as  a disgrace  to  the  civilization  of  the  age.” 

In  1854,  strained  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain  grew  out  of  the  detention  of  the  American  steamer 
Black  Warrior  in  the  harbor  of  Havana,  and  the  search 


60 


AMERICA  S PAST  ATTITUDE 


of  several  American  vessels  by  Spanish  cruisers.  This 
incident  was  perhaps  the  immediate  cause  of  that  which 
is  historically  known  as  the  Ostend  Manifesto.  This  in- 
cident is  reported  as  follows,  in  Lawrence’s  Wheaton: 

“In  the  summer  of  1854  a conference  was  held  by  the  ministers 
of  the  United  States  accredited  at  London,  Paris,  and  Madrid, 
with  a view  to  consult  on  the  negotiations  which  it  might  be  advis- 
able to  carry  on  simultaneously  at  these  several  courts  for  the  satis- 
factory adjustment  with  Spain  of  the  affairs  connected  with  Cuba. 
The  joint  despatch  of  Messrs.  Buchanan,  Mason,  and  Soule  to  the 
Secretary  of  State,  dated  Aix-la-Chapelle,  Oct.  18,  1854,  after  re- 
marking that  the  United  States  had  never  acquired  a foot  of  terri- 
tory, not  even  after  a successful  war  with  Mexico,  except  by  pur- 
chase or  by  the  voluntary  application  of  the  people,  as  in  the  case 
of  Texas,  thus  proceeds:  “Our  past  history  forbids  that  we  should 
acquire  the  Island  of  Cuba  without  the  consent  of  Spain,  unless 
justified  by  the  great  law  of  self-preservation.  We  must,  in  any 
event,  preserve  our  own  conscious  rectitude  and  our  self-respect. 
While  pursuing  this  course,  we  can  afford  to  disregard  the  censures 
of  the  world,  to  which  we  have  been  so  often  and  so  unjustly  ex- 
posed. After  we  shall  have  offered  Spain  a price  for  Cuba  far  be- 
yond its  present  value,  and  this  shall  have  been  refused,  it  will 
then  be  time  to  consider  the  question  — Does  Cuba,  in  the  pos- 
session of  Spain,  seriously  endanger  our  internal  peace  and  the 
existence  of  our  cherished  Union  ? Should  this  question  be  an- 
swered in  the  affirmative,  then  by  every  law,  human  and  divine, 
we  shall  be  justified  in  wresting  it  from  Spain,  if  we  possess  the 
power;  and  this  upon  the  very  same  principle  that  would  justify 
an  individual  in  tearing  down  the  burning  house  of  his  neighbor 
if  there  were  no  other  means  of  preventing  the  flames  from  de- 
stroying his  own  home.  Under  such  circumstances,  we  ought 
neither  to  count  the  cost  nor  regard  the  odds  which  Spain  might 
enlist  against  us.  We  forbear  to  enter  into  the  question  whether 
the  present  condition  of  the  Island  would  justify  such  a measure.” 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


61 


In  1859,  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the 
United  States  Senate  took  favorable  action  upon  a bill  whose 
purpose  was  “To  facilitate  the  acquisition  of  the  Island  of 
Cuba.”  The  bill  contained  the  following  expression: 

“The  ultimate  acquisition  of  Cuba  may  be  considered  a fixed 
purpose  of  the  United  States  — a purpose  resulting  from  political 
and  geographical  necessities,  which  have  been  recognized  by  all 
parties  and  all  administrations,  and  in  regard  to  which  the  popular 
will  has  been  expressed  with  a unanimity  unsurpassed  on  any 
question  of  national  policy  that  has  heretofore  engaged  the  public 
mind.” 

When  President  Grant  wrote  his  annual  message  in  1875, 
a Cuban  insurrection  had  lasted  for  seven  years.  The  re- 
volt led  to  many  complications  and  a vast  amount  of  diplo- 
matic correspondence  and  attempted  negotiation.  In  that 
message,  General  Grant  called  attention  to  the  situation 
in  Cuba,  and  said: 

“The  absence  of  any  reasonable  assurance  of  a near  termination 
of  the  conflict  must,  of  necessity,  soon  compel  the  States  thus  suffer- 
ing to  consider  what  the  interests  of  their  own  people  and  their  duty 
toward  themselves  may  demand.  ...  A recognition  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  Cuba  being,  in  my  judgment,  impracticable  and 
indefensible,  the  question  which  next  presents  itself  is  that  of  the 
recognition  of  belligerent  rights  in  the  parties  to  the  contest.  . . . 
Considered  as  a question  of  expediency,  I regard  the  accordance  of 
belligerent  rights  still  to  be  unwise  and  premature  at  present, 
indefensible  as  a measure  of  right.  . . . Had  it  been  the  desire  of 
the  United  States  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba,  repeated  oppor- 
tunities for  so  doing  have  been  presented  within  the  last  few  years; 
but  we  have  remained  passive  and  have  performed  our  whole  duty 
and  all  international  obligations  to  Spain  with  friendship,  fairness, 
and  fidelity,  and  with  a spirit  of  patience  and  forbearance  which 


62 


AMERICA’S.  PAST  ATTITUDE 


negatives  every  possible  suggestion  of  desire  to  interfere  or  to  add 
to  the  difficulties  with  which  she  has  been  surrounded.” 

In  January,  1896,  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  submitted  majority  and  minority  reports  with 
reference  to  the  war  in  Cuba.  The  majority  report,  in  which 
the  House  concurred,  proposed  the  tender  of  the  friendly 
offices  of  the  United  States  to  request  Spain  to  accord  bel- 
ligerent rights  to  her  Cuban  opponents.  The  miiymty 
report  proposed  that  the  President  interpose  his  friendly 
offices  with  the  Spanish  Government  for  the  recognition 
of  the  independence  of  Cuba.  On  February  5,  a substitute 
was  reported  in  the  place  of  this  majority  report.  It  pro- 
posed that  the  United  States  should  accord  to  Cuba,  as  well 
as  to  Spain,  the  rights  of  belligerents.  In  this  the  House 
also  concurred.  During  March,  a communication,  of  un- 
doubted authenticity,  was  transmitted  to  Secretary  of  State 
Olney,  by  T.  Estrada  Palma,  then  the  agent  in  this  country 
for  the  Republic  of  Cuba.  This  document  carried  the 
following  heading: 

Republic  of  Cuba,  Executive  Headquarters, 

Cubitas  Mountain,  Feb.  1,  1896. 

It  was  addressed 

To  the  American  People: 

It  announced  the  firm  establishment  of  an  organized 
government  and  asked  from  the  United  States  the  recog- 
nition of  belligerent  rights. 

In  his  message  of  December,  1896,  President  Cleveland, 
among  much  else  regarding  Cuba,  said: 

“I  have  deemed  it  not  amiss  to  remind  the  Congress  that  a time 
may  well  arrive  when  a correct  policy  and  care  for  our  interests,  as 
well  as  a regard  for  the  interests  of  other  nations  and  their  citizens, 


AMERICA'S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


63 


joined  by  considerations  of  humanity  and  a desire  to  see  a rich  and 
fertile  country  intimately  related  to  us  saved  from  complete  devas- 
tation, will  constrain  our  Government  to  such  action  as  will  subserve 
the  interests  thus  involved,  and  at  the  same  time  promise  to  Cuba 
and  its  inhabitants  an  opportunity  to  enjoy  the  blessings  of  peace.” 

The  platform  of  the  Republican  party,  adopted  at  St.  Louis, 
on  June  18,  1896,  contains  the  following  declaration: 

“The  Government  of  Spain  having  lost  control  of  Cuba,  and 
being  unable  to  protect  the  property  or  lives  of  resident  American 
citizens,  or  to  comply  with  its  treaty  obligations,  we  believe  that  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  should  actively  use  its  influence 
and  good  offices  to  restore  peace  and  give  independence  to  the 
Island.” 

Within  two  years  there  were  referred  to  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  the  following  Senate  resolutions: 

Joint  Resolution  No.  2,  authorizing  and  requesting  the 
President  to  issue  a proclamation  recognizing  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Republic  of  Cuba. 

Senate  Resolution  No.  40,  instructing  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  to  inquire  what  obligations  the  United 
States  have  assumed  toward  the  people  of  Cuba  by  refusing 
to  allow  the  Island  to  pass  into  other  hands  than  those  of 
Spain. 

Senate  Resolution  No.  185,  declaring  the  sense  of  the 
Senate  that  Congress  should  duly  and  promptly  recognize 
the  independence  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba. 

Joint  Resolution  No.  133,  recognizing  Cuban  independence 
and  declaring  war  against  Spain. 

Joint  Resolution  No.  134,  recognizing  Cuban  indepen- 
dence and  providing  for  intervention  by  the  United  States. 

Joint  Resolution  No.  135,  directing  and  empowering  the 


64 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


President,  in  his  discretion,  to  intervene  for  the  termination 
of  hostilities  and  the  establishment  of  Cuban  independence. 

Joint  Resolution  No.  142,  for  the  recognition  of  the  in- 
dependence of  the  Republic  of  Cuba. 

Joint  Resolution  No.  145,  authorizing  the  President  to 
take  such  steps  as  are  necessary  to  put  an  end  to  hostilities 
in  Cuba  and  to  establish  a republican  form  of  government. 

These  formed  the  subject  of  frequent  and  prolonged 
debate,  but  no  definite  action  was  taken  upon  any  of  them. 

In  his  message  of  December,  1897,  President  McKinley 
said: 

“Of  the  untried  measures  (regarding  Cuba)  there  remain  only: 
Recognition  of  the  insurgents  as  belligerents;  recognition  of  the 
independence  of  Cuba;  neutral  intervention  to  end  the  war  by 
imposing  a rational  compromise  between  the  contestants,  and  inter- 
vention in  favor  of  one  or  the  other  party.  I speak  not  of  forcible 
annexation,  for  that  cannot  be  thought  of.  That,  by  our  code  of 
morality,  would  be  criminal  aggression.” 

These  extracts  form  only  a small  fraction  of  the  mass  of 
correspondence,  reports,  and  other  utterances  dealing  with 
the  subject  of  Cuba  during  the  past  century.  The  diplo- 
matic negotiations  at  different  times  within  that  period, 
called  out  by  special  incidents,  form  volumes  in  themselves. 
The  trend  of  all  our  relations  with  Spain  for  a hundred 
years,  notwithstanding  frequent  provocation  and  proposal 
to  act  otherwise,  was  toward  non-interference  with  her 
affairs  in  Cuba  except  in  the  case  of  some  dire  emergency. 
The  beginning  of  1898  showed  that  unless  a change  came 
speedily,  American  intervention  would  become  little  short 
of  imperative. 

Recognition  of  the  Cubans  as  belligerents,  by  the  United 
States,  would  have  effected  a radical  change  in  the  whole 


AMERICA’S  PAST  ATTITUDE 


65 


situation.  It  would  have  given  the  Cubans  equal  rights 
and  privileges  in  the  American  market  for  arms  and  sup- 
plies, and  the  same  privileges  in  American  ports  and  upon 
the  high  seas,  as  those  possessed  by  Spain.  Naturally, 
it  would  have  strengthened  greatly  the  position  of  the  in- 
surgents, and  that  in  itself  would,  in  all  probability,  have 
been  regarded  by  the  Spanish  Government  as  an  unfriendly 
act.  Yet,  under  all  established  laws  and  precedents,  the 
claim  to  belligerency  and  the  recognition  of  belligerent 
rights  rest  upon  the  establishment  of  certain  facts.  Grant- 
ing the  existence  of  certain  definite  conditions,  the  claim 
is  warranted  and  the  recognition  justified  if  not  actually 
demanded.  Those  conditions  did  exist  in  Cuba  at  this 
time.  The  American  refusal  to  recognize  those  conditions 
and  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  facts,  turned  not  upon  the 
recognized  law  governing  such  cases,  but  upon  a question 
of  domestic  politics  and  expediency.  The  arguments  ad- 
vanced by  the  American  authorities  in  support  of  their 
position  were  answered  and  refuted,  categorically,  in  an 
able  reply  submitted  by  Horatio  S.  Rubens,  Esq.,  the  coun- 
sel of  the  Cuban  Junta  in  New  York.  This  reply  has  re- 
ceived legal  recognition,  and  is  to  be  found  as  a document  of 
reference  in  law  libraries,  including  that  of  the  Bar  Asso- 
ciation of  New  York.  A review  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
period  clearly  indicates  that,  had  it  suited  the  purposes  of 
the  United  States,  very  much  the  same  arguments  would 
have  been  used  to  support  a recognition  of  Cuban  belligerent 
rights  as  those  which  were  used  to  support  denial  of  those 
rights, 


Chapter  V 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 

I do  not  deem  it  important  to  this  work  to  review  the 
story  of  the  ill-fated  Maine , or  to  analyze  the  influence  of 
that  disaster  upon  the  events  which  followed.  All  is  still 
fresh  in  the  public  mind,  and  full  details,  too  long  for  in- 
clusion here,  are  readily  obtainable  through  other  channels. 
The  sympathies  of  the  American  people  had  long  been  ex- 
tended to  the  people  of  Cuba.  Some  feeling  of  animosity 
toward  Spain,  who  was  regarded  as  the  oppressor  of  our 
Island  neighbor,  was  inevitable.  This  was  only  accen- 
tuated by  the  disaster  to  an  American  ship  of  war,  whose 
destruction  was  generally  charged  to  Spaniards  if  not  to 
Spain.  The  wrecked  vessel  still  lies  (1904)  in  the  mud  and 
slime  of  the  harbor  of  Havana,  and  the  years  have  revealed 
no  new  facts  regarding  the  cause  of  her  destruction. 

Although  a goodly  number  of  the  American  people  have 
withheld  their  judgment  upon  so  important  a question 
until  some  more  conclusive  proof  of  Spanish  action  in  the 
matter  might  be  made  available,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
popular  sentiment  was  expressed  in  that  report  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  which  concludes  with  the  terms 
of  the  Joint  Resolution  of  April  20,  1898.  That  report 
says: 

“The  event  in  itself,  though  in  a certain  sense  a distinct  occur- 
rence, was  linked  with  a series  of  precedent  transactions  which 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


67 


cannot  in  reason  be  disconnected  from  it.  It  was  the  catastrophe 
of  a unity  of  events  extending  over  more  than  three  years  of  momen- 
tous history.  . . . Considered,  as  it  must  be,  with  the  events  with 
which  reason  and  common  sense  must  connect  it,  and  with  animus 
by  Spain  so  plainly  apparent  that  no  one  can  even  plausibly  deny 
its  existence,  it  is  merely  one  reason  for  the  conclusion  to  which  the 
investigating  mind  must  come  in  considering  the  entire  subject  of 
the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  that  government.  ...  It  is 
the  opinion  of  your  committee,  having  considered  the  testimony 
submitted  to  the  board  of  inquiry,  in  connection  with  further  testi- 
mony taken  by  the  committee  and  with  the  relevant  and  established 
facts  presented  by  the  events  of  the  last  three  years,  that  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Maine  was  compassed  either  by  the  official  acts  of  the 
Spanish  authorities,  or  was  made  possible  by  a negligence  on  their 
part  so  willing  and  gross  as  to  be  equivalent  in  culpability  to 
positive  criminal  action.” 

Be  the  facts  what  they  may,  this  was  unquestionably  the 
attitude  and  the  sentiment  of  a great  mass  of  the  American 
people  during  the  weeks  which  succeeded  the  explosion  in 
the  harbor  of  Havana.  A sensational  press,  and  equally 
sensational  members  of  Congress,  clamored  for  immediate 
war.  This  sentiment  was  resisted  by  President  McKinley 
with  all  the  force  of  his  high  position.  Washington  and 
Madrid  were  engaged  in  an  active  diplomatic  correspond- 
ence, and  there  is  now  no  doubt  that  Spain  was  disposed 
to  yield  the  ground  upon  which  she  had  stood  for  so  long  a 
time.  President  McKinley  sought  to  secure  an  armistice 
during  which  terms  of  honorable  peace  might  be  effected. 

A conference  at  the  White  House  resulted  in  the  sub- 
mission, on  March  27,  of  the  following  demand  upon  Spain: 

(a)  An  armistice  until  October  1,  during  which  negotia- 
tions looking  toward  a permanent  peace  should  be  under- 
taken. 


68 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


( b ) The  immediate  revocation  of  the  order  of  reconcen- 
tration, and  relief  measures  for  those  in  the  camps. 

(c)  If  possible,  if  terms  of  peace  not  satisfactorily  settled 
by  October  1,  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  be  the 
final  arbiter  between  Spain  and  the  insurgents. 

These  terms  were  cabled  to  Hon.  Stewart  L.  Woodford, 
then  American  Minister  to  Spain,  for  submission  to  the 
Spanish  authorities.  It  is  of  interest  and  importance  to 
note  that  this  communication  contained  no  reference  to 
Cuban  independence.  Nor  does  it  appear  that  at  any 
time  during  the  negotiations  of  that  period,  the  United 
States  officially  demanded  from  Spain  the  independence 
of  Cuba.  The  statement  of  the  Joint  Resolution,  that 
“ Cuba  is  and  of  right  ought  to  be  free  and  independent  ” 
is  the  assertion  of  a fact,  and  not  an  official  demand  that 
Spain  establish  the  fact. 

To  the  American  proposition  of  March  27,  Spain  sub- 
mitted a counter-proposition,  as  follows,  on  March  31: 

(a)  Arbitration  concerning  the  Maine. 

( b ) Revocation  of  the  order  of  reconcentration,  and  per- 
mission to  the  United  States  to  relieve  the  needs  of  the 
sufferers. 

(c)  Preparation  for  honorable  and  stable  peace  through 
the  insular  parliament,  “it  being  understood  that  the  powers 
reserved  by  the  constitution  to  the  central  government  are 
not  lessened  and  diminished.” 

(i d ) No  truce  until  after  the  meeting  of  the  Cuban  Cham- 
bers on  May  4. 

These  proposals  were  unacceptable  to  the  authorities  in 
Washington.  On  April  9,  General  Woodford  cabled  to 
Mr.  Day,  Secretary  of  State,  that  at  the  request  of  the  Pope 
and  six  of  the  leading  nations  of  Europe,  an  armistice  had 
been  proclaimed  in  Cuba.  On  the  tenth,  the  administra- 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


69 


tion  received  a communication  from  the  Spanish  Minister 
which  was  virtually  a reply  to  the  American  proposals  of 
March  27.  In  brief,  the  reply  was  as  follows: 

(a)  Armistice  proclaimed,  and  in  fixing  the  terms  of  it 
the  general-in-chief  is  disposed  to  concede  all  possible 
facilities. 

( b ) Decree  of  reconcentration  repealed,  and  aid  of  all 
kinds  granted  and  permitted  to  be  given  to  the  reconcen- 
trados. 

(c)  The  responsibility  for  the  destruction  of  the  Maine 
to  be  submitted  to  the  decision  of  impartial  and  disinterested 
experts,  Spain  agreeing  to  be  bound  by  their  decision. 

(d)  The  same  full  and  generous  measure  of  self-govern- 
ment to  be  accorded  Cuba  as  Canada  enjoys. 

On  April  11,  President  McKinley  submitted  his  historic 
message  to  Congress.  In  it  he  refers  to  the  communication 
of  March  27,  and  to  the  unsatisfactory  reply  received  on 
March  31.  At  the  close  of  the  message,  he  alludes  briefly 
to  the  later  communication  from  Spain,  that  of  April  10, 
in  a few  lines  added  to  the  document  just  before  its  sub- 
mission. It  has  been  charged  that  the  Spanish  communi- 
cation was  suppressed.  No  foundation  appears  for  such  a 
charge.  It  is,  however,  a fact  that  little  or  no  attention  was 
paid  to  the  concessions  then  made  by  Spain,  although  in 
the  judgment  of  many,  they  have  been  deemed  a sufficient 
basis  for  an  avoidance  of  the  war  which  followed.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  American  authorities  had  already  decided 
for  war.  In  the  tense  excitement  of  the  time,  the  force 
of  the  Spanish  concessions  was  overlooked  and  disregarded. 
Spain  did  not  agree  to  grant  Cuban  independence,  it  is  true, 
but  the  United  States  had  made  no  demand  that  she  grant 
such  independence.  The  communication  of  March  27 
was  manifestly  in  the  nature  of  an  ultimatum.  Spain’s 


70 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


reply  of  April  10  not  only  accepted  the  terms  of  that  com- 
munication, but  declared  as  well  that  the  conditions  therein 
demanded  had  actually  been  complied  with. 

This  fact  received  no  public  attention  until  it  appeared, 
some  four  years  later,  as  a side  issue  in  a somewhat  foolish 
controversy  concerning  the  respective  attitudes  of  various 
foreign  powers  toward  the  United  States  during  the  critical 
days  of  the  spring  of  1898.  During  the  month  of  February, 
1902,  wide  publicity,  in  both  Europe  and  the  United  States, 
was  given  to  the  proceedings  of  a meeting  of  the  foreign 
ambassadors  in  Washington,  on  April  14,  1898.  The  re- 
sult of  that  meeting  was  the  submission  by  those  officials, 
to  their  home  governments,  of  an  expression  of  their  opinion 
that,  in  view  of  the  American  demand  upon  Spain  of  March 
27,  and  Spain’s  reply  of  April  9,  the  immediate  cause 
for  war  had  been  removed.  That  was  also  the  view  of 
some  of  the  cooler  heads  in  Washington  to  whom  the  facts 
were  fully  known.  Various  reasons  are  assigned  for  the 
disregard  of  the  Spanish  communication.  Among  them  are 
statements  that  the  Cuban  representatives  refused  to  con- 
sider the  declared  armistice  and  that  it  was  thus  made  of 
no  effect.  It  is  also  said  that  there  was  doubt  of  Spain’s 
good  faith;  that  her  action  was  only  an  effort  to  gain  time. 
The  rainy  season  was  coming  on,  and  Spain  hoped  that 
another  six  months  would  wear  out  the  Cubans  and  ter- 
minate the  struggle.  At  all  events,  the  Spanish  note  of 
concession,  Blanco’s  proclaimed  armistice,  the  full  revoca- 
tion of  the  reconcentration  order,  the  nominal  establish- 
ment of  an  autonomous  government,  and  the  declaration 
that  Spain  had  appropriated  $600,000  for  the  relief  of  the 
suffering  in  Cuba,  had  no  influence  upon  American  action. 

The  foregoing  appear  in  the  form  of  excuses  rather  than 
as  valid  reasons.  Doubt  of  the  good  faith  of  Spain  was 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


71 


utterly  without  justification.  If  she  was  not  worthy  of 
trust,  there  should  have  been  no  proposals  to  her.  The 
proposals  having  been  made,  there  was  no  excuse  for  a 
doubt  of  her  good  faith.  The  Cuban  attitude  had  no 
proper  place  in  the  immediate  question.  Essaying  the  estab- 
lishment of  peace  between  contestants,  the  United  States 
had  secured  the  acquiescence  of  one  of  the  parties.  Mani- 
festly, the  succeeding  and  logical  step  was  the  acquiescence 
of  the  other.  Should  that  prove  impossible  of  attainment, 
an  issue  lay  between  the  peace-maker  and  the  intractable 
contestant,  before  war  could  be  justly  declared  against 
the  consenting  party. 

The  attitude  of  President  McKinley  at  this  time  has  been 
endorsed  by  his  friends,  and  condemned  by  his  opponents. 
For  many  weeks  he  had  stood,  apparently  immovable, 
opposed  to  war,  and  striving  for  a determination  of  the 
problem  along  the  lines  of  peace.  At  this  critical  juncture 
he  yielded,  perhaps  in  conviction  that  war  was  inevitable, 
perhaps  in  response  to  a popular  clamor.  The  pro-peace 
element  has  criticised  his  disregard  of  Spain’s  yielding 
attitude  and  action.  Others  have  asserted  his  full  justifica- 
tion. His  message  of  April  10  was  distinctly  a pro-war 
argument.  It  had  been  carefully  considered  and  thought- 
fully worded.  It  had  been  submitted  to  his  Cabinet  some 
days  before  its  submission  to  Congress,  and  had  been  ap- 
proved by  some  and  disapproved  by  others  in  that  body. 
By  it  all  responsibility  for  war  or  for  peace  was  transferred 
to  the  American  Congress.  If  is  useless  to  consider  or 
speculate  upon  what  might  have  happened  had  President 
McKinley  seized  the  opportunity  which  many,  among  them 
the  foreign  ambassadors  in  Washington,  believed  to  have 
been  presented  by  Spain’s  concessions,  and  maintained  a 
persistent  stand  for  a peaceful  settlement.  Minister  Wood- 


72 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


ford,  in  Madrid,  confidently  asserted  his  belief  in  a satis- 
factory termination.  Spain  was  in  a yielding  mood,  and 
appeared  to  be  disposed,  if  tactfully  handled,  to  effect  an 
amicable  and  fairly  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  Cuban 
problem.  With  the  matter  in  the  hands  of  Congress,  the 
issue  was  no  longer  doubtful. 

The  President’s  message  reviewed  the  Cuban  situation 
and  the  earlier  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  Cuba. 
It  declared  that  forcible  intervention  was  justifiable,  and 
stated  the  ground  upon  which  such  intervention  might  rest. 
Its  essential  terms  are  quoted  in  the  preceding  chapter. 

The  message  provided  for  no  recognition  of  Cuban  in- 
dependence. On  the  contrary,  it  declared  the  inexpediency 
of  such  recognition. 

“Nor  from  the  standpoint  of  expediency  do  I think  it  would  be 
wise  or  prudent  for  this  Government  to  recognize  at  the  present 
time  the  independence  of  the  so-called  Cuban  Republic.  Such 
recognition  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  enable  the  United  States  to 
intervene  and  pacify  the  Island.  To  commit  this  country  now  to 
the  recognition  of  any  particular  government  in  Cuba  might  subject 
us  to  embarrassing  conditions  of  international  obligation  toward 
the  organization  so  recognized.  In  case  of  intervention  our  conduct 
would  be  subject  to  the  approval  or  disapproval  of  such  government. 
We  would  be  required  to  submit  to  its  direction  and  to  assume  to  il 
the  mere  relation  of  a friendly  ally. 

“WTien  it  shall  appear  hereafter  that  there  is  within  the  Island 
a government  capable  of  performing  the  duties  and  discharging  the 
functions  of  a separate  nation,  and  having,  as  a matter  of  fact,  the 
proper  forms  and  attributes  of  nationality,  such  government  can  be 
promptly  and  readily  recognized  and  the  relations  and  interests  of 
the  United  States  with  such  nation  adjusted.” 

Excepting  its  brief  reference  to  the  Spanish  communica- 
tion of  April  9,  added  subsequently  to  the  preparation  of 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


73 


its  main  body,  the  message  concludes  with  those  vibrant 
words  which  came  as  fuel  to  the  fire  of  popular  enthusiasm 
for  American  intervention  and  for  war  with  Spain. 

“The  long  trial  has  proved  that  the  object  for  which  Spain  has 
waged  the  war  cannot  be  attained.  The  fire  of  insurrection  may 
flame  or  may  smoulder  with  varying  seasons,  but  it  has  not  been 
and  it  is  plain  it  cannot  be  extinguished  by  present  methods.  The 
only  hope  of  relief  and  repose  from  a condition  which  can  no  longer 
be  endured  is  the  enforced  pacification  of  Cuba.  In  the  name  of 
humanity,  in  the  name  of  civilization,  in  behalf  of  endangered 
American  interests  which  give  us  the  right  and  the  duty  to  speak 
and  to  act,  the  war  in  Cuba  must  stop. 

“In  view  of  these  facts  and  of  these  considerations,  I ask  the 
Congress  to  authorize  and  empower  the  President  to  take  measures 
to  secure  a full  and  final  termination  of  hostilities  between  the 
Government  of  Spain  and  the  people  of  Cuba,  and  to  secure  in  the 
Island  the  establishment  of  a stable  government,  capable  of  main- 
taining order  and  observing  its  international  obligations,  insuring 
peace  and  tranquillity  and  the  security  of  its  citizens  as  well  as  our 
own,  and  to  use  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States 
as  may  be  necessary  for  these  purposes. 

“And  in  the  interest  of  humanity  and  to  aid  in  preserving  the 
lives  of  the  starving  people  of  the  Island  I recommend  that  the 
distribution  of  food  and  supplies  be  continued,  and  that  an  appro- 
priation be  made  out  of  the  public  treasury  to  supplement  the 
charity  of  our  citizens. 

“The  issue  is  now  with  the  Congress.  It  is  a solemn  responsi- 
bility. I have  exhausted  every  effort  to  relieve  the  intolerable 
condition  of  affairs  which  is  at  our  doors.  Prepared  to  execute 
every  obligation  imposed  upon  me  by  the  Constitution  and  the  law, 
I await  your  action.” 

Though  this  was  not  a declaration  of  war,  it  is  not  to  he 
doubted  that  it  made  war  inevitable.  A notable  portion 
of  the  press  was  in  a state  of  hysteria.  The  people  were 


74 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


indignant  and  impatient.  The  temper  of  Congress  was 
warlike.  Against  all  this,  Mr.  McKinley  had  stood  im- 
movable until  this  time.  Whether  Mr.  McKinley  was  right 
or  wrong,  wise  or  unwise,  in  thus  yielding  to  what  some  have 
regarded  as  a hysterical  clamor,  remains  for  determination 
by  the  impartial  historians  of  a later  day  and  generation. 
The  die  was  cast.  Congress  declared  for  war  and  the  people 
voiced  their  approval. 

On  April  16,  the  following  resolutions  were  adopted  by 
the  United  States  Senate: 

“First.  That  the  people  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  are  and  of  right 
ought  to  be  free  and  independent,  and  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  hereby  recognizes  the  Republic  of  Cuba  as  the  true 
and  lawful  Government  of  that  Island. 

“Second.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  demand, 
and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  does  hereby  demand,  that 
the  Government  of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and 
government  in  the  Island  of  Cuba  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval 
forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters. 

“ Third.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he 
hereby  is,  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States,  and  to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the 
United  States  the  militia  of  the  several  States,  to  such  extent  as  may 
be  necessary  to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect.” 

This  bill  was  passed  to  the  House  for  its  consideration. 
On  motion  of  Mr.  Dingley,  of  Maine,  and  after  careful  de- 
bate, that  body  decided  to  strike  out  the  clause  of  recogni- 
tion of  the  Cuban  Republic  contained  in  Article  I.  In  this, 
the  House  insisting,  the  Senate  finally  concurred,  and  the 
now  famous  Joint  Resolution  of  April  20,  1898,  became 
operative.  By  subsequent  action,  there  was  attached  to 
this  bill  the  equally  famous  Teller  Amendment,  as  follows: 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


75 


“That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  disposition  or 
intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over  said 
Island  except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts  its  determina- 
tion, when  that  is  accomplished,  to  leave  the  government  and  control 
of  the  Island  to  its  people.” 

The  passage  of  the  Joint  Resolution  was  tantamount  to  a 
declaration  of  the  war  which  followed.  It  is  not  my  purpose 
to  rehearse  the  story  of  the  fighting.  Spain’s  naval  squad- 
rons were  destroyed  at  Manila,  on  May  1,  1898,  and  at 
Santiago  on  July  3.  After  active  fighting  in  its  vicinity, 
articles  of  capitulation  were  signed  at  Santiago,  on  July  16. 
American  troops  entered  the  city  of  Manila  on  August  13, 
and  the  almost  bloodless  campaign  in  Porto  Rico  was 
brought  to  an  end  by  the  signing  of  the  protocol.  The  war 
was  over  and  Spain  was  beaten.  There  remained  the 
adjustment  of  the  terms  and  conditions  of  peace. 

Under  date  of  July  22,  1898,  the  Spanish  Minister  of 
State,  Due  d’Almodovar  del  Rio,  forwarded  a communica- 
tion to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  through  Mr. 
Jules  Gambon,  the  French  Ambassador  in  Washington. 
After  a brief  review  of  the  causes  and  the  conditions  of  the 
war,  the  letter  states: 

“To  end  calamities  already  so  great  and  to  avert  evils  still 
greater,  our  countries  might  mutually  endeavor  to  find  conditions 
upon  which  the  present  struggle  might  be  terminated  othenvise  than 
by  force  of  arms.  . . . And  so  do  we  wish  to  learn  from  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  the  basis  upon  which  there  might  be 
established  a political  status  in  Cuba,  and  an  ending  be  made  to  the 
unreasonable  continuance  of  a strife  which  might  be  terminated  by 
the  agreement  of  both  Governments  upon  terms  for  the  pacification 
of  the  Island.” 

This  was  answered  by  President  McKinley,  under  date 


76 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


of  July  30,  reviewing  the  situation  from  the  American  stand- 
point, and  stating  terms  upon  which  the  United  States  would 
enter  upon  negotiations  for  peace.  These  were: 

“ First.  The  relinquishment  by  Spain  of  all  claim  of  sovereignty 
over  or  title  to  Cuba,  and  her  immediate  evacuation  of  the  Island. 

“ Second.  The  President,  desirous  of  exhibiting  signal  generosity, 
will  not  put  forward  any  demand  for  pecuniary  indemnity.  Never- 
theless he  cannot  be  insensible  to  the  losses  and  expenses  of  the 
United  States  incident  to  the  war  or  to  the  claims  of  our  citizens  for 
injuries  to  their  persons  or  their  property  during  the  late  insurrection 
in  Cuba.  He  must,  therefore,  require  the  cession  to  the  United 
States  and  the  immediate  evacuation  by  Spain  of  the  Island  of  Porto 
Rico  and  other  islands  now  under  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  in  the 
West  Indies,  and  also  the  cession  of  an  island  in  the  Ladrones,  to  be 
selected  by  the  United  States. 

“ Third.  On  similar  grounds,  the  United  States  is  entitled  to 
occupy  and  will  hold  the  city,  bay,  and  harbor  of  Manila  pending 
the  conclusion  of  a treaty  of  peace  which  shall  determine  the  control, 
disposition,  and  government  of  the  Philippines.” 

These  very  positively  stated  terms  were  cabled  to  Spain, 
and  were  answered,  on  August  7,  by  a message  of  apparently 
unwilling  acceptance  of  terms  whose  inflexibility  was  recog- 
nized. America’s  superior  force  was  conceded,  and  Spain 
bowed  to  the  inevitable.  Something  of  vagueness  appear- 
ing in  the  statement  of  the  terms  and  in  the  Spanish  under- 
standing of  them,  Secretary  Day,  in  a letter  to  M.  Cambon, 
dated  August  10,  proposed  a protocol,  a draft  of  which  he 
submitted,  stating  the  terms  of  agreement,  and  providing 
for  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  arrange  the  de- 
tails of  evacuation,  and  also  for  the  appointment  of  com- 
missioners to  arrange  the  treaty  of  peace.  The  terms  of 
the  protocol  were  as  follows: 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


77 


Article  I.  Spain  will  relinquish  all  claim  of  sovereignty 
over  or  title  to  Cuba. 

Article  II.  Spain  will  cede  to  the  United  States  the  Island 
of  Porto  Rico  and  other  islands  now  under  Spanish  sover- 
eignty in  the  West  Indies,  and  also  an  island  in  the  La- 
drones,  to  be  selected  by  the  United  States. 

Article  III.  The  United  States  will  occupy  and  hold 
the  city,  bay,  and  harbor  of  Manila  pending  the  conclusion 
of  a treaty  of  peace  which  shall  determine  the  control,  dis- 
position, and  government  of  the  Philippines. 

Article  IV.  Spain  will  immediately  evacuate  Cuba, 
Porto  Rico,  and  other  islands  under  Spanish  sovereignty 
in  the  West  Indies;  and  to  this  end  each  government  will, 
within  ten  days  after  the  signing  of  this  protocol,  appoint 
commissioners,  and  the  commissioners  so  appointed  shall, 
within  thirty  days  after  signing  of  this  protocol,  meet  at 
Havana  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  and  carrying  out  the 
details  of  the  aforesaid  evacuation  of  Cuba  and  the  adjacent 
Spanish  islands.  (The  same  provision  also  made  regarding 
Porto  Rico.) 

Article  V.  The  United  States  and  Spain  will  each  ap- 
point not  more  than  five  commissioners  to  treat  of  peace, 
and  the  commissioners  so  appointed  shall  meet  at  Paris  not 
later  than  Oct.  1,  1898,  and  proceed  to  the  negotiation  and 
conclusion  of  a treaty  of  peace,  which  treaty  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  ratification  according  to  the  respective  constitutional 
forms  of  the  two  countries. 

Article  VI.  Upon  the  conclusion  and  signing  of  this 
protocol,  hostilities  between  the  two  countries  shall  be  sus- 
pended, and  notice  to  that  effect  shall  be  given  as  soon  as 
possible  by  each  government  to  the  commanders  of  its 
military  and  naval  forces. 

This  was  signed  on  August  12  by  William  R.  Day,  Secre- 


78 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


tary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  and  by  Jules  Gambon, 
the  French  Ambassador,  who  was  authorized  by  Spain  to 
sign  on  her  account.  Orders  were  immediately  issued  for 
the  suspension  of  hostilities  at  all  points.  The  commission 
assigned  to  Havana  for  conference  with  Spanish  commis- 
sioners regarding  evacuation  of  the  Island  of  Cuba,  con- 
sisted of  the  following:  Major  General  Wade,  U.  S.  A., 
Admiral  Sampson,  U.  S.  N.,  and  Major  General  Butler, 
U.  S.  V.  These  gentlemen  proceeded  to  the  field  of  their 
operations  and  effected  the  arrangements  which  were  finally 
concluded  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  last  of  the  Spanish 
troops  in  the  month  of  Februrary  of  the  following  year. 
The  Spanish  Commissioners  were  General  of  Division 
Gonzales  Parrada,  Rear  Admiral  Pastor  Y Landero,  and 
Marquis  de  Montoro. 

By  the  victory  at  Santiago,  the  American  forces  became 
an  army  of  occupation,  by  conquest,  in  the  eastern  province 
of  Cuba.  The  protocol  of  August  12  established  the 
United  States  as  the  supreme  authority  in  that  district, 
pending  the  final  adjustment  of  the  entire  question  at  issue 
by  the  peace  commission  for  which  provision  was  made  in 
Article  V of  that  instrument.  Gen.  Henry  W.  Lawton 
was  made  commander-in-chief  and  military  governor  of 
the  province.  He  was  succeeded  by  Gen.  Leonard  Wood 
on  September  24.  By  an  order  of  the  President,  issued  July 
13,  the  municipal  laws  of  the  Island  were  continued  in  force 
so  far  as  they  were  adjustable  to  the  new  conditions. 

The  first  important  step,  under  the  American  authority 
established  by  the  protocol,  was  a regulation  of  the  customs 
tariff  for  the  ports  of  the  Santiago  district.  A later  act, 
under  the  authority  of  General  Wood,  was  the  promulga- 
tion of  a Bill  of  Rights.  This  appeared  to  be  a most  im- 
portant step  and  was  highly  gratifying  to  the  American 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


71) 


people  who  regard  the  privileges  secured  by  and  under  it 
as  fundamental  and  sacred.  As  a matter  of  fact,  it  was 
quite  superfluous.  The  Spanish  Monarchical  Constitution, 
extended  to  the  island  of  Cuba  by  royal  decree  in  April, 
1881,  includes  practically  all  of  the  privileges  and  guaran- 
tees of  the  Bill  of  Rights  then  promulgated,  even  the  right 
of  habeas  corpus.  The  continuance  of  existing  laws,  by 
the  presidential  order  of  July  13,  gave  force  and  effect  to 
these  constitutional  rights,  and  rendered  the  American 
Bill  of  Rights  a needless  institution.  The  step  was  taken 
upon  an  assumption,  based  in  ignorance  of  the  facts,  that 
Spanish  laws  were  bad  because  Spanish  legal  procedure 
had  been  corrupt  and  inefficient. 

Municipal  reconstruction  and  sanitation  were  given  im- 
mediate attention.  Military  authority  was  established  in 
the  various  municipalities,  and  American  energy  essayed 
the  task  of  bringing  order  out  of  the  chaos  which  was  the 
inevitable  result  of  prolonged  warfare.  As  the  command- 
ing officer.  General  Wood  has  been  accorded  the  credit  for 
the  work  of  reform.  Without  any  minimizing  of  the  credit 
which  really  belongs  to  that  officer,  a due  amount  of  praise 
should  be  given  to  those  who,  as  district  commanders,  served 
under  him  and  who  did  in  their  various  districts  that 
which  he  did  in  Santiago.  Much  is  due  to  the  highly  in- 
telligent and  efficient  work  of  such  men  as  Hood  and 
Pettit  and  Ray  and  others,  and  to  men  of  lower  rank  in  the 
line,  to  say  nothing  of  the  work  of  the  staff. 

In  view  of  the  fact  of  the  subsequent  development  of  an 
active  controversy  in  which  General  Wood’s  work  in  Cuba 
was  made  a subject  of  somewhat  severe  criticism,  it  is  perti- 
nent here  to  refer  to  one  of  the  principal  features  upon  which 
General  Wood’s  reputation  as  a successful  administrator 
originally  rested.  Current  report  credited  him  with  the 


80 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


installation  of  a system  of  sewerage  in  the  City  of  Santiago, 
by  which  that  place  was  transformed  from  a centre  of  reek- 
ing pestilence  into  a veritable  health  resort.  It  is  true  that 
a system  of  sewer  pipes  was  laid.  But,  up  to  the  time  when 
this  is  written,  no  use  has  been  made  of  those  pipes.  A 
sewer  system  involves  a water  system.  Without  abundant 
water  to  flush  them,  sewer  pipes  are  more  of  a menace  than 
a benefit  if  opened  to  house  connection.  The  water  system 
of  the  city,  installed  by  the  Spaniards  in  earlier  days,  was  a 
trivial  affair,  and  utterly  inadequate  for  sewerage  purposes. 
For  more  than  six  years  after  his  departure  from  Santiago, 
General  Wood’s  famous  sewer  system  remained  a system 
of  useless  pipes,  from  lack  of  a water  supply  which  would 
have  made  them  effective. 

On  September  13,  the  President  issued  commissions  to 
the  following  gentlemen  as  the  American  Plenipotentiaries 
“to  negotiate  and  conclude  a treaty  of  peace  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain,  empowering  them  jointly  and 
severally  to  meet  the  commissioners  appointed  or  to  be 
appointed  under  said  protocol  on  behalf  of  Spain,  and  with 
them  to  negotiate  and  sign  a treaty  of  peace  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain,  subject  to  the  ratification  of  their 
government.”  The  members  of  the  commission  were 
William  R.  Day,  formerly  Secretary  of  State;  Whitelaw 
Reid,  of  New  York;  and  United  States  Senators  Cushman 
K.  Davis,  of  Minnesota,  William  P.  Frye,  of  Maine,  and 
George  Gray,  of  Delaware.  John  Bassett  Moore,  of  New 
York,  was  appointed  as  Secretary  and  Counsel  to  the  Com- 
mission. The  Spanish  Commission  consisted  of  Don 
Eugenio  Montero  Rios,  Don  Buenaventura  Abarzuza,  Don 
Jose  de  Garnica  Y Diaz,  Don  Wenceslao  Ramirez  de  Villa- 
Urrutia,  and  Don  Rafael  Cerero  Y Saenz. 

The  Commissions  met  in  Paris  on  October  1,  and  re- 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


81 


mained  in  session  until  the  signing  of  the  treaty  on  Decem- 
ber 10.  The  discussion  included  many  points  of  great  im- 
portance, and  involved  many  minor  issues  which  arose  as 
incidents  in  the  main  discussion.  One  of  the  questions 
raised  in  the  early  days  of  the  conference  was  in  regard  to 
the  technical  meaning  of  the  word  “relinquish”  as  used  in 
Article  I of  the  protocol.  This  was  held  to  affect  the  future 
of  the  Island.  Word  splitting  is  a frequent  and  a favorite 
practice  with  Spanish  officials,  and  the  point  was  raised 
that  if  Spain  “ relinquished  ” Cuba  she  thereby  transferred 
her  rights  and  powers  in  the  Island  to  the  United  States,  to 
be  held  in  trust  for  transference  at  the  proper  time  to  the 
Cuban  people.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  term  was  used 
in  the  sense  that  her  withdrawal  from  Cuba  implied  an 
abandonment  by  which  the  Island  became  a political  dere- 
lict and  a possible  prey  to  the  first  comer  who  might  seize 
and  hold  it,  Spain’s  consent  to  such  an  arrangement  could 
not  be  granted.  The  issue  was  determined  by  the  American 
assurance  that  the  relinquishment  involved  a temporary 
American  trusteeship  of  the  Cuban  Government  along  the 
line  of  the  declaration  of  the  Joint  Resolution. 

Another  and  a far  more  important  issue  concerned  the 
matter  of  the  so-called  Cuban  debt.  This  involved  a sum 
of  several  hundred  million  dollars,  the  larger  part  of  which 
represented  obligations  incurred  by  Spain  in  the  course  of 
her  efforts  to  suppress  Cuban  insurrections.  These  obli- 
gations Spain  charged  to  the  insular  account,  and  the  in- 
terest upon  them  was  paid  out  of  the  insular  revenues. 
The  contention  of  the  Spanish  Commissioners  was  that 
the  cession  and  relinquishment  of  sovereignty  included 
the  cession  and  relinquishment  of  its  obligations  as  well  as 
the  rights  pertaining  to  it.  The  American  Commissioners 
denied  that  the  so-called  Cuban  debt  constituted  a valid 


82 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


obligation.  They  said  that  “To  the  American  Commis- 
sioners this  appears  to  be  not  a proposition  to  ‘relinquish 
all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  and  title  to  Cuba,’  but  in  effect 
a proposition  to  ‘transfer’  to  the  United  States  and  in  turn 
to  Cuba  a mass  of  charges  and  obligations  which,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  American  Commissioners,  properly  belonged 
to  Spain.”  Their  point  was  more  definitely  stated  in  the 
Annex  to  Protocol  No.  5.  “From  no  point  of  view  can 
the  debts  above  described  be  considered  as  local  debts  of 
Cuba,  or  as  debts  incurred  for  the  benefit  of  Cuba.  They 
are  debts  created  by  the  Government  of  Spain,  for  its  own 
purposes  and  through  its  own  agents,  in  whose  creation 
Cuba  had  no  voice.” 

While  the  discussion  of  this  issue  was  in  progress.  Com- 
missioner Day  sent  the  following  cablegram  to  President 
McKinley : 

“At  conference  yesterday  we  again  informed  Spanish  Com- 
missioners that  United  States  would  not  subdivide  so-called  Cuban 
debt.  Spanish  Commissioners  then  intimated  they  were  willing 
to  meet  American  Commissioners  as  to  relinquishment  of  sovereignty 
over  Cuba,  if  some  responsibility  for  such  debt  was  acknowledged. 
We  insisted  upon  our  position  and  finally  asked  whether  they 
would  refuse  to  sign  any  articles  unless  such  acknowledgment  was 
made.  To  this  question  the  Spanish  Commissioners  asked  time 
for  reply.  Would  you  approve  an  article  in  treaty  which  should 
provide  that  the  United  States,  while  not  contracting  any  inde- 
pendent liability  of  its  own,  would  use  its  good  offices  with  any 
people  or  government  possessing  sovereignty  in  Cuba  for  acknowl- 
edgment of  any  debts  incurred  by  Spain  for  existing  internal  im- 
provements of  a pacific  character  in  the  islands,  a mixed  commis- 
sion to  be  appointed  to  ascertain  whether  any  such  debts  exist, 
and  if  so,  their  amount  ? This  would  be  a precedent  for  Porto 
Rico,  Guam,  and  Philippine  Islands.  Commission  may  feel  in- 
clined to  make  this  concession  on  strength  of  precedents  and  state- 


THE  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


83 


ments  of  publicists  as  to  passing  of  local  debts  or  debts  incurred 
specially  for  benefits  of  transferred  territory.” 

To  this  Secretary  Hay  sent  answer: 

“Answering  your  No.  15,  the  President  directs  me  to  say  that 
under  no  circumstances  will  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
assume  any  part  of  what  is  known  as  the  Cuban  debt,  which  is 
fully  described  in  the  memorandum  of  the  American  Commissioners 
marked  “E”  received  this  morning,  nor  would  the  United  States 
engage  to  use  its  good  offices  to  induce  any  government  hereafter 
to  be  established  in  Cuba  to  assume  such  debt.  It  is  not  believed 
that  there  are  any  debts  outstanding  incurred  by  Spain  for  existing 
improvements  of  a pacific  character.  It  should  be  made  clear 
what  is  meant  by  such  improvements  and  what  is  included.  The 
President  regards  it  as  most  desirable  that  in  the  present  negotia- 
tions you  should  adhere  strictly  to  the  terms  of  the  protocol.  If  this 
proves  impossible  you  will  ascertain  as  definitely  as  you  can  the 
exact  meaning  of  their  suggestions  as  to  local  Cuban  debt  and  the 
evidences  thereof,  and  report  to  the  President  with  your  recom- 
mendations.” 

While  these  were  the  essential  features  of  the  discussion, 
so  far  as  Cuba  was  concerned,  all  minor  issues  were  duly 
considered.  The  treaty  was  signed  by  the  commissioners 
on  Dec.  10,  1898;  signed  by  the  President  and  ratified  by 
the  Senate,  on  Feb.  6,  1899;  signed  by  the  Queen  Regent 
on  March  19,  and  proclaimed  on  April  11.  The  Spanish- 
Ameriean  war,  in  its  direct  operations,  definitely  terminated 
on  the  anniversary  of  the  issuance  of  President  McKinley’s 
war  message. 


Chapter  VI 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 

American  authority  was  established  in  the  eastern  end 
of  the  Island  in  July,  1898.  During  the  closing  months 
of  the  year,  much  was  accomplished  in  the  way  of  recon- 
struction and  establishment  along  special  lines.  Two 
forces  contributed  to  this  end.  The  influence  of  one  of 
these  has  been  emphasized  in  official  and  newspaper  re- 
ports, with  an  undue  minimizing  or  ignoring  of  the  other 
which  was  quite  as  potent  and  equally  important.  The 
distribution  of  American  troops  throughout  the  district 
did  much  for  the  restoration  of  law  and  order.  The  personal 
advice  and  aid  of  local  commanders  were  of  vast  importance 
in  the  adjustment  of  the  chaotic  conditions  which  prevailed. 
Too  much  cannot  be  said  in  commendation  of  the  individual 
efforts  of  officers  of  the  American  army.  Too  little  has  been 
said  regarding  the  contributory  work  of  the  Cubans  them- 
selves. As  it  became  possible  for  them  to  do  so,  these  people 
returned  to  the  site  of  their  former  homes,  and,  as  best  they 
could,  took  up  the  round  of  quiet  and  peaceful  life.  Thou- 
sands of  them  were  utterly  destitute,  without  a loof  to  cover 
them;  without  food  to  eat;  and  without  cattle  or  farming 
tools  with  wfliich  to  produce  the  necessary  sustenance  for 
themselves  and  their  families. 

The  American  people  were  greatly  interested  in  know- 
ing what  was  being  done  by  their  representatives  They 
were  little  or  not  at  all  interested  in  wrhat  the  Cubans  were 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


85 


doing  for  themselves.  This  neglect  of  the  Cuban  end  of 
the  question  did  much  to  establish  an  opinion  that  the 
Cubans  did  nothing,  and  were  incapable  of  doing  anything, 
in  their  own  behalf.  For  a time,  the  distribution  of  food 
supplies  was  imperative,  and  this  was  done  with  a liberal 
hand.  Paid  employment  was  furnished  to  many  in  general 
repairs  and  some  new  construction,  in  the  department  of 
sanitation  and  street  cleaning,  and  in  the  various  processes 
of  municipal  administration.  As  the  conditions  established 
by  the  presence  of  the  military  forces  made  it  possible,  opera- 
tions were  resumed  on  the  wrecked  plantations,  and  the 
suspended  mining  enterprises  were  set  in  motion  by  the 
mine  owners.  Gradually  and  steadily  the  life  of  the  sec- 
tion resumed  its  normal  conditions,  and  the  1st  of  January, 
1899,  saw  a large  part  of  the  people  of  Cuba’s  eastern  prov- 
ince orderly,  peaceable,  and  self-maintaining.  For  this, 
credit  is  due  to  both  officers  and  men  of  the  American  army. 
But  credit  is  also  due,  though  rarely  given,  to  those  who 
were  so  largely  left  to  work  out,  with  such  feeble  resources 
as  they  possessed,  their  own  economic  salvation. 

The  condition  of  the  larger  portion  of  the  Island  at  the 
time  of  the  American  occupation,  on  Jan.  1,  1899,  was  not 
dissimilar  to  that  of  Santiago  six  months  earlier.  Nominally, 
until  12  o’clock,  noon,  of  that  date,  Spanish  authority  con- 
tinued. But  the  duties  of  government  were  either  neglected 
or  were  performed  in  a wholly  perfunctory  manner.  Many, 
probably  most  of  the  various  municipal  and  provincial 
authorities,  being  Spaniards  or  of  Spanish  affiliation,  had 
resigned  or  deserted  their  positions.  Their  power  was  gone, 
and  it  was  useless  to  maintain  the  semblance  of  it.  There 
was  also  a feeling  of  personal  insecurity  and  a fear  of  Cuban 
reprisals. 

On  Nov.  20,  1898,  Gen.  Ramon  Blanco  resigned  his  post 


86 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


as  Governor  General  of  Cuba,  and  returned  to  Spain. 
General  Castellanos  succeeded  him  and  remained  the 
nominal  official  head  of  affairs  until  the  transfer  to  the 
American  authorities.  On  December  1,  President  McKin- 
ley allotted  from  available  funds  the  sum  of  $50,000  for 
expenditure  in  the  greatly  needed  cleansing  of  the  city  of 
Havana.  Throughout  the  month,  detachments  of  the  army 
of  occupation  reported  for  duty  on  the  Island,  and  were 
assigned  to  camps  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  though 
the  main  body  of  the  army,  consisting  of  the  Seventh  Army 
Corps,  U.  S.  V.,  under  command  of  Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee, 
with  two  regiments,  the  8th  and  the  10th,  of  the  regular 
army,  and  a force  of  regular  artillery,  was  centred  in  and 
around  Havana.  So  far  as  routine  processes  were  concerned, 
the  closing  days  of  December  saw  everything  in  readiness 
for  the  event  which  was  to  mark  the  opening  of  the  new 
year. 

The  official  transfer  was  a brief  and  simple  proceeding. 
At  12  o’clock  noon,  the  Spanish  flag  was  hauled  down, 
and  the  American  flag  hoisted  in  its  stead.  The  official 
representatives  of  Spain  and  the  United  States  met  in  the 
Hall  of  State  in  the  Governor’s  Palace,  in  Havana,  where 
General  Castellanos,  acting  for  his  government,  with  a sad 
and  bitter  heart  and  trembling  hand,  signed  the  paper 
which  transferred  the  sovereignty  of  Cuba  to  the  American 
authorities,  as  trustees  for  the  Cuban  people. 

It  is  doubtful  if  any  nation  of  the  world  ever  assumed  a 
similar  responsibility.  So  far  as  the  American  people  in 
general  were  concerned,  and  so  far  as  individual  authori- 
ties were  concerned,  the  purposes  of  the  Government  of  In- 
tervention were  straightforward  and  generous.  Their  object 
was  expressed  in  the  terms  of  the  Joint  Resolution,  that 
the  United  States  should  occupy  the  Island  until  it  was 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


87 


pacified.  When  that  was  accomplished,  American  govern- 
ment would  terminate,  and  all  control  be  turned  over  to 
the  Cuban  people. 

While  this  was  sufficiently  definite,  as  an  announcement 
of  the  American  intention,  it  was  also  sufficiently  vague  to 
shelter  a considerable  group  of  American  citizens  whose 
opinions  were  voiced  by  a distinguished  American  senator 
who  pointed  to  an  American  flag,  as  it  floated  over  a Cuban 
fortress,  and  said,  “That  flag  will  never  come  down  in  this 
Island.” 

It  is  eminently  unfortunate  that,  at  the  time  of  our  as- 
sumption of  control  of  the  destinies  of  the  Island  of  Cuba, 
so  little  was  really  known  by  the  American  people  of  Cuba’s 
special  needs  and  of  the  special  characteristics  of  the  Cubans. 
It  is  also  unfortunate  that  it  seemed  obligatory  to  place  the 
immediate  administration  of  affairs  in  the  hands  of  men 
who,  though  of  marked  ability  along  the  line  of  their  special 
training  and  experience,  had  no  adequate  knowledge  of 
civil  administration,  and  none  whatever  of  that  Spanish 
law,  both  civil  and  criminal,  the  establishment  of  which 
was  the  first  act  of  American  occupation.  With  the  ex- 
ception of  Gen.  James  II.  Wilson  and  Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee, 
department  commanders  in  Matanzas  and  Havana  provinces, 
all  of  the  designated  officials  were  distinctly  military  men. 
All  stood  high  in  their  profession,  and  all  were  of  known 
and  tried  personal  integrity.  Some  had  had  wide  experience 
in  dealing  with  Indian  questions  on  our  western  frontier, 
but  the  Cubans  were  not  Indians. 

For  a time  military  methods  were  imperative,  and  mili- 
tary channels  were  those  through  which  certain  phases  of 
the  work  could  best  be  accomplished.  In  the  maintenance 
of  peace  and  order;  in  the  distribution  of  food  to  the  starv- 
ing, and  medicine  and  relief  to  the  sick  and  the  suffering; 


88 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


in  sanitary  regulations;  and  along  various  other  lines,  the 
directness  and  the  promptness  of  military  methods  were 
indispensable.  The  special  misfortune  of  this  time  lay  in 
American  failure  to  obtain  a broad  grasp  of  such  important 
features  as  the  economic,  the  political,  and  the  judicial. 
It  was  work  for  broad  statesmanship,  and  a competent 
attention  to  those  features  would  have  averted  many  of  the 
ills  which  have  followed  and  whose  end  is  not  yet. 

Jan.  1,  1899,  saw  three  armies  in  Cuba  — the  American, 
the  Spanish,  and  the  Cuban.  The  army  of  occupation 
numbered  more  than  40,000  men.  Spain’s  troops  were 
in  process  of  withdrawal  for  return  to  the  Peninsula,  and  the 
Cuban  army  had  been  only  partially  disbanded.  As  the 
Spanish  troops  withdrew  from  the  interior  towns  and  cities, 
their  place  was  taken  by  the  Cuban  forces  who  maintained 
order  and  repressed  disturbance,  in  highly  creditable  manner, 
until  they,  in  their  turn,  were  supplanted  by  the  soldiers 
of  the  army  of  occupation.  The  last  of  the  Havana  con- 
tingent of  the  Spanish  army  went  on  board  transports  lying 
in  the  harbor  of  that  city,  on  the  morning  of  January  1. 
The  Matanzas  contingent  left  that  city  on  January  12,  and 
the  Cienfuegos  detachment  completed  the  Spanish  evacua- 
tion of  the  Island  on  February  6.  A part  of  the  Cuban 
army  remained  in  the  field  until  its  general  disbandment 
during  the  early  summer  months. 

The  condition  of  the  greater  portion  of  the  Island,  at  the 
time  of  the  American  occupation,  was  little  short  of  appall- 
ing. Notwithstanding  General  Blanco’s  revocation  of  the 
order  of  reconcentration,  and  the  relief  work  which  was 
afterward  carried  on,  the  Island  was,  on  Jan.  1,  1899,  a 
hospital  and  a poor-farm.  Hunger  stalked  abroad  and  the 
dying  lay  in  many  homes  and  in  all  public  institutions. 
Hundreds  of  children  wandered  homeless,  unclothed,  living 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


89 


as  they  could,  almost  like  wild  animals.  Relief  from  this 
condition  was  one  of  the  first  and  most  important  processes 
of  the  new  government.  In  this,  they  were  effectively  aided 
and  supported  by  those  of  the  Island  people  who  were  not 
themselves  impoverished  and  destitute.  The  amount  of 
money  expended  for  this  purpose  cannot  be  given,  because 
of  the  impossiblity  of  ascertaining  the  sums  expended 
through  the  channels  of  relief  organizations  and  by  indi- 
viduals, Cuban,  American,  and  Spanish.  The  financial 
reports  for  the  year  show  an  official  expenditure  for  hospi- 
tals and  charities  and  for  aid  to  the  destitute,  of  a little  short 
of  $1,000,000. 

The  report  of  General  Brooke  gives  the  issuance  of  ra- 
tions to  the  needy  during  the  opening  months  of  1899,  as 


By  the  War  Department 5,493,500 

Through  other  channels  1,000,000 

6,493,500 


A ration  represents  a day’s  supply  to  the  individual.  A 
vast  work  was  done,  in  which  the  Cubans  themselves  are 
entitled  to  a large  measure  of  credit  and  commendation. 

The  next  step  in  the  order  of  importance  was  doubtless 
that  of  sanitation.  Neither  Spain  nor  her  colonies  have  at 
any  time  been  notable  for  their  devotion  to  this  department 
of  municipal  and  village  life.  In  this  they  are  by  no  means 
unique,  sharing,  as  they  have,  the  experience  of  much  the 
greater  portion  of  the  world’s  population.  Though  at  no 
time  had  it  ever  been  commendable,  the  condition  of  Cuba, 
in  the  matter  of  street  and  house  sanitation,  had  become 
more  scandalous  than  ever.  The  disturbances  of  a pro- 
longed war,  and  the  inevitable  interruption  of  all  govern- 
mental processes,  had  left  the  Island,  and  particularly  its 
chief  cities,  in  a state  which  it  is  wholly  within  bounds  to 


!)() 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


pronounce  as  horrible.  All  of  the  streets  of  the  Island  cities 
were  dirty;  many  of  them  were  almost,  and  some  were  quite 
impassable  by  reason  of  lack  of  repairs  wdiich  had  been 
necessarily  suspended  during  the  war  period. 

Probably  no  public  building  in  the  Island  was  in  a fit 
state  for  use  or  occupation.  The  penal  institutions,  jails, 
houses  of  detention,  and  even  asylums  and  hospitals  for 
the  sick  and  insane,  were  in  a state  of  indescribable  filthi- 
ness. The  crowded  tenement  areas  of  the  poorer  classes 
in  the  cities  were  most  of  them  disgusting,  some  of  them 
nauseating.  The  residences  of  not  a few  of  the  better 
classes  were  an  offence  to  their  occupants  and  a menace  to 
the  community.  Facilities  for  the  removal  of  the  accumu- 
lation of  garbage  and  other  offensive  matter  were  utterly 
inadequate.  The  work  of  cleansing  was  attacked  with  a 
vigor  which  was  productive  of  immediately  visible  results, 
although  weeks  elapsed  before  there  were  even  indications 
of  the  establishment  of  wholesome  conditions. 

The  American  authorities  found  the  machinery  of  civil 
government  disorganized  if  not  demoralized.  This  obtained 
in  all  departments  of  both  national  and  municipal  life. 
Because  of  its  importance  as  a source  of  Cuban  revenue, 
the  Department  of  Customs  stands  preeminent  in  insular 
administration.  This  department  was  placed  under  the 
charge  of  a highly  efficient  officer  of  the  United  States  army, 
Lieut.  Col.  Tasker  H.  Bliss  (now  Brigadier  General).  In 
the  beginning,  the  charge  and  supervision  of  the  Treasury 
Department  was  also  placed  in  his  hands.  In  his  capacity 
as  head  of  the  Treasury  Department,  Colonel  Bliss  promptly 
abolished  that  well-known  institution,  the  Havana  Lottery, 
which  was  under  the  general  control  of  that  office.  Of  the 
conditions  which  attended  his  assumption  of  the  adminis- 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


91 


tration  of  the  Custom  House,  this  officer  says,  in  his  report 
dated  August  1,  1899: 

“Upon  taking  charge  of  the  Havana  Custom  House,  I found  it 
almost  entirely  stripped  of  equipment  for  the  work  to  be  done. 
The  building  was  formerly  the  Convent  of  San  Francisco,  founded 
shortly  after  the  year  1574.  It  is  situated  at  the  foot  of  Teniente 
Rey  Street,  on  the  harbor  front,  with  the  wharves  and  docks  ex- 
tending on  either  side.  I found  that  all  but  the  rudest  furniture 
had  been  taken  away  from  the  Custom  House,  that  nearly  all  of  the 
important  records  or  documents  had  been  removed  or  destroyed, 
and  that  there  remained  practically  no  facilities  for  transacting 
public  business.  Had  it  not  been  for  a personal  appeal  to  my  retiring 
predecessor,  I doubt  if  there  would  have  been  left  on  January  1 a 
table  at  which  to  write  or  a chair  on  which  to  sit.” 

Colonel  Bliss  began  business  in  his  important  department 
with  little  else  than  an  official  building,  and  a tariff  of  duties 
and  taxes  to  be  levied  and  collected  by  the  Customs  Sendee. 
This  tariff  was  issued  by  executive  order  in  Washington, 
on  Dec.  13,  1898.  The  customs  building  itself  was  in  a 
filthy  and  dangerously  unsanitary  condition.  Over  1200 
cubic  yards  of  accumulated  rubbish  and  several  tons  of 
fetid  matter  were  removed  from  this  structure  alone.  Of 
the  nominal  personnel  of  the  department,  some  250  in  num- 
ber, nearly  if  not  quite  all  of  them  Spaniards,  a large  ma- 
jority resigned  for  various  reasons,  necessitating  the  organi- 
zation of  an  entirely  new  staff.  The  experience  of  Colonel 
Bliss  in  Havana  was  practically  duplicated  in  all  of  the  sub- 
offices of  the  Island. 

The  Postal  Department  was  another  badly  disorganized 
institution.  The  work  of  organization  and  establishment 
was  placed  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  E.  G.  Rathbone.  In  his 
report,  he  states  that  “The  Spanish  Government  on  retiring 
left  no  records  for  my  guidance,  and  not  one  stamp  of  any 


92 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


denomination,  nor  a cent  of  money.  In  fact,  about  all 
that  was  found  was  a great  quantity  of  undelivered  mail 
matter,  some  of  it  dating  as  far  back  as  the  year  1891,  a 
disreputable  old  post-office  building,  in  a very  bad  sanitary 
condition,  and  a miserable  post-office  outfit.”  Under  the 
former  system,  mail  carriers,  in  the  cities  as  well  as  in  the 
country,  collected  fees  for  the  delivery  of  letters,  from  those 
to  whom  they  were  addressed.  The  old  railway  mail  ser- 
vice on  the  Island  consisted  in  sending  bags  of  mail  matter 
to  the  outgoing  trains  and  steamers,  and  receiving  other 
bags  from  the  incoming  trains  and  vessels.  The  bags  for 
despatch  by  train  were  not  sealed,  their  contents  being  tied 
up  in  open  bundles  for  delivery  at  the  stations  along  the 
way.  These  bags  were  placed  on  seats,  openly  exposed, 
in  one  of  the  cars  of  the  train.  The  train  conductor  de- 
livered the  bundles  to  some  recognized  agent  at  each  station, 
receiving  on  his  part  such  matter  as  might  be  going  in  his 
direction.  No  record  was  made  of  these  receipts  and  de- 
liveries. The  local  post-office  system  throughout  the  Island 
was  on  a par  with  the  transportation  system. 

I have  already  referred  to  the  distress  which  prevailed 
throughout  the  Island  at  this  time.  My  personal  observa- 
tion and  experience  finds  ample  confirmation  in  a letter 
quoted  by  General  Brooke  in  his  report  of  Oct.  1,  1899. 
The  writer  was  a distinguished  Cuban  general  who,  during 
the  month  of  February,  made  a trip  through  the  western 
provinces.  In  his  letter  to  General  Brooke,  this  officer 
said  that  “ a state  of  desolation,  starvation,  and  anarchy 
prevailed  almost  everywhere.  In  Santa  Clara,  with  the 
exception  of  the  municipal  district  of  Cienfuegos,  agricul- 
ture and  trade  had  practically  disappeared.  The  country 
roads,  mail  service,  public  instruction,  and  local  govern- 
ments were  in  a state  of  almost  complete  abandonment. 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


93 


Matanzas  province  was  in  a worse  condition.  The  Province 
of  Havana  presented  a similar  aspect;  and  in  Pinar  del 
Rio,  the  war  had  caused  its  greatest  havoc.” 

This  illustrates  with  sufficient  clearness  the  social  and 
industrial  situation  at  the  time  of  the  American  occupation. 
Cuba,  eminently  an  agricultural  country,  was  practically 
in  the  position  of  a farmer  who  had  a piece  of  land  and  a 
family,  but  no  house  for  shelter,  and  no  tools  or  cattle  with 
which  to  work.  The  force  of  existing  economic  distress 
and  the  imperative  need  of  affording  early  and  ample  re- 
lief was  not  appreciated  by  those  in  supreme  authority. 
Only  one  of  the  department  commanders,  I believe,  makes 
special  mention  of  this  need.  General  Wilson,  a man  of 
wide  experience  in  civil  affairs,  says  in  his  report  for  the 
first  six  months  of  1899: 

“Before  there  can  be  a complete  restoration  of  prosperity,  some 
effective  arrangement  must  be  made  by  which  oxen,  cows,  carts, 
plows,  and  hoes  can  be  supplied  in  reasonable  quantities  to  such 
smaller  proprietors  and  their  tenants  as  have  been  reduced  to 
destitution  by  the  war.  ...  I am  so  convinced  of  the  futility  of 
approaching  the  problem  of  reconstruction  from  any  other  direction 
that  I must  again  urge  the  necessity  of  some  action  to  relieve  the 
wants  of  the  agricultural  population,  and  to  put  agriculture  on  a 
sound  basis  with  the  least  possible  delay.” 

The  industrial  rehabilitation  of  the  Island  should  have 
been,  but  was  not,  made  a dominant  feature  in  the  work  of 
the  new  government.  A few  realized  the  fact,  though 
views  differed  regarding  the  proper  steps.  Charity  had 
done  its  helpful  work.  A bridge  was  needed  between  the 
domain  of  charity  and  that  of  reasonable  prosperity  as  a 
result  of  individual  industry.  This  might  have  been  effected 
by  methods  suggested  by  General  Wilson,  Sefior  Pcrfecto 


94 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


Lacoste,  and  others,  whereby  a portion  of  the  revenues  of 
the  Island  would  have  been  made  available  as  a fund  from 
which  loans  could  be  made  to  the  trustworthy,  and  cattle 
and  implements  brought  in  to  be  sold  on  an  installment 
plan,  under  due  provisions  for  their  security,  to  such  as 
needed  them. 

In  his  report  of  June  30,  1900,  Senor  Lacoste,  Secretary 
of  the  Department  of  Agriculture,  Commerce,  and  Indus- 
try, says  that  “Up  to  the  present  time  nothing  has  been 
done  toward  the  improvement  of  our  agricultural  situation.” 
In  his  report  of  Dec.  31,  1900,  the  same  official  states  that 
“ No  order  of  a general  character  has  been  issued  during 
the  six  months  to  which  this  report  refers,  in  connection  with 
agricultural  matters.”  These  reports  cover  a period  of 
two  years  of  American  control.  An  appropriation  was 
afterward  made  which  permitted  the  importation  of  a 
limited  number  of  cattle  for  sale  to  the  people  of  eastern 
Cuba.  The  step  was  on  too  small  a scale  for  notable  benefit. 
Had  the  matter  been  taken  in  hand  upon  broader  lines  in 
the  earlier  days,  there  is  much  reason  for  belief  that  the 
stories  of  widespread  economic  distress,  so  often  heard 
during  1901,  might  have  been  given  a widely  different 
character. 

The  question  of  Cuba’s  finances  at  this  time  presented 
only  one  feature.  That  was  the  amount  of  her  liabilities. 
There  was  in  existence  a series  of  obligations,  issued  by 
the  mother  country  and  charged  by  her  to  the  Island  of 
Cuba.  The  amount  of  these  obligations  is  variously  given 
at  from  $400,000,000  to  $650,000,000.  The  American 
Commissioners,  at  Paris,  with  the  full  support  of  the  Presi- 
dent, refused  to  assume  for  the  United  States  or  for  Cuba 
the  payment  of  these  bonds.  A portion  of  the  sum  had 
been  borrowed  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing  a previous 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


95 


revolution  in  the  Island,  and  this,  with  other  indebtedness, 
was  charged  to  Cuba.  No  other  national  debts  existed 
save  those  which  were  given  validity  under  the  terms  of 
the  Cuban  Constitution  adopted  three  years  later.  These 
were  represented  by  some  $2,000,000  of  bonds  issued  by 
the  insurgent  government,  and  the  claims  of  the  Cuban 
soldiery  for  payment  for  their  services  during  the  war.  A 
number  of  municipalities,  however,  carried  outstanding 
obligations  and  some  bonded  debt.  These,  aside  from  the 
bonded  indebtedness  of  Havana,  approximately  $10,000,000, 
were  not  large  even  in  their  aggregate,  probably  little  if  at 
all  exceeding  $3,000,000.  This  constituted  no  burden 
under  any  approach  to  normal  conditions.  The  total  valid 
obligations  of  the  Island  as  a whole,  or  of  its  municipalities, 
was  a sum  of  comparatively  insignificant  amount. 

A much  more  serious  feature  was  presented  in  the  con- 
dition of  the  laws  and  the  methods  of  their  application. 
Of  the  general  character  and  the  general  characteristics 
of  the  people  for  whom  they  had  become,  for  the  time  being 
at  least,  responsible,  little  was  known  by  the  people  of  the 
United  States  or  by  their  representatives  in  the  Island. 
They  were  generally  weighed,  after  the  American  fashion, 
in  American  scales,  and  were  found  wanting.  Men  who 
had  seen  no  country  except  their  own,  and  who  knew  no 
other  people  than  their  own  countrymen,  saw  the  Cubans 
in  their  deplorable  and  broken  state.  The  tendency  was 
to  pity  them  as  one  pities  some  suffering  animal,  and  to 
regard  them  as  lamentably  destitute  of  self-sufficiency.  A 
few  weeks,  often  no  more  than  a few  days,  was  a sufficient 
time  for  hundreds  of  superficial  and  unqualified  observers 
to  sit  in  judgment,  and  to  determine  that  Cuba  was  little 
other  than  a land  of  turbulent  and  illiterate  negroes  needing 
the  government  of  a stronger  race,  indisposed  to  industry, 


96 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


and  quite  unsuited  for  that  independence  for  which  they 
had  been  fighting.  A group  of  political  and  military  leaders, 
posing  as  the  duly  constituted  representatives  of  the  Cuban 
people,  was  in  session,  and  their  proceedings  were  assumed 
to  be  a type  of  that  which  might  be  expected  in  any  Cuban 
political  body.  The  element  which  was  most  in  evidence 
was  regarded  by  too  many  as  typical  of  the  mass. 

The  United  States  began  its  work  in  Cuba  with  little 
or  no  knowledge  of  the  Cubans’  special  needs,  and  with  a 
distinct  misconception  of  the  qualities  and  characteristics 
of  the  Cuban  people.  That  so  little  friction  occurred, 
during  the  term  of  American  control,  is  due,  in  notable 
measure,  to  the  very  qualities  and  characteristics  which 
were  so  generally  ignored  when  that  control  was  assumed. 

The  productive  industries  of  the  Island  were  paralyzed 
to  a point  little  short  of  absolute  suspension.  While  an 
inconsiderable  amount  of  home  and  market  gardening  may 
be,  and  was,  carried  on  by  hand,rall  extensive  production 
for  commercial  purposes  is  dependent  upon  animals  for 
ploughing  and  other  necessary  processes.  In  1894,  the  year 
preceding  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution,  Cuba  had,  in  all 
parts  of  the  Island,  some  three  million  head  of  cattle.  Some 
of  these  were  range  cattle,  but  many  of  them  were  working- 
oxen  upon  which  the  Cuban  planter,  large  and  small,  chiefly 
depends  in  his  agricultural  processes.  At  the  close  of  the 
war,  it  was  estimated  that  fully  ninety  per  cent  of  these 
cattle  had  been  destroyed,  largely  for  consumption  by  the 
contending  armies  and  by  the  hungry  people.  These  had 
found  no  replacement  at  the  time  of  the  American  occupa- 
tion. In  1894,  there  w'ere  some  600,000  horses  and  mules 
on  the  Island.  The  reduction  of  this  group  was  not  so  great 
as  in  the  case  of  the  cattle.  But  the  Cuban  horse  is  of  little 
or  no  use  for  farm  purposes,  being  small  in  size  and  light 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


97 


in  weight.  Without  cattle,  any  early  resumption  of  the 
industries  of  the  Island  w^as  impossible. 

In  1894,  there  were  more  than  350  mills  for  the  grinding 
of  sugar  cane  and  the  conversion  of  the  juice  into  raw  sugars. 
Few  of  these  escaped  all  injury  during  the  processes  of  the 
war.  About  one-half  of  them  were  either  totally  destroyed 
or  so  thoroughly  wrecked  as  to  render  necessary  their  almost 
complete  reconstruction.  That  required  both  time  and 
money.  In  the  majority  of  cases,  the  owners  of  these, 
whether  ruined  in  whole  or  in  part,  were  without  means 
for  their  proper  rehabilitation.  The  result  of  this  enforced 
industrial  suspension,  in  its  effect  upon  the  people  of  the 
Island,  may  be  partially  realized  from  the  fact  that  a large 
percentage  of  the  entire  population  of  the  Island  is  depen- 
dent, directly  or  indirectly,  upon  sugar  production. 

In  view  of  the  importance  of  this  industry  in  the  life  of 
the  Island,  and  in  view  of  its  known  demoralization,  it  is  as 
much  a matter  of  surprise  as  of  regret  that  the  authorities 
of  the  intervening  government  did  not  proceed  at  once  to 
the  very  root  of  the  evils  which  existed  in  Cuba  at  the  time 
of  American  occupation.  That  the  point  of  recognition  of 
this  special  and  fundamental  need  was  urged  upon  the 
authorities  is  shown  in  the  official  report  (p.  12)  of  General 
Brooke,  the  Military  Governor.  He  says: 

“Many  requests  have  been  made  by  the  planters  and  farmers  to 
be  assisted  in  the  way  of  supplying  cattle,  farming  implements,  and 
money;  the  latter  to  enable  them  to  restore  their  houses.  The 
matter  has  been  most  carefully  considered  and  the  conclusion 
reached  that  aid  could  not  be  given  in  this  direction.  It  should  be 
understood  that  the  full  amount  of  the  revenues  would  not  be  suffi- 
cient to  meet  all  demands  of  this  kind,  even  were  this  the  only 
objection  to  the  scheme.  The  real  solution  of  this  question  of 
furnishing  means  to  those  who  need  this  kind  of  aid,  is  through  the 


98 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


medium  of  banks,  agricultural  or  others;  through  them  and  through 
them  alone,  it  is  believed,  means  now  sought  from  the  public  treasury 
should  be  obtained.  In  this  system  of  loans,  which  can  be  under 
the  scrutiny  of  the  banks  or  associations  from  which  loans  are 
secured,  lies  the  only  apparent  solution  of  this  much-talked-of  source 
of  assistance.  This  system  would  not  destroy  or  impair  the  self- 
respect  of  the  borrower;  he  would  not  be  the  recipient  of  charity, 
but  a self-respecting  citizen  working  out  his  own  financial  salvation 
by  means  of  his  own  labor  and  brain.  From  information  on  the 
subject,  it  is  believed  that  there  is  enough  capital  lying  idle  in  Cuba 
to-day  to  supply  all  that  is  needed,  were  the  capitalists  assured  as 
to  the  future. 

“The  scheme  of  those  who  urge  this  system  of  assistance  to 
agriculturists  by  the  use  of  revenues  of  the  Island  is  that,  as  appears 
in  the  papers  submitted,  very  cumbersome  and  expensive  govern- 
mental and  other  machinery  must  be  organized  to  carry  it  out. 
It  is  believed  that  the  workers  of  farms  will  have  obtained  through 
other  and  more  satisfactory  channels  the  assistance  needed  before 
this  system  could  be  put  to  work.  One  feature  of  this  particular 
scheme  is  that  it  will  require  five  years  to  work  it  out,  possibly 
more.” 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  reasons  here  stated  appear 
to  be  entirely  sound  and  valid.  Naturally,  there  were, 
among  the  advocates  of  such  a measure,  many  whose  plans 
were  visionary,  and  who  urged  steps  which  could  only  be 
regarded  as  unwarranted  and  ultra-paternal.  Among  those 
who  urged  the  adoption  of  some  plan  of  agricultural  relief 
was  General  Wilson,  Military  Governor  of  the  provinces 
of  Matanzas  and  Santa  Clara.  The  following  is  quoted 
from  that  official’s  report  of  Sept.  7,  1898  (p.  24): 

Agricultural  Relief.  — “The  persistent  call  for  assistance  in 
the  various  agricultural  districts  is  based  upon  the  fact  that  the 
Island  itself,  although  not  deprived  of  capital  — but  having  no 
banks,  and  being  left  in  a state  of  uncertainty  as  to  the  particular 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


99 


form  of  government,  and  the  particular  character  of  administra- 
tion, which  are  to  come  — is  compelled  to  look  either  to  the  insular 
treasury  or  to  some  extraneous  source  for  such  additional  capital 
as  will  enable  it  to  establish  agriculture  and  commerce  on  a sound 
basis. 

“In  view  of  the  foregoing  facts,  I have  strenuously  urged  in 
my  report  of  February  16,  pages  14  and  15,  in  my  report  of  June 
20,  pages  13  and  14,  and  in  a special  communication  to  the  Adjutant 
General  of  the  Army  dated  August  29,  — that  the  insular  treasury 
should  make  an  allotment  of  funds  for  the  purchase  of  cattle, 
agricultural  implements,  and  seeds,  to  be  sold  to  the  farmers,  on 
long  time,  at  a low  rate  of  interest;  and  also  for  such  loans  as  may 
be  necessary  to  assist  them  in  reconstructing  their  homes,  and  in 
bringing  their  land  again  into  production. 

“So  firmly  am  I convinced  of  the  wisdom,  indeed,  of  the  absolute 
necessity,  for  some  such  measure  as  this,  that  I again  reiterate  my 
recommendation,  and  express  the  hope  that  if  the  plan  which  I 
have  submitted  be  not  regarded  as  feasible,  some  other  plan,  with 
the  same  end  in  view,  may  be  substituted  for  it.” 

It  will  be  noted  that  General  Wilson  does  not  advocate 
the  loaning  of  large  sums  to  holders  of  extensive  plantations, 
a point  which  seemed  to  occasion  some  confusion  in  the  mind 
of  his  ranking  officer,  but  a measure  of  relief,  involving  no 
vast  outlay,  to  the  masses  who  stood  in  such  need  of  even 
the  means  of  subsistence. 

Attention  had  been  called  to  the  matter  of  industrial  re- 
construction even  before  the  date  of  the  occupation.  Mr. 
Robert  P.  Porter,  as  Special  Commissioner  to  Cuba,  stated 
in  his  report  of  Nov.  15,  1898,  that  “The  only  hope  for 
the  renewal  of  prosperity  in  Cuba  is  first,  the  rehabilitation 
of  the  sugar  industry  ; secondly,  a revival  of  work  on  tobacco 
plantations;  and  thirdly,  a full  complement  of  men  in  the 
mining  districts.  These  industries  are  the  basis  of  the 
prosperity  of  the  Island.” 


100 


CONDITIONS  ON  JAN.  1,  1899 


In  a restoration  of  the  industries  of  the  Island,  in  the 
establishment  of  the  people  in  a state  of  modest  comfort  as  a 
result  of  their  individual  industry,  lay  the  key  to  the  solu- 
tion of  the  political  situation.  A closer  attention  to  the 
economic  problem,  presented  in  the  very  beginning  of  the 
American  occupation,  would  have  averted  many  of  the 
evils,  both  economic  and  political,  which  fell  upon  the 
Cuban  people  during  the  succeeding  years.  More  than 
that  may  also  be  said  with  safety.  The  establishment  of 
the  small  farmers  of  the  Island  in  the  modest  homes  which 
content  them,  with  a yoke  of  oxen  and  a plow,  would  have 
filled  the  Island  with  a people  whose  gratitude  to  their  bene- 
factors would  have  simplified,  if  it  did  not  solve,  the  politi- 
cal questions  of  a later  date. 


CHAPTER  VII 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION  — 1899 

The  first  official  step  of  American  Government  in  Cuba 
was  the  issuance  of  the  following  proclamation,  on  Jan.  1, 
1899: 

To  the  People  of  Cuba: 

Coming  among  you  as  the  representative  of  the  President,  in 
furtherance  and  in  continuation  of  the  humane  purpose  with  which 
my  country  interfered  to  put  an  end  to  the  distressing  condition 
in  this  Island,  I deem  it  proper  to  say  that  the  object  of  the  present 
Government  is  to  give  protection  to  the  people,  security  to  person 
and  property,  to  restore  confidence,  to  build  up  waste  plantations, 
to  resume  commercial  traffic,  and  to  afford  full  protection  in  the 
exercise  of  all  civil  and  religious  rights. 

To  this  end,  the  protection  of  the  United  States  Government 
will  be  directed,  and  every  possible  provision  made  to  earn'  out 
these  objects  through  the  channels  of  civil  administration,  although 
under  military  control,  in  the  interest  and  for  the  benefit  of  all  the 
people  of  Cuba,  and  those  possessed  of  rights  and  property  in  the 
Island. 

The  civil  and  criminal  code  which  prevailed  prior  to  the  relin- 
quishment of  Spanish  sovereignty  will  remain  in  force,  with  such 
modifications  and  changes  as  may  from  time  to  time  be  found 
necessary  in  the  interest  of  good  government. 

The  people  of  Cuba,  without  regard  to  previous  affiliations,  are 
invited  and  urged  to  co-operate  in  these  objects  by  exercise  of 
moderation,  conciliation,  and  good  will  one  toward  another,  and  a 
hearty  accord  in  our  humanitarian  puqioses  will  insure  kind  and 
beneficent  government. 


102 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


The  Military  Governor  of  the  Island  will  always  be  pleased 
to  confer  with  those  who  may  desire  to  consult  him  on  matters  of 
public  interest.  John  R.  Brooke, 

Major  General , Commanding  Division  of  Cuba , and  Military  Governor. 

The  Military  Government  was  divided  into  departments 
corresponding  to  the  already  established  provinces  of  the 
Island,  with  the  administration  of  the  City  of  Havana  as  an 
additional  department.  These,  in  the  beginning,  were 
under  the  command  and  supervision  of  the  following  officers 
of  the  United  States  Army: 

Havana  Province  Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee. 

Pinar  del  Rio  Province  ....  Gen.  Geo.W.  Davis. 

City  of  Havana  Gen.  Wm.  Ludlow. 

Matanzas  Province  Gen.  Jas  H.  Wilson. 

Santa  Clara  Province Gen.  John  C.  Bates. 

Puerto  Principe  Province  . . . Gen.  L.  H.  Carpenter. 
Santiago  Province  Gen.  Leonard  Wood. 

On  January  11,  provision  was  made  for  the  administra- 
tion of  Civil  Government  through  four  departments,  as 
follows:  Department  of  State  and  Government;  Depart- 
ment of  Finance;  Department  of  Justice  and  Public  Instruc- 
tion; Department  of  Agriculture,  Commerce,  Industries, 
and  Public  Works. 

On  January  12  these  departments  were  established  by 
the  following  appointments: 

Domingo  Mendez  Capote,  to  be  Secretary  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  and  Government. 

Pablo  Desvernine,  to  be  Secretary1  of  the  Department 
of  Finance. 

Jose  Antonio  Gonzalez  Lanuza,  to  be  Secretary  of  the 
Department  of  Justice  and  Public  Instruction. 

Adolfo  Saenz  Yanez,  to  be  Secretary  of  the  Department 
of  Agriculture,  Commerce,  Industries,  and  Public  Works. 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


103 


It  is  not  possible  to  present  here  either  the  complicated 
functions  of  these  departments,  or  the  many  difficulties 
which  confronted  both  the  Military  and  the  Civil  Adminis- 
tration. For  four  centuries  the  Cuban  people  had  lived 
under  the  domination  of  an  autocratic  government  whose 
local  administration  was  virtually  a military  dictatorship. 
One-third  of  the  population  consisted  of  blacks,  many  of 
whom  had  been  slaves  prior  to  the  emancipation  act  of  188G. 
From  lives  of  subjection  and  subservience,  political  or 
physical,  white  and  black  alike  were  now  to  step  into  the 
broad  field  of  democracy,  freedom  of  speech,  and  self-govern- 
ment. Some  of  their  leaders,  by  education  and  experience 
in  the  United  States  and  in  France,  were  partially  qualified 
for  such  a step,  but  even  to  these  there  clung  the  influence, 
strongly  marked,  of  training  under  Spanish  methods. 

The  military  governors  faced  questions  which  were  new 
to  them,  a people  whom  they  did  not  understand,  and  by 
whom  they  were  not  understood.  Laws  and  language  were 
equally  unfamiliar.  Years  of  maladministration  of  the 
Spanish  legal  code  had  stamped  upon  the  American  mind 
a firm  belief  that  the  laws  themselves  were  bad.  A long 
period  of  Cuban  revolt  led  to  a belief  that  the  Cubans  were 
a turbulent  people,  akin  in  their  revolutionary  habits  to 
their  neighbors  in  Ilayti,  Santo  Domingo,  and  the  Central 
and  South  American  Republics.  All  this  and  more  the 
Americans  had  to  unlearn.  Many  Cubans,  in  blind  enthu- 
siasm, looked  for  the  sun  of  prosperity  to  burst  at  once  from 
the  clouds  of  oppression  and  disaster.  Looking  back  upon 
those  early  days  of  Cuba’s  new  life,  they  who  shared  in  those 
processes  and  they  who  stood  and  watched  them  from  the 
point  of  observers,  see  in  them  the  development  of  a problem 
whose  complexities  were  at  the  time  but  dimly  appreciated. 

The  first  and  most  immediately  important  step  was  re- 


104 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


lief  for  the  suffering.  To  that  end,  the  following  instructions 
were  sent  to  all  Department  Commanders: 

General: 

I am  directed  by  the  Major  General  Commanding  the  Division 
to  invite  your  attention  to  the  reported  need  of  food  by  a large 
number  of  the  people  of  the  Island.  He  desires  that  you  inquire 
into  this  matter  at  once  and  investigate  fully  the  condition  of  the 
people  as  regards  the  matter  of  food  supply.  In  all  cases  where 
you  may  find  destitution,  you  will  immediately  relieve  it.  In  this 
connection,  your  attention  is  invited  to  the  enclosed  extract  from 
G.  O.  110,  A.  G.  O.,  Washington,  Aug.  1,  1898,  specifying  the 
ration  to  be  issued  to  Cuban  destitutes.  You  will  please  under- 
stand that  all  able-bodied  men  needing  food  will  be  given  work, 
as  soon  as  practicable,  on  the  repair  of  roads  and  sanitary  and  other 
public  works.  They  will  be  paid  fair  wages  in  United  States 
money,  but  this  cannot  now  be  paid  weekly  for  the  reason  that 
the  funds  are  not  available.  It  is  not  proposed  to  furnish  work 
to  those  people  who  remain  in  Cuba  and  retain  their  allegiance 
to  Spain.  Men  who  are  offered  work  and  refuse  to  work  should 
not  be  fed.  On  investigation  of  this  matter  you  will  show,  by 
timely  estimates  of  funds,  the  necessities  of  your  department, 
remembering,  however,  that  the  funds  for  this  and  for  other  pur- 
poses are  limited  at  present.  You  will  exercise  a wise  discretion 
in  the  distribution  of  food;  it  is  better  to  make  an  error  on  the  side 
of  humanity  always.  Medical  attendance  and  medicines  will 
always  be  afforded  and  given  where  necessary.  Please  keep  these 
headquarters  fully  advised  as  to  all  conditions  in  your  department 
at  all  times,  and  to  this  end  you  will  acquaint  yourself  with  affairs 
by  an  active  use  of  the  means  at  hand.  For  the  present,  and  until 
proper  arrangements  are  made  for  remission  of  customs  revenues 
to  Havana,  or  disbursement  of  same  at  port  of  collection,  sub- 
collectors must  understand  that  they  will  be  held  to  a strict  account- 
ability under  executive  order  of  Dec.  9,  1898,  to  the  Collector  of 
Customs  for  the  Island  for  all  funds  received  by  them. 

Very  respectfully, 

Adna  R.  Chaffee, 

Major  General,  U.  S.  Volunteers,  Chief  of  Staff. 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


105 


In  the  beginning,  food  distribution  was  conducted  on  very 
liberal  lines.  It  was  better  that  a few  unworthy  should  be 
supplied  than  that  any  who  were  in  actual  need  should  suffer 
or  die  from  hunger.  Unfortunate  results  were  immediately 
apparent.  People  who  could  afford  to  buy  stood  in  line 
with  the  destitute.  Pauperization  was  the  inevitable  ten- 
dency. System  was  introduced  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and 
house  to  house  inspection  was  instituted.  The  inspectors 
furnished  orders,  upon  a printed  form,  calling  for  the  requi- 
site supply  in  the  various  individual  cases.  These  orders 
were  filled  upon  presentation  at  the  central  distributing 
stations.  The  medical  department  was  also  given  due 
attention,  and  the  sick  were  properly  cared  for. 

One  of  the  most  serious  features  which  attended  the  re- 
lief work  lay  in  the  fact  that  there  were  many  whose  physical 
system  was  so  disordered  by  long-continued  starvation  that 
such  food  as  it  was  possible  to  supply,  as  rations,  was  not 
suited  to  their  needs.  Many  of  these  cases  were  hopeless. 
As  rapidly  as  possible,  such  were  taken  to  hospitals  or  to 
buildings  used  for  hospital  purposes,  and  there  nursed  and 
cared  for  until  death  kindly  relieved  them  of  their  misery. 
Few  more  pitiable  sights  are  ever  encountered  than  those 
rows  of  hospital  cots,  each  occupied  by  a doomed  sufferer, 
the  victim  of  an  inhuman  policy.  Mendicants  swarmed  in 
the  streets,  and  infested  the  stores,  hotels,  and  cafes.  A 
considerable  number  became  semi-professionals  and  paid 
daily  visits  to  particular  patrons. 

The  lines  of  restriction  and  exclusion  in  the  matter  of 
food  distribution  were  drawn  more  closely  with  each  pass- 
ing week,  and  the  effect  was  soon  apparent.  By  the  first 
of  April,  the  list  of  recipients  in  Havana  had  been  reduced 
from  20,000  to  8,000,  and  a similar  condition  prevailed 
throughout  the  country.  During  the  latter  part  of  March, 


106 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


it  was  officially  announced  that,  thereafter,  the  expense  of 
this  charitable  distribution  would  be  charged  to  the  insular 
fund.  The  expenditure  at  the  time  was  estimated  at  $280,000 
per  month.  So  effectively  was  the  relief  work  accomplished 
that  by  the  month  of  June  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  sus- 
pend all  general  distribution  of  food  supplies  and  to  limit 
charitable  relief  to  cases  of  special  need.  The  work  had 
then  become  so  systematized  that  such  cases  were  known 
to  those  engaged  in  it.  By  that  time,  many  had  returned,  or 
had  been  aided  in  returning  to  their  homes  to  take  up  as 
best  they  could  the  work  of  self-maintenance.  Thousands 
had  found  employment  in  the  various  departments  of  govern- 
mental and  municipal  processes  and  operations.  But  it  is 
to  the  little-aided  efforts  of  the  Cubans  themselves  that  most 
of  the  credit  belongs  for  the  industrial  rehabilitation  of  the 
Island.  Neighbor  helped  neighbor,  and  he  who  had  an  ox 
or  a plow  or  a hoe  shared  its  use  with  his  neighbor  who 
had  nothing.  This  feature  of  Cuban  reconstruction  has 
been  little  noted.  Those  who  did  this  lived,  in  large  pro- 
portion, away  from  the  beaten  track,  unseen  by  all  save  a 
few  special  students  of  Cuba’s  real  situation. 

America  is  prone  to  take  credit  for  all  that  has  been  done 
in  Cuba.  The  truth  is  that,  along  economic  lines,  the  Cuban, 
whether  planter  or  peasant,  received  little  assistance  from 
the  American  Government.  The  planter  borrowed  such 
money  as  he  could  for  the  rehabilitation  of  his  estate;  em- 
ployed such  hands  as  he  could,  often  on  a basis  of  wages 
contingent  upon  his  receipts  for  his  crop.  Of  my  own 
knowledge,  I can  testify  to  the  work  of  the  peasant,  the 
guajiro.  I have  seen  him  scratching  a shallow  furrow  in 
the  soil  with  a bit  of  bent  iron  barrel  hoop  that  he  might 
plant  a few  boniatos.  I have  seen  three  Cubans  slowly 
and  laboriously  dragging  a crude  and  cumbrous  Cuban 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


107 


plow,  while  a fourth  guided  it.  By  such  methods  as  these 
have  the  Cuban  people  struggled  for  life  and  maintenance. 

During  the  year,  changes  were  made  in  the  Military  De- 
partments. General  Hasbrouck  succeeded  General  Davis, 
who  was  ordered  to  Porto  Rico.  During  the  month  of  April, 
there  was  a consolidation  of  departments.  Havana  and 
Pinar  del  Rio  provinces  were  combined  under  the  command 
of  General  Lee.  General  Bates  was  ordered  to  the  Philip- 
pines, and  Santa  Clara  province  was  added  to  the  command 
of  General  Wilson.  Puerto  Principe  was  coupled  with  San- 
tiago. With  the  diminution  of  extreme  distress,  and  the 
gradual  return  of  the  people  to  their  various  occupations, 
the  work  of  the  military  department  lessened.  A large 
portion  of  the  American  troops  were  withdrawn.  By  the 
end  of  the  year,  while  there  was  still  a vast  amount  of  work 
to  be  done  by  the  department  commanders  and  their  staffs, 
it  had  been  sifted  down  into  a generally  systematic  routine. 
No  disturbances  or  uprisings  occurred,  though  there  was 
occasional  friction  between  the  two  peoples,  and  rumors  and 
threats  of  disturbance  were  sometimes  heard. 

A notable  cause  of  threatened  disturbances  occurred  in 
the  existence  of  a body  known  as  the  Cuban  Assembly. 
This  group  claimed  for  itself  the  position  of  an  established 
Cuban  representation.  It  was  presumably  composed  of 
representatives  of  the  different  corps  of  the  Cuban  army, 
and  paraded  under  the  imposing  title  of  La  Asamblca  dc 
Rcprescntantes  del  Ejcrcito  Cubano,  or  the  Assembly  of  Repre- 
sentatives of  the  Cuban  Army.  It  held  a series  of  meetings 
and  claimed  an  official  recognition  which  was  refused.  Its 
desire  was  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  Government 
of  Intervention,  and  its  object  was  to  constitute  itself  the 
successor  of  that  government.  It  discussed  the  placing  of  a 
considerable  national  loan,  and  essayed  steps  toward  such  a 


108 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


loan.  It  had  some  following  among  an  irresponsible  ele- 
ment, notably  in  the  ranks  of  the  still  existent  remnant  of 
the  Cuban  forces.  Its  deposition  of  Maximo  Gomez  as  the 
General  in  Chief  of  the  army  divided  its  support,  as  many 
adhered  to  the  side  and  the  fortunes  of  their  old  leader.  The 
organization  stormed  itself  to  death  and  passed  away  to  re- 
appear in  the  persons  of  some  of  its  members  as  individual 
factors  in  the  politics  of  a later  day.  At  no  time  was  the 
body  dangerous,  but  for  many  weeks  it  existed  as  a potential 
breeder  of  trouble. 

An  interesting  question  arises  in  connection  with  this 
body.  While  its  experience  as  an  organization  which  was 
ignored  by  the  intervening  government  was  not  notably 
creditable,  it  remains  a clear  possibility  that  its  recognition 
and  co-operation  might  have  resulted  in  material  benefit 
to  both  Cubans  and  Americans.  Numbered  in  its  personnel 
there  were  more  than  a few  who  had  been  leaders  in  the  war, 
who  afterward  appeared  as  members  of  the  Cuban  Con- 
stitutional Convention,  and  who  are  to-day  members  of 
the  Cuban  Congress.  There  were  others  who  afterward 
held,  and  who  still  hold  official  positions.  The  authority 
of  the  Asamblea  was  recognized  by  General  Gomez  who 
accepted  his  deposition  by  them  as  the  head  of  the  army. 
The  body  claimed  for  itself  the  legitimate  succession  to  the 
Constituent  Assembly  which  met  at  Jimaguayu,  on  Sept. 
13,  1895,  to  organize  a Cuban  government  and  to  prepare  a 
constitution  for  a Cuban  Republic.  The  United  States 
had  distinctly  refused  to  recognize  that  government,  officially, 
and  refused  to  recognize  the  creators  of  it  after  the  American 
occupation.  Whether  the  body  possessed  any  rights  which 
entitled  it  to  recognition,  or  whether  it  could  be  regarded  as 
duly  representative  of  the  Cuban  people,  may  be  matters  of 
opinion.  It  certainly  did  constitute  an  organization  which 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


109 


included  in  its  membership  a notable  number  of  Cuban 
citizens  of  both  respectability  and  prominence,  and,  whether 
it  was  or  was  not  the  constitutional  representative  of  the 
Cuban  people,  it  did  form  an  association  which  might  have 
been  used,  under  the  supervision  of  the  American  authori- 
ties, as  a valuable  agent  in  the  processes  of  the  intervention. 
Such  a proceeding  would  have  been  entirely  logical,  and 
much  more  consistent  with  the  pledges  and  the  assertions 
of  the  American  government  than  was  the  method  adopted. 
Recognized,  they  might  well  have  become  useful  aids  in 
carrying  out  the  professed  policy  of  the  United  States. 
Ignored  and  offended,  they  became  a suspicious  and  dis- 
turbing element. 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  at  this  time,  notwithstand- 
ing her  recorded  pledges,  the  United  States  had  no  definite 
policy  regarding  the  Island.  Vague  ideas  were  held  of 
Cuban  capacity,  and  doubts  existed  of  Cuban  fitness  for 
any  political  position  save  that  of  political  dependents. 
The  United  States,  after  its  occupation  of  the  Island,  con- 
tinued the  policy  which  Mr.  Cleveland,  in  his  message  of 
December,  1896,  called  the  “expectant  attitude.”  It  is 
now  no  more  than  a matter  of  pure  speculation,  but  it  will 
always  remain  a question  whether  many  of  the  evils  which 
appeared  later  might  not  have  been  avoided  by  a judicious 
combination  with  the  Cuban  Asamblea  in  the  early  months 
of  1899. 

A serious  problem  presented  itself  in  the  shape  of  what 
was  known  as  the  Mortgage  Extension  question.  The  cen- 
sus of  1899  gives  a valuation  of  the  real  estate  of  the  Island 
as  $323,641,895.  Upon  this,  the  same  authority  shows  an 
indebtedness,  represented  by  mortgages  and  censos,  of 
$247,915,494.  The  major  portion  of  this  was  of  some 
years  standing.  On  Muy  15,  1896,  General  Weyler  issued 


110 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


a decree,  in  view  of  the  financial  and  industrial  distress  re- 
sulting from  the  war  then  going  on,  that: 

“ 1.  Mortgages  maturing  or  to  mature  from  this  date 
onward  are  to  be  extended  until  April  29,  1897. 

“ 2.  During  this  time  (May  15,  1896,  to  April  30,  1897)  all 
legal  steps  regarding  the  payment  of  such  claims  will  also 
he  held  in  suspense.” 

This  applied  to  the  Island  at  large  with  the  exception  of 
Santiago  and  Puerto  Principe  Provinces  where  it  applied 
for  one  month  only.  A continuance  of  the  period  of  dis- 
turbance led  to  a continuance  of  the  decree  until  April, 
1898,  when  it  was  again  extended  until  April  1,  1899.  This 
lapped  over  into  the  period  of  American  control.  A vigorous 
agitation  was  started  for  a still  further  renewal,  and  after  a 
thorough  canvass  an  extension  wTas  granted  until  the  spring 
of  1901.  The  extension  was  a doubtful  measure,  beneficial 
to  the  debtor  class  but  seriously  detrimental  to  the  creditor 
class,  not  a fewr  of  wdiom  were  disastrously  affected  by  it. 
It  was  moreover  a serious  infraction  of  a fundamental  law  — 
that  of  contracts.  Even  to-day,  it  is  not  easy  to  say  whether 
the  granted  extension  worked  helpfully  or  injuriously  to  the 
general  welfare  of  the  Island.  At  all  events,  its  benefits 
were  not  so  clearly  evident  as  to  show  full  justification  for 
the  proceeding. 

In  view  of  the  general  lack  of  accurate  information  in  the 
United  States  regarding  Cuba,  the  Cuban  people,  and  Cuban 
affairs,  and  the  plentiful  amount  of  misinformation  supplied 
during  that  much  tangled  period,  it  is  less  surprising  than  it  is 
unfortunate  that  a wiser  and  more  definite  policy  should  not 
have  been  formulated  for  the  immediate  and  future  govern- 
ment of  the  Island.  The  situation  was  further  complicated 
by  the  fact  that  there  existed,  on  both  sides  of  the  straits, 
a feeling  that  those  who  had  fought  for  the  independence 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


111 


of  Cuba  were  the  ones  deserving  of  recognition  rather  than 
those  who  had  either  opposed  the  war  or  held  aloof  from 
it.  Yet  the  former  class  included  by  far  the  greater  number 
of  the  less  responsible,  while  the  latter  class  included  many 
of  the  highest  intelligence  and  the  greatest  property  in- 
terests. These  latter  held  back  from  participation,  while 
the  others  clamored  for  place  and  recognition.  As  in  both 
earlier  and  later  days,  there  was  illustrated  the  tendency 
of  the  Cuban  people  to  split  into  political  factions  rather 
than  to  divide  into  distinct  political  parties. 

Unduly  magnifying  that  which  their  country  had  done 
for  Cuba,  and  forgetting  that  American  intervention  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Island  was  far  from  being  entirely  unselfish, 
too  many  Americans  looked  to  see  the  Cuban  people  in  an 
attitude  of  subservient  gratitude,  and,  finding  them  less 
voluble  in  their  thanks  than  was  thought  to  be  fit  and  proper, 
at  once  declared  them  an  ungrateful  race.  The  pity  with 
which  the  Cubans  had  been  regarded,  during  their  days  of 
struggle  and  suffering,  largely  disappeared,  and  its  place  was 
filled  by  an  uncharitable  conviction  of  Cuban  unworthiness. 
Too  many  held  an  idea  that  to  have  freed  the  Cubans  from 
Spanish  bondage  was  enough  to  command  their  submission 
to  and  gratitude  for  anything  which  might  be  imposed  upon 
them  by  their  alien  rescuers.  Unbridled  comment  upon 
their  ignorance,  their  indifference  to  sanitation,  upon  the 
clamor  of  many  whom  the  Cubans  themselves  knew  to  be 
unworthy  of  place  and  preferment,  and  a general  air  of 
superiority  on  the  part  of  so  many  of  the  thousands  of  Ameri- 
cans who,  as  soldiers  or  civilians,  were  on  the  Island  in  those 
early  days,  tended  strongly  to  drive  the  Cubans  into  a semi- 
hostile  attitude  which  was  clearly  noticeable. 

A well-defined  breach  between  the  Cubans  and  the 
Americans  was  apparent  as  early  as  the  middle  of  February. 


112 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


The  Cubans  felt  that  they  were  being  ignored  in  affairs 
in  which  they  believed  they  had  an  active  concern.  Mili- 
tary methods  over-rode  civil  systems  established  by  the 
military  authorities.  Americans  were  irritated  by  Cuban 
manifestation  of  a resentment  which,  in  many  ways,  was 
excusable  if  not  justifiable.  Opposition  and  unfriendliness 
grew  upon  the  one  side,  and  uncharitableness  developed 
upon  the  other.  Cuba’s  most  emphatic  political  grievance 
in  earlier  days  had  been  the  system  of  military  absolutism. 
America’s  special  energies  might  be  directed  along  other 
lines  than  those  followed  by  her  predecessor,  but  the  Cuban 
saw  little  change  in  the  system.  No  doubt,  the  Cubans 
expected  too  much,  and  unreasonably  expected  political 
and  economic  relief  which  could  only  come  through  a process 
of  time.  But  it  is  perhaps  equally  beyond  doubt  that  the 
Americans  too  frequently  failed  to  take  the  Cuban  and  his 
ambitions  into  a duly  tactful  consideration. 

A problem  which  was  among  the  earliest  to  be  encountered 
was  presented  by  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  various 
municipalities.  Under  the  existing  system,  the  Island  was 
divided  into  municipal  districts  which  practically  correspond 
to  American  counties  or  parishes.  These  districts  consti- 
tute the  political  and  administrative  units  of  the  Island. 
Each  municipal  district  is  under  the  government  of  a munic- 
ipal council.  Each  must  contain  not  less  than  two  thou- 
sand inhabitants,  and  present  an  area  of  territory  fairly 
proportioned  to  its  population.  They  are  sub-divisions  of 
judicial  districts  and  provinces.  At  that  time  there  were 
in  the  division  of  the  Island  six  provinces,  thirty-one  judicial 
districts,  and  one  hundred  and  thirty-two  municipalities. 
The  municipality  is  divided  into  subdistricts  and  these  into 
wards,  or  barrios.  The  affairs  of  these  municipalities  were 
found  to  be  sorely  tangled.  There  was  confusion  in  the 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


113 


laws  which  regulated  them,  and  dire  confusion  in  their 
administrative  processes.  Many  of  them  showed  outstand- 
ing liabilities  with  creditors  seeking  the  settlement  of  accounts. 
Many  of  the  municipal  governments  had  expired  and  there 
were  neither  officials,  treasury,  nor  revenue.  On  March  21, 
an  order  was  issued  suspending  the  prosecution  of  all  claims 
against  municipalities  or  Provincial  Deputations,  pending  a 
reorganization.  As  rapidly  as  possible,  mayors  were  ap- 
pointed to  fill  vacancies,  and  allotments  made  from  the 
insular  fund  to  provide  for  their  immediate  needs.  This 
method  was  continued  until  the  elections  of  June,  1900. 
Yet,  notwithstanding  this  provision,  at  the  close  of  the  year 
it  was  found  that  the  municipalities  had  incurred  a debt 
whose  total  amounted  to  some  $300,000.  This,  it  will  be 
understood,  was  the  sum  of  municipal  expenditure  beyond 
the  amount  locally  collected  and  the  appropriation  by  the 
central  government.  This  situation  was  due,  in  part,  to 
the  influence  left  in  the  Cuban  mind  and  custom  by  Spanish 
methods;  in  part,  to  the  inexperience  of  the  officials;  and, 
in  part,  to  the  failure  of  the  intervening  power  to  set  in 
motion  those  processes  of  local  taxation  from  which  self- 
governing  municipalities  properly  derive  their  revenues. 

The  problem  of  the  effective  reconstruction  of  these  or- 
ganizations was  one  of  the  most  serious  and  complicated 
which  was  presented  for  American  consideration.  Life 
under  a strongly  centralized  government,  in  whose  processes 
municipal  governments  were  inextricably  entangled,  find- 
ing a confused  termination,  local  self-government  and  pro- 
vision for  necessary  revenues  seemed  beyond  the  immediate 
reach  of  the  Cuban  people.  The  application,  even  in  no 
more  than  a general  way,  of  the  American  system,  involved 
a change  so  radical  as  to  encounter  the  disapproval  of  Cuba’s 
ablest  men.  The  poverty  of  the  people  was  urged  as  an 


114 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


insurmountable  barrier  to  any  system  of  local  taxation. 
In  the  minds  of  many,  this  was  an  excuse  and  not  a reason. 
Doubtless  there  were  those  who  were  utterly  unable  to  pay 
taxes  upon  real  property  which  belonged  to  them.  But 
there  were  also  many,  notably  in  the  larger  cities,  who  could 
pay,  and  they  were  relieved  because  of  the  poverty  of  the 
others. 

The  City  of  Havana  was  especially  favored  in  the  matter 
of  appropriation  from  the  insular  fund.  Major  Ladd,  the 
treasurer  of  the  Island,  reported  that 

“From  Jan.  1,  1899,  to  June  30,  1900, the  city  of  Havana  received 
from  the  General  Government  nearly  five  millions  of  dollars,  the 
same  being  expended  almost  exclusively  for  distinctly  municipal 
purposes.  In  lesser  degree  the  same  conditions  obtained  in  other 
cities.  The  proper  course  would  seem  to  have  been  some  system 
of  local  taxation  by  which  the  various  municipalities  bore  all  or  at 
least  a large  part  of  their  expenses.’’ 

A complete  revision  of  the  system  of  taxation  may  have 
been  beyond  the  scope  of  the  proper  functions  of  a govern- 
ment which  was  pledged  “to  exercise  neither  sovereignty, 
jurisdiction,  nor  control,”  but  it  is  nevertheless  true  that 
equally  radical  changes  were  effected  in  other  departments 
of  insular  affairs.  But  that  was  not  the  ground  upon  which 
decision  was  made  in  this  matter.  The  innovation  appeared 
to  be  unpopular,  as  taxation  usually  is,  and  appropriations 
continued  from  the  insular  funds. 

It  may  be  said  in  this  connection  that  this  matter  con- 
tinued as  a source  of  more  or  less  active  confusion  and 
irritation  throughout  the  period  of  American  occupation. 
A committee  appointed  by  General  Wood,  in  January, 
1900,  reported  adversely  to  the  taxation  of  values  instead 
of  incomes  and  products,  although  the  system  relieved 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


115 


from  taxation  many  large  areas  and  valuable  properties 
from  which  owners,  often  men  of  large  wealth,  were  de- 
riving no  immediate  income,  and  imposed  a burden  upon 
many  who  were  struggling  for  livelihood.  There  was  also 
gross  misuse  of  such  funds  as  were  made  available  by  the 
system  adopted.  In  the  official  report  of  the  insular  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury,  Senor  Cancio,  published  in  the  fall  of 
1900,  it  was  shown  that  the  municipal  revenues  for  the 
whole  Island  were  $1,188,333.31.  Of  this  sum  $838,908.50 
was  spent  for  official  salaries  and  office  materials,  and 
$349,304.81  for  public  improvements  of  all  kinds.  This  is 
a most  discreditable  showing  for  the  officials,  though  it  is 
indicative  of  nothing  so  much  as  of  the  effect  of  Spanish 
influence  and  political  example.  The  problem  is  now  being 
worked  out,  and  its  full  solution  will  be  facilitated  and 
hastened  by  a reasonable  measure  of  industrial  prosperity 
in  the  Island. 

Early  attention  was  paid  to  the  condition  of  Cuba’s  penal 
institutions.  These  places  were  not  only  in  a condition  of 
disgusting  and  horrible  filthiness,  but  they  were  as  well 
crowded  with  prisoners,  some  serving  sentences,  some 
awaiting  trial,  and  some  held  for  no  ascertainable  reason. 
Many  of  them  were  political  prisoners.  An  American 
officer  was  assigned  to  investigate  the  cases  as  rapidly  as 
possible,  and  for  a time  a very  considerable  jail  delivery 
was  effected.  The  process  continued  as  time  was  found  for 
investigation,  and  the  end  of  the  year  found  no  great  num- 
ber of  people  in  jail  who  did  not  properly  belong  there. 

The  gradual  dissolution  of  the  Cuban'Army  of  Liberation 
had  been  in  process  ever  since  the  termination  of  hostilities 
at  Santiago.  Its  definite  disbandment  began  in  Novem- 
ber, 1898.  A Licencia,  or  furlough,  was  granted  to  all 
who  could  obtain  work  or  who  desired  to  return  to  their 


116 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


homes.  A notable  part  of  the  army,  however,  held  together 
and  so  remained  during  the  opening  months  of  1899.  This 
body  constituted  a disturbing  element  in  the  community. 
It  was  a menace  to  peace  although  a considerable  portion 
of  it  was  definitely  engaged,  under  American  authority, 
in  maintaining  peace,  in  the  capacity  of  a Rural  Guard. 
As  an  army,  its  recognition  was  impossible,  though  its  exist- 
ence was  not  to  be  denied.  Its  actual  dissolution,  as  an 
organization,  was  highly  desirable.  Aside  from  the  limited 
number  whose  services  were  of  advantage  as  a rural  police, 
it  did  no  work,  and  it  had  to  eat.  It  remained  as  a body 
of  non-producers  in  a land  whose  welfare  depended  upon 
production.  Those  who  should  have  been  burden-bearers 
became  a burden.  There  was  no  reason  why  the  greater 
number  of  them  should  not  wield  a hoe  in  place  of  carrying 
a gun,  and  there  was  every  reason  why  they  should 
do  so. 

A point  of  personal  dignity,  or  something  of  that  kind, 
stood  in  the  way  of  an  adjustment  for  several  weeks.  The 
mountain  would  not  go  to  Mahomet,  neither  would  Mahomet 
go  to  the  mountain.  Maximo  Gomez  stood  upon  his  dignity, 
and  General  Brooke  upon  his.  To  some  of  us  who  were  in 
the  Island  at  the  time,  it  did  not  appear  that  any  special 
strain  of  either  dignity  or  diplomacy  was  required  for  these 
two  leaders  to  get  together  in  furtherance  of  the  interests 
and  the  welfare  of  both  countries.  Gomez  was  the  recog- 
nized leader  of  his  people,  and  particularly  of  the  Cuban 
army,  whose  return  to  productive  industry  was  most  desirable. 
He  was  in  the  field,  near  Remedios,  and  refused  to  become 
a suppliant.  General  Brooke  was  in  Havana,  occupied  with 
important  affairs,  and  declined  to  make  any  overtures  to  the 
stubborn  and  somewhat  erratic  old  gentlemen  out  in  the 
woods.  No  serious  trouble  resulted,  it  is  true,  but  there 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


117 


remains  a possibility  that  much  good  might  have  resulted 
from  a cordial  understanding  between  these  two  leaders. 

An  arrangement  was  finally  effected  through  Mr.  Robert 
P.  Porter,  who  arrived  in  Havana  about  the  end  of  January'. 
Mr.  Porter  secured  a conference  with  General  Gomez  and 
obtained  a verbal  agreement  by  which  the  army  was  to  be 
disbanded  upon  the  distribution  of  $3,000,000,  a sum  which 
the  authorities  at  Washington  had  tentatively  allotted  for 
the  purpose.  There  was  much  discussion  whether  this  sum 
constituted  a gift  or  a loan  to  the  Island,  and  the  authority 
for  the  appropriation  was  called  in  question.  The  sum 
was  a part  of  the  remaining  balance  of  the  congressional 
appropriation  of  $50,000,000,  which  was  placed  at  the  dis- 
posal of  President  McKinley  in  the  earlier  days  of  the  war. 
The  object  of  the  allotment  was  to  aid  the  soldiers  of  the 
Cuban  Army  to  return  to  their  homes,  and,  so  far  as  was 
possible,  to  resume  their  wonted  occupations.  Its  return 
was  not  required.  The  conditions  were  that  the  benefi- 
ciaries should  prove  their  connection  with  the  army,  and 
turn  in  a gun.  A tedious  delay  followed,  although  the 
money  was  sent  and  held  on  board  a war-ship  in  the  harbor 
of  Havana. 

The  “ Cuban  Assembly,”  claiming  to  be  the  qualified 
representative  of  the  army,  was  greatly  incensed  at  the  action 
of  General  Gomez,  and  promptly  deposed  him  from  his 
position  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Cuban  forces. 
This  act  served  no  purpose  save  the  increased  confusion  of 
an  anomalous  situation.  The  people  and  the  army  gener- 
ally stood  by  Gomez,  with  whom  the  United  States  had  made 
the  arrangement,  and  who  would  doubtless  be  further  recog- 
nized in  the  distribution  of  the  funds.  To  the  Asamblea , 
the  United  States  had  definitely  and  distinctly  refused  any 
sort  of  recognition.  But  the  Asamblea  held  the  rolls  of  the 


118 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


army,  and,  for  a time,  declined  to  produce  them.  These 
were  essential  in  determining  the  service  qualification. 
They  were  at  last  released  by  the  dissolution  of  the  Asamblea. 
They  included  the  names  of  some  48,000  men,  a number 
which  many  competent  Cuban  authorities  declared  to  be 
absurdly  in  excess  of  all  possible  enrollment  in  the  Cuban 
army.  It  included  the  names  of  many  who  could  not  be 
found,  and  failed  to  include  many  who,  by  other  evidence, 
proved  the  fact  of  service  beyond  any  reasonable  doubt. 
It  included  the  names  of  many  who  had  seen  no  fighting 
and  no  military  service,  but  who  had  acted  in  some  official 
or  clerical  position  in  connection  with  the  quasi  Cuban 
Republic. 

The  allotment  had  been  made  on  the  basis  of  a payment 
of  $100  per  man  to  an  estimated  force  of  30,000.  Several 
months  were  consumed  in  effort  to  adjust  the  matter.  It 
was  finally  determined  by  the  elimination  of  officers  and 
those  who  had  served  only  in  civil  or  semi-civil  capacities. 
Seventy-five  dollars  per  man  was  awarded  to  33,930  men, 
and  the  balance,  $455,250,  was  returned  to  Washington. 
With  the  exception  of  those  who  were  retained  as  a rural 
police,  the  Army  of  Liberation  passed  into  history  and  into 
organizations  of  Veterans  of  the  Cuban  Army.  Some  used 
the  money  which  they  thus  received  in  the  commendable 
fashion  of  home  establishment.  Some  disposed  of  their 
share  in  more  expeditious  but  less  laudable  manner. 


Chapter  VTII 


FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION  — Continued 

One  of  the  interesting  features  of  the  year  was  the  some- 
what problematic  position  of  Gen.  Maximo  Gomez.  He 
had  been  a notable  leader  in  the  Ten  Years’  War,  although 
he  was  not  a Cuban.  It  was  he  who  effected  the  termina- 
tion of  that  war  by  the  Treaty  of  Zanjon.  That  accom- 
plished, he  returned  to  his  home  in  Santo  Domingo,  where 
he  remained  until,  on  the  personal  solicitation  of  Jose  Marti, 
the  idealist  to  whose  efforts,  more  than  to  those  of  any  other, 
the  revolution  of  1895  was  due,  he  returned  to  Cuba  to  as- 
sume the  military  leadership  of  the  new  insurrection.  Ilis 
methods  of  fighting  were  those  of  the  guerilla  rather  than 
those  of  the  soldier,  but  it  was  to  his  skill  in  that  style  of  war- 
fare, and  to  his  tenacity  of  purpose,  that  Cuba’s  insurrec- 
tion was  brought  to  a practical  deadlock  which  might  have 
continued  almost  indefinitely  had  it  not  been  for  the  inter- 
vention of  the  United  States.  While  neither  Gomez  nor 
his  companions,  either  in  the  field  or  in  the  government, 
asked  for  that  intervention,  it  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  he 
looked  for  the  time  when  the  United  States  would  be  vir- 
tually forced  to  interfere  in  some  more  effective  manner 
than  that  of  diplomatic  negotiation. 

The  developments  of  that  interference  left  General  Gomez 
on  one  side.  Gen.  Calixto  Garcia  was  the  commander  of 
the  department  of  Santiago,  and  it  was  with  him  that  the 
United  States  transacted  the  necessary  business  which 


120 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


followed  the  capitulation  of  Santiago  and  the  destruction 
of  the  Spanish  squadron.  Gomez  remained  in  the  field  in 
the  northern  central  portion  of  the  Island,  and  for  many 
months  was  inactive  except  for  a general  police  supervision 
for  the  preservation  of  law  and  order.  He  opened  no  official 
relations  with  the  new  authorities,  and  it  is  quite  certain 
that  he  entertained  grave  doubts  concerning  the  future 
course  of  the  United  States.  To  a man  of  his  previous 
experience  and  mental  make-up,  fidelity  to  national  pledges 
or  to  the  terms  of  treaties  was  difficult  of  comprehension,  and 
the  voluntary  giving  up  of  that  which  lay  in  the  hand  of  a 
mighty  nation  was  a proceeding  which  required  actual 
accomplishment  before  it  could  be  fully  believed.  He  re- 
mained in  camp,  attended  by  a body-guard  of  his  old  troops, 
watchfully  awaiting  the  development  of  the  plans  and  pur- 
poses of  the  United  States. 

In  February  he  came  to  Havana,  after  making  a triumphal 
procession  through  the  Island.  In  spite  of  the  many  enemies 
he  had  made  during  the  processes  of  two  wars,  it  is  certain 
that,  at  this  time,  he  was  the  strong  man  of  the  Island,  and 
the  fact  that  he  had  remained  aloof,  semi-mysterious  in  his 
plans  and  movements,  instead  of  plunging  into  the  disturbed 
arena  of  the  period,  served  only  to  add  to  his  prestige.  It 
was  known  that  he  realized  the  strength  of  the  United  States, 
and  the  ability  of  that  country  to  seize  and  hold  the  Island, 
and  to  stamp  out  insurrection  in  a manner  which  was  be- 
yond the  range  of  Spanish  military  methods.  It  was  known 
that  he  had  no  unlimited  confidence  in  the  American  Con- 
gress. Therefore  he  waited,  and  many  Cubans  held  their 
own  attitude  in  suspense  pending  the  action  of  Gomez  in 
either  allying  himself  with  or  definitely  opposing  the  inter- 
ventores. 

Following  an  interview  with  Mr.  Robert  P.  Porter,  at 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


121 


Remedios,  and  the  arrangement  for  the  payment  of  the  army, 
he  started  for  Havana,  visiting  the  more  prominent  towns 
and  cities  on  his  way.  The  journey  was  a continuous  ova- 
tion, and  despite  the  poverty  and  distress  of  the  country, 
his  arrival  was  signalized  by  triumphal  arches,  processions, 
balls,  and  banquets.  The  result  of  it  all  was  a distinct 
unification  of  Cuban  sentiment.  Wherever  he  went,  he 
urged  forbearance,  forgiveness,  and  the  burial  of  the  past, 
to  Cuban  and  to  Spaniard  alike.  He  urged  harmony  and 
unity  of  action,  not  against  Americans,  but  for  the  building 
of  a distinct  Cuban  nation  which  should  be  recognized  by 
the  American  people  with  whom  it  should  live  in  relations 
of  the  closest  amity. 

In  the  whole  history  of  Havana,  no  such  reception  had 
ever  been  given  to  any  man  as  that  given  to  this  idol  of  scores 
of  thousands  of  Cuban  hearts.  Never  before  in  their  his- 
tory had  the  Cuban  people  been  given  so  free  a hand  in  a 
popular  demonstration.  Parades,  fiestas,  and  decorations 
were  sufficiently  familiar,  but  all  previous  affairs  had  been 
tinged  with  the  red  and  yellow  of  Spain.  This  event  was 
distinctly  Cuban,  and  Havana  gave  to  Cuba’s  hero  a royal 
welcome.  He  entered  the  city  triumphant,  though  not  as 
a conqueror,  to  be  greeted  by  the  plaudits  of  the  multitude, 
and  to  stand,  in  the  palace  of  Spain’s  many  Governors,  in 
the  very  room  in  which  plan  after  plan  had  been  formed 
for  his  capture,  his  overthrow,  or  his  death.  He  came  to 
occupy,  for  a time,  the  summer  palace  of  the  Spanish  Gov- 
ernor-General, by  the  invitation  of  those  who  had  made  his 
visit  to  Havana  a possibility.  A vast  parade  of  military 
organizations  and  civic  societies  wound  through  the  narrow 
streets  of  the  city,  bordered  throughout  its  way  by  dense 
masses  of  excited  Cubans  who  shouted  and  cheered  as  they 
never  had  shouted  in  all  their  previous  life. 


122 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


Huge  and  elaborate  floats  formed  a part  of  the  procession. 
Some  were  of  interesting  significance.  Two  appeared  as 
companions.  The  first  pictured  the  Cuba  of  Yesterday. 
It  represented  desolation.  Dried  grass  indicated  wasted 
fields,  and  broken  agricultural  implements  indicated  agri- 
cultural idleness.  A shackled  maiden  personified  the  Cuban 
people.  This  was  followed  by  the  contrasting  float  — the 
Cuba  of  To-morrow.  Over  a parquet  flooring,  surrounded 
by  festoons,  flowers,  and  banners,  there  presided  the  bright 
goddess  of  a free  and  happy  people.  This  was  a bit  of 
characteristic  significance.  It  indicated  a return  to  pleasure 
on  the  part  of  a pleasure-loving  people,  a people  to  whom 
work  was  a means  to  an  end,  rather  than  the  return  to  in- 
dustry on  the  part  of  an  industrious  people.  The  first  float 
was  a wasted  field.  The  second  was  a ball-room.  In  one 
carriage  three  young  ladies  represented  Cuba,  Spain,  and 
the  United  States.  Each  carried  the  flag  of  the  respective 
countries.  Significance  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  Spanish 
flag  was  not  torn  from  the  group  by  some  hot-headed  patriot, 
and  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  combination  called  out  abun- 
dant applause.  The  union  of  the  Cuban  flag  and  the  stars 
and  stripes  was  frequent,  and,  in  nearly  every  instance, 
those  who  bore  them  sat  with  linked  hands. 

The  immediate  presence  of  General  Gomez  was  un- 
doubtedly a disturbing  clement.  It  emphasized  the  quarrel 
which  the  Asamblea  had  made  with  him,  and  some  friction 
occurred  between  their  respective  followers.  Difficulty 
also  arose  from  the  fact  of  the  recognition  of  Gomez  by  the 
American  authorities,  who  had  persistently  declined  any 
recognition  of  the  Asamblea.  Gomez  essayed  no  interference 
in  the  process  of  affairs,  and  made  himself  of  service  in 
various  ways.  Due  recognition  of  his  place  and  influence 
was  made  by  liberal  contributions  from  the  insular  fund  for 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


123 


his  pecuniary  needs.  This  “gratuity”  was  only  a little 
less  than  the  pay  and  revenue  of  the  Military  Governor. 
Gomez  soon  ceased  to  be  an  active  factor  in  Cuban  affairs, 
though,  until  the  last,  he  remained  an  element,  sometimes 
helpful  and  sometimes  disturbing,  in  political  processes. 
The  Constitution  made  it  possible  for  him  to  become  the 
first  president  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba,  but  his  elevation  to 
that  position  by  the  choice  of  the  people  was  at  all  times  a 
matter  of  no  little  doubt.  He  had  too  deeply  offended 
many  of  both  the  political  and  the  military  leaders.  He 
remains  and  will  ever  remain  the  great  and  romantic  figure 
in  the  history  of  Cuba’s  struggles  for  national  independence. 

The  year  1899  maybe  divided  into  three  periods,  although 
there  was,  of  necessity,  a general  overlapping.  They  occur 
in  the  following  order:  First  — The  resolution  of  chaotic 
conditions;  Second  — Construction  and  reconstruction  of 
governmental  machinery;  and  Third  — The  operation  of 
that  machinery.  A fundamental  requirement  in  all  these 
processes  was  the  establishment  of  peace  and  order.  For 
this,  both  a city  and  a rural  police  were  necessary.  The 
provost  marshal’s  guard,  imperative  in  the  earlier  days,  was 
an  offensive  institution  to  the  people,  as  too  strongly  sugges- 
tive of  the  old  Spanish  military  government.  For  a time 
the  Cuban  army  voluntarily  assumed  the  functions  of  Rural 
Guard  and  of  police  in  the  larger  towns.  The  valuable 
services  of  ex-Superintendent  of  Police  John  B.  McCullagh, 
of  New  York,  were  secured  for  the  organization  of  a munic- 
ipal police  for  the  city  of  Havana.  On  March  1,  a uni- 
formed and  equipped  and  partly  drilled  force  of  about 
one  thousand  men  was  entrusted  with  the  maintenance  of 
law  and  order  in  that  city.  With  proper  allowance  for 
faults  due  to  lack  of  experience,  the  work  of  this  organiza- 
tion has  been  highly  creditable,  though  it  should  not  be 


124 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


forgotten  that  the  work  of  any  Cuban  police  is  greatly  sim- 
plified by  the  fact  that  the  Cubans  are  neither  a turbulent 
nor  a drunken  people.  A local  detective  force  was  also 
organized  under  the  efficient  direction  of  ex-sergeant  Crowley, 
of  New  York.  In  addition  to  the  municipal  police  of  the 
different  cities,  a Rural  Guard,  for  the  maintenance  of  order 
throughout  the  country  areas,  was  organized  in  all  of  the 
provinces  of  the  Island  with  the  exception  of  Matanzas. 
This  exception  is  accounted  for  not  by  any  less  need  for 
them  in  that  province,  but  by  the  evidently  justified  belief 
of  the  department  commander,  General  Wilson,  that  the 
system  was  un-American  and  savored  too  greatly  of  the 
old  Spanish  method.  It  was  that  officer’s  opinion  that 
the  proper  course  was  the  effective  organization  of  the 
Municipal  Police,  and  his  experience  in  Matanzas  Province 
amply  endorsed  his  opinion.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
the  Cuban  municipality  includes  the  rural  as  well  as  the 
urban  districts.  The  Rural  Guard,  as  it  was  organized, 
was  composed  of  and  officered  by  those  who  had  served 
in  the  Cuban  army.  It  was  of  unquestionable  service  and 
furnished  paid  employment  to  some  twelve  hundred  men. 
While  the  system  is  open  to  many  objections  as  a system, 
through  the  ready  possibility  of  its  misuse  in  the  hands  of 
an  unscrupulous  central  government,  and  while  many  of 
these  objections  would  have  been  eliminated  by  the  insti- 
tution of  a municipal  police,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  body  was  of  important  service  in  the  Island. 

Naturally,  the  retiring  government  left  an  empty  insular 
treasury.  This  was  soon  remedied  by  receipts  from  various 
sources,  and  the  first  eight  months  of  the  year  1899  show  a 
revenue  of  some  $10,000,000.  The  administration  of  the 
fiscal  department  was  simplified  and  rendered  more  effec- 
tive by  the  appointment,  on  February  2,  of  Major  Eugene 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


125 


F.  Ladd  as  Treasurer  and  Disbursing  Officer  of  Customs. 
By  Headquarters  Order  of  March  18,  Major  Ladd  was 
appointed  Auditor  of  the  Island  of  Cuba,  and,  on  July  1, 
he  was  appointed  as  the  insular  Treasurer.  It  is  to  be  said 
of  Major  Ladd  that  not  only  did  he  make  himself  cordially 
liked  and  sincerely  respected  by  all  who  came  into  contact 
with  him,  but,  as  well,  that  of  the  more  than  $30,000,000 
which  passed  through  his  department  during  his  incum- 
bency, eveiy  cent  was  duly  accounted  for. 

The  insular  financial  system  made  its  early  and  impera- 
tive demand  for  attention  and  regulation.  The  monetary 
system  was  in  itself  complex.  The  gold  in  circulation  con- 
sisted of  both  Spanish  and  French  coins.  To  prevent 
their  exportation,  an  artificial  value  had  been  placed  upon 
them  by  Spanish  law.  Thus,  the  actual  value  of  a Spanish 
centen  might  be  equivalent  to  $4.82  in  American  money. 
Its  value  in  circulation  was  counted  at  $5.30.  Silver  money, 
in  its  relation  to  gold,  showed  constant  and  sometimes  marked 
fluctuation.  Throughout  Havana  there  were  many  small 
shops  and  offices,  known  as  cambios,  or  exchanges,  which 
derived  a fair  income  from  the  conversion  of  these  fluctuat- 
ing mediums.  Into  the  already  complicated  system,  there 
came  American  gold,  paper,  and  silver  with  still  other 
circulating  values.  The  order  establishing  an  official  ratio 
of  these  various  coins,  for  use  in  the  custom  house,  post- 
office,  etc.,  had  little  effect  on  their  use  in  general  circula- 
tion, and  Americans  and  visiting  strangers  found  in  the 
system  much  that  was  perplexing  and  annoying. 

As  a natural  result  of  disturbed  conditions  and  a change 
of  government,  both  insular  and  municipal  treasuries  were 
empty,  and  the  entire  fiscal  system  in  a deranged  condition. 
During  earlier  days,  an  office,  known  as  the  Intcndcncia, 
had  been  vested  with  almost  unrestricted  power  of  extract- 


126 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


ing  revenue  from  the  Island.  With  the  introduction  of  the 
nominal  autonomy  of  1897-1898,  changes  were  effected  in 
the  old  system.  These,  of  brief  duration  and  ineffective 
operation,  only  served  to  pile  confusion  upon  confusion. 
Reorganization  of  revenue,  auditing,  and  systems  of  taxa- 
tion were  imperative.  On  February  10,  an  order  was  issued 
remitting  “ all  taxes  due,  under  Spanish  laws  in  force  in  this 
Island,  and  unpaid  on  Jan.  1,  1899,”  with  the  exception 
of  taxes  on  railway  passengers  and  freight,  collected  and 
held  by  the  various  railway  companies.  Various  other 
Spanish  taxes  were  abolished,  including,  by  an  order  of 
March  25,  the  tax  known  as  the  Consumo  de  Ganado,  which 
added  four  and  one  quarter  cents  per  kilo  to  all  market 
beef.  By  the  same  order  — 

“All  taxes  and  imposts  on  articles  of  prime  necessity,  such  as 
food  and  fuel,  including  kindling  wood,  coal,  and  charcoal,  are  also 
hereby  abolished,  with  the  exception  of  those  imposed  on  distilled 
and  fermented  alcoholic  liquors. 

“ No  municipality  shall  be  allowed  to  place  a tax  on  the 
importation  or  exportation  of  merchandise  or  cattle,  and  all 
municipal  taxes  now  affecting  those  articles  are  hereby  abol- 
ished.” 

Modification  and  regulation  were  effected  in  the  taxation 
of  urban  and  rural  property  and  in  the  system  of  industrial 
taxes.  The  internal  excise  tax,  on  wholesale  and  retail  sale 
of  alcohol,  spirits,  and  liquors,  was  greatly  increased  and 
constituted  a revenue  of  the  municipalities  instead  of  the 
State.  Under  the  old  system,  fees  were  necessary  for  the 
obtaining  of  academic  or  professional  degrees  of  their  various 
kinds.  These  fees  were  abolished,  and  students  could 
attach  letters  to  their  names,  without  payment,  after  pass- 
ing the  proper  examination.  On  April  19,  all  war  taxes 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


127 


were  abolished,  and  adjustment  effected  in  other  branches 
of  taxation.  On  June  14,  an  order  provided  for  the  return, 
to  actual  owners,  of  all  property,  urban  or  rural,  then  held 
by  the  State  or  by  a municipality  as  a result  of  proceedings 
for  the  collection  of  taxes,  subject  to  certain  prescribed 
regulations. 

A condition  quite  unfamiliar  to  Americans  existed  in  the 
church  owmersliip  of  many  of  the  cemeteries  of  the  Island. 
A few  were  owned  by  the  municipalities,  but  the  majority 
were  the  property  of  the  dominant  church,  whose  officials 
collected  fees  for  burial  and  rental  for  burying  ground. 
Some  confusion  existed  in  the  administration  of  the  two 
systems.  The  attempt  to  regulate  this,  upon  a basis  of 
incomplete  information,  led  to  further  entanglement  until 
its  later  settlement  was  effected  upon  a basis  fairly  accept- 
able to  both  parties. 

The  condition  of  the  marriage  laws  was  also  productive 
of  confusion.  The  old  Spanish  system  recognized  no  mar- 
riages as  legal  save  those  solemnized  under  the  authority  of 
the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  A provision  had  been  made 
for  the  legality  of  the  civil  marriage  of  non-Catholic  persons. 
Rut  as  the  Island  people  were,  with  few  exceptions,  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  faith,  the  civil  marriage  was  unusual. 
The  religious  marriage  was  imperative  for  all  Catholics. 
With  the  complete  separation  of  Church  and  State,  which 
followed  the  expulsion  of  the  Spanish  Government,  a new 
order  became  necessary.  On  May  31,  there  was  issued 
Order  No.  6(>.  Its  first  article  is  as  follows:  — “Here- 
after civil  marriages  only  shall  be  legally  valid.  The  con- 
tracting parties  may  conform  to  the  precepts  of  whatever 
religion  they  may  profess,  in  addition  to  the  formalities 
necessary  to  contract  the  civil  marriage.” 

The  order  also  made  provision  for  the  validation  of  pre- 


128 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


vious  marriages,  for  proper  registration,  and  fixed  the 
marriage  fee  at  one  dollar,  or  its  equivalent,  in  American 
money.  The  intention  of  this  law  was,  unquestionably, 
entirely  worthy.  Yet  much  confusion  followed  it,  and  its 
repeal  became  necessary.  Its  author,  Senor  Lanuza,  the 
Secretary  of  Justice,  occupies  something  more  than  six 
pages  of  his  official  report  in  an  explanation  and  a defence 
of  the  measure.  It  is  interesting  to  note  in  the  report  of 
General  Wood,  for  the  year  1900,  that  when  a change  was 
proposed,  eighty  out  of  one  hundred  and  seven  municipali- 
ties declared  for  its  continuance.  The  members  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  with  one  exception,  also  favored  its  con- 
tinuance, as  did  three  of  the  six  Provincial  Governors  and  a 
majority  of  the  Judges  of  the  First  Instance.  Its  notable 
opponent  was  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  headed  by  the 
Archbishop  of  Santiago  and  the  Bishop  of  Havana.  Their 
influence  prevailed,  and  Order  No.  307  was  issued  on  Aug. 
8,  1900.  This  order  declared  that  marriage  “ may  be  civil 
or  religious  at  the  option  of  the  contracting  parties,”  and 
provides  the  conditions  under  which  each  is  to  be  regarded 
as  legally  valid. 

Order  No.  66  was  issued  in  all  good  faith,  at  the  instance 
of  the  Cuban  Secretary  of  Justice,  and  was  in  no  way  an 
American  or  a Protestant  attempt  to  undermine  or  interfere 
with  the  processes  or  position  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church. 
A new  law  was  necessary  by  reason  of  the  changed  relations 
between  the  Church  and  the  State.  It  is  unfortunate  that 
the  Cuban  functionary  should  have  drafted  so  radical  a 
measure,  and  it  is  equally  unfortunate  that  General  Brooke 
gave  it  his  approval.  It  gave  needless  offence  to  the  Church, 
and  gave  ground  for  no  little  unjust  criticism. 

On  August  19  an  important  order  was  issued  under  the 
authority  of  the  United  States  directing  the  preparation 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


129 


of  a census  report  covering  the  population  of  the  Island, 
its  agricultural  conditions  and  its  products,  and  a full  report 
of  the  educational  conditions.  Lieut.  Col.  J.  P.  Sanger, 
of  the  Inspector  General’s  Department  of  the  United  States 
Army,  was  appointed  Director  of  the  Census,  with  Mr. 
Victor  H.  Olmstead  as  Assistant  Director.  Six  Cubans 
were  appointed  as  supervisors.  Cubans  were  also  employed 
as  enumerators.  Endless  difficulties  were  encountered  in 
the  performance  of  the  work,  but  the  result  was  the  com- 
pilation and  publication  of  a volume  of  great  interest  and 
high  importance.  It  reviews,  in  brief,  the  history  and  the 
past  government  of  the  Island,  its  geography,  flora,  and 
fauna,  the  character  and  the  occupations  of  the  people,  and 
their  educational  and  sociological  conditions,  with  full 
tabulation  of  the  industrial  features.  Reports  at  various 
times  from  1768  to  1887  had  been  made  by  the  Spanish 
authorities,  but  all  were  inaccurate  and  rudimentary.  Many 
of  them  were  little  else  than  general  estimates.  Colonel 
Sanger’s  work  was  broadly  and  effectively  accomplished. 

In  February,  1899,  the  American  Congress  passed  a bill, 
known  as  the  Foraker  law,  prohibiting  the  granting  of 
franchises  or  concessions  during  the  period  of  American 
occupation.  Such  a law  must,  of  necessity,  produce  both 
beneficial  and  detrimental  results.  Viewed  broadly,  there 
can  be  no  question  that  it  has  been  of  great  and  lasting  ser- 
vice to  the  Island  and  its  people.  Scores  of  promoters  and 
irresponsible  speculators  turned  longing  eyes  toward  a land 
so  generally  destitute  as  Cuba  was  of  those  institutions 
known  as  “modern  improvements.”  Steam  railways  and 
electric  lines,  telegraph  systems,  and  all  departments  in 
which  monopoly  becomes  a desirable  possession,  were 
among  the  special  rights  sought  by  plausible  but  irrespon- 
sible men  who  desired  them  thut  they  might  dispose  of  them 


ISO 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


at  large  figures  to  responsible  parties  who  might  then  under- 
take their  development.  Against  this  tide  of  generally  im- 
pecunious speculators,  whose  aim  was  to  obtain  much  while 
giving  little  or  no  equivalent,  Cuba  was  guarded  by  the 
Foraker  Law.  On  the  other  hand,  that  law  doubtless 
operated  to  stop  certain  lines  of  important  development  of 
the  Island  and  its  resources,  which  would  have  been  of 
marked  advantage.  These,  however,  were  only  delayed, 
not  improbably  with  some  measure  of  advantage  in  the 
delay,  inasmuch  as  a better  knowledge  of  conditions  was 
gained  during  the  waiting  period. 

During  a time  of  such  inevitable  confusion,  attended  by  a 
general  lack  of  adequate  information  on  the  part  of  the  new 
authorities,  it  must  be  admitted  that  much  was  done  that 
should  not  have  been  done,  and  much  more  was  not  done  that 
might  have  been  better  done.  The  most  serious  mistake 
unquestionably  lay  in  the  failure  to  give  due  attention  to 
that  feature  which  is  the  key  to  peace  and  order  in  Cuba  — 
her  economic  welfare.  Political  entanglements  and  social 
disorganization  forced  themselves  into  prominence  and 
demanded  the  time  and  attention  of  the  insular  govern- 
ment. The  immediate  distress  was  relieved,  and  much 
was  accomplished  in  the  solution  of  the  many  vexing  politi- 
cal problems.  The  Cuban  people  turned  in  hopeful  pa- 
tience to  the  resumption  of  their  industries  with  such  limited 
resources  as  they  could  command. 

A number  of  prominent  Cubans  urged  upon  the  Govern- 
ment the  necessity  for  assisting  the  agricultural  classes  who 
constitute  a large  percentage  of  the  Island  people.  Others 
would  have  been  glad  to  give  their  counsel  and  express  their 
views,  but  the  step  was  somewhat  too  radical  for  all  save 
a few  of  a people  in  whose  experience  the  tendering  of 
advice  or  suggestion  to  their  rulers  was  not  a customary 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


131 


proceeding.  Their  only  resource  in  earlier  days  had  been 
revolt,  and  many  of  those  who  would  gladly  have  spoken, 
lacked  the  courage  to  do  so.  One  incident  along  the  line 
of  industrial  relief  may  be  noted.  I quote  from  the  report 
of  Maj.  Gen.  James  H.  Wilson,  then  Military  Governor  of 
the  provinces  of  Matanzas  and  Santa  Clara. 

“An  experiment,  in  a small  way,  has  been  made  with  much 
success  in  the  tobacco  region  near  Sagua  la  Grande  of  supplying 
farmers  with  oxen  and  implements  at  cost  price  and  on  reasonable 
terms  of  payment,  and  sending  them  out  from  the  town  to  establish 
themselves  in  colonies.  It  was  desired  to  locate  them  on  land 
where  they  could  eventually  buy  their  farms  at  fair  prices,  to  be 
fixed  beforehand.  It  was  found,  however,  that  the  owners  of  large 
tracts  were  generally  unwilling  to  part  with  small  pieces  for  fear 
that  they  should  have  the  remnants  on  their  own  hands.  The 
experiment  is,  however,  entirely  successful  in  its  main  features. 
The  farmers  are  all  self-supporting  and  many  of  them  will  anticipate 
the  payments  upon  their  cattle  and  implements.  A similar  experi- 
ment has  been  made  and  similar  results  obtained  at  Sancti  Spiritus 
under  the  supervision  of  Captain  Fremont,  2d  Infantry,  aided  by 
Father  Castillo,  a worthy  parish  priest  of  that  city.  At  the  urgent 
solicitation  of  the  Civil  Governor  of  the  Province  of  Matanzas  help 
of  the  same  sort  was  extended  to  twenty-two  families  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  the  City  of  Matanzas,  but  owing  to  the  lateness  of  the 
season  and  the  less  advantageous  situation  of  the  farmers,  the  result 
has  not  been  quite  so  satisfactory.  The  cattle  were  young  and 
unbroken,  but  have  materially  improved  in  value,  and  in  several 
instances  the  purchasers  will  be  able  to  anticipate  payments  due 
upon  them,  but  for  the  most  part  the  experiment  has  not  gone  far 
enough  to  justify  the  statement  that  it  is  entirely  successful.” 

The  value  of  work  of  this  character  was  illustrated  in  the 
comparatively  rapid  rehabilitation  of  the  tobacco  areas, 
notably  in  the  Vuelta  Abajo  district  of  the  province  of  Pinnr 
del  Rio.  That  district  was  soon  put  fairly  upon  its  feet 


132 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


as  a result  of  the  commercial  needs  of  manufacturers  of  and 
dealers  in  tobacco.  The  plant  makes  a quick  crop,  and 
agents  of  Havana  and  American  merchants  made  cash 
advances,  holding  the  growing  crops  as  security.  This  was 
impossible  in  the  larger  and  more  important  department 
of  sugar  cultivation  upon  which,  directly  and  indirectly,  a 
large  proportion  of  the  Island  people  are  immediately  de- 
pendent. 

The  closing  weeks  of  the  year  saw  the  initial  steps  in  a de- 
partment which  makes  special  appeal  to  the  American 
people  — that  of  school  establishment.  On  November  2, 
a headquarters  order  was  issued  which  created  a new  office 
in  the  Department  of  Justice  and  Public  Instruction.  This 
was  to  be  known  as  that  of  Superintendent  of  Schools  in 
Cuba.  Mr.  Alexis  E.  Frye  was  appointed  to  the  position. 
On  December  6 an  order  was  issued  which  in  its  form  and 
purpose  constituted  a school  law.  This  was  drafted  by  Mr. 
Frye.  It  provided  for  Boards  of  Education,  school  estab- 
lishment, books,  and  subjects  of  study.  Paragraph  VII 
provided  that 

“Boards  of  Education  shall  make  all  necessary  arrangements 
for  opening  the  elementary  (primary  and  grammar)  schools  by 
Dec.  11,  1899,  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  possible,  and  to  that  end  will 
rent  rooms  or  buildings,  supply  suitable  equipment,  and  employ 
teachers.  Each  of  said  Boards  is  hereby  authorized  to  expend  a 
sum  not  exceeding  fifty  dollars,  for  furniture  for  each  school  room, 
but  no  further  purchase  of  school  furniture  shall  be  made  without 
the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  Justice  and  Public  Instruction.” 

Thus  was  begun  America’s  work  in  the  establishment  of 
a new  order  of  educational  methods  in  Cuba,  under  the 
authority  of  General  Brooke,  although  the  credit  for  school 
establishment  has  been  given  to  his  successor. 

Of  the  work  of  the  Cuban  Cabinet  it  is  to  be  said  that  it 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


133 


became  the  subject  of  no  little  adverse  criticism.  It  is  quite 
probable  that  any  other  group  which  might  have  been  selected 
to  carry  on  a government  under  an  alien  governor  would 
have  been  similarly  criticised.  In  what  was  doubtless  a 
desire  to  give  to  the  Cubans  the  fullest  possible  measure 
of  influence  in  their  own  affairs.  General  Brooke  gave  to  his 
Secretaries  a very  free  hand.  So  much  was  given  that  it 
became  a common  saying  in  the  Island  that  “ The  American 
Governor  reigns,  but  the  Cuban  Secretaries  govern.”  These 
gentlemen  were  without  experience  in  government  along 
the  lines  of  the  new  institution.  It  was  natural  that  all 
their  methods  bore  the  stamp  of  the  only  government  with 
which  they  were  at  all  familiar  — that  of  the  old  Spanish 
system  of  centralization  and  partisan  supremacy.  The  re- 
sult was  the  creation  of  a political  machine  whose  lines  ex- 
tended throughout  the  Island.  The  continuance,  by  Ameri- 
can authority,  of  the  Spanish  laws  in  their  entirety,  made 
this  readily  possible.  Perhaps  its  most  unfortunate  result 
lay  in  the  prominent  recognition  of  the  old  militares  ele- 
ment, and  the  practical  exclusion  of  a large  class  of  citizens 
of  intellectual  capacity,  social  standing,  and  large  property 
interests. 

Another  important  order  of  the  closing  year  was  that  of 
November  17,  which  recognized  the  disordered  condition  of 
the  finances  of  the  municipalities  of  the  Island,  and  provided 
a monthly  appropriation  for  the  maintenance  of  the  munic- 
ipal police. 

On  December  20,  General  Brooke  was  relieved  of  his 
command  in  Cuba,  and  was  succeeded  by  Gen.  Leonard 
Wood,  formerly  Military  Governor  of  Santiago  Province. 
Upon  his  withdrawal.  General  Brooke  issued  a proclama- 
tion from  which  the  following  may  be  quoted: 


134 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


“A  year  ago  I found  a country  most  thoroughly  devastated,  its 
resources  and  commerce  destroyed,  its  rural  population  gathered  in 
its  towns  without  food  and  without  shelter,  dying  from  starvation 
and  exposure.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  immediately 
supplied  food  and  work;  in  a short  time  this  terrible  condition 
passed  away,  and  now  the  country  is  rapidly  pressing  on  to  a pros- 
perity hitherto  unknown  in  its  history.  Look  about  you  and  see 
how  true  this  is.  The  various  steps  which  led  up  to  the  present 
conditions  are  well  known  to  you  and  need  not  be  mentioned  here. 
The  change  is  truly  marvellous. 

“Without  a semblance  of  civil  government  then,  you  now  have 
a complete  organization  of  your  municipal  and  provincial  govern- 
ments all  in  the  hands  of  your  own  citizens,  the  ‘Military  control’ 
being  purely  advisory  and  supervisory;  many  of  your  laws  have 
been  modified  and  changed  to  suit  the  times  in  which  you  live,  as 
well  as  in  the  interest  of  good  government;  your  courts  have  been 
reorganized  and  are  in  operation;  peace  reigns;  law  and  order  rules; 
and  by  your  own  industry  and  a careful  observance  of  these  condi- 
tions the  full  restoration  of  your  social  affairs  and  prosperity  is 
assured.” 

It  is  only  natural  that  such  an  experience  as  that  of  our 
first  year  in  Cuba  should  be  open  to  much  of  both  praise 
and  censure.  To  praise  without  limit,  as  some  have  done, 
is  foolish.  To  condemn  without  limit,  is  unjust.  The 
notable  weakness  lay  in  the  lack  of  a definite  and  openly 
declared  policy.  The  terms  of  the  Joint  Resolution  were 
fresh  in  the  public  mind.  The  American  people  accepted 
that  as  the  declaration  of  the  American  policy.  Yet,  not- 
withstanding the  specific  statement  of  that  resolution, 
American  officials,  both  political  and  military,  openly  as- 
serted that  the  American  flag  would  never  be  hauled  down  in 
the  Island  of  Cuba.  Visitors  to  the  Island,  few  of  whom 
possessed  even  a shadow  of  competent  information,  returned 
to  the  United  States  with  loudly  voiced  opinions  of  Cuban 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


135 


incapacity  for  self-government.  A doubt  of  the  good  faith 
of  the  United  States  developed  even  within  the  opening  days 
of  the  American  occupation.  This  continued  up  to  the 
very  time  of  the  transfer,  in  May,  1902.  Apologists  for  our 
conduct  of  Cuban  affairs  are  disposed  to  ridicule  this  propo- 
sition, but  it  remains  a fact  that  our  attitude  and  our  actions 
in  Cuba  during  this  first  year  laid  the  foundation  for  a prev- 
alent belief  in  the  Island  that  the  United  States  intended 
to  stay  in  Cuba  in  spite  of  the  Teller  Amendment  to  the 
Joint  Resolution. 

Praise  in  most  abundant  measure  is  due  to  those  sub- 
ordinate officials,  staff  men  and  department  men,  almost 
all  of  whom  were  officers  in  our  regular  army,  for  the  faithful 
performance  of  their  duties.  To  commend  these  men  by 
name  would  involve  the  publication  of  almost  the  entire 
roster  of  the  American  officers  serving  in  Cuba.  The  work 
which  they  did  is  open  to  little  save  the  highest  commenda- 
tion. But  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  general  policy  of  the 
administration,  as  dictated  by  the  authorities  in  Washing- 
ton, was  so  vague  that  many  of  them,  without  dispute  or 
reprimand,  frankly  and  openly  declared  their  conviction 
that  their  country  would  be  recreant  to  its  trust  and  false  to 
its  pledges.  American  Congressmen  also  endorsed  and 
supported  this  opinion.  There  is  ample  ground  for  belief 
that  the  President  and  others  at  Washington  were  widely 
misled  by  some  whose  opinions  were  incompetent,  and  by 
others  who  had  special  interests  to  foster.  It  was  a time 
of  much  confusion  in  affairs  and  in  opinions,  and  the  truth 
of  the  situation  was  not  easily  obtainable.  There  were 
those  who  thought  that  the  United  States,  having  specifically 
declared  its  purpose,  should  work  unswervingly  toward  the 
accomplishment  of  that  purpose.  There  were  others  who 
upheld  a policy  of  opportunism,  and  there  is,  unfortunately. 


136 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


little  room  for  doubt  that  the  administration  followed  the 
latter  plan. 

The  notably  weak  point  in  our  relations  with  Cuba  lay 
in  our  failure  to  work  directly  and  definitely  toward  the 
fulfilment  of  our  pledge  as  expressed  in  the  Teller  Amend- 
ment. The  strong  point  lay  in  the  fidelity  with  which  in- 
dividual representatives  of  the  Government  of  Intervention 
discharged  the  duties  which  were  placed  in  their  hands. 
One  fact  in  the  work  of  this  first  year  has  been  unduly  over- 
looked. It  has  become  the  custom  to  give  the  credit  for 
our  accomplishments  in  Cuba  to  the  successor  of  General 
Brooke.  The  fact  is  that  the  broad  foundation,  and  no 
small  part  of  the  main  structure  of  our  work  in  Cuba,  was 
laid  and  built  during  the  first  year  of  our  occupation.  To 
the  untiring  energy  of  General  Ludlow  the  credit  is  really 
due  for  the  cleansing  of  Havana.  General  Brooke  began 
the  establishment  of  schools.  Bliss,  in  the  Custom  House; 
Ladd,  in  the  Treasury;  Greble,  in  the  Department  of  Relief 
Work;  and  a score  or  two  of  efficient  men  in  other  and  in 
subordinate  departments  in  Havana  and  other  cities,  all 
had  their  work  in  excellent  running  order  at  the  close  of 
the  year  1899  when  General  Wood  succeeded  General 
Brooke  as  Military  Governor  of  Cuba.  The  new  incum- 
bent reversed  the  system  which  developed  under  his  pre- 
decessor. General  Brooke’s  Cuban  appointees  made  a 
tool  of  their  chief.  General  Wood  made  tools  of  his  Cuban 
appointees.  General  Brooke’s  Cabinet  established  an  elabo- 
rate bureaucracy.  General  Wood  essayed  autocracy  and 
met  with  notable  success  in  his  effort. 

A readily  comprehensible  statement  of  the  finances  for 
the  year  is  not  easily  to  be  made.  The  bookkeeping  of  the 
first  six  months  was  not  notably  systematic,  but  there  is  no 
ground  whatever  for  even  a suspicion  of  irregularity  of  any 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


137 


kind.  Certain  measures  were  imperative.  Hundreds,  per- 
haps thousands,  of  lives  were  at  stake,  and  it  was  no  time 
to  stand  on  special  methods  or  processes.  Red-tape  was 
cut  and  the  needful  work  was  done,  and  it  was  done  honestly 
and  effectively.  In  the  statement  for  the  year,  the  “ Re- 
ceipts from  all  sources,”  from  January  1 to  August  31,  are 
given  as  $10,373,786.16.  By  that  time,  the  machinery  was 
in  better  running  order,  and  the  statement  for  the  year, 
up  to  the  date  of  General  Brooke’s  retirement  from  the 
island,  December  15,  stands  as  follows: 

Receipts  January  1 to  August  31 $10,373,768.16 

Receipts  Customs,  September  1 to  December  15  . . 4,709,358.65 

Receipts  Postal  Service,  September  1 to  December  15.  57,152.25 

Receipts  Internal  Revenue,  Sept.  1 to  Dec.  15  238,278.04 

Receipts  Miscellaneous,  Sept.  1 to  Dec.  15 113,302.83 

Total $15,491,859.93 

The  expenditures  for  the  same  period  are  given  as 
$13,327,380.79.  Among  the  purposes  to  which  this  sum 
was  appropriated,  there  appear  the  following: 


Barracks  and  Quarters  (principally  for  the  occupa- 
tion of  American  troops)  $1,137,404.22 

Sanitation  3,035,404.80 

(Of  this  sum,  the  City  of  Havana  rec’d  $2,020,937.85) 

Rural  Police  and  Administration  2,172,782.99 

Public  Works,  Ports,  etc 582,469.12 

Charities  and  Hospitals  and  Aid  to  Destitute 990,781.81 

Expenses  of  Municipalities 1,299,179.97 

Quarantine  119,790.41 

Miscellaneous 376,699.14 

State  and  Government 594,518.65 

Justice  and  Public  Instruction  669,332.08 

Department  of  Finance  • 527,458.86 

Department  of  Agriculture  and  Public  Works 286,578.81 

Civil  Government  248,295.10 

Census 349,777.37 


138 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


After  making  allowance  for  all  accounts  in  suspense, 
General  Brooke  turned  over  to  liis  successor  in  office,  a 
sum  which,  in  round  figures,  amounted  to  $2,000,000. 

As  given  by  Collector  of  Customs  Bliss,  in  his  report  for 
1902  (Tables  28  and  37),  the  statistics  of  foreign  trade  for 
the  year  1899  appear  as  follows: 


Total  imports  (including  bullion) $74,845,186.00 

Total  exports  49,327,724.00 


Of  the  imports,  $37,188,597  came  from  the  United 
States,  and  $37,656,589  from  all  other  countries.  Of 
the  exports,  $34,381,738  went  to  the  United  States,  and 
$14,945,986  to  all  other  countries. 


Chapter  IX 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 

General  John  R.  Brooke,  the  first  American  Military 
Governor  of  Cuba,  was  a soldier  with  a soldier’s  training. 
He  was  approaching  the  year  of  his  retirement,  and  had 
grown  gray  in  the  sendee  of  his  country.  His  only  ambi- 
tion was  that  of  the  true  soldier  — to  do  the  work  to  which 
he  was  assigned  according  to  the  best  of  his  ability.  He 
had  no  special  interests  to  serve  and  no  special  axes  to  grind. 
Although  often  severely  criticised  during  the  year  of  his 
incumbency,  many  a Cuban  wished,  afterward,  that  he  were 
back  again.  It  was  remembered  that,  whatever  his  fail- 
ings, he  never  broke  a promise.  General  Wood,  his  suc- 
cessor, was  a younger  man,  with  an  ample  endowment  of 
personal  ambition. 

The  new  Military  Governor  of  Cuba  was  not  in  full 
accord  with  the  views  expressed  in  the  proclamation  of  his 
retiring  predecessor.  In  his  report,  after  reviewing  the 
organization  of  the  insular  administration,  General  Wood 
says : 

“The  country  was,  generally  speaking,  tranquil.  There  were 
in  certain  sections  small  groups  of  bandits.  General  conditions 
were  improving  throughout  the  Island.  A large  tobacco  crop  anti 
a small  sugar  crop  were  in  prospect. 

"A  new  school  law.  somewhat  rudimentary  in  character  but 
believed  sufficiently  complete  for  immediate  needs,  had  been  pub- 
lished in  order  to  permit  the  preliminary  establishment  of  schools. 


140 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


the  efficient  operation  of  which  would  cost  several  hundred  thou- 
sand dollars  per  month.  The  schools  were  practically  without 
school  furniture  and  the  amount  of  supplies  and  materials  was 
very  small. 

“The  crowded  condition  of  the  jails,  filled  with  untried  prisoners, 
indicated  only  too  clearly  an  inefficient  administration  of  justice. 
Generally  speaking,  jails  and  hospitals  were  all  in  need  of  refitting 
and  repairs.  In  the  Department  of  Public  Works,  a systematic 
and  well-defined  plan  of  operation  was  needed  in  order  that  the 
main  lines  of  communication  might  be  opened  with  as  little  delay 
as  possible.  . . . All  municipalities  were  in  debt  and  without 
revenues  sufficient  for  their  maintenance,  necessitating  monthly 
allotments  from  the  treasury  of  the  Island.” 

With  the  opening  of  the  new  administration,  the  Secre- 
taries of  the  former  government  tendered  their  resignations, 
which  were  accepted.  An  order  of  Jan.  1,  1900,  filled  the 
vacancies,  as  follows: 

Secretary  of  State  and  Government.  .Diego  Tamayo. 

Secretary  of  Finance Enrique  Jose  de  Varona. 

Secretary  of  Justice Luis  Estevez. 

Secretary  of  Agriculture Juan  Ruis  Rivera. 

Secretary  of  Public  Instruction Juan  Bautista  Barreiro. 

Secretary  of  Public  Works Jose  Ramon  Villalon. 

This,  by  the  division  of  two  of  the  former  departments, 
established  six  secretaryships  in  place  of  four.  Various 
changes  were  made  during  the  year.  Sehor  Rivera  resigned 
on  May  1,  and  was  succeeded  by  Perfecto  Lacoste.  Sehor 
Estevez  resigned  on  the  same  date,  and  was  succeeded  by 
Sehor  Barreiro,  whose  place  in  the  Department  of  Public 
Instruction  was  filled  by  the  transfer  of  Sehor  Varona. 
Leopoldo  Cancio  was  made  Secretary  of  Finance  vice  Sehor 
Varona.  Sehor  Barreiro’s  resignation,  on  August  11,  made 
place  for  Miguel  Gener  y Rincon.  Many  changes  were 
made  in  the  sub-secretaryships  and  various  minor  offices. 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


141 


By  these  changes,  an  effort  was  made,  in  theory  at  least, 
to  counteract  the  tendency  toward  that  governmental  cen- 
tralization which  had  marked  the  experience  of  the  former 
Cabinet.  It  can  hardly  be  contended  that  the  effort  was 
notably  successful.  So  actively  did  the  new  incumbent 
concern  himself  in  the  details  of  administration  throughout 
the  Island  that  the  change  was  rather  one  of  form  than  of 
fact.  It  substituted  autocracy  for  bureaucracy  and  made 
the  bureau  the  instrument  of  the  Military  Governor.  The 
Civil  Orders  issued  during  the  second  year  about  doubled  in 
number  those  issued  by  General  Brooke. 

The  special  activities  of  General  Wood  were  exercised  in 
two  directions,  with  a third  only  less  prominent.  These 
were  education  and  sanitation,  with  legal  reform  for  the 
third.  He  became  dissatisfied  with  the  somewhat  diffuse 
methods  of  Superintendent  Frye,  who  was  establishing 
schools  at  an  amazing  rate  throughout  the  Island,  but  after  a 
method  which  was  at  least  unsystematic  and  lacking  in 
proper  regulation  and  record.  For  the  confusion  which 
followed,  Mr.  Frye  disclaims  all  responsibility,  and  alleges 
interference  and  unfaith  on  the  part  of  the  Military  Gover- 
nor. Out  of  the  experience  there  has  grown  a somewhat 
acrimonious  dispute  which  might  be  called  the  Wood-Frye 
controversy.  While  the  affair  is  somewhat  complicated, 
the  evidence  which  has  appeared,  official  and  non-official, 
points  clearly  to  a conclusion  that  Mr.  Frye  was  acting 
under  a duly  promulgated  school  law,  and  that  he  acted 
entirely  within  the  provisions  of  that  law.  It  also  appears 
clearly  that  the  Military  Governor  failed  to  support  him  by 
carrying  out  the  further  provisions  of  the  law  in  departments 
which  did  not  come  within  the  scope  of  Mr.  Frye’s  duties 
and  responsibilities.  Testifying  under  oath  before  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  on  Dec.  9,  1903,  Mr. 


142 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


Frye  preferred  severe  charges  against  General  Wood,  and 
supported  them  with  documentary  evidence.  Among  others, 
he  made  the  following  statement: 

Q.  That  is  what  you  claim  he  was  doing  — destroying 
the  schools  ? 

A.  I do  not  say  he  was  destroying  them  deliberately,  but 
the  effect  of  his  orders  was  to  destroy  them,  and,  personally, 
I think  it  was  simply  to  create  the  necessity  for  the  new 
school  law  to  be  published  by  himself,  and  thus  throw  dis- 
credit upon  General  Brooke. 

Whether  or  not  Mr.  Frye  was  justified  in  thus  assailing 
General  Wood’s  motives,  two  facts  remain.  One  is  that 
somewhat  more  than  ninety  per  cent  of  all  the  schools  in 
Cuba  were  organized  and  established  under  the  Brooke 
law  of  Dec.  6,  1899,  and  the  other  is  that  this  law  was  super- 
seded by  another  issued  by  General  Wood  on  June  30,  1900. 
This  contained  certain  provisions  which  are  the  basis  of 
other  charges  made  by  Mr.  Frye,  and  was  in  its  turn  followed 
by  a revision  which  was  issued  as  Order  No.  368,  on  Aug.  1, 
1900.  This  continued  as  the  School  Law  of  the  Island  for 
the  remainder  of  the  term  of  American  occupation.  It 
was  drafted  by  Lieut.  Matthew  E.  Hanna,  of  the  Governor 
General’s  staff,  and  was  based  upon  the  laws  of  the  State  of 
Ohio.  To  Lieutenant  Hanna  is  due  great  credit  for  the 
systematizing  of  the  entire  school  work  of  the  Island. 
Monthly  reports  were  required  from  every  school,  and  an 
efficient  system  of  tabulation  enabled  one  to  see  at  a glance 
just  what  was  being  done  in  each  and  in  all. 

So  much  stress  has  been  laid  upon  the  educational  work 
of  the  American  Government  during  the  years  1900  and  1901 
that  an  incorrect  impression  has  been  left  upon  the  public 
mind.  Contrary  to  a widely  prevalent  idea,  a school  system 
existed  under  the  Spanish  Government.  That  it  was  both 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


143 


corrupt  and  inefficient  may  be  admitted,  but  the  Island  was 
not  so  benighted  as  to  be  utterly  destitute  of  such  an  insti- 
tution. As  far  back  as  the  year  1571,  there  are  recorded 
gifts  and  legacies  for  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of 
educational  institutions.  In  1817,  there  were  about  ninety 
schools  in  the  Island,  supported  by  voluntary  contributions. 
Public  instruction  was  instituted,  for  the  first  time  in  the 
history  of  the  Island,  by  the  law  of  1842. 

This  law  appears  to  have  been  only  indifferently  effective. 
During  the  succeeding  decade,  Captain  General  Concha 
introduced  a far  more  efficient  system,  and  made  school 
establishment  and  maintenance  obligatory  upon  the  town 
councils.  In  1863,  the  public  school  laws  of  Spain  were 
extended  to  the  Island,  and  school-teaching  became  a pro- 
fession. Compared  with  our  own  system,  the  Spanish 
school  laws  and  customs  were  a somewhat  benighted  outfit. 
The  schools  easily  fell  under  the  dominant  influence  of  the 
church  establishment,  and  teacherships  became  a matter  of 
personal  and  political  traffic.  School-houses,  as  distinct 
edifices  erected  for  school  purposes,  were  unknown.  Dur- 
ing Spanish  times,  schools  were  usually  held  at  the  residence 
of  the  teacher.  This  was  prohibited  under  the  American 
system,  which  required  the  renting  of  buildings  suitable 
for  school  purposes.  There  were  also  many  private  schools. 

While  the  law  of  1842,  and  those  of  later  promulgation, 
established  public  schoools,  and,  presumably,  made  provi- 
sion for  their  maintenance,  there  was  nothing  which  corre- 
sponded to  our  free-school  system.  A tuition  fee  was  im- 
posed upon  all  until  December,  1880,  when  a law  was  passed 
by  which  the  children  of  those  who  were  unable  to  pay  a 
fee  were  admitted  to  the  elementary  schools  without  payment. 
By  the  same  law,  of  December,  1880,  school  attendance  was 
made  obligatory,  and  the  general  system  was  enlarged  and 


144 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


improved.  So  far  as  school  laws  were  concerned,  Cuba, 
under  Spanish  control,  was  fairly  well  equipped,  and,  not- 
withstanding the  many  and  glaring  crudities  and  irregulari- 
ties of  its  administration,  Cuba  had  a school  system.  Nor 
would  it  appear,  from  a comparison  of  tables  of  statistics, 
that  Cuba  was  much  worse  off,  in  point  of  illiteracy,  than 
are  some  of  our  own  Southern  and  Southwestern  States  at 
the  present  time. 

The  Cuban  school  system  on  Jan.  1,  1895,  is  reported 
by  the  Department  of  Public  Instruction,  as  follows: 


Public  Schools 904 

Private  Schools 740 

Colleges 70 

Public  School  Teachers 998 

Public  School  Pupils 36,306 

Private  School  Pupils 25,384 

College  Pupils 2,265 


The  cost  of  maintenance  is  reported  as  follows: 


Public  Schools $716,892.52 

Provincial  Institutes  118,735.20 

University  of  Havana 134,350.00 

Art,  Normal,  and  Professional  Schools 45,850.00 


$1,015,927.72 


Two-thirds  of  this  sum  was  covered  by  matriculation  fees. 

During  the  term  of  his  incumbency,  the  time  and  atten- 
tion of  General  Brooke  were  commanded  by  matters  of  more 
immediate  moment  than  that  of  school  establishment.  Yet, 
during  the  year,  much  was  done,  by  Department  Commanders, 
which  paved  the  way  for  the  later  work,  and,  when  the  more 
immediately  important  governmental  work  had  become 
settled  into  something  of  routine.  General  Brooke  laid  the 
foundation  upon  which  the  later  structure  was  built.  To 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


145 


the  period  of  his  administration  is  undoubtedly  due  the 
credit  for  the  inception  of  our  educational  work  in  the  Island. 
In  view  of  these  facts,  it  is  unfortunate  that  General  Wood’s 
’later  relations  with  General  Brooke’s  appointee,  Mr.  Alexis 
E.  Frye,  should  have  led  him  to  submit  a report  upon  the 
school  question  which  reflects  upon  the  work  of  his  pre- 
decessor in  office,  and  which  tends  to  rob  General  Brooke 
of  the  credit  which  is  really  his  due.  In  that  report.  General 
Wood  states  that  “A  certain  number  of  schools  had  been 
opened,  but  it  was  under  the  old  system,  or  rather,  lack  of 
system.  There  were  no  proper  text-books,  no  desks,  no 
school  materials.  The  children  were  perched  on  benches 
without  regard  to  size.  No  attempt  was  made  to  grade  or 
classify  them,  nor  was  there  any  settled  procedure  in  the 
school  methods;  in  short,  public  instruction  was  without 
organization  and  of  little  value.” 

While  the  general  accuracy  of  this,  as  a statement  of  fact, 
may  not  be  questioned,  it  unduly  and  unjustly  ignores  that 
which  had  been  done  and  the  very  sound  reasons  for  the 
failure  to  do  more. 

By  an  order  issued  on  Jan.  24,  1900,  the  new  Military 
Governor  established  a “ Board  of  Superintendents  of 
Schools.”  The  appointees  of  this  board  were  Messrs. 
Alexis  E.  Frye,  Esteban  Borrero  Echeverria,  and  Lincoln 
de  Zayas.  These  gentlemen  proceeded  to  act  under  the 
school  law  issued  on  Dec.  (5,  1S99.  That  provided  for 
municipal  boards  of  education,  and  for  the  payment  of 
teachers  and  the  rental  of  buildings  for  school  purposes. 
It  authorized  the  expenditure  of  a “sum  not  exceeding 
$50  for  furniture  for  each  school-room.”  When  this 
became  known,  applications  for  the  appropriation  poured 
in  by  hundreds.  Within  six  months,  the  number  of  schools 
rose  from  635  to  3,313.  So  overwhelming  was  the  applica- 


146 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


tion  for  this  allotment  that,  on  March  3,  a telegraphic  order 
was  sent  out  forbidding  the  opening  of  any  more  schools. 
Seven  hundred  and  three  were  opened  during  the  month  of 
January;  1788  in  February.  Owing  to  the  suspension  order, 
only  187  were  opened  during  the  following  four  months. 

The  opening  of  schools  created  a demand  for  teachers. 
It  is  also  probable  that  the  desire  to  draw  the  excellent  pay 
of  a Cuban  teacher  was,  in  many  cases,  the  immediate  cause 
of  a demand  for  schools.  The  teachers  of  Cuba  were  well 
paid.  If  measured  by  their  special  qualifications  in  com- 
parison with  those  of  the  United  States,  they  were  decidedly 
overpaid.  Salaries  in  Havana  ran  up  to  $75  per  month; 
in  smaller  cities,  $60;  and  in  towns,  $50.  In  schools  in 
which  the  average  daily  attendance  was  below  thirty  pupils, 
the  maximum  was  $30.  These  salaries  were  continued 
during  the  summer  vacation  months  provided  the  teacher 
attended  the  Normal  Schools  established  for  the  education 
of  teachers. 

The  sum  appropriated  from  the  insular  fund  for  school 
establishment  and  maintenance  during  the  year  1900  was 
$4,009,460.31.  This  was  only  a little  less  than  one-quarter 
of  the  total  revenue  of  the  Island. 

It  is  open  to  question  whether  it  was  wise  for  a temporary 
government  to  expend  upon  this  department  so  large  an 
amount  of  Cuba’s  none  too  abundant  revenue.  For  many 
years  Cuba  had  shared  the  general  ignorance  of  the  great 
majority  of  the  people  of  the  world.  Iler  special  require- 
ments at  this  time  were  along  the  line  of  industrial  rehabili- 
tation, in  which  department  very  little  was  done  for  the 
Island  save  that  which  was  done  by  the  people  themselves. 
It  was  a matter  of  much  local  comment  and  no  little  criticism 
that  so  much  of  their  money  was  spent  for  schools  and  so 
little  for  the  establishment  of  the  Island’s  industries.  Had 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


147 


Cuba’s  financial  and  industrial  condition  even  approximated 
the  normal,  such  an  expenditure  could  not  properly  have 
been  called  in  question.  The  matter  is,  perhaps,  one  of 
individual  opinion  concerning  the  importance  of  schools  at  a 
time  when  the  children  were  so  generally  naked  or  in  rags, 
and  many  of  the  parents  were  in  a condition  bordering  on 
destitution,  and  when  demands  came  from  all  over  the 
Island  for  relief  from  the  severity  of  industrial  conditions. 
Had  a portion  of  the  fund  thus  appropriated  been  utilized 
for  the  industrial  relief  of  the  Cuban  people,  there  is  much 
reason  for  belief  that  the  land  would  have  been  quickly 
placed  in  position  to  expend  even  a greater  sum  with  far 
less  of  strain  upon  its  financial  resources. 

Taking  the  appropriation  and  the  number  of  scholars 
reported  as  in  attendance  (150,000),  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
cost  of  education  per  year  per  pupil  was  about  $26.50. 
There  are  cities  and  towns  in  the  United  States  whose  out- 
lay exceeds  that  rate.  But  the  average  for  the  entire  country 
is  $22.50.  The  average  for  our  South  Atlantic  and  South 
Central  States  is  $8.60  per  year  per  pupil.  How  far  this 
liberal  expenditure  was  honestly  endorsed  by  the  majority 
of  the  Cuban  people,  it  is  not  possible  to  say,  notwithstanding 
the  assertions  of  universal  approval  made  by  those  specially 
interested  in  the  measure. 

During  the  opening  months  of  the  year,  contracts  to  the 
amount  of  $587,000  were  placed  for  school  supplies,  furni- 
ture, books,  etc.,  etc.  Freight  charges,  packing,  and  the 
cost  of  distribution  of  these  articles,  increased  the  item  to 
about  three-quarters  of  a million  of  dollars.  During  the  last 
half  of  the  year,  when  matters  were,  presumably,  in  fair 
running  order,  some  3,600  teachers  were  employed  at  an 
average  monthly  cost  of  about  $170,000,  or  nearly  $48  per 
month  per  teacher.  Headquarters  Circular  No.  2,  dated 


148 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


Jan.  24,  1900,  states  that  “Taking  into  account  all  salaries 
paid  in  every  department  of  the  public  schools  of  the  United 
States,  the  average  salary  for  all  grades  is  $525  a year,  or 
$75  less  than  the  lowest  salary  paid  to  any  primary  teacher 
in  a complete  school  in  Cuba.”  The  proper  economy  of 
the  limited  funds  of  a poverty-stricken  country,  as  repre- 
sented by  this  appropriation,  would  appear  to  be  open  to 
question  if  not  to  criticism. 

Another  important  work  in  the  department  of  child-life 
was  accomplished  during  this  year.  It  came  as  a sequel 
to  the  work  of  the  preceding  year.  Thousands  of  homes 
were  broken  up  by  the  war.  Thousands  of  children  were 
rendered  homeless,  and  wandered,  as  waifs  and  strays, 
living  as  they  could.  During  the  year  1899,  these  were 
gathered  up  and  cared  for.  But  such  arrangements  as 
could  then  be  made  were,  in  many  cases,  no  more  than 
temporary.  A more  permanent  disposition  was  necessary. 
The  accomplishment  of  this  stands  to  the  credit  of  Major  E. 
St.  John  Greble,  the  head  of  the  Department  of  Charities, 
and  his  assistants  in  that  department.  Civil  Order  No.  271, 
prepared  under  the  immediate  supervision  of  Major  Greble, 
was  issued  on  July  7.  Section  6,  of  that  order,  is  as  follows: 

“It  is  hereby  declared  to  be  the  general  policy  of  the  Island  of 
Cuba,  to  be  carried  into  effect  as  speedily  as  circumstances  will 
permit,  that  destitute  and  delinquent  children  who  are  now,  or  be- 
come in  the  future,  subjects  of  support  from  public  funds,  shall  be 
cared  for  by  the  State,  and  shall  be  committed  to  the  guardianship 
of  the  appropriate  insular  authorities.  Such  children  shall  be 
cared  for,  according  to  their  respective  needs,  in  families,  training 
schools,  or  reformatories,  as  may  from  time  to  time  be  found  to  be 
advisable.” 

Between  the  first  of  May  and  the  end  of  the  year,  two 
hundred  and  eighty-two  children  were  placed  in  families, 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


149 


though  the  department  continued,  for  the  time,  its  general 
supervision  of  their  welfare.  Seventeen  of  these  were  re- 
turned, for  various  reasons,  to  the  asylums.  Fifteen  were 
taken  in  charge  by  relatives.  At  the  end  of  the  year,  seventy- 
seven  boys  and  one  hundred  and  seventy-two  girls  were 
regarded  as  definitely  provided  for  in  Cuban  homes,  though 
two  hundred  and  thirty-six  were  still  under  supervision.  Two 
hundred  and  thirty-three  of  these  were  orphans,  and  two 
were  half-orphans. 

A correctional  school  for  boys  was  established  at  Guanajay, 
and  an  industrial  school,  also  for  boys,  was  established  at 
Santiago  de  las  Vegas,  a few  miles  from  Havana.  These 
were  not  local  in  character,  but  were  intended  for  the  desti- 
tute and  the  delinquent  from  the  entire  Island.  Institutions 
were  also  opened  for  the  shelter,  the  care,  and,  if  necessary, 
the  reformation  of  girls.  This  work  was  somewhat  sim- 
plified by  the  old  Spanish  institutions,  known  as  Beneficen- 
cias.  These  were  found  in  nearly  all  of  the  larger  towns 
of  the  Island.  Most  of  them  are  amply  endowed,  and  some 
of  them  are  wealthy.  But  inasmuch  as  most  of  their  hold- 
ings were  in  the  shape  of  real  estate  securities,  the  results  of 
a devastating  war  had  deprived  them  of  the  major  portion 
of  their  income.  Many  of  them  had  fallen  into  a lamentable 
condition.  The  reestablishment  of  these  institutions  upon 
an  efficient  basis  formed  a part  of  the  work  of  the  first  year 
of  the  intervention,  and  maintenance  of  them  was  a part 
of  the  work  of  the  succeeding  years. 

With  the  lapse  of  all  organized  municipal  government, 
consequent  upon  the  disturbances  of  the  war,  it  might  be 
said  that  the  Island  in  general  and  the  cities  in  particular 
had  fallen,  through  neglect,  into  an  appallingly  unsanitary 
condition.  During  his  regime,  General  Brooke  expended 
upward  of  $9, 000, 000  in  this  important  department,  two- 


150 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


thirds  of  which  was  allotted  to  the  City  of  Havana.  A similar 
amount  was  expended  during  the  second  year  of  American 
administration.  The  primary  purpose  of  this  heavy  expendi- 
ture was  the  stamping  out  of  disease,  notably  the  much- 
dreaded  yellow  fever.  In  this  connection  it  is  of  interest 
to  note  the  comment  of  Chief  Surgeon  Havard.  In  his  re- 
port for  1900,  that  gentleman  says:  “The  part  played  by 
dirt  and  filth  in  the  breeding  and  propagation  of  the  fever 
was  always  problematical;  now  we  know  that  they  have 
nothing  to  do  with  it  except  inasmuch  as  they  may  attract 
and  feed  mosquitoes.  It  is  certain  that  in  Havana,  in  1900, 
no  visible  correlation  could  be  seen  between  dirt  and  yellow 
fever.”  Although  it  now  appears  to  be  clear  that  dirty 
streets  and  accumulated  heaps  of  refuse  are  only  remotely 
connected  with  the  dissemination  of  yellow  fever,  the  object 
lesson  taught  in  the  department  of  municipal  cleanliness 
cannot  fail  to  be  of  service  in  the  days  to  come.  The  only 
question  concerning  the  work  lies  in  the  now  useless  propo- 
sition whether  a better  and  more  important  use  might  not 
have  been  found  for  the  large  sums  expended  from  the 
insular  treasury. 

The  credit  for  American  accomplishment  in  this  depart- 
ment is  generally  accorded  to  General  Wood.  The  notable 
cleanliness  of  Havana  is  properly  due  to  Gen.  William 
Ludlow,  the  Military  Governor  of  the  Department  of  Havana 
during  the  first  eighteen  months  of  the  American  adminis- 
tration. That  which  General  Wood,  as  Military  Governor 
of  Santiago,  during  the  year  1899,  was  doing  in  his  depart- 
ment, was  also  being  done  by  all  Department  Commanders 
to  such  extent  as  was  possible  with  the  funds  allotted  to 
them.  In  all  of  these  departments,  an  efficient  system  was 
inaugurated  during  1899,  and  the  close  of  the  year  saw  the 
Island  cities  cleaner  than  most  American  cities,  sanitary 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


151 


and  street-cleaning  departments  organized  and  in  excellent 
working  order.  General  Wood,  coming  to  the  position  of  chief 
authority  in  the  Island,  found  sanitary  work  reduced  to  a 
routine  wliich  called  for  no  changes  of  any  importance.  The 
methods  wliich  had  been  adopted  were  sound  and  efficient. 
The  new  incumbent  had  little  to  do  except  to  continue  them. 

A detailed  review  of  the  sanitary  work  seems  unnecessary 
here.  Such  a review  is  open  only  to  general  eulogium,  and 
detailed  account  of  the  number  of  carts  employed,  the  tons 
of  offal  and  debris  removed,  the  system  of  house  to  house 
inspection,  and  the  routine  of  operations.  All  this,  in  full 
detail,  is  obtainable  in  special  and  voluminuous  reports 
issued  by  the  department  in  Washington.  Two  notable 
points  in  connection  with  the  sanitary  work  call  for  considera- 
tion. A primary  object  in  it  all  was  the  conservation  of 
American  interests  through  the  eradication  of  yellow  fever 
germs.  America  was  deeply  concerned  by  a belief  that  the 
existing  conditions,  notably  in  Havana,  constituted  a per- 
petual manace  to  her  southern  ports  through  the  introduc- 
tion of  the  dreaded  fever.  This  fear  was  warranted,  al- 
though it  was  later  determined  that  the  special  danger 
centre  did  not  lie  where  it  was  generally  supposed  to,  namely, 
in  unsanitary  conditions.  The  direct  responsibility  for 
the  dissemination  of  the  disease  was  found  to  lie  with  a cer- 
tain species  of  mosquito,  which  it  was  possible  to  fight  effec- 
tively with  inexpensive  coal-oil,  by  the  draining  or  the  fill- 
ing up  of  all  pools  of  standing  water,  whether  large  or  small, 
and  by  the  isolation  of  all  foci  of  infection. 

Much  credit  for  this  discovery  belongs  to  a Cuban  physi- 
cian, Dr.  Finlay.  Even  more  is  due  to  Surgeon  Major 
Walter  Reed,  U.  S.  A.  It  was  the  good  fortune  of  both 
Cuba  and  the  United  States  that  Major  Reed  was  able  to 
present  his  views  and  the  results  of  his  study  to  a Military 


152 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


Governor  who  had  received  a medical  training.  The  techni- 
cal presentation  of  those  results  appealed  to  General  Wood 
as  it  might  not  have  done  had  he  been  trained  as  a soldier 
or  a politician.  A sum  of  money  was  appropriated  from 
the  insular  fund,  and  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Medical 
Department  for  further  and  more  exhaustive  investigation. 
The  result  of  a long  series  of  most  interesting  experiments 
was  the  establishment  of  the  fact  that  the  notably,  and  per- 
haps exclusively,  mischievous  agent  was  the  female  of  a cer- 
tain species  of  mosquito.  This,  for  both  countries  and  for 
the  world  as  well,  can  only  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  most 
important  and  valuable  results  of  America’s  work  in  Cuba. 

The  other  point  which  arises  in  this  connection  is  the 
much-vexed  question  of  the  sewering  and  paving  of  the  City 
of  Havana.  In  the  autumn  of  1898,  Col.  George  E.  Waring, 
of  New  York,  was  sent  to  Havana  to  report  upon  this  ques- 
tion, which  was,  at  that  time,  regarded  as  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance to  the  United  States.  The  people  of  Havana 
desired  the  proper  sewering  and  paving  of  their  city,  but  the 
emphatic  demand  for  the  prosecution  of  the  work  came  from 
the  United  States.  The  story  is  long,  complex,  and  con- 
tradictory. Its  real  starting  point,  so  far  as  the  United 
States  is  concerned,  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment had  already  taken  steps  toward  the  prosecution  of  the 
work,  and  that  the  responsibility  for  failure  to  proceed  with 
it,  up  to  the  time  of  the  American  withdrawal,  rests,  almost 
absolutely,  with  the  American  administration  of  the  Island. 

The  history  of  the  case  may  be  reviewed  briefly,  as  fol- 
lows: In  1894,  the  authorities  of  the  City  of  Havana  called 
for  the  submission  of  plans  for  sewering  and  paving  the  city. 
On  December  11,  of  the  same  year,  the  Alcalde  of  Havana 
approved  the  resolution  of  the  Ayuntamiento  to  authorize 
an  American  firm,  Messrs.  M.  J.  Dady  & Co.,  to  submit 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


153 


such  plans.  On  Oct.  30,  1895,  the  Ayuntamiento  approved 
and  accepted  one  of  eighteen  projects  submitted  by  Dady  & 
Co.  Under  the  Spanish  law,  enterprises  of  this  nature  are 
of  two  parts  — the  technical  and  the  financial.  By  this  act 
of  October  30,  the  technical  department  was  covered  in 
the  acceptance,  by  constituted  authority,  of  a project  duly 
passed  upon  and  approved  by  the  official  engineers.  The 
project  was  accepted,  but  the  contract  remained  inchoate 
until  the  means  were  provided  for  the  payment  thereof. 

It  was  generally  conceded  that  the  owner  of  the  accepted 
project  became  entitled,  under  the  Spanish  law  of  Tanteo, 
to  certain  rights  and  claims  whenever,  in  accordance  with 
that  law,  the  project  was  placed  upon  the  market  for  bids  for 
its  execution.  At  the  request  of  General  Weyler,  then 
Governor  General,  Messrs.  Dady  & Co.  submitted  a 
proposition  to  undertake  the  work  at  a specified  price,  and 
to  accept  in  payment  bonds  of  the  City  of  Havana  at  ninety, 
secured  by  a special  mortgage.  The  matter  was,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  law,  referred  to  the  Finance  Committee  of 
the  City  Council  for  its  action. 

The  political  and  military  activity  of  the  time  involved 
a prolonged  delay.  On  Dec.  12,  1898,  the  Finance  Com- 
mittee approved  the  proposition  for  a bond  issue.  On 
December  17,  the  corporation  voted  to  accept  the  proposi- 
tion. But  the  approval  and  signature  of  the  Governor 
General  were  needed  for  completion.  On  the  day  following. 
General  Castellanos,  at  the  special  request  of  the  American 
Evacuation  Committee,  issued  the  following  order  to  the 
Havana  authorities: 

“In  view  of  the  present  exceptional  conditions  and  as  the  only 
superior  authority  in  these  moments,  until  the  sovereignty  of  Spain 
ceases  in  this  Island,  I have  deemed  it  advisable  to  order  that  this 


154 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


corporation  shall  not  make  contracts  of  any  kind  referring  to  sewer- 
age or  other  works  whose  execution  cannot  be  completed  in  the 
time  which  remains  to  this  sovereignty.  Also  all  the  concessions 
made  since  I took  charge  of  the  command  of  this  Island,  and  which 
are  under  consideration,  shall  remain  in  suspense  until  the  new 
authorities  resolve  what  they  consider  proper.” 

Thus  the  case  stood  on  Jan.  1,  1899.  With  any  question 
of  the  methods  which  may  have  been  employed  to  bring  the 
proceedings  to  their  stage  at  that  time,  the  United  States  had 
nothing  to  do.  Its  only  consideration  was  the  status  of  the 
transaction  at  the  time  of  American  occupation.  The  matter 
came  into  the  department  commanded  by  General  Ludlow, 
who  was  an  experienced  officer  of  the  United  States  Engineer 
Corps.  He  stated  frankly  his  desire  to  proceed  with  the 
work,  under  Iris  own  charge  and  supervision.  Instead  of 
recognizing  the  claims  of  Messrs.  Dady  & Co.,  and  en- 
deavoring to  effect  an  adjustment  of  them,  or  refusing  to 
recognize  them,  and  leaving  Dady  & Co.  to  look  for  redress 
through  the  courts,  General  Ludlow  held  the  company  in 
suspense.  After  about  a year  of  such  investigation  and  of 
the  drafting  of  new  plans  upon  his  own  lines  and  ideas, 
General  Ludlow  reported  that  “ the  Department  now  has 
final  plans  and  estimates  that  can  be  put  into  effect  when- 
ever it  shall  be  practicable  to  obtain  the  funds.”  Yet  work 
upon  those  plans,  conducted  at  a cost  of  many  thousands 
of  dollars,  was  continued  for  at  least  two  years  more.  Ex- 
perts were  brought  from  the  United  States,  and  changes 
were  continually  made  in  plans,  specifications,  and  estimates 
until  the  matter  became  an  affair  of  no  little  confusion  and 
much  wordy  discussion.  In  a letter  to  the  “ Alcalde  and 
Ayuntamiento  of  Havana,”  under  date  of  Sept.  26,  1900, 
General  Wood  referred  to  those  plans  as  “ modifications  ” 
of  those  presented  by  Dady  & Co. 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


155 


As  time  went  on  the  matter  became  more  and  more  con- 
fused, and  the  Military  Governor  played  fast-and-loose  with 
Dady  & Co.,  who  stood  by  their  claims  and  insisted  upon 
recognition  of  them.  Committees  sat  in  consideration  of 
them  only  to  have  their  findings  promptly  rejected  by  the 
Engineering  Department  of  the  American  Government.  At 
last,  about  the  first  of  April,  1901,  General  Wood,  by  an 
arbitrary,  if  not  illegal  proceeding,  paid  to  Dady  & Co.  the 
sum  of  $250,000  for  all  their  rights,  in  law  and  equity,  in 
what  were  known  as  the  Dady  plans.  In  other  words,  with 
funds  from  the  insular  treasury,  he  bought  a claim,  not 
legally  established,  against  the  City  of  Havana,  at  a price 
agreed  upon  by  himself  and  the  claimant.  By  this  act, 
military  authority  over-rode  laws  which  military  authority 
had  declared  to  be  established  and  in  force.  The  same 
proceeding  was  repeated  in  another  and  only  less  disputed 
case  in  which  one  Jose  de  Armas  was  paid  $47,500  for  his 
claim  under  another  inchoate  contract,  similarly  obtained 
to  that  of  Dady  & Co.,  to  float  a loan  for  the  City  of  Havana. 

Dady  & Co.  were  thus  removed  as  a disturbing  element, 
and  plans  for  the  sewering  and  paving  of  Havana,  presum- 
ably acceptable  to  the  Engineering  Department,  were  the 
undisputed  property  of  the  city.  Notwithstanding  an  exist- 
ing law  that  no  public  contract  shall  be  advertised  for  bids 
until  due  provision  is  made  for  the  payment  of  the  same, 
General  Wood  instructed  a duly  elected  and  presumably 
autonomous  municipal  government  to  advertise  for  bids 
for  sewering  and  paving  the  city  according  to  the  plans  and 
specifications  provided.  His  attention  was  called  to  the 
“irregularity”  of  the  advertisement,  whereupon  he  suspended 
an  important  section  of  the  law  of  the  land,  and  brought  the 
law  into  accordance  with  his  individual  purposes.  An 
advertisement  in  the  spring  of  1901  brought  no  response 


156 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


except  a bid  from  Dady  & Co.,  which  the  Engineering 
Department,  a persistent  opponent  of  that  company,  re- 
jected as  excessive.  The  department  made  further  altera- 
tions, and  the  contract  was  again  advertised.  On  Nov.  10, 
1901,  the  Ayuntamiento  voted  to  award  the  contract  to 
Messrs.  McGivney  & Rokeby,  who  were  the  lowest  bidders 
in  response  to  the  advertisement.  Before  the  final  approval 
of  the  acceptance,  Mr.  Dady  appeared  and  entered  a plea 
of  misunderstanding.  He  reduced  his  bid  by  nearly  $600,000 
(the  original  bid  being  $1 1,485,896,  as  against  that  of  $10,393, 
015  by  Messrs.  McGivney  & Rokeby).  Upon  this,  the 
Ayuntamiento  voted  acceptance  of  the  Dady  bid.  This  act 
failed  of  endorsement  by  the  higher  authorities,  and  accept- 
ance rested,  for  the  time,  with  the  bid  of  McGivney  & 
Rokeby. 

The  entire  proceedings  were  almost  inextricably  confused. 
Charges  and  counter-charges  of  irregularity  of  all  kinds 
marked  their  course,  and  the  affair  presents  little  that  is 
creditable  to  either  the  American  or  the  Cuban  authorities. 
The  sum  of  the  matter  is  that  after  three  and  a half  years  of 
absolute  control  of  the  affairs  of  the  Island,  the  American 
authorities  failed  to  consummate,  or  even  to  begin,  or  to 
make  it  possible  to  begin,  a work  which  had  been  so  often 
declared  of  supreme  importance  to  the  United  States  as  well 
as  to  the  Island  of  Cuba.  It  is  hardly  to  be  denied  that  the 
whole  proceeding  was  a distinct  violation  of  the  pledge  to 
exercise  “neither  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  nor  control’’ 
over  the  Island  “ except  for  the  pacification  thereof.”  More- 
over, there  stands  the  fact  that  those  processes  to  which,  for 
the  sake  of  convenience,  we  give  the  name  of  sanitation, 
were  not  sanitation,  and  that  the  only  work  properly  de- 
serving that  title  was  effectively  prohibited  by  the  acts  of 
American  officials. 


Chapter  X 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION.  — Continued 

The  year  1900  saw  many  changes  in  the  establishment 
of  the  courts,  in  legal  processes,  and  even  in  the  codes  them- 
selves AVlnie  such  proceedings  were  foreign  to  the  declared 
purposes  of  the  United  States,  and  have  been  held  by  some 
to  be  a usurpation  of  governmental  power,  the  idea  developed 
among  the  authorities  that,  the  United  States  being  in  re- 
sponsible control  of  the  Island,  they  wrere  justified  in  correct- 
ing that  in  all  governmental  processes  which  was  deemed  in- 
adequate or  unsuited  to  the  new  institution.  The  warrant 
for  this  assumption  of  “sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  and  con- 
trol ” has  been  called  in  question  by  many  in  both  countries. 
Supporters  of  these  changes  and  so-called  “ reforms  ” in 
Cuban  law  and  law-processes  rested  their  justification  in 
the  mere  fact  that  they  were  effected  by  the  authority,  and 
presumably  by  the  wisdom,  of  the  United  States. 

The  first  year  of  occupation  saw  numerous  changes  in  the 
laws  and  in  legal  processes,  but  none  which  was  not  de- 
manded by  the  exigencies  of  the  situation.  The  second 
year,  however,  saw  the  development  of  a distinct  intention 
to  effect  reforms,  as  such,  along  the  general  lines  of  Ameri- 
can institutions.  Some  of  these  were  of  advantage  and 
benefit,  and  received  popular  approval.  Others  were  an 
unwarranted  interference,  with  no  justification  save  that 
which  lay  in  the  supreme  power  of  military  control. 

During  the  preceding  year.  General  Ludlow,  as  Military 


158 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


Governor  of  the  City  of  Havana,  established  a Police  Court. 
The  step,  without  endorsement  by  an  official  order  from  the 
Governor  of  the  Island,  was  of  doubtful  legality,  but  the 
institution  served  a desirable  purpose  and  it  was  allowed  to 
stand.  This  became  popularly  known  as  the  Court  of  “ Ten 
dollars  or  ten  days.”  Official  orders  of  February  and  April, 
1900,  gave  this  court  a definite  legal  status.  On  July  1, 
similar  courts  were  established  in  other  cities  of  the  Island. 
Later  orders  extended  the  powers  of  these  Correctional, 
or  Police  Courts,  and  regulated  their  proceedings.  Various 
changes  were  also  made  in  the  Courts  of  First  Instance  and 
in  the  Municipal  Courts.  During  the  year,  full  or  partial 
pardon  was  granted  to  more  than  two  hundred  prisoners, 
and  action  was  declared  ended  in  some  four  hundred  other 
cases.  This  was  done  under  the  provisions  of  an  order 
issued  on  January  16  which  declared  as  follows: 

“1.  Total  pardon  is  hereby  granted  to  all  persons  convicted  of 
crimes  committed  before  Feb.  24,  1895,  and  from  Aug.  12,  1898, 
to  May  19,  1899,  who  may  show  conclusive  proof  that  they  belonged 
to  the  Cuban  Army  and  that  their  conduct  has  been  good  since 
they  were  mustered  out  therefrom. 

“2.  Total  pardon  is  also  granted  to  all  such  persons  convicted 
of  crimes  (whether  as  perpetrators,  accomplices,  or  accessories) 
who  were  pardoned  by  the  Decrees  of  Dec.  16  and  27,  1898. 

“3.  Total  pardon  is  also  granted  to  all  such  persons  convicted 
of  crimes  punishable  with  prition  correctional  in  its  minimum  de- 
gree, as  may  have  served  six  months  of  their  sentence;  and  also  all 
persons  convicted  of  crimes  punishable  with  arresto  mayor  y menor 
in  all  their  degrees,  as  well  as  all  persons  undergoing  terms  of  ‘sub- 
sidiary punishment’  for  pecuniary  liabilities. 

“4.  All  persons  who  may  have  been  committed  for  a period  of 
time  equal  to  or  longer  than  corresponds  to  the  punishment  for 
the  crime  of  which  they  stood  accused,  shall  be  at  once  set  at  liberty.” 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


159 


Other  clauses  provided  for  the  liberation  of  other  classes. 
The  special  object  of  so  general  a jail  delivery  is  not  clearly 
apparent,  though  in  many  cases  it  was  no  more  than  an  act 
of  justice.  But  it  also  released  a considerable  number  for 
whom  a penal  institution  was  a perfectly  proper  residence. 
The  step  was,  in  fact,  less  an  act  of  justice  than  an  evidence 
of  weakness.  The  court  system  was  one  of  the  glaring 
iniquities  of  Spanish  government  in  Cuba.  Inasmuch  as  it 
was  assumed  that  a notable  feature  of  our  mission  in  Cuba 
was  the  correction  of  flagrant  abuses,  it  would  have  been 
better  for  us  and  for  Cuba  had  we  cleared  her  jails  in  some 
more  regular  fashion.  We  assumed  the  right  to  establish  a 
Supreme  Court  and  a system  of  police  courts.  We  revoked 
and  amended  civil  and  criminal  laws.  We  created  laws 
and  incorporated  them  into  the  established  codes.  If  those 
steps  were  justifiable,  there  was  certainly  warrant  for  any 
measures,  however  drastic,  which  would  have  corrected 
the  many  abuses  and  delays  of  Cuban  legal  procedure.  As 
it  is,  we  left  Cuba’s  so-called  Department  of  Justice  little  if 
any  better  than  we  found  it. 

The  fundamental  problem  in  this  department  was  gener- 
ally disregarded,  notably  in  the  domain  of  the  civil  courts. 
That  was,  to  establish  in  the  Island  a system  under  which 
contentions  would  find  at  least  a reasonably  prompt  deter- 
mination in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  estab- 
lished code.  The  excuse  given  for  the  failure  to  do  this 
was  that  it  was  impossible  because  of  the  lack  of  suitable 
material  — in  other  words,  that  the  whole  Cuban  legal  in- 
stitution was  so  steeped  in  the  methods  and  the  practices  of 
former  days  that  reform  was  out  of  the  question.  It  is  true 
that  any  attempt  in  this  direction  was  seriously  hampered  by 
the  established  methods.  Spanish  laws,  as  a legal  system, 
were  admirable.  Spanish  court  systems  and  practices  were 


160 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


abominable,  and  justice  was  one  of  the  last  things  to  be  ex- 
pected from  an  insular  court. 

In  his  report  of  Oct.  31,  1900,  Senor  Gener,  the  Secretary 
of  Justice,  said: 

“The  political  system  which  had  prevailed  in  Cuba  for  four 
centuries,  having  been  essentially  modified,  the  sovereignty  which 
served  as  its  foundation  having  been  destroyed,  the  necessity 
for  the  modification  of  legal  procedure  became,  and  continues 
to  be,  necessary.  Cuba  cannot  readily  and  methodically  make 
political  progress  while  hampered  by  embarrassing  legal  methods. 
Judicial  forms  should  not  be  the  same  in  countries  which  are 
under  a colonial  system,  as  they  are  in  countries  which  have 
freed  themselves  from  the  dominion  of  the  nation  which  con- 
trolled them.  The  judicial  forms  which  might  be  good,  or  at 
least  adequate,  for  Cuba  as  a Spanish  colony,  could  not  be 
equally  good  for  a Cuba  which  had  been  emancipated  from 
Spanish  control.” 

This  explanation  and  apology  for  the  alteration  of  the 
existing  laws  holds  good  as  a general  proposition.  But  the 
fact  remained  that  Cuba  was  still,  in  effect,  a colonial  govern- 
ment notwithstanding  its  change  of  governors.  So  long  as 
the  authority  of  last  resort  lay  with  an  individual  Military 
Governor  whose  power  dominated  that  of  all  courts  and 
all  written  laws,  it  was  impossible  for  either  courts  or  law 
to  perform  that  part  in  national  life,  which,  under  a republi- 
can form  of  government,  is  supposed  to  be  their  proper 
function.  So  long  as  individual  power  remains  ultimate 
and  supreme,  judicial  proceedings  will  rest  upon  that  as  a 
basis  rather  than  upon  proclaimed  and  written  laws.  The 
attitude  of  the  Military  Governor  toward  the  insular  judi- 
ciary was  one  of  distrust  of  either  their  honesty  or  their 
ability,  or  of  both.  His  interference  with  legal  proceedings 
was  a matter  of  frequent  comment  and  frequent  criticism. 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


161 


The  admission  of  ex-parte  testimony  in  the  post-office  trials, 
by  his  authority,  may  be  cited  as  a flagrant  instance  of  this 
nature.  Under  such  a system,  changes  in  laws  are  readily 
effected,  but  no  adequate  and  basic  reform  is  possible. 
According  to  the  index  of  the  Civil  Orders  issued  during 
1900,  out  of  a total  issue  of  five  hundred  and  twenty-six, 
one  hundred  and  sixty-two  appear  under  the  heading  of 
“Law;  Amendments,  Modifications,  and  Repealing  of.” 
Some  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  others  refer  to  courts, 
court  processes,  appointment  and  removal  of  court  officials, 
and  to  other  matters  directly  connected  with  tins  depart- 
ment. Thus  somewhat  more  than  the  half  of  all  the  orders 
issued  during  the  year  relate  to  the  Department  of  Justice. 

Much  was  done  to  the  legal  system,  but  very  little  was 
done  which  tended  to  the  establishment  of  general  con- 
fidence in  courts  and  court  processes.  This  was  notably 
the  case  in  the  matter  of  civil  proceedings.  A ground  for 
criticism  was  furnished  by  the  fact  of  an  abortive  attempt  to 
reform  an  evil  whose  danger  was  recognized  and  whose 
seriousness  was  clearly  perceived.  It  was  also  a misfortune 
that  tiie  United  States,  through  its  representatives,  had  been 
placed  in  no  very  creditable  position  by  its  own  acts  in  refer- 
ence to  the  rights  of  sundry  Cuban  citizens. 

These  cases  are  too  long  and  too  complex  for  analysis 
here,  but  reference  may  be  made  to  such  matters  as  the 
Vedado  Water  Contract,  by  which  a concession  was  annulled 
and  property  seized  by  the  arbitrary  act  of  an  American 
official  who  justified  his  act  upon  the  dubious  ground  that 
“public  interest  constitutes  a higher  law  than  any  existing 
legislation,  which  enables  competent  public  officials,  acting 
in  the  public  interest  in  relation  to  matters  directly  affecting 
the  relation  of  citizens  to  the  local  government,  to  override 
contract  relations  affecting  matters  of  this  nature,  subject 


162 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


only  to  the  ascertainment  of  damages  should  such  be  found 
to  exist.”  The  law,  the  logic,  and  the  grammar  of  this 
statement  are  equally  bad.  Yet  it  was  seventeen  months 
before  the  case  was  determined  by  the  reestablishment  of 
the  contract,  and  the  restitution  of  the  property. 

Other  cases  of  similar  nature  are  the  Triscornia  land  case, 
the  Nogueira  case,  and  the  Paso  Caballo  case.  In  all  of 
these,  land  was  seized  by  the  American  authorities  upon 
the  ground  of  “military  necessity.”  The  proposed  re- 
muneration, arbitrarily  determined  by  agents  of  the  govern- 
ment, was,  in  all  of  the  cases,  entirely  unsatisfactory  to  the 
owners.  More  than  two  years  passed  before  a settlement 
was  effected  in  any  of  them,  and  the  delay  was  not  in  Cuban 
courts  but  in  the  American  headquarters.  When  settle- 
ment was  finally  made,  it  was  upon  a basis  of  much  greater 
advantage  to  the  owners  than  were  the  terms  of  the  original 
propositions.  The  delay  and  the  inherent  weakness  of  the 
Government’s  position  were  not  unnoticed  by  the  Cubans, 
whose  courts  and  court  processes  the  same  officials  were 
denouncing  and  proposing  to  reform. 

The  broad  ground  in  this  matter  is  extremely  simple. 
If  the  United  States  was  justified  in  the  reformation  of 
Cuban  courts  and  codes,  beyond  the  point  of  changes  neces- 
sary for  the  “ pacification  ” of  the  Island,  the  work  should 
have  been  done  by  competent  officials  acting  in  harmony 
with  the  best  element  of  the  Cuban  bar.  Legal  reform  is  a 
business  for  lawyers,  and  not  for  military  or  medical  men. 
Half-way  measures  only  led  to  endless  confusion  at  the 
time,  and  left  a legacy  of  endless  confusion  to  the  Cuban 
Government. 

Among  the  most  important  steps  of  the  year  were  those 
taken  in  the  direction  of  the  establishment  of  civil  govern- 
ment in  the  Island.  By  Order  No.  164,  dated  April  18, 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


163 


1900,  provision  was  made  for  municipal  elections  to  be  held 
on  June  16,  the  elected  candidates  to  assume  office  on  July  1, 
and  to  continue  in  office  for  one  year.  The  qualifications 
for  the  suffrage  were: 

“1.  The  voter  must  be  a native  male  Cuban;  or  the  son  of  a 
native  male  Cuban,  bom  while  his  parents  were  temporarily  re- 
siding abroad;  or  a Spaniard  included  within  the  provisions  of 
Article  9 of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  who  had  not  made  declaration  of 
his  decision  to  preserve  his  allegiance  to  the  Crown  of  Spain,  as 
provided  in  said  Article. 

“2.  He  must  be  of  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  or  upwards,  on 
the  day  preceding  the  day  of  election. 

“3.  He  must  have  resided  in  the  municipality  in  which  he  in- 
tends to  vote,  at  least  thirty  days  immediately  preceding  the  first 
day  of  registration,  and,  in  addition  to  the  above,  he  must  possess 
any  one  of  the  following  qualifications: 

“(a)  Ability  to  read  and  write; 

“ ( b ) Ownership  of  real  or  personal  property  to  the  value  of  two 
hundred  and  fifty  dollars,  American  gold; 

“(c)  Service  in  the  Cuban  army  prior  to  July  18,  1898,  and 
honorable  discharge  therefrom,  whether  a native  Cuban  or  not. 

Provision  was  made  by  this  order  for  the  processes  and 
machinery  of  election. 

The  decision  to  hold  municipal  elections  in  June  was 
reached  during  the  month  of  February,  and  on  the  sixteenth 
of  that  month  a commission,  consisting  of  thirteen  Cubans 
and  two  Americans,  was  appointed  to  draft  an  electoral 
law.  The  Cuban  members  represented  the  various  political 
elements  of  the  Island  — the  so-called  Cuban  National 
party,  the  Republican  party,  and  the  Union  Democratic. 
The  Cuban  Nationals  and  the  Republicans  represented  the 
radical  and  the  ultra-radical  elements  of  the  Island,  and  the 
Union-Democratic  stood  as  representative  of  the  conser- 
vative element.  Between  the  aims  of  the  Nationals  and  the 


164 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


Republicans,  there  was  little  difference.  The  Union- 
Democratic  party  was  limited  in  its  numbers  and  in  its 
organization.  Its  leaders  were  largely  men  who  had  be- 
longed to  the  old  Autonomist  party,  and  the  views  of  its 
members  ranged  from  a desire  for  annexation  to  a desire 
for  some  form  of  temporary  or  permanent  protectorate  under 
the  United  States.  Before  the  election,  the  party  withdrew 
from  the  contest,  alleging  unfairness  in  the  electoral  laws, 
and  corrupt  practices  on  the  part  of  its  opponents. 

The  committee  submitted  majority  and  minority  reports 
after  a series  of  somewhat  inharmonious  meetings.  The 
minority  report  was  accepted  by  the  Governor  General. 
The  electoral  law  was  issued,  on  April  18,  as  Civil  Order 
No.  164.  As  the  election  was  called  for  June  16,  this  gave 
two  months  for  preparation.  Many  urged  that  the  time 
was  too  short  for  an  honest  and  adequate  canvass.  The 
ground  appears  to  have  been  well  taken,  though  it  is  doubt- 
ful whether,  in  any  case,  the  results  would  have  been  materi- 
ally changed.  The  officers  to  be  chosen  were,  Alcaldes 
(Mayors),  Members  of  the  Ayuntamiento  (City  Council), 
Municipal  Treasurers,  Municipal  Judges,  and  Judges  of 
the  Correctional  Courts.  Each  of  the  existing  Ayunta- 
mientos  was  authorized  to  appoint  a Supervisor  of  Elections 
for  each  barrio  (or  ward)  within  their  respective  jurisdic- 
tions. Under  the  supervision  of  these,  Boards  of  Registra- 
tion were  chosen  by  the  qualified  electors.  Ten  consecu- 
tive days,  May  6 to  16,  were  appointed  as  the  days  of 
registration . 

The  total  number  registered,  throughout  the  Island,  was 
150,648,  or  about  one-half  the  probable  number  of  adult 
males.  Into  this  consideration,  however,  there  must  be 
taken  the  Spanish  element  of  the  Island.  Under  the  Treaty 
of  Paris,  Article  IN,  “Spanish  subjects,  natives  of  the 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


165 


Peninsula,  residing  in  the  territory,  etc.,  may  preserve  their 
allegiance  to  the  Crown  of  Spain  by  making,  before  a court 
of  record,  ...  a declaration  of  their  decision  to  preserve 
such  allegiance,  etc.”  Of  the  67,000  (approximately)  who 
made  this  declaration,  a considerable  number  were  adult 
males.  This  reduced  the  number  of  possible  voters  in  the 
Island,  and  eliminated  in  large  measure  the  Spanish  element 
from  participation  in  insular  affairs,  notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  in  the  City  of  Havana,  in  particular,  Spaniards 
were  even  more  concerned  than  were  the  Cubans  by  the 
processes  of  municipal  government.  This  is  by  reason  of 
their  extensive  property  holdings  as  well  as  because  of  their 
very  considerable  number. 

The  day  of  election,  June  16,  was,  so  far  as  peace  and 
order  and  general  quiet  are  concerned,  not  greatly  unlike 
the  ordinary  Cuban  Sunday.  The  total  vote  reported,  for 
the  whole  Island,  was  110,816.  Individual  opinion  of  the 
actual  number  of  votes  legitimately  cast  depends  upon 
which  or  whose  statement  is  accepted.  The  City  of  Havana, 
with  a population  of  upward  of  250,000,  was  reported  as 
casting  20,078  votes.  No  active  contest  being  made,  the 
returns  were  officially  approved,  notwithstanding  the  vocif- 
erous and  direct  allegations  of  extensive  frauds  in  the  pro- 
ceedings. Even  the  most  ardent  pro-Cuban  will  hesitate 
to  assert  that  Cuban  municipal  self-government,  for  the 
first  year  or  two  of  its  experience,  was  a notable  success. 

Another  important  step  of  the  year  was  the  establish- 
ment and  operation  of  a new  customs  tariff  for  the  Island. 
Prior  to  the  application  of  this  tariff,  on  June  15,  duties  had 
been  levied  under  an  Executive  Order  issued  from  Wash- 
ington on  Dec.  1),  1898,  and  published  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment on  December  18.  That  order  merely  established  a 
provisional  tariff  by  modifying  the  Spanish  tariff.  Various 


16G 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


changes  were  subsequently  made  to  meet  existing  conditions 
more  adequately. 

The  new  tariff  took  effect  on  June  15,  1900.  Its  improve- 
ment lay  in  its  removal  of  many  of  the  difficulties  and  am- 
biguities which  were  presented  by  the  earlier  tariff.  In 
the  well-qualified  judgment  of  Colonel  Bliss,  the  Collector 
of  Customs,  neither  the  old  tariff  nor  the  new  were  suitably 
adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  situation.  The  methods  em- 
ployed in  this  department  during  the  Spanish  regime  have 
become  a by-word  for  corruption  and  dishonesty.  It  was 
held  that  the  new  tariff  was  open  to  the  ready  possibility 
of  similar  practices.  It  was  also  asserted  that  its  pro- 
visions were  somewhat  too  distinctly  advantageous  to 
American  products.  That  various  American  food 
products  were  given  such  advantage  is  not  to  be  de- 
nied. The  argument  used  in  support  of  this  provision 
was  the  poverty  of  the  Island  and  the  desirability  of 
placing  sundry  necessaries  of  life  upon  the  Cuban  market 
at  the  lowest  possible  prices.  The  argument  against  it 
was  that  it  restricted  Cuba’s  domestic  production  and  sent 
out  of  the  country  large  sums  of  money  which  should 
have  been  kept  at  home. 

For  instance,  during  the  last  six  months  of  1900,  there 
were  imported  into  Cuba,  a distinctly  agricultural  country, 
breadstuffs  to  the  value  of  one  and  a half  millions  of  dollars, 
and  twelve  hundred  thousand  dollars  worth  of  vegetables. 
There  were  also  large  quantities  of  beef  and  hog  products 
brought  in.  A tariff  which  would  force  some  of  the  Island 
people,  and  induce  others,  to  engage  in  more  extensive 
production  for  home  consumption  and  for  the  local  market, 
would  have  been  much  more  to  Cuban  advantage  than  the 
tariff  established  for  them  by  the  United  States.  It  is  to 
be  noted  that  very  soon  after  the  government  came  into 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


1G7 


Cuban  hands,  steps  were  taken  to  increase,  very  materially, 
the  duties  on  such  imports. 

The  notably  black  spot  in  the  history  of  the  year  occurs 
in  the  case  of  the  defalcations  in  the  Havana  Post-office. 
This  stands  out  with  glaring  distinctness  because  of  the 
general  rectitude  and  integrity  of  American  officials  stationed 
in  Cuba.  One  of  the  lessons  which  America  was  to  teach 
Cuba  was  that  of  a high  moral  standard  in  administration. 
This  breach  in  that  course  of  instruction  is  in  all  ways  most 
lamentable.  That  those  charged  with  the  offence  could 
not  have  been  brought  to  speedy  trial,  and  upon  proof  of 
guilt  sentenced  to  ample  punishment,  is  only  less  to  be 
regretted.  As  it  stands,  the  incident  furnished  another 
illustration  of  the  delay  of  justice  in  a case  which,  although 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Cuban  courts,  was  practically 
under  the  immediate  control  of  the  Military  Governor.  It 
is  certain  that  that  official  concerned  himself  very  directly 
in  the  proceedings,  and,  notably  in  the  case  of  Director 
of  Posts  Rathbone,  open  charges  have  been  made  that  the 
Military  Governor  flagrantly  violated  the  laws,  and  occa- 
sioned a perversion  of  justice  by  his  interference.  From 
various  causes,  some  of  which  could  and  some  of  which 
could  not  have  been  controlled  by  the  exercise  of  such 
power  as  that  sometimes  employed  by  General  Wood,  the 
Post-office  cases  dragged  for  more  than  a year  and  a half 
before  their  final  determination.  Public  opinion  on  the 
island  held  Neely  to  be  a deliberate  criminal,  while  Mr. 
Rathbone  was  generally  regarded  as  a victim  of  individual 
persecution  on  the  part  of  the  Military  Governor. 

The  most  important  event  of  the  year,  and  really  the 
most  important  of  the  entire  period  of  intervention,  was  the 
calling  and  the  sessions  of  the  Constitutional  Convention. 
This  subject  will  be  reviewed  in  separate  chapters. 


168 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


The  year  shows  an  apparent  improvement  in  economic 
and  industrial  conditions.  The  production  of  sugar  doubled 
that  of  the  preceding  year.  There  was  a consequent  in- 
crease in  the  amount  of  Cuban  exports.  The  imports 
show  a slight  decrease.  The  increase  in  the  sugar  output 
was  of  little  advantage  to  the  planters  inasmuch  as  it  had 
to  be  sold  at  prices  which  gave  no  living  profit  on  the  work 
of  the  year.  The  trade  of  the  United  States  wTith  the  Island 
showed  a falling  off. 

The  year  closed  upon  a commercial  and  industrial  situa- 
tion which  was  far  from  encouraging.  How  far  this  is 
attributable  to  the  failure  of  the  administration  to  give  aid 
and  encouragement  to  those  special  departments,  cannot 
be  said.  There  was  certainly  much  of  complaint,  to  which 
the  authorities  gave  no  heed.  The  official  reports  declared 
the  Island  to  be  prosperous  and  the  people  to  be  contented. 
The  statements  of  many  of  the  Cuban  people,  and  the  as- 
sertions of  the  Island  press,  quite  fail  to  support  these  re- 
ports, and  the  financial  statements  appear  to  endorse  the 
Cuban  argument.  The  local  administration  rested  its 
claims  for  approval  largely  upon  the  work  done  in  the  de- 
partments of  education  and  sanitation.  But  if  these  fea- 
tures were  developed  at  the  expense  of  the  economic  well- 
being of  the  Island,  the  measure  of  that  approval  must  be 
limited.  Cuba’s  endless  agricultural  resources,  and  the  mar- 
vellous fertility  of  her  soil,  make  her  readily  responsive  to 
even  a shadow  of  industrial  encouragement.  Recovery 
from  even  devastation  should  be  rapid,  but  it  is  not  shown, 
except  in  the  increased  output  of  sugar,  during  the  first 
two  years  of  American  occupation.  Cuba’s  normal  posi- 
tion had  been  that  of  a creditor  nation  to  the  extent  of  some 
$30,000,000  a year.  These  two  years  saw  her  transferred 
to  the  debtor  class  to  an  amount  approximating  $30,000,000 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


169 


for  the  term.  The  year  1900  saw  no  hunger  or  sore  dis- 
tress in  the  Island,  but  there  was  an  increasing  stress  in  the 
field  of  industry. 

Referring  to  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1900,  the 
Collector  of  Customs,  Col.  Tasker  H.  Bliss,  says,  in  his 
report  dated  August  6:  “The  economic  situation  of  Cuba, 
as  indicated  by  the  statistics  of  the  Customs  Service  during 
the  past  year,  cannot  be  regarded  as  favorable.  The  re- 
turns of  imports  and  exports,  excluding  the  movement  of 
specie,  show  an  excess  of  the  former  over  the  latter,  or  a 
balance  against  the  Island  of  $26,260,065.”  The  remainder 
of  the  year  showed  no  improvement  in  this  condition. 

Although  it  was  not  given  prominence  before  the  Ameri- 
can people,  there  developed  a wide-spread  dissatisfaction 
with  the  methods  pursued  by  the  local  administration.  The 
popularity  of  the  Military  Governor  was  urgently  asserted 
in  the  United  States.  Yet  a leading  American  Senator, 
with  a special  interest  in  and  a close  connection  with  Cuban 
affairs,  declared  in  a private  conversation  that,  so  far  as  he 
could  learn,  the  Military  Governor  had  hardly  a friend  in 
the  Island,  Cuban  or  American.  As  early  as  the  14th  of  April, 
La  Discusion,  a leading  Cuban  newspaper  in  Havana, 
stated  editorially  that  “ In  a trimestre,  General  Wood’s 
administration  had  worn  out  in  a surprising  manner,  al- 
though it  did  not  have  to  tide  over  the  great  difficulties 
presented  by  the  former  one,  and  in  spite  of  its  having  found 
the  way  open,  and  of  being  able  to  avail  itself  of  the  experi- 
ence and  trials  made  by  the  former  administration.  There 
are  very  few  men  of  independence  who  feel  satisfied  with 
the  policy  of  the  Government  and  the  procedure  adopted 
at  the  Palace.  It  can  also  be  affirmed  that  there  is  no  one 
in  Cuba  disjjosed  to  defend  it  except  for  some  particular 
interest.” 


170 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


Much  of  this  sort  of  opinion  developed  during  the  year. 
It  appeared  from  time  to  time  in  the  insular  press,  and  was  a 
frequent  expression  in  private  conversation.  The  American 
people  were  informed,  upon  the  authority  of  the  Palace, 
that  it  was  only  the  querulous  complaint  of  a disgruntled 
element,  small  in  numbers  and  of  no  consideration.  A 
personal  experience  covering  many  months  led  me  to  a de- 
cided conviction  that  the  complaints  were  a genuine  expres- 
sion of  Cuban  opinion.  That  it  was  not  more  openly  and 
more  emphatically  stated  was  due  largely  to  the  fact  that  the 
Cubans  could  not  even  then  quite  realize  that  an  American 
Military  Governor  could  not  send  them  to  Cabana,  or  to 
Ceuta,  as  Spanish  Governors  had  done,  for  the  expression 
of  opinions  against  the  administration.  It  is  beyond  ques- 
tion that  there  was  a deep  and  strong  undercurrent  of  such 
opinions. 

Regarding  statements  of  revenue  and  expenditure  for  this 
and  for  the  succeeding  years,  it  is  necessary  to  say  that  a 
marked  confusion  appears  in  the  reports,  although  the  War 
Department  has  prepared  a tabulation  to  which  it  has  given 
official  endorsement.*  The  statements  officially  submitted 
by  the  different  departments  of  the  insular  government  en- 
tirely fail  of  harmony,  and  one  is  at  liberty  to  select  from 
an  assortment  presented  by  various  officials  each  of  whom 
is  supposed  to  be  an  authority.  This  comment  carries  no 
implication  whatever  of  dishonesty,  of  or  any  irregularities 
other  than  those  of  bookkeeping.  The  fact  of  discrepancy 
is  open  in  any  review  of  the  submitted  reports.  I use  the 
following  as  probably  closely  approximate  rather  than  as 
unquestionably  accurate.  They  are  for  the  calendar  year: 

Total  Revenue  $17,154,929.00 

Total  Expenditure  17,644,991.00 

* For  a fuller  statement  of  Revenues  and  Expenditures,  see  article  in 
Chapter  XX. 


THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


171 


I take  these  figures  from  the  message  of  the  Cuban  Presi- 
dent, dated  Dec.  2,  1902.  Mr.  Palma  notes  them  as  “ Data 
from  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the  United  States 
of  America.”  General  Brooke,  at  the  time  of  his  withdrawal 
from  the  Island,  turned  over  to  his  successor  a treasury  sur- 
plus of  a little  less  than  $2,000,000.  The  year  1900  shows 
a deficit  approximating  $500,000. 

Classifying  some  of  the  principal  items  of  expenditure, 
they  appear,  in  approximate  figures,  as  follows: 


Barracks  and  Quarters  $910,700.00 

Sanitation  3,029,500.00 

Police  and  Administration 2,358,150.00 

Public  Works  — Ports,  etc 1,786,700.00 

Charities  and  Hospitals 1,568,500.00 

Education  3,672,000.00 

Agriculture,  Industry,  and  Commerce 205,500.00 


The  statement  of  the  amount  of  foreign  trade,  as  presented 
by  General  Bliss  in  his  official  reports  may  be  accepted  as 
entirely  reliable.  He  gives  the  total  business  for  1900  as 


follows: 

Exports  $51,363,498.00 

Imports  (including  bullion)  69,887,547.00 


Of  the  imports,  $32,248,595  came  from  the  United  States, 
and  $37,038,952  from  other  countries.  Of  the  exports, 
$33,571,994  went  to  the  United  States,  and  $17,791,504  to 
other  countries. 


Chapter  XI 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 

Some  of  the  more  important  affairs  of  the  year  1901,  such 
as  the  proceedings  of  the  Constitutional  Convention,  the 
Platt  Amendment,  and  the  economic  movement,  will  be 
considered  in  special  chapters.  So  far  as  general  govern- 
mental processes  are  concerned,  it  may  be  said  that,  by  the 
beginning  of  1901,  they  had  settled  into  routine.  Opinions 
differ  widely  regarding  the  wisdom  of  policies  adopted,  and 
the  success  of  results  obtained.  Americans  who  visited 
the  Island,  and  took  their  opinions  from  the  Military  Gover- 
nor, returned  to  declare  the  greatness  of  his  works  and  the 
marvels  of  his  administration.  The  few  who  delved  more 
deeply  and  analyzed  more  closely,  obtaining  their  informa- 
tion from  Cuban  sources,  were  disposed  to  a contrary  view. 
That  much  had  been  done,  and  that  much  was  being  done, 
was  not  denied.  The  difference  in  individual  view  lay  in  a 
question  whether  that  which  was  being  done  was  being 
most  wisely  done,  and  whether  processes  and  achievements 
which  could  be  used  for  exhibition  purposes  were  really 
that  which  was  most  needed  in  the  Island,  and  which  would 
best  serve  to  establish  and  cement  those  cordial  relations 
which  were  so  eminently  desirable  between  the  American 
and  the  Cuban  people. 

By  the  opening  of  the  year,  General  Wood  had  made  him- 
self, in  fact  as  well  as  in  name,  the  Governor  of  the  Island, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  this  was  contrary  to  the  de- 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


173 


dared  purposes  of  the  country  which  he  represented.  He 
asserted  the  Cuban  need  of  government,  and  justified 
his  course  by  calling  public  attention  to  his  achievements, 
to  peace  and  order  throughout  the  Island,  to  clean  streets 
and  reduced  death-rate,  and  to  educational  establishment. 
In  this  attitude,  General  Wood  overlooked  certain  factors 
which  were  of  supreme  importance.  Peace  and  order  ex- 
isted because  of  the  general  peaceful  and  orderly  character 
of  the  people.  To  himself  and  to  his  Government  he  took 
the  credit  for  that  quiet,  unassuming,  and  patient  struggle 
so  persistently  maintained  by  the  Cuban  people  themselves 
for  the  restoration  of  their  land  and  the  establishment  of  a 
new  social  and  political  order. 

One  of  the  most  important  and  interesting  processes  of 
the  year  was  the  energetic  crusade  in  the  City  of  Havana 
against  the  fever-bearing  mosquitoes.  The  satisfactory 
demonstration  of  the  fact,  shown  by  the  work  of  the  preceding 
year,  that  mosquitoes  were  the  mischievous  agent  in  the 
spread  of  yellow  fever,  led  to  the  organization  of  a systematic 
campaign  for  their  extinction.  In  his  report  for  1901,  Major 
Gorgas,  the  Chief  Sanitary  Officer,  states  his  belief  that  at 
the  close  of  the  year  1901  the  number  of  mosquitoes  in  the 
City  of  Havana  was  not  more  than  one-tenth  what  it  was  at 
the  beginning  of  the  year.  Dr.  Gorgas  does  not,  however, 
claim  to  have  taken  an  accurate  census  of  the  insects. 
Whether  or  not  the  eradication  of  mosquitoes  was  as  general 
as  was  estimated,  the  more  important  fact  stands  that  the 
year  shows  only  eighteen  deaths  from  yellow  fever,  as  against 
the  following  records  for  preceding  years: 

1899  108 

1900  310 

These  preventive  measures  have  been  persistently  main- 


174 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


tained,  and  up  to  the  present  time  (1904)  there  has  been  no 
reappearance  of  the  disease. 

Some  effort  was  made  during  the  year  to  put  the  govern- 
ment of  the  various  municipalities  upon  a better  and  more 
independent  footing,  but  the  results  were  far  from  satis- 
factory. The  causes  for  this  are  various  and  not  a little 
complex.  Under  the  Spanish  regime,  municipalities  were 
presumably  semi-independent  political  units  exercising  a 
measure  of  administrative  independence.  As  a matter  of 
fact,  they  were  little  else  than  a part  of  a governmental 
machine  operated  from  Havana  by  the  power  and  authority 
of  the  Governor  General.  Of  municipal  autonomy  and  self- 
government  along  the  lines  of  that  of  American  cities,  nothing 
was  known  to  the  people  of  Cuba.  The  effort  to  establish 
the  American  system  among  an  inexperienced  people  into 
whose  minds  there  had  been  effectively  instilled  the  system 
practised  in  earlier  days,  resulted  only  in  confusion,  ineffi- 
ciency, and  extravagance.  There  stood  also  the  fact  that 
civic  administration  entails  expenditure,  and  taxation  for 
necessary  revenue.  The  people  were  poor,  many  of  them 
impoverished,  few  able  to  bear  any  taxation  whatever, 
especially  direct  taxation.  This  fact  in  itself  presented  an 
obstacle  of  endless  difficulty. 

Another  influence  appears  of  which  it  is  difficult  to  treat 
by  reason  of  the  divergent  views  upon  the  matter  and  be- 
cause it  is  largely  speculative.  That  rests  in  the  possible 
error  in  the  attitude  of  the  Military  Governor  toward  these 
institutions.  He  assumed  their  incapacity  and  acted  upon 
that  basis.  It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  say  what  would 
have  been  the  result  of  the  provision  of  a wisely  drawn 
municipal  law  would  have  given  a fuller  measure  of  local 
and  individual  responsibility  than  that  which  was  accorded 
them,  while  holding  all,  electors  as  well  as  elected,  to  a strict 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION  175 

accountability  under  the  law.  It  has  been  demonstrated 
repeatedly  that  where  Cubans  have  been  thrown  upon  their 
own  resources  and  forced  to  assume  their  own  responsibility, 
they  have  shown  better  results  than  have  appeared  where 
they  have  been  either  carried  or  half-carried.  This  finds 
endorsement  in  the  fact  that  in  no  municipality  of  the  Island 
was  interference  by  the  Military  Governor  so  direct  or  so 
persistent  as  it  was  in  Havana,  and,  by  General  Wood’s 
own  statement,  in  no  other  municipality  was  incompetency 
so  marked.  The  Military  Governor  declares  that  his  inter- 
ference was  imperative  to  prevent  results  injurious  to  the 
city,  and  that  the  conduct  of  officials  was,  at  times,  scandal- 
ous. Yet  these  officials  were  elected  under  laws  which  he 
promulgated,  and  under  his  own  immediate  supervision. 

The  weakness  of  General  Wood’s  position  in  this  matter 
is  fairly  shown  by  a comparison  of  records  during  his  ad- 
ministration and  that  of  the  Cubans  themselves.  The 
following  table  appears  in  an  official  (Cuban)  pamphlet  of 
general  statistics  relating  to  muncipal  budgets,  issued  by 
the  Secretaria  de  Hacienda: 


FISCAL  YEAR 

NUMBER  OF  CITIES 

TOTAL  DEFICIT 

1901-1902 

29 

$106,452.66 

1902-1903 

19 

28,233.43 

FISCAL  YEAR 

NUMBER  OF  CITIES 

TOTAL  SURPLUS 

1901-1902 

53 

$128,337.11 

1902-1903 

03 

305,316.21 

This  shows  that,  left  to  their  own  devices  without  inter- 
ference by  a Military  Governor,  ten  cities  were  transferred 
from  the  “deficit”  to  the  “surplus”  group;  the  total  deficit 
reduced  by  $78,219.23,  or  alxmt  three-quarters;  while  the 
total  surplus  was  increased  by  $170,979.10. 

It  is  probable  that  no  small  measure  of  the  trouble  in  Cuban 


176 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


municipal  government,  notably  that  of  the  City  of  Havana, 
lay  in  General  Wood’s  lack  of  tact  and  diplomacy,  in  his 
distrust  of  Cuban  ability,  and  in  his  desire  to  govern  all 
departments  according  to  his  own  idea.  This  may  have 
been  the  result  of  conscientious  desire  for  a government 
upon  high  ideals,  but  it  involved  a somewhat  conceited  ap- 
preciation of  his  own  ideals.  That  his  attitude  was  resented 
is  quite  beyond  question,  and  it  is  more  than  probable  that 
much  of  the  confusion  which  arose  was  due  to  a lack  of 
harmony  between  those  who  desired  self-government,  and 
believed  themselves  capable  of  exercising  it,  and  a superior 
officer  whose  attitude  clearly  showed  a doubt  and  distrust 
of  their  capacity  and  ability.  Although  the  Havana  Ayun- 
tamiento  was  organized  as  a virtually  autonomous  body, 
elected  by  the  citizens,  General  Wood  repeatedly  acted  over 
their  heads  in  important  matters  relating  distinctly  to  munic- 
ipal affairs.  This  was  notably  instanced  in  the  matter 
of  the  Havana  loan,  and  in  the  sewering  and  paving  contract. 
If  the  Havana  officials  were  really  so  dire  a menace  to  the 
well-being  of  the  city  as  General  Wood  assumed  them  to 
be,  it  was  quite  within  the  power  which  he  arrogated  to 
himself  to  remove  them  in  toto,  and  to  call  for  a new  election 
of  a more  reliable  group,  though  it  is  doubtful  if  he  would 
thus  have  secured  a more  intelligent  or  more  representative 
organization.  At  all  events,  admitting  their  inexperience, 
it  is  a fair  assumption  that  the  fault  in  Cuban  municipal 
administration  did  not  lie  exclusively  with  the  elected  offi- 
cials. 

During  the  year,  new  laws  were  issued  and  the  existing 
laws  were  repealed  and  modified  according  to  the  idea  of 
the  Military  Governor.  In  the  index  to  the  official  report 
for  the  year,  there  appear  twenty-four  orders  amending, 
repealing,  or  modifying  laws  previously  issued  by  the  Ameri- 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


177 


can  authorities.  The  pardon  of  offenders,  serving  sentence 
or  under  trial,  was  continued.  General  Wood’s  course  in 
the  matter  of  pardons  has  never  been  clearly  understood. 
A tabulation  shows  that,  during  his  incumbency,  he  issued 
pardons  to  more  than  a thousand  offenders  who  were  either 
under  sentence  or  under  trial  for  their  offences.  It  is  en- 
tirely probable  that  in  some  cases  this  executive  clemency 
was  quite  justified,  and  in  some  it  may  have  been  meritorious. 
But  its  free  indulgence  was  the  occasion  of  much  comment, 
and  a judge  of  one  of  the  higher  courts  remarked  in  a private 
conversation  that  it  was  useless  to  impose  sentence  upon 
criminals  because  the  Military  Governor  would  so  quickly 
pardon  them.  The  press  of  the  Island  complained  of  a 
prevalence  of  crime  because  of  these  pardons.  The  process 
was  continued  up  to  the  very  closing  days  of  the  Wood  regime. 
Within  the  three  days  preceding  his  departure  from  the 
Island,  General  Wood  issued  pardons,  remitted  fines,  or 
suspended  action  in  thirty-two  cases.  Among  the  crimes 
committed  by  those  thus  relieved  there  appear,  murder, 
robbery,  forgery  of  an  official  document,  bribery,  and  mis- 
appropriation of  funds. 

Under  date  of  April  5,  there  was  issued  an  elaborate  order 
effecting  the  organization  of  the  Rural  Guard.  This  body 
constituted  a national  police  force,  and,  in  many  communi- 
ties, performed  all  the  duties  which  ordinarily  devolve  upon 
a municipal  force  or  a rural  constabulary.  The  wisdom  of 
such  a system  may  be  a matter  of  doubt,  but  it  was  generally 
approved,  and  the  Cubans  themselves,  when  authority  came 
into  their  hands,  enlarged  the  organization.  It  is  probable 
however  that  politics  had  much  to  do  with  the  matter.  Under 
date  of  April  10,  an  order  was  issued  which  effected  a re- 
organization of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  provided  more 
specifically  for  its  composition  and  its  functions.  Orders 


178 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


issued  in  1899  and  in  1900  had  essayed  the  establishment 
of  laws  regarding  marriage.  In  his  report  for  1900,  General 
Wood  displays  no  little  personal  satisfaction  over  the  deter- 
mination of  the  matter  by  his  order  of  August  8 of  that  year. 
This  was  superseded  by  a more  elaborate  order  on  May  28, 
1901.  Its  general  provisions  were  as  follows: 

1.  Nature  of  contract:  Marriage,  in  so  far  as  its  validity  and 
effects  are  concerned,  continues  to  be  a civil  contract,  to  the  making 
of  which  the  consent  of  legally  capable  parties  is  essential. 

2.  Forms  of  marriage:  The  law  authorizes  two  equally  valid 
forms  of  marriage,  civil  and  religious.  The  contracting  parties 
may,  at  their  option,  enter  into  either  or  both. 

3.  Effects  of  marriage  ceremony:  Both  marriages,  civil  and  re- 
ligious, if  contracted  according  to  the  provisions  of  this  order,  shall 
have  the  same  legal  effect. 

Order  No.  173,  under  date  of  June  22,  provided  a com- 
prehensive set  of  Custom  House  regulations,  and  prescribed 
in  detail  the  powers  and  the  duties  of  customs  officials. 

On  November  25,  the  following  order  was  issued: 

“ Whenever  the  Government  may  deem  it  necessary  for  the  pub- 
lic interest,  it  shall  order  an  adjustment  of  the  railroad  companies’ 
tariffs,  whereby  just  and  reasonable  rates  will  be  fixed,  that  will 
insure  to  the  railroad  companies  a reasonable  profit  on  the  capital 
invested,  after  giving  due  consideration  to  the  needs  of  the  country 
served  by  said  railroad  companies.” 

This  is  quoted  here  because  of  its  bearing  upon  orders 
which  will  be  submitted  in  their  place  in  another  chapter. 
In  our  own  country,  individual  States  have  placed  limits 
upon  passenger  tariffs,  and,  by  means  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act,  the  Federal  Government  has  assumed  and 
exercised  authority  in  certain  departments  of  transportation. 
But  the  Federal  Government  of  the  United  States  has  never 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


179 


laid  down  so  sweeping  a proposition  regarding  railway 
tariffs  as  that  laid  down  by  its  agent  in  the  Island  of  Cuba. 

The  Constitutional  Convention  having  framed  and 
adopted  a Constitution  for  the  Republic  of  Cuba,  and  hav- 
ing accepted,  though  most  reluctantly,  the  conditions  im- 
posed by  the  Platt  Amendment,  the  way  was  opened  to  the 
next  step  — that  of  governmental  organization  by  a popular 
election  of  national  officials.  To  that  end,  there  was  issued, 
on  October  14,  Civil  Order  No.  218,  which  begins  with  the 
following  preamble: 

Havana,  Oct.  14,  1901. 

The  Military  Governor  of  Cuba  directs  the  publication  of  the 
following  order: 

1.  An  election  will  be  held  throughout  the  Island  on  Dec.  31, 
1901,  which  is  hereby  declared  a legal  holiday,  at  which  there  will 
be  elected  Presidential  and  Senatorial  electors;  members  of  the 
House  of  Representatives;  Governors  of  Provinces  and  Members 
of  Provincial  Councils,  as  hereinafter  provided  for. 

2.  Another  election  will  be  held  throughout  the  Island  on 
Feb.  24,  1902,  which  is  also  hereby  declared  a legal  holiday,  at 
which  there  will  be  elected  the  President,  the  Vice-President,  and 
Senators  as  hereinafter  provided  for. 

The  remainder  of  the  order  constituted  a Provisional 
Electoral  Law.  It  specified,  under  its  various  chapters, 
the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  elections,  as  follows:  Elec- 
toral Right;  Conditions  of  Eligibility;  Incompatibilities  and 
Disabilities;  Electoral  Registry;  Registration;  Provincial 
Boards;  Designation  of  Candidates;  Ballots;  Electoral 
Board;  Elections;  Scrutiny;  Election  of  Senators;  Election 
of  President  and  Vice-President  of  the  Republic;  Organiza- 
tion of  Congress;  Offences  and  Transgressions;  and  sundry 
Additional  Dispositions. 

There  were  many,  particularly  in  the  United  States,  who 


180 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


regarded  Maximo  Gomez  as  the  logical  if  not  the  inevitable 
candidate  for  the  honor  of  being  the  first  President  of  the 
new  Republic.  Those  of  better  information  knew  him  to 
be  an  impossibility.  His  services  in  the  field  might  well 
have  warranted  a claim  upon  the  position,  as  a reward,  but 
his  general  lack  of  proper  qualifications  for  the  presidency 
was  as  clearly  recognized  by  General  Gomez  himself  as  it 
was  by  those  who  knew  him  and  who  knew  the  real  needs 
of  the  Island.  Although  it  was  not  generally  known,  he  had 
long  been  tentatively  if  not  definitely  committed  to  the 
support  of  Tomas  Estrada  Palma  for  the  presidency.  Gen. 
Estrada  Palma  was  a veteran  of  the  Ten  Years’  War,  in 
which  he  had  played  a prominent  part,  even  holding,  at  the 
time  of  his  capture  by  the  Spaniards,  the  position  of  Presi- 
dent of  the  so-called  Republic.  In  the  later  war,  his  ser- 
vices, as  head  of  the  revolutionary  Junta,  in  New  York, 
had  rivalled  those  of  General  Gomez  in  the  active  and 
efficient  aid  given  to  the  cause  of  the  insurgents. 

At  a meeting  of  Cuban  political  leaders,  held  during  the 
month  of  July,  Senor  Estrada  Palma’s  eligibility  was  care- 
fully canvassed.  Cuba’s  political  camps,  at  that  time,  were 
divided  upon  the  issue  of  endorsement  of  or  opposition  to  the 
acceptance  of  the  Platt  Amendment,  the  radical  element 
being  anti-Plattista.  Many  of  these  believed  that  Senor 
Palma’s  long  residence  in  the  United  States  had  subjected 
him  to  influences  which  would  dispose  him  to  look  with 
favor,  or  at  least  with  tolerance,  upon  a measure  which 
was  offensive  to  many  of  the  Cuban  people.  It  was  rumored 
that  he  was  the  candidate  of  the  administration  at  Wash- 
ington, and  that  American  influences  were  at  work  in  his 
interest  in  Cuba. 

During  the  month  of  August,  a communication  was  sent 
to  him  asking  a definition  of  his  attitude  and  a statement 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


181 


of  his  views  upon  various  political  issues.  His  reply  was 
diplomatic  and  somewhat  vague,  but  it  was  fairly  acceptable 
to  the  majority.  It  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 

“The  United  States  Government  favors  mutual  concessions 
such  as  would  help  Cuban  products,  especially  sugar;  but  as  Cuba 
for  some  years  will  be  dependent  upon  her  income  from  customs, 
skill  will  be  needed  in  deciding  what  concessions  she  can  safely  offer.” 

Regarding  finance  he  said: 

“ Cuba  is  a new  nation  and  must  not  be  extravagant.  She  should 
adjust  her  expenditure  to  her  income  and  resources.” 

Regarding  the  payment  of  the  army,  Senor  Palma  recog- 
nized the  principle  that  the  army  must  be  paid,  but  added: 

“The  lists  must  be  carefully  examined,  and  the  Cuban  Congress 
should  reduce  the  rate  of  pay  for  officers  and  men  which  the  revo- 
lutionary government  allowed.” 

Regarding  treaty  relations,  he  said: 

“The  Cuban  Government  in  making  a treaty  should  try  so  to 
interpret  the  Platt  Amendment  as  to  give  it  the  meaning  most 
favorable  to  the  interests  of  Cuba  and  to  her  sovereignty  and  in- 
dependence. She  will  fulfil  the  treaty,  but  expects  the  United 
States  to  do  likewise  and  to  respect  her  independence,  which  is 
recognized  by  one  of  the  clauses  of  the  Platt  Amendment  in  the 
most  solemn  manner.” 

These  statements  became  the  general  basis  for  the  cam- 
paign platforms  of  both  of  the  leading  political  parties,  the 
National  and  the  Republican,  and  it  soon  became  a matter 
of  common  understanding  that  while  each  would  present 
its  own  candidates  for  other  offices,  both  parties  would 
support  Senor  Palma  for  the  presidency.  It  was  really  he, 
and  not  General  Gomez,  who  was  the  logical  candidate. 
No  other  possible  candidate  was  any  better  qualified  for  the 
post;  his  services  had  given  him  a strong  claim  upon  it;  and 
his  absence  from  the  many  wranglings  of  partisan  politics 


182 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


made  him  the  man  who,  more  than  any  other  and  better 
than  any  other,  could  harmonize  conflicting  interests.  For 
his  companion  on  the  ticket,  as  Vice-President,  Gen.  Bar- 
tolome  Maso  was  regarded  as  the  fit  and  logical  candidate 
for  very  much  the  same  reasons  as  those  which  made  Senor 
Palma  the  most  available  man  for  the  presidency.  Both 
had  served  in  similar  capacities  in  Cuba’s  republics  of  earlier 
days,  and  both  were  honored  and  respected  by  the  Cuban 
people.  For  some  weeks  it  was  generally  understood  that 
these  gentlemen  would  be  the  approved  candidates  of  both 
parties.  But  Senor  Palma’s  somewhat  indefinite  attitude 
in  the  matter  of  the  Platt  Amendment,  and  the  tendency  of 
Cuban  politicians  to  split  upon  issues  of  individual  leader- 
ship more  than  upon  differences  of  political  opinion,  resulted 
in  the  organization  of  a movement  which  made  Maso  the 
rival  of  Estrada  Palma  for  the  presidency. 

On  October  31,  General  Maso  issued  a campaign  mani- 
festo in  which  he  declared  that  he  had  been  “induced  to 
enter  the  field  of  presidential  candidature  in  order  to  preserve 
the  nationalism  and  patriotism  of  the  country.”  He  as- 
serted that  the  Government  of  Intervention  had  been  “per- 
verted into  a military  occupation  approaching  a conquest.” 
His  statement  is  less  absurd  than  many  may  suppose  it  to 
be.  He  made  his  appeal  to  the  generally  neglected  elements 
in  Cuban  affairs  — the  Autonomist,  the  Spanish,  and  the 
Negro,  a decidedly  incongruous  combination.  While  not 
a little  of  General  Maso’s  attitude  seemed  to  put  him  into 
a position  antagonistic  to  the  United  States,  it  is  only  fair 
to  him  to  say  that  he  was  ardently  pro-Cuban  rather  than 
in  any  way  anti-American.  He  was,  like  many  who  lacked 
his  courage  in  saying  so,  opposed  to  the  Platt  Amendment, 
which  was  made  a feature  in  this  campaign. 

While  the  honesty  and  the  genuine  patriotism  of  General 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


183 


Maso  were  equally  beyond  question,  his  following  consisted 
largely  of  political  malcontents.  The  ablest  political  leaders 
had  allied  themselves  with  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  leading 
parties,  and  not  a few  of  them  had  been  provided  with 
official  positions  in  a government  which  was  known  to  en- 
dorse the  candidacy  of  General  Palma.  The  National  party 
was,  broadly  speaking,  the  party  of  Maximo  Gomez.  The 
Republican  party  was  its  rival  for  supremacy.  Between 
the  two  men,  individually,  there  was  perhaps  little  difference 
in  point  of  personal  worth.  The  political  issue,  the  only 
one  of  any  force,  was  essentially  factitious.  The  Platt 
Amendment  was  a fact  to  be  faced  and  not  an  issue  to  be 
fought.  The  place  to  be  occupied  in  the  new  government  by 
the  Spaniard,  the  Negro,  and  the  representatives  of  the 
former  Autonomist  party,  necessarily  remained  for  deter- 
mination by  their  own  attitude  and  political  influence,  and 
could  not  be  established  by  any  declaration  of  a party  plat- 
form. 

December  31  was  the  day  set  for  the  election.  The  Maso 
party  gained  a following  which,  for  a short  time,  appeared 
to  be  formidable,  and  the  Palma  group  was  stimulated  to  a 
moderately  energetic  canvass.  Mass  meetings  were  held  and 
campaign  speeches  were  made.  Yet,  notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  some  of  the  more  enthusiastic  Masoists  declared 
their  faction  to  be  representative  of  sixty  per  cent  of  tire 
people  of  the  Island,  the  party,  as  a party,  withdrew  from 
the  contest.  Their  withdrawal  was  based  upon  alleged 
unfairness  in  election  methods,  and  upon  assertions  that 
they  were  not  given  proper  representation  on  the  various 
Election  Boards,  including  the  Board  of  Scrutiny,  which 
was  composed  of  Palma  adherents  and  which  was  vested 
with  a wide  measure  of  determining  power.  Charges  were 
brought  of  fraud  in  registration  processes,  and  in  the  various 


184 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


processes  of  nomination.  An  appeal  was  made  for  a post- 
ponement of  the  day  of  election,  and  for  a representation 
of  the  Maso  party  on  the  various  Boards  of  Canvass  and 
Scrutiny.  The  appeal  was  refused.  On  December  31, 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Maso  party  was  announced.  At  a 
meeting  of  the  party  leaders  a resolution  was  adopted  which 
contained  the  following  expression: 

“The  Central  Board  is  a coalition  of  partisans,  and  General 
Maso,  after  exhausting  every  means  to  insure  impartiality,  recti- 
tude, and  justice  at  the  coming  elections,  has  become  convinced 
that  neither  in  official  circles  in  the  United  States  nor  in  Cuba 
does  the  intention  exist  to  see  that  the  elections  are  carried  out  with 
sufficient  legality  to  reflect  the  real  wish  of  the  Cubans,  who  are 
desirous  of  independence  and  anxious  to  elect  freely  their  first 
constitutional  government.” 

The  Palma  faction  declared  that  the  withdrawal  was  due 
to  a recognition  of  weakness  and  the  futility  of  a contest. 
Whatever  the  facts  may  be,  whether  Maso’s  followers  were 
numbered  by  hundreds  or  by  thousands,  the  entire  incident 
can  only  be  regarded  as  a matter  for  regret,  inasmuch  as  the 
justice  and  the  fairness  of  Cuba’s  first  national  election 
must  remain  as  an  undetermined  question,  and  a doubt  must 
remain  of  the  entire  good  faith  of  the  officials  of  the  Inter- 
vention. Some  weakness  appears  in  the  official  argument 
from  the  fact  that,  notwithstanding  the  Maso  withdrawal, 
eight  pronounced  Masoists  were  chosen  out  of  the  sixty- 
three  candidates  for  the  electoral  college.  How  much  this 
might  have  been  increased  had  the  campaign  been  con- 
ducted upon  broader  lines  cannot,  of  course,  be  estimated. 

Charges  of  fraud  and  irregularity  were  brought,  but  the 
methods  proposed  for  hearing  and  decision  were  unaccept- 
able to  those  who  brought  them,  and  the  matter  was  dropped 
as  hopeless,  leaving  some  to  believe  that  injustice  had  been 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


185 


done  with  the  support  and  connivance  of  the  Military 
Governor.  The  Spanish  press  took  no  part  in  the  cam- 
paign, and  as  it  had  no  ardent  affection  for  either  side,  its 
opinions  may  be  regarded  as,  to  considerable  extent,  non- 
partisan. The  general  tenor  of  the  comment  of  the  local 
Spanish  papers  was  to  the  effect  that  Estrada  Palma  was 
regarded  as  the  candidate  of  the  United  States  and  of  Cuban 
officialdom,  and  that  it  was  therefore  useless  to  oppose  him. 
It  is  unfortunate  that  any  ground  should  have  existed  for 
the  assertions  and  allegations  of  the  time,  even  if  it  be  ad- 
mitted that  they  were  not  warranted.  America’s  hands  in 
Cuba  should  have  been  so  clean  that  no  stain  could  have 
clung  to  them.  Her  acts  should  have  been  beyond  the 
possibility  of  impeachment. 

Election  day  was  marked  with  quiet  and  order  through- 
out the  Island,  and  only  a light  vote  was  polled.  In  his 
report  for  1902  (p.  3),  General  Wood  says: 

“I  regret  to  state  that  a large  portion  of  the  conservative  element, 
composed  of  property  owners,  business  and  professional  men,  etc., 
did  not  take  such  an  interest  in  the  elections  as  proper  regard  for 
the  welfare  of  their  country  required,  and  consequently  the  repre- 
sentation of  this  element  among  the  officials  elected  has  not  been 
proportionately  as  large  as  the  best  interests  of  the  Island  demand.” 

Something  is  to  be  said  upon  the  other  side  of  this  ques- 
tion. General  Wood  did  not  command  the  respect  and  the 
confidence  of  this  “conservative  element,”  which  saw  liim 
surrounded  and  influenced  by  a political  element  in  which 
they  had  no  confidence.  They  noted  his  neglect  of  and 
general  indifference  to  the  economic  interests  in  which  they 
were  most  deeply  concerned.  For  these  reasons,  precisely 
as  many  of  our  own  citizens  do  in  this  country,  they  held 
aloof  from  participation  in  insular  politics. 

Subject  to  the  conditions  set  forth  in  the  preceding  chap- 


186 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


ter,  the  statement  of  revenue  and  expenditure  for  the  year 
may  be  given  as  follows : * 


Total  Receipts $18,791,473.21 

Total  Expenditure 19,514,603.87 


Classifying  the  expenditures,  the  leading  items  may  be 
given,  approximately,  as  follows: 


Administration  $1,139,911.00 

Agriculture  172,519.00 

Barracks  and  Quarters 360,709.00 

Charities  and  Hospitals 1,589,549.00 

Justice  991,656.00 

Education  4,211,481.00 

Public  Works 1,692,754.00 

Rural  Guard 929,111.00 

Sanitation  2,787,093.00 

Custom  Houses  975,732.00 

Public  Buildings  913,123.00 

Jails 511,232.00 

Postal  Service 440,901.00 

State  and  Government 399,240.00 


The  foreign  trade  for  the  year  is  given  by  General  Bliss, 
Collector  of  Customs,  as  follows: 


Total  Imports $67,751,911.00 

Total  Exports 66,502,533.00 

Of  the  imports,  $28,469,251  came  from  the  United  States, 
and  $39,282,660  from  other  countries.  Of  the  exports, 
$50,016,318  was  sent  to  the  United  States,  and  $16,486,215 
to  other  countries. 

The  deficit  for  the  year  1901  exceeds  $700,000.  The  def- 
icit of  this  year,  taken  with  that  of  the  preceding  year,  gives 
ground  for  a legitimate  comparison.  During  his  incumbency. 


* For  fuller  details,  see  article  on  Revenues  and  Expenditures,  Chapter  XX. 


THE  THIRD  YEAR  OF  OCCUPATION 


187 


General  Brooke  accumulated  a treasury  surplus  of  nearly 
$2,000,000.  General  Wood,  during  his  term,  appears  to  have 
overspent  his  revenues  by  about  $1,500,000.  One  year  after 
the  American  withdrawal,  the  Cuban  Treasurer  reported  an 
available  cash  balance  of  nearly  $3,000,000.  This  was  done 
in  spite  of  an  increase  in  the  running  expenses  for  items 
which  did  not  appear  in  the  Wood  budget,  such  as  the  pay- 
ment of  a congress,  a larger  salary  and  appropriation  for  the 
executive,  and  the  maintenance  of  a diplomatic  corps  and  a 
consular  service.  It  was  also  done  with  no  appreciable  dimi- 
nution in  the  efficiency  of  government  in  the  departments 
of  law  and  order,  education,  sanitation,  and  public  improve- 
ments. As  a financier.  General  Wood  was  outclassed  by 
both  General  Brooke  and  Seiior  Estrada  Palma. 


Chapter  XII 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 

The  opening  days  of  1902  found  the  Island  of  Cuba  upon 
the  threshold  of  a new  life.  The  conditions  under  which 
the  United  States  proposed  withdrawal  had  been  accepted. 
A national  election  had  been  held,  and  although  another 
election  was  required  for  full  determination,  the  personnel 
of  the  new  government  was  generally  known.  On  February 
24,  the  second  election  was  held,  and  Tomas  Estrada  Palma 
was  formally  chosen  as  Cuba’s  first  President,  with  Luis 
Estevez  as  Vice-President.  The  elected  Senators  included 
some  whose  names  had  been  made  familiar  to  American 
readers  by  their  participation  in  the  military  operations  of 
the  revolution,  and  the  political  operations  which  followed 
the  termination  of  hostilities.  So  far  as  Cuba  was  con- 
cerned, nothing  remained  except  the  official  organization 
of  the  various  elements.  May  20  was  announced  as  the  date 
of  American  withdrawal  and  of  the  definite  establishment 
of  the  Cuban  Republic. 

Economically  and  industrially,  the  Island  was  in  a state 
of  suspense  and  unrest.  The  struggle  for  tariff  concessions 
in  the  United  States  was  in  active  process.  This  will  be 
treated  in  another  chapter.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
the  generally  predicted  industrial  disaster  did  not  occur, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  the  situation  was  seriously  menacing, 
and  that  a real  ground  existed  for  the  wide-spread  appre- 
hension that  was  both  felt  and  manifested.  That  the 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


189 


disaster  did  not  fall  is  in  no  way  due  to  any  act  of  the  United 
States.  Its  aversion  was  the  result  of  other  influences. 

Any  consideration  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Government 
of  Intervention  during  the  year  1902  is  necessarily  subject 
to  the  individual  view  of  America’s  justification  for  the 
policy  which  had  been  adopted  in  the  matter  of  “ sovereignty, 
jurisdiction,  and  control”  over  the  Island.  This  applies 
throughout  the  entire  experience,  but  especially  to  the 
closing  days.  Notably  from  the  beginning  of  the  Wood 
regime,  there  was  shown  an  increasing  tendency  to  ignore 
the  declaration  of  the  Teller  Amendment,  and  a manifest 
purpose  not  only  to  administer  the  present  affairs  of  the 
Island,  but  as  well  to  essay  regulation  of  its  fundamental 
laws  and  governmental  processes.  Technically,  this  can 
only  be  regarded  as  a flagrant  violation  of  a national  pledge. 
The  point  was  not  broadly  raised  in  the  United  States,  and 
the  American  people,  hearing  no  vigorous  outcry  of  pro- 
test, assumed  Cuban  acquiescence  and  approval  from  the 
mere  fact  of  Cuban  silence.  The  Cuban  point  of  view  was 
that  protest  was  useless.  They  were  in  the  hands  of  a 
stronger  power  which,  having  adopted  a certain  course  of 
procedure,  was  undoubtedly  disposed  to  stand  by  its  actions. 
The  power,  of  course,  existed.  The  moral  or  the  legal  right 
to  exercise  that  power  is  distinctly  open  to  question. 

In  his  report  for  1902  (p.  271)  General  Wood  says:  “The 
work  called  for  and  accomplished  was  the  building  up  of  a 
republic,  by  Anglo-Saxons,  in  a Latin  country  where  approxi- 
mately seventy  per  cent  of  the  people  were  illiterate;  where 
they  had  lived  always  as  a military  colony;  where  general 
elections,  as  we  understand  them,  were  unknown;  ...  in 
short,  the  establishment,  in  a little  over  three  years,  in  a 
Latin  military  colony,  ...  of  a republic  modelled  closely 
uj>on  lines  of  our  great  Republic.”  This  appears  to  have 


190 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


been  General  Wood’s  interpretation  of  the  only  authorita- 
tive policy  ever  announced  by  the  United  States  regarding 
its  control  of  Cuban  affairs,  a policy  declared  by  the  Ameri- 
can Congress  in  these  words:  “That  the  United  States  hereby 
disclaims  any  disposition  or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty, 
jurisdiction,  or  control  over  said  Island  except  for  the  paci- 
fication thereof,  and  asserts  its  determination,  when  that  is 
accomplished,  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of  the 
Island  to  its  people.” 

There  is  neither  statement  nor  intimation  here  that  the 
work  called  for  or  to  be  accomplished  was  the  constitution 
of  a republic,  “by  Anglo-Saxons,”  for  those  of  an  alien 
race,  upon  Anglo-Saxon  lines.  At  no  time  during  the  pre- 
ceding three  years  had  there  been  manifested  so  definite  a 
purpose  as  that  shown  during  the  months  of  1902,  in  the 
adoption  of  autocratic  monarchical  methods  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a republic  in  a foreign  land.  In  the  issuance 
of  official  orders,  during  the  preceding  period,  those  orders 
were  prefaced  with  the  statement  that  “The  Military  Gov- 
ernor directs  the  publication  of  the  following  order.”  In 
numerous  cases,  in  1902,  this  was  changed  to  “ I,  Leonard 
Wood,  Military  Governor,  by  virtue  of  the  authority  vested 
in  me,  direct  the  publication  of  the  following  order.”  At 
no  previous  time  had  interference  with  established  laws  been 
so  direct  and  flagrant. 

On  February  7 and  on  March  3,  there  were  issued 
railroad  laws  which  instituted  an  entirely  new  order  in 
Cuban  railway  matters.  The  primary  object  of  the  law 
of  February  7 was,  undoubtedly,  the  definite  legal  estab- 
lishment of  the  new  railway  from  Santiago  to  Santa  Clara. 
The  law,  in  itself,  has  much  to  recommend  it.  It  is  a good 
law,  and  its  operation  will  in  all  probability  make  for  the 
general  welfare  of  the  Island.  Nevertheless,  the  establish- 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


191 


ment  of  such  laws  belonged  properly  to  the  Cuban  Govern- 
ment which  was  so  soon  to  be  inaugurated.  On  April  28, 
only  three  weeks  before  the  installation  of  the  new  govern- 
ment, another  law  was  issued  which  regulated  in  detail  the 
rates  for  both  freight  and  passenger  traffic  on  all  the  insular 
railways.  The  general  railway  question  is  treated  in  an- 
other chapter  under  a special  heading. 

On  January  24,  Civil  Order  No.  23  abolished  about  one- 
third  of  the  existing  municipalities  of  the  Island.  This  was 
distinctly  a matter  which  concerned  the  Cuban  people  and 
the  Cuban  Government.  In  his  report  covering  the  period, 
General  Wood  states  that  “ Shortly  following  the  publication 
of  the  decree  of  suppression  (of  these  municipalities)  a con- 
siderable number  of  complaints  and  protests  were  received 
concerning  the  advisability  and  the  fairness  of  the  distribution 
as  made.  Some  of  the  protests  seemed  to  be  well  grounded 
and  the  modifications  suggested  were  embodied  in  sub- 
sequent orders.  . . . Considering  the  number  of  interests 
involved,  political  and  material,  the  large  number  of  persons 
concerned,  the  gravity  and  the  perplexity  of  the  question, 
the  general  acceptance  of  the  order,  with  a comparatively 
small  number  of  protests,  was  remarkable.” 

This  statement  of  the  Military  Governor  certainly  war- 
rants an  opinion  that  the  re-districting  of  these  municipalities 
was  done  without  due  and  proper  consideration  and  investi- 
gation. Suitable  opportunity  should  have  been  given  for 
the  entry  of  complaints  and  protests  before  the  matter  was 
acted  upon,  and  the  step,  if  to  be  taken  at  all,  should  have 
been  final.  It  is  precisely  upon  such  issues,  and  upon  his 
frequent  retraction  of  previous  steps  and  rectification  of 
previous  errors,  that  General  Wood  made  the  mistake  which 
cost  him  the  confidence  and  the  esteem  of  the  Cuban  people. 
It  has  been  generally  supposed  that  he  possessed  both.  As 


192 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


a matter  of  fact,  he  held  neither.  He  acted  upon  a sup- 
position of  his  thorough  comprehension  of  Cuban  character. 
The  Cubans  realized  his  failure  in  that  respect  and  quietly 
bided  their  time  knowing  that  his  control  of  their  affairs 
could  be  no  more  than  temporary.  General  Wood  mis- 
interpreted Cuban  silence.  Where  protest  appeared,  it  was 
his  custom  to  denounce  it  as  the  unjustified  complainings 
of  the  disaffected.  But  the  Cuban  people  had  been  trained 
in  self-repression  by  many  years  of  life  under  Spanish  mili- 
tary autocracy,  and  the  influence  of  that  training  remained. 
A few  might  protest,  but  the  many  kept  silence. 

An  important  law,  of  doubtful  justification  under  the 
circumstances,  was  issued  on  March  5.  This  related  to  a 
question  known  as  that  of  the  Haciendas  Comuneras.  It 
involved  a matter  of  boundary  lines  and  undivided  estates. 
During  the  earlier  days  of  the  Spanish  settlement  in  the 
Island,  land  grants  were  made  by  the  government.  These 
were  made  in  circles  from  some  more  or  less  well  defined 
central  object,  a tree,  a rock,  or  a special  formation  of  land. 
Surveys  were  most  loosely  made,  and  there  were  many  in- 
stances in  which  these  circles  overlapped  and  gave  rise  to 
disputed  ownership.  Land  sales,  transfers,  and  successive 
inheritance  had  left  titles  to  numerous  areas  in  a state  of 
utter  confusion.  These  were  determined  by  the  law  of 
March  5.  Properly,  the  determination  belonged  to  a Cuban 
government  and  to  Cuban  courts,  and  General  Wood’s 
action  was,  in  reality,  a usurpation  of  prerogatives  not 
rightfully  his,  although  the  technical  work  was  done  under 
the  control  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

On  April  12,  1902,  there  appeared  the  following  official 
announcement : 

“I,  Leonard  Wood,  Military  Governor  of  Cuba,  by  virtue  of 
the  authority  vested  in  me,  order  publication  of  the  following: 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


193 


“The  officers  who  are  at  present  serving  in  the  judicial  and 
public  prosecution  services,  and  those  who  in  the  future  may  be 
appointed  thereto  in  accordance  with  law,  shall  not  be  suspended 
from  their  positions,  dismissed  therefrom,  nor  removed  from  said 
services  except  for  reason  of  a duly  proven  crime  or  other  serious 
cause,  and  never  without  a hearing  to  the  interested  party.” 

Then  followed  detailed  specifications  of  the  justifying 
causes  of  removal. 

This,  which  was  known  as  the  inamobabilidad  order, 
roused  a vigorous  and  general  protest.  In  those  private 
circles  where  Cubans  gathered  for  discussion  of  their  affairs, 
it  was  openly  and  freely  asserted  that  the  step  was  taken  to 
reward  judges  and  others  who  had  served  the  Military 
Governor  by  lending  countenance  to  measures  of  doubtful 
legality,  by  making  their  positions  permanent  whether  the 
incumbents  were  or  were  not  acceptable  to  the  incoming 
government.  Upon  any  other  than  that  very  doubtful 
ground,  the  order  was  little  else  than  preposterous,  utterly 
without  warrant.  So  energetic  were  the  protests  and  so 
vigorous  the  outcry,  that  the  sound  reached  Washington, 
and  orders  were  promptly  sent  for  the  revocation  of  the 
order.  In  a little  group  of  orders  which  was  held  back 
until  a late  hour  of  the  night  of  May  19,  there  appeared  one 
which,  coming  when  it  did,  was  quite  ridiculous.  It  declared 
that  Order  No.  99,  that  under  consideration  here,  should  be 
without  effect  after  the  noon  of  May  20.  Life  tenure  was  thus 
reduced  to  the  life  of  American  authority  in  the  Island, 
somewhat  to  the  personal  chagrin  of  the  Military  Governor. 

During  the  opening  months  of  this  year,  there  occurred 
the  final  trial  of  the  notorious  Post-office  cases,  in  which 
the  Military  Governor  very  actively  concerned  himself. 
It  would  be  of  interest  to  review  this  case,  but  it  is  impossible 


194 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


to  do  so  here  because  of  its  length  and  complexity.  Two 
features  of  the  trial  may  be  cited  because  of  their  bearing 
upon  administrative  processes.  Notwithstanding  the  Ameri- 
can establishment  of  the  Spanish  codes  as  the  law  of  the  land, 
it  is  of  record  that  the  Military  Governor  did  definitely  and 
directly  instruct  the  officers  and  judges  of  the  courts  in 
matters  pertaining  to  court  processes  in  the  Post-office  cases. 
From  Ardsley,  N.  Y.,  where  he  was  visiting  at  the  time, 
he  cabled  instructions  for  the  arrest  of  Major  Rathbone, 
and  specified  the  amount  of  bail  to  be  fixed  in  his  case  as 
“at  least  $25,000.” 

He  also  gave  instructions  and  information  which  resulted 
in  the  use  of  ex  parte  testimony  in  these  trials.  This  was  in 
violation  of  principles  plainly  set  forth  in  a communication 
from  Washington.  This  was  transmitted  to  the  court  and  the 
following  is  quoted  from  the  transmitted  instructions,  under 
date  of  Nov.  15,  1901: 

“The  Act  of  Congress  passed  on  the  6th  day  of  June,  1900,  for 
the  extradition  of  persons  accused  of  crimes  in  any  foreign  country, 
or  any  territory  occupied  by  or  under  the  control  of  the  United 
States,  provides  that  the  authorities  who  may  have  control  of  these 
countries  or  territories  shall  guarantee  to  such  persons  a fair  and 
impartial  trial. 

“A  trial  in  which  there  are  used  ex  parte  depositions  given  by 
persons  whom  there  is  no  opportunity  to  cross-examine,  is  not  a 
‘fair  and  impartial  trial’;  and  accordingly,  as  before  stated,  such 
depositions  cannot  be  used  at  the  trial.” 

This  laid  down  the  broad  principle  applicable  in  such 
cases.  Nevertheless,  upon  representations  made  to  Secre- 
tary Root,  and  upon  instructions  afterward  sent  to  the  court 
by  General  Wood,  such  depositions  were  used,  and  they  con- 
stituted an  important  part  of  the  testimony  upon  which 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


195 


Major  Rathbone  was  convicted.  Neely  was  convicted  upon 
proof  of  guilt  clearly  established,  and  Reeves  confessed  his 
guilt  and  turned  State’s  evidence.  These  facts  were  presented 
to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  in  person,  with  the 
result  that  an  order  was  issued,  by  his  direction,  making 
provision  for  a re-hearing  of  the  case,  on  appeal.  But  this 
order  was  not  issued  until  the  19th  of  May,  the  day  pre- 
ceding the  American  withdrawal,  and,  in  the  meantime, 
the  Cuban  Congress  had  agreed  upon  a bill  of  amnesty  to 
American  subjects  under  sentence  or  trial  in  the  Island. 
Neely  was  released  and  Reeves  was  pardoned  by  General 
Wood  for  his  services  as  State’s  evidence.  Major  Rathbone 
returned  to  the  United  States  to  demand  from  the  Secretary 
of  War,  the  Senate,  and  the  President,  an  opportunity  to 
prove  and  establish  his  innocence  of  the  crime  with  which 
he  had  been  charged. 

During  the  four  weeks  preceding  the  termination  of 
American  control,  numerous  orders  were  issued  relating  to 
matters  which  were,  under  any  conditions,  for  Cuban  rather 
than  for  American  determination.  These  included  Order 
No.  112,  dated  April  23,  which  provided,  in  full,  detail  for 
the  systematizing  of  the  financial  departments  of  the  munic- 
ipalities of  the  Island.  Order  No.  116,  April  28,  provided 
a Manual  for  Courts  Martial  and  Procedure  under  Military 
Law,  for  use  of  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  Island  of  Cuba,  a 
matter  in  which  American  interference  was  distinctly  gratui- 
tous and  uncalled  for.  Order  No.  122,  April  29,  gave  effect 
to  a comprehensive  set  of  Quarantine  Laws  and  Regulations 
for  the  Island.  Order  No.  128,  May  6,  declared  that  the 
land  and  buildings  known  as  “Camp  Columbia,”  in  the 
western  suburbs  of  Havana,  previously  occupied  by  Ameri- 
can troops  as  a military  camp,  “including  all  the  works, 


196 


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buildings,  additions,  increase,  and  improvements,  whether 
now  existing  or  to  be  hereafter  constructed,”  should  become 
a permanent  camp  for  the  use  of  the  “ military  forces  ” of 
Cuba.  This  appears  to  have  been  done  because,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Military  Governor,  Cuba  ought  to  have 
military  forces  and  a permanent  camp  for  their  use  and  occu- 
pation. This  order  was  issued  just  two  weeks  before  the 
Cubans  assumed  control  of  their  government,  and,  on  the 
day  preceding  its  issuance,  President-elect  Palma  had  said 
that  there  would  be  no  war  estimates  in  the  Cuban  budget, 
and  that  “ an  army  would  be  useless  to  the  Island,  and  would 
tend  to  encourage  that  militarism  which  has  been  the  curse 
of  so  many  Latin  countries.” 

Order  No.  154,  May  14,  provided  at  great  length  all  the 
details,  specifications,  and  regulations  for  the  revenue 
cutter  service  of  the  Island  of  Cuba.  It  declared  the  duties 
of  the  service,  the  duties  of  its  officers,  the  salaries,  pay,  and 
uniforms  of  those  connected  with  it,  and  even  provided  that 
the  “galley  fire  shall  be  extinguished  at  8 p.m.,  unless 
specially  authorized  by  the  commanding  officer  to  be  con- 
tinued longer.”  On  May  15,  an  order  declared  the  appli- 
cation to  the  Island  of  Cuba,  soon  to  become,  by  the  promise 
and  pledge  of  the  United  States,  an  independent  Republic, 
of  the  Immigration  Laws  of  the  United  States.  Truly,  vio- 
lation of  the  Teller  Amendment  to  the  Joint  Resolution,  and 
assumption  of  unlimited  “sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  and  con- 
trol” over  a land  declared  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  to  be  “ foreign  territory  ” could  go  no  further. 
On  May  17,  three  days  prior  to  the  withdrawal.  General 
Wood  issued  an  order  (No.  159)  for  the  regulation  of  the 
sanitary  affairs  of  the  Island  of  Cuba.  It  established  the 
“Superior  Sanitary  Board,”  prescribed  its  duties,  and  fixed 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


197 


the  pay  of  its  members.  It  established  local  sanitary 
boards,  and  fixed  their  pay  and  prescribed  their  duties. 
Order  No.  170,  May  17,  affected  fourteen  specific  articles 
in  the  Law  of  Civil  Procedure.  Orders  No.  172  and  178, 
both  dated  May  18,  gave  full  pardon  to  eighteen  criminals, 
ended  penal  action  in  fourteen  cases,  and  affected  sundry 
other  cases. 

A very  pertinent  question  arises  from  any  consideration 
of  the  laws  and  regulations  thus  promulgated  on  the  very 
eve  of  the  termination  of  American  control  of  Cuba.  If 
these  matters  were  deemed  of  vital  importance  to  the  Island, 
why  were  they  not  put  into  effect  at  an  earlier  time?  The 
affairs  of  the  Island  had  gone  on  without  them  so  well  that 
the  administration  commented  with  pride  and  satisfaction 
upon  their  progress  and  development.  If  the  new  provisions 
were  not  imperative  up  to  this  time,  it  is  fair  to  suppose 
that  they  might  have  rested  until  the  Cubans  themselves 
should  act  upon  them.  If  the  Cubans  were  not  to  be  trusted 
to  act  wisely,  they  were  manifestly  unfit  for  self-government. 
There  was  no  ground  whatever  for  the  issuance  of  such 
fundamental  laws  as  those  regulating  municipal  finance,  re- 
stricting immigration,  and  amending  the  code  of  civil  pro- 
cedure, except  that  of  an  assumption  of  Cuban  incapacity. 
Such  incapacity  being  assumed,  there  was  no  justification  for 
intrusting  them  with  self-government. 

On  May  5,  the  elected  Cuban  Congress  assembled  in 
Havana,  at  the  call  of  the  Military  Governor.  They  met 
at  the  Palace  to  receive  the  following  message  from  General 
Wood: 

“ I have  the  honor,  in  the  name  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  as  Military  Governor  of  the 
Island  of  Cuba,  to  welcome  you  and  most  earnestly  wish 
you  every  success  in  the  great  work  upon  which  you  arc 


198 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


soon  to  enter.  You  have  been  convened  solely  for  the 
purpose  expressed  in  paragraph  II  of  Order  No.  101,  dated 
Havana,  April  14,  1902  (examining  credentials  of  Congress- 
men and  counting  and  rectifying  vote  of  electoral  college 
for  President  and  Vice-President),  and  no  legislative  power 
will  be  vested  in  the  Congress  until  after  the  formal  transfer 
of  the  government  to  the  government-elect,  which  transfer 
will  take  place  at  noon,  May  20,  1902.”  Other  less  im- 
portant information  followed.  Sefior  Mendez  Capote  was 
chosen  by  his  associates  to  make  reply,  which  he  did  in  the 
following  words  (translation) : 

Mr.  Military  Governor  of  the  Island  of  Cuba: 

“In  the  name  of  my  companions.  Senators  and  Representatives 
of  the  Cuban  Congress  who  have  designated  me  for  the  mission  of 
giving  you  an  affectionate  reply  for  the  speech  you  have  just  made, 
I address  you. 

“We  desire  that  you  as  Military  Governor  of  the  Island  of  Cuba 
notify  the  President  of  the  United  States  Government  and  the 
American  people,  of  our  sincere  gratitude  for  complying  with  the 
promises  which  they  have  given  to  the  aspirations  of  the  Cuban 
people  for  an  independent  republic. 

“It  is  our  earnest  desire  to  comply  with  the  mission  with  which 
we  are  charged  by  the  Cuban  Constitution,  as  adopted  by  the  Con- 
stitutional Assembly. 

“We  give  you  our  heartiest  thanks  for  the  good  wishes  which 
you  have  expressed  for  us  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  duties  en- 
trusted to  us  by  our  people.” 

Senators  and  Representatives  then  adjourned  to  the  halls 
which  had  been  provided  for  their  respective  use.  During 
the  succeeding  days  they  effected  their  organization  and 
transacted  such  routine  business  as  fell  within  the  scope  of 
their  then  existing  powers. 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


199 


President-elect  Palma  sailed  for  Cuba  during  the  latter 
part  of  April,  and  landed  at  Gibara,  on  the  northeast  coast 
of  the  Island.  From  that  point,  he  crossed  to  Santiago, 
and  to  his  old  home  near  Bayamo,  and  then,  partly  by  boat 
and  partly  by  rail,  proceeded  to  Havana,  reaching  that  city 
on  May  11.  His  course  was  a veritable  triumphal  proces- 
sion. People  of  all  classes,  Spaniards  as  well  as  Cubans, 
bade  him  welcome,  and  received  him  with  balls,  dinners, 
and  other  forms  of  public  entertainment.  His  speeches 
during  the  trip  were  broadly  conservative,  and  did  much  to 
establish  a general  confidence  in  the  future.  Havana  re- 
ceived him  with  great  enthusiasm. 

The  ensuing  days  were  spent  in  preparation,  by  the  officials 
and  by  the  people,  for  the  coming  event.  Elaborate  arches 
were  erected  in  the  streets  of  the  city,  and  the  morning  of  the 
20th  of  May  saw  the  streets,  residences,  and  public  buildings 
radiant  with  bunting.  Many  of  the  leading  thoroughfares 
were  converted  into  arcades  of  brilliant  colors.  The  ship- 
ping in  the  harbor  was  decorated  with  a profusion  rivalling 
that  of  the  shore.  The  night  of  the  19th  was  a pandemonium 
of  noise.  Bombs  and  fire-crackers,  large  and  small,  banged, 
boomed,  and  snapped  throughout  the  night.  Sleep  was 
evidently  no  object  to  thousands  of  Cuban  patriots,  and 
was  made  impossible  for  the  less  enthusiastic.  At  midnight 
some  three  thousand  people  were  gathered  in  the  Parque 
Central.  The  other  parks  presented  their  full  quota  of  a 
noisy  and  excited  throng.  Rockets  pierced  the  air  from 
many  points,  and  Cuba’s  natal  day  was  ushered  in  with 
shouts  and  vivas  and  a terrific  din  of  explosives.  Steamers 
in  the  bay  tied  their  whistles  wide  open  and  screamed  a 
welcome  to  Cuba’s  birthday.  The  jubilation  of  the  night 
slackened  at  about  3 a.m.,  but  was  quickly  renewed  by  the 
opening  of  the  noise  of  those  who  had  reserved  their  energies 


200 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


for  the  day.  By  five  o’clock,  the  streets  were  thronged 
with  a swarming  mass  bent  upon  noise-making  and  upon 
seeing  all  that  was  to  be  seen.  Only  slightly  moderated, 
this  was  the  experience  of  the  nights  and  the  days  of  the 
20th,  the  21st,  and  the  22d. 

The  ceremony  of  the  official  transfer  was  set  for  twelve 
o’clock,  noon,  of  the  20th.  At  that  hour  there  gathered  in 
the  State  Apartment  of  the  Palace,  the  officials  of  the  Ameri- 
can and  the  Cuban  governments,  the  representatives  of 
the  foreign  powers,  and  a limited  number  of  guests  whose 
position  gave  them  claim  to  admission.  It  was  in  the  same 
apartment  that  Castellanos  signed  the  abdication  of  Spanish 
authority  in  the  Island.  The  ceremony  of  transfer  was 
almost  as  brief  and  as  simple  as  that  of  January  1,  1899. 
General  Wood  read  the  following  letter  of  instruction  from 
his  superior  at  Washington,  under  date  of  May  10: 

To  the  President  and  Congress  of  the  Republic  oj  Cuba. 

Sirs:  On  the  20th  of  this  month,  the  Military  Governor  of  Cuba 
will,  by  my  direction,  transfer  to  you  the  control  and  government  of 
the  Island  of  Cuba,  to  be  thenceforth  exercised  under  the  provisions 
of  the  Constitution  adopted  by  your  Constitutional  Convention  as 
on  that  day  promulgated;  and  he  will  thereupon  declare  the  occu- 
pation of  Cuba  by  the  United  States  to  be  at  an  end. 

At  the  same  time  I desire  to  express  to  you  the  sincere  friend- 
ship and  good  wishes  of  the  United  States,  and  our  most  earnest 
hopes  for  the  stability  and  success  of  your  government,  for  the 
blessings  of  peace,  justice,  prosperity,  and  ordered  freedom  among 
your  people,  and  for  enduring  friendship  between  the  Republic  of 
the  United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Cuba. 

Theodore  Roosevel/t, 
President  of  the  United  States. 

Sundry  details  of  the  transfer  were  then  submitted,  in- 
cluding the  following: 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


201 


Headquarters  Department  of  Cuba, 

Havana,  May  20,  1902. 

T o the  President  and  Congress  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba. 

Sirs:  Under  the  direction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
I now  transfer  to  you  as  the  duly  elected  representative  of  the 
people  of  Cuba  the  government  and  control  of  the  Island;  to  be 
held  and  exercised  by  you,  under  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  Republic  of  Cuba  heretofore  adopted  by  the  Constitutional 
Convention  and  this  day  promulgated;  and  I hereby  declare  the 
occupation  of  Cuba  by  the  United  States  and  the  Military  Govern- 
ment of  the  Island  to  be  ended. 

This  transfer  of  government  and  control  is  upon  the  express 
condition,  and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  will  under- 
stand, that  by  the  acceptance  thereof  you  do  now,  pursuant  to  the 
provisions  of  the  said  Constitution,  assume  and  undertake,  all  and 
several,  the  obligations  assumed  by  the  United  States  with  respect 
to  Cuba,  by  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  of  America  and 
Her  Majesty  the  Queen  Regent  of  Spain,  signed  at  Paris  on  the 
10th  day  of  December,  1898. 

All  money  obligations  of  the  Military  Government  down  to  this 
date  have  been  paid  as  far  as  practicable.  The  public  civil  funds 
derived  from  the  revenues  of  Cuba  transferred  to  you  this  day, 
amounting  to  $689,191.02,  are  transferred  subject  to  such  claims 
and  obligations  properly  payable  out  of  the  revenues  of  the  Island 
as  may  remain.  The  sum  of  $100,000  has  been  reserved  from  the 
transfer  of  funds  to  defray  anticipated  expenses  of  accounting,  re- 
porting, and  winding  up  the  affairs  of  the  Military  Government, 
after  which  any  unexpended  balance  of  said  sum  will  be  paid  into 
the  Treasury  of  the  Island. 

The  plans  already  devised  for  the  sanitation  of  the  cities  of 
the  Island  and  to  prevent  a recurrence  of  epidemic  and  infectious 
diseases,  to  which  the  Government  of  the  United  States  under- 
stands that  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  contained  in  the  fifth 
article  of  the  appendix  applies,  are  as  follows: 

1.  A plan  for  the  paving  and  sewering  of  the  City  of  Havana 


202 


THE  END  OP  THE  INTERVENTION 


for  which  a contract  has  been  awarded  by  the  municipality  of  that 
city  to  McGivney,  Rokeby  & Co. 

2.  A plan  for  waterworks  to  supply  the  City  of  Santiago  de  Cuba, 
prepared  by  Capt.  S.  D.  Rockenbach,  in  charge  of  the  District  of 
Santiago,  and  approved  by  the  Military  Governor,  providing  for 
taking  water  from  the  wells  of  San  Juan  Canyon  and  pumping  the 
same  to  reservoirs  located  on  the  heights  to  the  east  of  the  city. 

3.  A plan  for  the  sewering  of  the  City  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  a 
contract  for  which  was  awarded  to  Michael  J.  Dady  & Co.  by  the 
Military  Governor  of  Cuba,  and  now  under  construction. 

4.  The  rules  and  regulations  established  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  on  the  17th  of  January,  1899,  for  the  maintenance  of 
quarantine  against  epidemic  diseases  at  the  ports  of  Havana, 
Matanzas,  Cienfuegos,  and  Santiago  de  Cuba,  and  thereafter  at 
the  other  ports  of  the  Island,  as  extended  and  amended  and  made 
applicable  to  future  conditions  by  the  order  of  the  Military  Governor, 

dated  , published  in  the  Official  Gazette  of  Havana  on 

the  day  of  April,  1902. 

5.  The  sanitary  rules  and  regulations  in  force  in  the  City  of 
Havana  (and  in  any  other  city  having  official  rules,  etc.). 

(a)  It  is  understood  by  the  United  States  that  the  present  govern- 
ment of  the  Isle  of  Pines  will  continue  as  a de  facto  government, 
pending  the  settlement  of  the  title  to  said  island  by  treaty  pursuant 
to  the  Cuban  Constitution  and  the  Act  of  Congress  of  the  United 
States  approved  March  2,  1902. 

(b)  I am  further  charged  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  to 
deliver  to  you  the  letter  which  I now  hand  you. 

Leonard  Wood,  Military  Governor. 

To  this  and  to  its  accompanying  communications,  Presi- 
dent Palma  replied  as  follows: 

Havana,  May  20,  1902. 

Honorable  General  Leonard  Wood. 

Sir:  As  President  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba,  I hereby  receive  the 
government  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  which  you  transfer  to  me  in  com- 
pliance with  orders  communicated  to  you  by  the  President  of  the 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


203 


United  States,  and  take  note  that  by  this  act  the  military  occupa- 
tion of  Cuba  ceases. 

Upon  accepting  this  transfer  I declare  that  the  Government  of 
the  Republic  assumes,  as  provided  for  in  the  Constitution,  each  and 
every  one  of  the  obligations  concerning  Cuba  imposed  upon  the 
United  States  by  virtue  of  the  treaty  entered  into  on  the  10th  of 
December,  1898,  between  the  United  States  and  Her  Majesty 
the  Queen  Regent  of  Spain. 

I understand  that,  as  far  as  possible,  all  pecuniary  responsibilities 
contracted  by  the  Military  Government  up  to  this  date  have  been 
paid;  that  $100,000,  or  such  portion  thereof  as  may  be  necessary, 
has  been  set  aside  to  cover  the  expenses  that  may  be  occasioned 
by  the  liquidation  and  finishing  up  the  obligations  contracted  by 
said  government;  and  that  there  has  been  transferred  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  the  sum  of  $689,191.02,  which  constitutes 
the  cash  balance  existing  to-day  in  favor  of  the  State. 

In  the  belief  that  Article  V of  the  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
is  applicable  to  the  matter,  the  Government  will  take  pains  to  facili- 
tate the  execution  of  the  works  of  sanitation  projected  by  the  Mili- 
tary Government;  furthermore,  it  will  procure,  in  so  far  as  depends 
upon  the  same  and  corresponds  thereto  in  the  sanitary  measures  for 
the  necessities  of  both  countries,  the  observance  of  the  system  im- 
planted by  the  Military  Government  of  Cuba. 

It  is  understood  that  the  Isle  of  Pines  is  to  continue  de  facto 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba, 
subject  to  such  treaty  as  may  be  entered  into  between  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  and  that  of  the  Cuban  Republic,  as 
provided  for  in  the  Cuban  Constitution  and  in  the  act  passed  by 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  and  approved  on  the  2d  of  March, 
1901. 

I receive  with  sincere  gratification  the  letters  which  President 
Roosevelt  addresses  to  the  Congress  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba  and 
to  me,  for  the  sentiments  of  friendship  for  the  people  of  Cuba  which 
inspire  them. 

I take  this  solemn  occasion,  which  marks  the  fulfilment  of  the 
honored  promise  of  the  Government  and  people  of  the  United 


204 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


States  in  regard  to  the  Island  of  Cuba,  and  in  which  our  country 
is  made  a ruling  nation,  to  express  to  you,  the  worthy  representa- 
tive of  that  grand  people,  the  immense  gratitude  which  the  people 
of  Cuba  feel  toward  the  American  nation,  toward  its  illustrious 
President,  Theodore  Roosevelt,  and  toward  you  for  the  efforts  you 
have  put  forth  for  the  successful  accomplishment  of  such  a precious 
ideal. 

T.  Estrada  Palma. 

This  completed  the  formal  ceremony  and  was  immediately 
followed  by  the  hauling  down  of  the  American  flag  and  the 
substitution  of  the  flag  of  Cuba  in  its  stead.  The  exchange 
of  flags  was  effected  at  all  points  where  the  American  banner 
had  waved  as  a national  emblem,  and  was  attended  by  the 
most  enthusiastic  demonstrations.  This  was  notably  the 
case  in  the  hoisting  of  the  Cuban  flag  over  Morro  Castle  at 
the  entrance  to  the  harbor  of  Havana.  Not  even  tire  hoist- 
ing of  the  Palace  flag  had  such  deep  significance  to  the 
Cuban  mind  as  the  elevation  of  their  own  national  emblem 
over  that  celebrated  fortress.  With  the  hoisting  of  the  flag, 
everything  that  was  noisy  burst  into  demonstration.  Whistles 
blew  and  cannon  roared.  Men  shouted  themselves  hoarse 
and  women  shrieked  their  joy.  Bombs  and  crackers  added 
to  the  general  din.  This  lasted  for  a quarter  of  an  hour,  but 
the  pace  was  too  hot  to  hold,  and  there  came  a reaction  in  the 
shape  of  still  joyful  but  subdued  sentimental  feeling.  The 
dense  throng  streamed  away  from  the  Palace,  which  had 
been  for  an  hour  the  chief  centre  of  interest,  to  renew  its 
hilarious  and  noisy  enthusiasm  in  every  park  and  street  in 
the  city.  Some  followed  the  new  officials  as  they  attended 
the  American  officers  to  the  wharf  from  which  they  imme- 
diately embarked.  A large  audience  witnessed  the  de- 
parture and  shouted  cordial  farewells. 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION  205 

Subject  to  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  Platt  Amend- 
ment, Cuba  was  Cuba  Libre  y Independienie.  A new  Re- 
public was  bom,  and  the  banner  which  was  first  displayed  in 
the  revolution  of  1868,  floated  throughout  the  Island  from 
Cape  Antonio  to  Cape  Maisi. 

The  new  government  was  born  out  of  sore  trouble  and  dis- 
tress, and  there  were  many  who  predicted  its  speedy  ter- 
mination in  failure.  While  this  was  in  no  way  fairly  war- 
ranted, there  were  attendant  conditions  which  were  far  from 
encouraging.  The  industrial  condition  of  the  Island  was 
deplorable,  and  the  new  government  really  started  under  a 
handicap  of  immediate  insolvency.  There  were  outstand- 
ing obligations,  such  as  the  pay  of  the  Cuban  army  and  the 
redemption  of  bonds  issued  during  the  revolution,  which 
could  only  be  met  by  a national  loan. 

The  receipts  and  expenditures  from  Jan.  1,  1902,  to  May 


20,  1902,  are  given  as  follows:* 

Receipts  $7,057,014.23 

Expenditures  7,982,615.76 

The  principal  items  of  expenditure  appear  as  follows: 

Education  $1,716,917.61 

Sanitation  1,162,852.60 

Public  Works 932,929.03 

Agriculture,  Industry,  and  Commerce 62,650.26 

Administration  481,656.03 

Hospitals  and  Charities 542,322.16 

Rural  Guard 356,568.68 

Justice  427,175.06 

Postal  Service 396,705.88 

Customs  Service 354,132.53 


For  fuller  details  see  article  on  Hevenues  and  Expenditures,  Chapter  XX. 


206 


THE  END  OF  THE  INTERVENTION 


The  commerce  for  the  period  is  given  as  follows: 

Total  Imports $25,157,300.00 

Total  Exports 23,133,719.00 

Of  the  imports  $11,217,080  came  from  the  United  States, 
and  $13,940,220  from  other  countries.  Of  the  exports, 
$16,631,002  went  to  the  United  States,  and  $6,502,717  to 
other  countries. 


Chapter  XIII 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 

Having  reviewed  in  general  outline  the  experiences  of 
the  full  term  of  occupation,  there  remains  a consideration 
of  some  of  the  more  important  features  and  incidents  in 
fuller  detail.  The  most  momentous  of  these  was  the  Con- 
stitutional Convention. 

During  the  spring  of  1900,  the  authorities  in  Washington 
deemed  it  expedient  to  take  preliminary  steps  toward  the 
establishment  of  a Cuban  government.  The  decision  was 
doubtless  made  from  political  considerations  rather  than 
because  of  any  special  recognition  of  Cuba’s  immediate 
readiness  for  the  assumption  of  governmental  control. 
Suspicion  of  the  good  faith  of  the  United  States  was  becom- 
ing  apparent,  and  there  were  many  who  openly  expressed 
their  doubt  of  American  intent  to  withdraw  from  the  Island. 
Some  restlessness  was  manifest  in  Cuba,  and  there  were 
expressions  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  existing  government. 
There  were  also  numerous  indications  that  the  prompt 
fulfilment  of  the  pledge  of  the  Joint  Resolution  was  to  be 
made  an  active  feature  in  the  political  campaign  of  that 
year.  For  these,  and  for  other  reasons,  it  was  decided  to 
call  a Constitutional  Convention. 

On  July  25,  there  was  issued  the  now  historic  Order  No. 
301.  The  order  read  as  follows: 


208 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


No.  301 

Headquarters  Division  of  Cuba, 

Havana,  July  25,  1900. 

The  Military  Governor  of  Cuba  directs  the  publication  of  the 
following  instructions: 

Whereas,  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  by  its  joint  resolu- 
tion of  April  20,  1898,  declared 

“That  the  people  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  right  ought 
to  be  free  and  independent. 

“That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  disposition  or 
intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over  said 
Island  except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts  its  deter- 
mination when  that  is  accomplished,  to  leave  the  government  and 
control  of  the  Island  to  its  people.” 

And,  W7hereas,  the  people  of  Cuba  have  established  municipal 
governments,  deriving  their  authority  from  the  suffrages  of  the 
people  given  under  just  and  equal  laws,  and  are  now  ready,  in  like 
manner,  to  proceed  to  the  establishment  of  a general  government 
which  shall  assume  and  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  and  con- 
trol over  the  Island. 

Therefore,  it  is  ordered  that  a general  election  be  held  in  the 
Island  of  Cuba  on  the  third  Saturday  of  September,  in  the  year 
nineteen  hundred,  to  elect  delegates  to  a convention  to  meet  in  the 
City  of  Havana,  at  twelve  o’clock  noon  on  the  first  Monday  of 
November,  in  the  year  nineteen  hundred,  to  frame  and  adopt  a 
Constitution  for  the  people  of  Cuba,  and,  as  a part  thereof,  to  pro- 
vide for  and  agree  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States  upon 
the  relations  to  exist  between  that  Government  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  Cuba,  and  to  provide  for  election  by  the  people  of  officers 
under  such  Constitution  and  the  transfer  of  government  to  the 
officers  so  elected. 

The  election  will  be  held  in  the  several  voting  precincts  of  the 
Island  under  and  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  electoral  law 
of  April  18,  1900,  and  the  amendments  thereof. 

The  people  of  the  several  provinces  will  elect  delegates  in  num- 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  209 

ber  proportioned  to  their  populations  as  determined  by  the  census, 
viz: 

The  people  of  the  Province  of  Pinar  del  Rio  will  elect  three  (3) 
delegates. 

The  people  of  the  Province  of  Havana  will  elect  eight  (8)  dele- 
gates. 

The  people  of  the  Province  of  Matanzas  will  elect  four  (4) 
delegates. 

The  people  of  the  Province  of  Santa  Clara  will  elect  seven  (7) 
delegates. 

The  people  of  the  Province  of  Puerto  Principe  will  elect  two  (2) 
delegates. 

The  people  of  the  Province  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  will  elect  seven 
(7)  delegates. 

J.  B.  Hickey, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

The  declaration  that  provision  for  the  relations  to  exist 
between  the  new  government  and  that  of  the  United  States 
was  to  be  included  in  the  Constitution  “as  a part  thereof,” 
called  out  much  criticism  in  the  United  States  and  general 
opposition  in  the  Island.  It  was  declared  that  such  pro- 
vision was  not  within  the  proper  scope  of  a Constitutional 
Convention.  It  involved  a question  of  international  treaties, 
and  the  point  was  urged  that  the  right  and  power  to  make 
such  treaties  lay  only  with  the  duly  elected  officials  of  an 
established  government.  Political  parties  refused  to  partici- 
pate under  such  terms;  individuals  declared  that  they  would 
not  go  to  the  polls;  and  aspirants  for  election  expressed 
their  determination,  in  the  event  of  their  election,  to  resign 
from  the  Convention  unless  the  terms  were  modified  by  the 
excision  of  the  objectionable  point,  that  of  the  incorporation 
of  the  matter  of  “relations”  as  an  integral  part  of  the  Con- 
stitution. These  protests,  supported  as  they  were  by  argu- 
ments and  protests  from  American  sources,  became  so  cm- 


210 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


phatic  that  assurances  were  given  that  the  terms  of  the 
order  would  be  modified. 

Following  this  call,  there  was  issued,  on  August  11,  the 
general  terms  and  conditions  of  the  election.  This,  subject 
to  the  modifications  required  for  an  election  of  different 
character,  followed  the  lines  of  the  order  for  municipal 
elections.  The  qualifications  for  the  suffrage  were  the 
same. 

The  election  was  held  on  September  15.  Contrary  to 
that  which  might  reasonably  be  expected,  the  election  ex- 
cited no  widespread  enthusiasm.  The  affair  was  one-sided 
and  the  vote  a small  one.  At  the  time,  three  parties  may  be 
said  to  have  existed.  These  were  the  Cuban  National, 
composed  almost  entirely  of  the  ultra-radical  and  military 
element;  the  Republican,  a factional  offshoot  from  the 
National  and  no  less  radical  in  its  sentiments;  and  the 
Union  Democratic,  nominally  representing  the  conserva- 
tive element.  The  aims  of  the  National  and  the  Republican 
were  much  the  same.  The  Union  Democratic  made  little 
showing,  electing  only  one  member,  Senor  Giberga.  The 
others,  notwithstanding  their  different  party  titles,  may  be 
grouped  as  Radicals.  Many  assertions  were  made  of  fraud 
in  the  election  methods,  but  no  definite  charges  were  pre- 
ferred and  no  action  was  taken  in  the  matter.  The  election 
resulted  in  the  choice  of  the  following  gentlemen  as  members 
of  the  Constitutional  Convention. 

For  the  Province  of  Pinar  del  Rio  — Gen.  Juan  Ruis 
Rivera;  Dr.  Joaquin  M.  Quilez;  Senor  Gonzalo  de  Quesada; 
with  Messrs.  Beltran,  Villalon,  and  Manduley  as  substitutes. 

For  the  Province  of  Havana  — Generals  Jose  Lacret 
Morlot;  Alejandro  Rodriguez;  Emilio  Nunez;  Drs.  Miguel 
Gener;  Manuel  Sanguilly;  Diego  Tamayo;  Leopoldo  Berriel; 
Senor  Alfredo  Zayas;  with  Messrs.  Pichardo,  L.  Rodriguez, 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


211 


Vidal,  Castellanos,  Fonts  y Sterling,  Figueredo,  F.  Mora, 
and  G.  Mora,  as  substitutes. 

For  the  Province  of  Matanzas  — Generals  Pedro  Betan- 
court; Mendez  Capote;  Senor  Eliseo  Giberga;  Senor  Luis 
Fortun;  with  Messrs.  Garmendia,  Lajonchere,  Martinez, 
and  Jimenis,  as  substitutes. 

For  the  Province  of  Puerto  Principe  — Messrs.  Ramon 
Silva  and  Salvador  Cisneros;  with  Messrs.  Arango  and  O.  F. 
Cisneros  as  substitutes. 

For  the  Province  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  — Messrs.  Eudaldo 
Tamayo;  Antonio  Bravo;  Rafael  Portuondo;  Juan  Gualberto 
Gomez;  Jose  Fernando  de  Castro;  Rafael  Manduley;  and 
Joaquin  Castillo  Duany;  with  Messrs.  Garcia,  Buduen, 
Sanchez,  Clarens,  Milanes,  Torres,  and  Ferrer,  as  substi- 
tutes. 

The  Convention  assembled  at  two  o’clock  on  the  5th  of 
November,  1900.  A large  and  enthusiastic  crowd  had 
gathered  in  and  around  the  building.  General  Wood  called 
the  assembly  to  order,  and  read  the  following,  which  was 
afterward  issued  as  Civil  Order  No.  455. 

“ Gentlemen: 

“As  Military  Governor  of  the  Island,  representing  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  I call  this  Convention  to  order. 

“It  will  be  your  duty,  first,  to  frame  and  adopt  a Constitution 
for  Cuba,  and  when  that  has  been  done,  to  formulate  what,  in  your 
opinion,  ought  to  be  the  relations  between  Cuba  and  the  United 
States. 

“The  Constitution  must  be  adequate  to  secure  a stable,  orderly, 
and  free  government. 

“When  you  have  formulated  the  relations  which,  in  your  opinion, 
ought  to  exist  between  Cuba  and  the  United  States,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  will  doubtless  take  such  action  on  its 
part  as  shall  lead  to  a final  and  authoritative  agreement  between 


212 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


the  people  of  the  two  countries  to  the  promotion  of  their  common 
interests. 

“All  friends  of  Cuba  will  follow  your  deliberations  with  the 
deepest  interest,  earnestly  desiring  that  you  shall  reach  just  con- 
clusions, and  that,  by  the  dignity,  individual  self-restraint,  and  wise 
conservatism  which  shall  characterize  your  proceedings,  the 
capacity  of  the  Cuban  people  for  representative  government  may 
be  signally  illustrated. 

“The  fundamental  distinction  between  true  representative 
government  and  dictatorship  is  that  in  the  former  every  representa- 
tive of  the  people,  in  whatever  office,  confines  himself  strictly  within 
the  limits  of  his  defined  powers.  Without  such  restaint  there  can 
be  no  free  constitutional  government. 

“Under  the  order  pursuant  to  which  you  have  been  elected  and 
convened,  you  have  no  duty  and  no  authority  to  take  part  in  the 
present  government  of  the  Island.  Your  powers  are  strictly 
limited  by  the  terms  of  that  order.” 

After  reading  the  foregoing  official  instructions,  General 
Wood  made  a brief  personal  address  in  which  he  emphasized 
the  two  essential  features  of  the  work  of  the  Convention.  A 
local  paper  (The  Havana  Post ) reported  this  as  follows: 

“When  Secretary  Varona  had  concluded  reading  the  Spanish 
translation  of  the  address,  General  Wood  made  a few  more  plain 
remarks  to  the  delegates.  He  wanted  them  to  understand  that 
they  had  been  elected  to  frame  a Constitution  for  Cuba.  That  was 
their  plain  duty.  The  matter  of  relations  which  should  exist  be- 
tween Cuba  and  the  United  States  was  another  matter.  He 
wished  them  success.” 

The  terms  of  the  official  order  and  these  remarks  of  the 
Military  Governor,  speaking  as  the  representative  of  the 
American  administration,  would  seem  to  dispose,  utterly 
and  completely,  of  any  ground  for  charges  that,  in  omitting 
from  their  Constitution  the  question  of  relations,  the  Cubans 
were  violating  their  instructions;  and  of  all  ground  for  any 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


213 


just  criticism  for  not  making  provision,  in  the  body  of  their 
Constitution,  for  such  relations.  Yet  these  charges  were 
brought  again  and  again,  and  an  endless  amount  of  severe 
criticism  was  showered  upon  the  Convention  for  its  failure 
to  violate  its  instructions. 

Order  No.  455  effected  the  promised  modification  of  the 
order  of  July  25.  It  distinctly  provided  for  the  omission 
of  the  vexed  question  of  “relations”  from  the  body  of  the 
Constitution.  It  called  for  no  more  than  an  expression  of 
“opinion”  of  what  those  relations  “ought  to  be.”  The 
point  was  emphasized  by  the  Military  Governor  in  his  per- 
sonal address  to  the  Convention. 

For  some  reason,  this  substitute  order  does  not  appear  to 
have  received  wide  circulation  in  the  United  States.  If  it 
did,  it  was  given  little  attention.  Its  failure  to  receive 
general  recognition  became  the  basis  of  a wide-spread  mis- 
conception during  the  ensuing  months  — a misconception 
which  did  much  to  excite  unfriendliness  between  the  people 
of  the  two  countries,  and  much  American  uncharitableness 
toward  the  Cuban  Convention.  When  the  special  issue 
became  prominent,  namely,  that  of  the  separation  of  the 
matter  of  “ mutual  relations  ” from  the  body  of  the  Consti- 
tution, and  the  substitution  of  an  expression  of  “ opinion  ” 
as  an  independent  proceeding,  the  Convention  was  widely 
denounced  in  this  country  for  its  failure  to  include  in  the 
Constitution  that  which  it  had  been  expressly  told  to  leave 
out.  This  point  is  of  importance  from  the  fact  that  there 
is  every  reason  for  a belief  that,  owing  to  a mistaken  view 
of  the  situation,  many  Americans  assumed  that  the  Cuban 
Convention  was  deliberately  violating  its  definite  instruc- 
tions, and  became  prejudiced  against  the  Cubans  as  a result 
of  the  assumption.  Much  carping  and  unkind  criticism 
appeared  in  the  American  press,  and  was  expressed  by 


214 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


prominent  officials.  This  reached  Havana  through  news 
channels,  and  excited  a feeling  of  irritation  and  resentment. 

Upon  the  completion  of  his  remarks,  the  Military  Gover- 
nor withdrew  from  the  hall,  and  the  body  proceeded  to  a 
temporary  organization.  Senor  Pedro  Llorente,  the  oldest 
member  of  the  assembly,  was  chosen  as  temporary  chair- 
man, and  Senor  Enrique  Villuendas,  the  youngest  member, 
was  chosen  as  temporary  secretary.  The  Chief  Justice  of 
the  Island  then  administered  the  following  oath  of  office, 
to  which  all  yielded  their  assent: 

“We,  the  delegates  elected  by  the  people  of  Cuba  to  the  National 
Constitutional  Convention,  swear  and  promise  to  fill  our  positions 
faithfully.  We  renounce  publicly  and  solemnly  our  fidelity  or 
contract,  past,  direct,  or  indirect,  to  any  other  State  or  nation; 
swearing  the  solemnity  of  the  freedom  and  independence  of  Cuba, 
and  accepting  and  obeying  the  Constitution  which  this  Convention 
adopts  as  well  as  the  government  thereby  established.” 

This  renunciation  of  allegiance  to  other  powers  was 
necessitated  by  the  fact  that  a number  of  the  members  of 
the  Convention  were  naturalized  American  citizens.  The 
first  question  raised  was  in  regard  to  the  rules  to  be  adopted 
for  the  guidance  of  the  Convention.  Tumultuous  applause 
followed  the  declaration  of  Senor  Aleman  that  no  new  rules 
were  necessary,  as  rules  had  already  been  adopted  and  used 
by  the  Cuban  Revolutionary  Congress.  He  said,  “What 
was  good  enough  for  us  when  we  were  struggling  in  the  field, 
is  good  enough  for  us  here.”  The  rules  were  adopted.  After 
a brief  discussion  of  the  question  of  credentials  and  contested 
seats,  the  session  adjourned.  At  a later  meeting,  Domingo 
Mendez  Capote  was  chosen  as  permanent  president,  and 
Alfredo  Zayas  and  Enrique  Villuendas  as  permanent  secre- 
taries. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  the  work  of  the  Convention, 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONTENTION 


215 


there  was  a tacit,  if  not  a definitely  expressed  understanding 
that  the  United  States  and  its  official  representatives  were  to 
stand  entirely  aloof  from  its  proceedings.  Owing  to  the 
impossibility  of  absolutely  verifying  certain  rumors  and 
suspicions  which  one  is  obliged  to  accept  as  facts  without 
being  able  to  establish  them  as  such  in  the  public  mind  by 
concrete  incidents,  there  is  difficulty  in  making  any  asser- 
tions respecting  the  degree  of  strictness  with  which  this 
professed  policy  of  non-interference  was  carried  out.  The 
term  “obstructionists”  came  to  the  front  during  the  sittings, 
and  at  least  a fair  number  of  the  members  of  the  Convention 
were  convinced  that  the  so-called  “obstructionists”  were  in- 
fluenced if  not  controlled  by  the  military  government.  A 
motion  to  hold  night  sessions,  as  well  as  day  sessions,  was 
introduced,  partly  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  a more  rapid 
despatch  of  the  work  of  the  Convention,  and  partly  for  the 
purpose  of  forcing  all  or  some  of  the  suspected  “ obstruction- 
ists” to  declare  themselves.  But  no  direct  interference  ap- 
peared until  the  middle  of  Februrary,  1901. 

The  story  of  the  making  of  Cuba’s  Constitution  is  generally 
similar  to  the  story  of  all  deliberative  and  legislative  bodies. 
It  is  a story  of  routine;  of  work  in  committee- rooms;  of 
public  and  private  sessions;  of  the  manoeuvres  of  political 
parties  to  secure  party  advantage  and  party  supremacy; 
and  of  effort  to  attain  individual  ascendency.  It  is  a story 
of  tiresome  discussion  on  trivial  points,  and  of  heated  de- 
bate on  important  cjuestions;  of  effort  to  secure  the  adoption 
of  this  or  that  plan,  or  to  prevent  the  acceptance  of  this  or 
that  theory.  Much  time  was  consumed  in  effecting  the 
working  organization  of  the  body,  and  in  adopting  rules 
for  its  procedure.  Public  sessions  were  practically  sus- 
pended about  the  first  of  December,  and  the  following 
weeks  were  given  mainly  to  reviewing,  in  committee-rooms. 


216 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


the  constitutions  of  other  republics,  and  to  the  selection 
from  them  of  such  elements  or  provisions  as  met  with  the 
approval  of  the  reviewers.  Toward  the  end  of  the  month, 
these,  together  with  the  individual  ideas  and  propositions 
of  some  of  the  members,  were  assembled  in  a form  which 
constituted  a working  basis  for  amendment,  addition,  or 
elimination.  The  first  week  in  January  saw  the  instrument 
in  process  of  revision  in  the  committee-rooms. 

Committee  work  and  secret  sessions,  with  an  occasional 
semi-public  session,  continued  until  Jan.  21,  1901.  The 
American  Constitutional  Convention  of  1787  sat  behind 
closed  doors  for  four  months.  On  January  21,  the  Cuban 
Convention  sat  in  a session  which  was  open  to  the  holders 
of  special  tickets,  for  a semi-public  reading  of  the  draft 
which  constituted  a general  outline  of  the  proposed  instru- 
ment. More  or  less  concerning  the  nature  and  provisions 
of  the  draft  had  become  public  property  and  little  interest 
was  shown  in  this  session.  The  Constitution,  as  then  sub- 
mitted, was  a combination  of  compromises.  The  same  is 
to  be  said,  with  equal  truth,  regarding  our  own  Constitution. 
In  fact,  many  of  the  tangles,  great  and  small,  presented  for 
the  determination  of  the  Cuban  Convention,  were  remark- 
ably like  those  which  faced  the  United  States  during  the 
opening  years  of  its  national  life.  Our  own  confusion  over 
those  problems,  during  the  preparation  of  the  American 
Constitution,  forbids  us  any  criticism  upon  the  confusion 
and  the  little  animosities  which  were  engendered  by  their 
consideration  in  the  Cuban  Convention,  and  interesting 
parallels  are  presented  in  the  processes  of  the  establishment 
of  republican  governments.  Individual  members  threatened 
to  withdraw  from  the  Cuban  Convention,  and  there  were 
times  when  a general  disruption  seemed  imminent.  Some 
members  of  the  American  Convention  of  1787  did  actually 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


217 


retire,  and  there  were  the  same  more  or  less  frequent  indi- 
cations of  the  dissolution  of  that  body.  Yet  both,  in  due 
time,  adjusted  their  differences,  and  submitted  a collection 
of  compromises. 

The  Cuban  Constitution  opens  with  the  following  pre- 
amble: 

“We,  the  delegates  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  having  met  in  Con- 
stitutional Convention  for  the  purpose  of  preparing  and  adopting 
the  fundamental  law  of  their  organization  as  an  independent  and 
sovereign  people,  establishing  a government  capable  of  fulfilling 
its  international  obligations,  maintaining  public  peace,  insuring 
liberty,  justice,  and  promoting  the  general  welfare,  do  hereby  agree 
upon  and  adopt  the  following  Constitution,  invoking  the  favor  of 
God.” 

The  final  clause  of  this  preamble  called  out  an  animated 
discussion,  and  gave  rise  to  one  of  the  most  dramatic  inci- 
dents of  the  Convention.  Senor  Salvador  Cisneros,  a veteran 
of  both  the  Ten  Years’  War  and  the  Revolution  of  1895,  an 
ex-president  of  the  so-called  Republic  of  1868,  a man  of 
upward  of  seventy-five  years  of  age,  proposed  the  striking 
out  of  the  invocation  of  the  favor  of  God.  Schor  Manuel 
Sanguilly,  widely  renowned  among  the  Cubans  for  his 
power  as  an  orator,  in  a speech  of  considerable  length  set 
forth  his  opinion  that  the  matter  was  really  one  of  little  im- 
portance. There  was  no  benefit  in  including  the  clause,  and 
no  advantage  in  striking  it  out.  It  would  hurt  none  and 
might  please  some  to  have  it  left  in.  Immediately  in  front 
of  Schor  Cisneros,  and  facing  Senor  Sanguilly  across  the 
semi-circle  formed  by  the  arrangement  of  the  desks  of  the 
delegates,  sat  Schor  Pedro  Llorentc,  a man  of  small  stature, 
and  of  nervous,  alert  manner.  lie  too  had  lived  beyond 
the  third  quarter  of  a century.  At  times,  his  nervous  energy 
made  him  almost  grotesque.  At  times  his  absorbed  earnest- 


218 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


ness  made  him,  despite  his  stature,  a figure  of  commanding 
dignity.  Obtaining  recognition  from  the  chairman,  he  rose 
and  stood,  with  upraised  hand,  his  voice  tremulous  with 
emotion,  to  protest  against  the  measure,  and  to  declare  as 
one  not  far  from  the  close  of  life,  that  the  assembled  body 
did  not  represent  an  atheistic  people.  The  Cisneros  motion 
was  defeated,  and  the  Convention  proceeded  to  discuss  the 
Articles  of  the  Constitution  in  their  order.  Article  I is  as 
follows: 

“The  people  of  Cuba  are  hereby  constituted  a sovereign  and 
independent  State,  and  adopt  a republican  form  of  government.” 

This  was  promptly  adopted  without  discussion  or  dis- 
senting vote.  While  various  minor  changes  in  the  phrase- 
ology of  some  of  the  parts  were  effected,  no  really  serious 
difficulty  was  encountered  until  that  was  reached  which  now 
stands  as  Article  XXVI.  It  refers  to  the  freedom  of  religious 
belief  and  form  of  worship,  and  the  relations  which  should 
exist  between  Church  and  State.  This  occasioned  an  ani- 
mated debate  between  the  supporters  of  the  old  system  of  a 
Church  intimately  associated  with  and,  in  part,  financially 
maintained  by  the  State,  and  those  of  the  newer  school  who 
stood  for  a complete  separation  of  the  two  authorities.  The 
discussion  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  the  article,  as  it  now 
stands,  as  follows: 

“The  profession  of  all  religious  beliefs,  as  well  as  the  practice 
of  all  forms  of  religion,  are  free,  without  further  restriction  than 
that  demanded  by  the  respect  for  Christian  morality  and  public 
order.  The  Church  shall  be  separated  from  the  State,  which  shall 
in  no  case  subsidize  any  religion.” 

The  question  of  universal  suffrage  constituted  another 
bone  of  active  contention.  Among  the  total  number  of 
Cubans  of  voting  age,  there  was  a considerable  percentage 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


219 


both  of  blacks  and  illiterates.  There  were  also  many  who 
could  not  qualify  under  a property  clause.  Yet,  to  bar 
any  or  all  of  these  from  the  right  of  participation  in  the 
affairs  of  the  new  government,  meant  the  exclusion  of  many 
thousands  whose  work  as  soldiers  in  the  liberating  army 
made  the  existence  of  that  government  a possibility.  The 
exclusion  of  such  from  the  polls  would  have  been  a manifest 
injustice,  and  would  have  established  a government  of  the 
many  by  the  few,  a principle  inconsistent  with  the  first  article 
of  their  Constitution.  To  admit  all  to  the  rights  of  citizen- 
ship laid  the  new  government  broadly  open  to  all  the  dangers 
of  placing  so  great  a power  in  the  hands  of  a group  which  in- 
cluded a large  percentage  of  the  ignorant  and  the  irrespon- 
sible. Restriction  meant  almost  certain  disorder,  and 
disorder  meant  disaster  to  the  new  institution.  Universal 
suffrage  might  contain  a menace  of  difficulties,  but  it  was 
the  safer  course,  and  that  system  was  adopted  subject  to  the 
usual  limitations  of  mental  and  legal  incapacity. 

Another  active  controversy  arose  regarding  qualifications 
for  the  presidency.  To  limit  eligibility  to  native-born 
Cubans  barred  Maximo  Gomez,  a native  of  Santo  Domingo, 
from  candidacy  and  election.  Many  of  those  who  were 
opposed  to  General  Gomez  as  an  aspirant  for  presidential 
honors,  felt  that  to  close  the  door  in  his  face  by  constitu- 
tional enactment  would  be  an  act  of  disgraceful  ingratitude. 
Gomez  stood  high  in  the  esteem  of  the  great  mass  of  the 
Island  people,  but  he  was  not  liked  by  the  majority  of  the 
political  leaders.  He  had  bitter  enemies  in  the  Convention, 
and  they  fought  the  point  of  possible  candidacy  until  their 
final  defeat  by  a bare  majority.  The  discussion  lasted, 
in  public  and  in  private  session,  for  a number  of  days,  and 
evoked  a spirit  of  personal  bitterness  beyond  that  displayed 
upon  any  other  measure. 


220 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


Other  points  of  notable  debate  were: 

The  right  of  government  to  expel  pernicious  aliens. 

Popular  election  of  Senators. 

The  governmental  powers  of  the  provinces. 

The  recognition  of  Cuban  debts. 

General  state  control  of  education. 

No  decisions,  in  either  public  or  secret  sessions,  were  made 
without  careful  consideration.  In  fact,  critics  were  dis- 
posed to  charge  an  undue  deliberation  over  many  points, 
and  there  is  no  doubt  that,  at  the  time,  there  were  not  a few 
periods  when  it  seemed  as  though  valuable  time  was  being 
wasted.  Yet,  so  far  as  the  Constitution  itself  is  concerned, 
the  work  of  the  Convention  was  carried  out  with  all  reason- 
able despatch,  and  the  result  was  distinctly  creditable  not- 
withstanding the  unkindly  and  unjust  criticism  passed  upon 
it  by  some  whose  information  and  courtesy  were  equally 
limited. 

As  a theory,  the  signing  of  a constitution  is  a notable 
event  in  a nation’s  history.  As  a fact,  the  signing  of  the 
Cuban  Constitution  was  little  more  than  an  incident  in  the 
day’s  work.  On  Monday,  February  11,  the  instrument 
appeared  in  the  form  of  a printed  pamphlet.  All  changes, 
modifications,  amendments,  and  rearrangements  in  its 
phraseology  had  been  effected,  except  the  few  minor  altera- 
tions which  were  made  in  its  grammar  and  wording  at  the 
session  of  that  day.  It  was  then  ready  to  be  engrossed  and 
signed.  The  21st  of  February  was  designated  as  the  day 
for  the  official  signature.  No  special  effort  was  made  to 
give  the  event  the  dignity  of  an  important  ceremonial. 
Tickets  of  admission  were  issued  as  they  were  to  the  ordi- 
nary sessions.  A band  was  in  attendance,  and  the  foreign 
consuls  were  given  special  invitations.  The  Military  Gov- 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


221 


ernor  was  not  present  in  person  nor  by  representation. 
The  hall  was  fairly  filled  but  not  in  any  way  crowded. 

As  a scene,  there  was  little  or  nothing  to  mark  the  time 
as  an  event  of  special  note  in  a nation’s  history.  The  Con- 
stitution, in  its  final  form,  was  read  from  the  engrossed 
copies,  and  the  members  of  the  Convention  filed  up  to  the 
speaker’s  desk  to  affix  their  signatures.  At  the  close  of  the 
reading,  the  band  played  the  Cuban  national  air,  the  au- 
dience and  the  members  of  the  Convention  standing  during 
its  performance.  The  signing  completed.  President  Mendez 
Capote  made  a brief  address,  stating  that  the  delegates  had 
put  the  best  of  their  thought  and  judgment  into  the  work 
which  was  then  consummated,  and  expressing  the  hope  that 
upon  the  result  there  might  rest  a free,  happy,  and  prosperous 
republic.  A little  hand-clapping  followed  until  an  enthu- 
siast in  the  audience  shouted  Viva  la  Republica  de  Cuba. 
Shouts,  cheers,  and  hand-clapping  lasted  for  perhaps  half  a 
minute,  and  the  ceremony  was  ended. 

Outside  the  hall,  the  general  public  paid  no  attention  to 
the  incident.  On  the  streets,  in  clubs,  cafes,  and  theatres, 
there  was  no  sign  of  any  unusual  occurrence.  Many  did  not 
even  know  what  had  been  done.  But  there  were  many  who 
were  quite  indifferent  because  they  doubted  the  good  faith  of 
the  interventors,  and  regarded  the  whole  proceeding  as  a bit 
of  farcical  politics,  practically  meaningless.  It  was  believed 
that  the  American  Congress  would  sit  in  judgment  on  the 
w’ork  of  the  Convention,  and  this  was  not  a satisfactory 
reflection  to  those  whose  representatives  had  so  recently 
asserted,  in  their  name,  that  “The  people  of  Cuba  are  hereby 
constituted  a sovereign  and  independent  State.”  Annexa- 
tionists and  ultra-conservatives  were  in  no  way  inclined  to 
jubilation  over  any  Constitution  which  might  be  drafted. 
'Those  whose  aim  and  desire  was  independence,  without  limi- 


222 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


tation  and  supervision,  were  not  disposed  to  enthusiasm 
over  a Constitution  which  they  understood  must  be  sub- 
mitted for  approval  or  amendment  by  a foreign  power. 

As  a Constitution,  the  Cuban  production  is  not  a perfect 
instrument.  Neither  was  the  American  at  the  time  of  its 
adoption,  and  there  are  many  who  doubt  its  perfection  even 
now.  Our  State  constitutions  have  been  subjected  to 
frequent  change  and  even  to  almost  complete  readjustment. 
As  a working  basis  for  governmental  conduct,  the  Cuban 
Constitution  is  unquestionably  as  competent  and  suitable  an 
instrument  as  any  that  could  have  been  drawn,  either  by 
Cubans  or  Americans.  It  was  framed  within  an  entirely 
reasonable  time,  a little  less  than  four  months,  and  its  pro- 
duction was  attended  by  no  more  friction  than  is  customary 
in  all  constitution-making  bodies. 

In  his  annual  report  for  1901  (p.  45)  Secretary  Root  com- 
ments upon  the  Cuban  Constitution  as  follows: 

“ I do  not  fully  agree  with  the  wisdom  of  some  of  the  provisions 
of  this  Constitution,  but  it  provides  for  a republican  form  of  govern- 
ment; it  was  adopted  after  long  and  patient  consideration  and  dis- 
cussion; it  represents  the  views  of  the  delegates  elected  by  the 
people  of  Cuba,  and  it  contains  no  features  which  would  justify 
the  assertion  that  a government  organized  under  it  will  not  be  one 
to  which  the  United  States  may  properly  transfer  the  obligations 
for  the  protection  of  life  and  property  under  international  law, 
assumed  in  the  Treaty  of  Paris.” 

This  would  appear  to  be  the  only  properly  justified  posi- 
tion of  the  United  States  toward  such  an  instrument  as  the 
Cuban  Constitution.  Much  trouble,  for  both  countries, 
would  have  been  avoided  had  the  United  States  stopped  at 
that  point,  recognized  the  work  of  the  Convention,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  the  organization  of  a government  under  the  Con- 
stitution. That  government  organized,  a satisfactory  treaty 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION 


223 


could  have  been  effected  under  which  all  the  rights  and  in- 
terests of  the  United  States  would  have  been  duly  conserved 
and  protected,  and  in  which  provision  could  and  should 
have  been  made  for  commercial  relations  between  the  two 
countries,  based  upon  a favorable  if  not  a free  exchange 
of  natural  and  manufactured  products.  The  natural  and 
proper  step  at  this  point  was  the  establishment  of  a Cuban 
government,  elected  by  the  people  of  the  Island,  and  the 
consummation  of  a permanent  treaty  of  friendship  and 
commerce. 


Chapter  XIV 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “RELATIONS.” 

The  completion  of  the  work  of  framing  a Constitution  for 
the  Republic  of  Cuba  was  followed  by  the  consideration  of 
the  question  of  what,  in  Cuban  opinion,  “ought  to  be  the 
relations  between  Cuba  and  the  United  States.”  While  the 
matter  was  not  definitely  taken  up  at  any  time,  this  question 
constantly  intruded  itself  into  the  discussions  upon  the  Con- 
stitution. Believing,  as  many  did,  and  as  they  were  given  to 
understand,  that  the  American  Congress  would  review  and 
revise  the  work  of  the  Convention,  and  probably  insist  upon 
the  elimination  of  any  provisions  which  were  unacceptable  to 
the  American  authorities,  there  was  present  in  the  Conven- 
tion, and  outside  of  it,  an  undercurrent  of  query  regarding 
the  manner  in  which  this  or  that  in  the  Constitution  might 
affect  the  American  reviewers.  There  was  also  a realization 
of  the  fact  that  the  matter  of  “ relations  ” would  be  of  more 
direct  concern  to  the  American  Government  than  would  the 
general  terms  of  the  Constitution. 

A large  proportion  of  the  American  press,  and  many 
American  officials,  failing  to  realize  the  definiteness  of  the 
instructions  given  to  the  Convention  at  the  time  of  its  assemb- 
ling, on  November  5,  were  engaged  in  severe  and  unkindly 
criticism  of  the  Convention  for  its  failure  to  include  any 
reference  to  the  United  States.  While  such  reference  had 
no  proper  place  in  the  Constitution  of  an  independent  nation, 
there  was,  in  the  United  States,  a widely  prevalent  idea  that 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


225 


Cuba,  in  spite  of  the  pledge  of  the  Joint  Resolution,  was  and 
must  be  a dependency,  more  or  less  clearly  defined,  of  that 
country.  An  endless  amount  of  misunderstanding  and  con- 
fusion followed  this  mistake  of  a notable  percentage  of  the 
American  people. 

On  the  one  hand  stood  the  assertion  of  the  United  States, 
made  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  that  “ Cuba  is  and  of  right 
ought  to  be  free  and  independent.”  On  the  other  hand 
stood  the  Treaty  of  Paris  by  which  it  was  generally  under- 
stood that  the  United  States  assumed  responsibility  for 
Cuba’s  future.  There  was  also  the  fact  that  the  United 
States,  having  intervened  in  Cuban  affairs  for  the  purpose  of 
definitely  terminating  a situation  which  had  become  “in- 
tolerable,” primarily  to  the  American  people,  and  inciden- 
tally to  Cuba  and  to  civilization  in  general,  seemed  bound  to 
establish  an  institution  which  should  make  impossible  a 
repetition  of  the  previous  conditions. 

The  latter  proposition  was  quite  untenable.  Law,  order, 
and  peace  may  be  declared,  but  cannot  be  assured,  by  either 
constitutional  provisions  or  by  international  treaties.  There 
was  doubt  of  the  responsibility  of  the  United  States  after  its 
withdrawal  upon  the  pacification  of  the  Island,  beyond  that 
which  existed  as  well  without  as  with  constitutional  pro- 
visions. In  the  absence  of  such  provisions,  the  same  justi- 
fication for  American  intervention  would  exist  at  any  future 
time  as  that  which  existed  when  the  United  States,  through 
its  President,  declared  the  situation  to  be  intolerable,  and 
insisted  that  it  be  terminated.  The  assumption  of  renewed 
disturbance,  arising  from  Cuban  incapacity  for  self-govern- 
ment, or  from  Cuban  disposition  to  turbulence,  was  an  hy- 
pothesis based  either  in  a limited  knowledge  of  insular  con- 
ditions or  in  unjust  or  uncharitable  indifference  to  those 
conditions. 


226 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


For  their  bearing  upon  the  special  issue,  the  provisions 
of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  may  be  repeated  here.  Article  I of 
that  treaty  declares  that: 

“Spain  relinquishes  all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  and  title  to 
Cuba.  And  as  the  Island  is,  upon  its  evacuation  by  Spain,  to  be 
occupied  by  the  United  States,  the  United  States  will,  so  long  as 
such  occupation  lasts,  assume  and  discharge  the  obligations  that 
may  under  international  law  result  from  the  fact  of  its  occupation, 
for  the  protection  of  life  and  property.” 

Article  XVI  declares  that: 

“It  is  understood  that  any  obligations  assumed  in  this  treaty 
by  the  United  States  with  respect  to  Cuba  are  limited  to  the  time 
of  its  occupancy  thereof;  but  it  will  upon  the  termination  of  such 
occupancy,  advise  any  government  established  in  the  Island  to 
assume  the  same  obligations.” 

While  the  letter  of  these  articles  would  seem  to  limit,  with 
sufficient  definiteness,  American  obligation  and  responsi- 
bility to  the  “time  of  its  occupancy,”  that  view  of  it  was  not 
taken  by  the  administration  and  its  supporters.  It  was 
their  argument  that  responsibility  existed  beyond  “the  time 
of  occupancy.”  It  may  be  admitted  that  it  did  so  extend, 
but  it  may  be  questioned  whether  that  responsibility  was  in 
anyway  modified  or  affected  by  the  imposition  of  terms 
which  were  so  notably  offensive  to  so  large  a number  of  the 
Cuban  people. 

The  Cubans  understood  very  clearly  that  which  they  were 
told  to  do  in  Order  No.  455,  which  supplanted  Order  No. 
301.  This  was  not  understood  in  the  land  of  its  origin,  and 
there  was  a constant  insistence  there  that  Cuba  do  precisely 
that  which  she  had  been  definitely  told  not  to  do.  The 
American  press  of  the  period  was  filled  with  animated  con- 
troversy. One  group  stood  for  the  faithful  fulfilment  of 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


227 


the  terms  of  the  Joint  Resolution  by  the  establishment  of 
an  independent  republic  over  whose  acts  the  United  States 
should  exercise  no  supervision  or  control  beyond  that  in- 
volved by  the  expressions  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris.  That 
treaty  unquestionably  placed  upon  the  United  States  a meas- 
ure of  responsibility  for  Cuba’s  peace,  and  for  the  due  pro- 
tection of  the  life  and  property  of  all  residents  in  the  Island, 
native  and  foreign.  But  it  gave  the  United  States  no  right 
to  assume  that  Cuba  was  incapable  of  properly  conducting  her 
own  affairs,  and  no  right  to  intervene  in  those  affairs  until 
Cuban  incapacity  had  been  demonstrated  by  some  overt 
act.  The  attitude  of  the  other  group,  the  anti-Cuban,  was 
based  upon  an  unwarranted  and  uncharitable  assumption 
that  Cuba  would  not,  and  probably  could  not,  discharge 
with  due  ability  and  fidelity  the  duties  devolvent  upon  her 
as  an  absolutely  independent  nation.  Out  of  this  assump- 
tion there  came,  later  on,  that  which  is  known  as  the  Platt 
Amendment. 

As  the  Constitution  began  to  assume  a determined  shape, 
the  question  of  “relations”  also  began  to  assume  definite 
form  in  the  minds  of  the  Cubans.  The  first  concise  public 
statement  appeared  in  the  press  soon  after  the  first  of  Jan- 
uary, 1901.  That  was  made  in  the  following  terms,  as  a 
tentative  proposition  which  fairly  reflected  Cuban  sentiment: 

“1.  The  Republic  of  Cuba  regards,  as  a necessity  for  its  preser- 
vation, in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the 
establishment  of  definite  relations  of  friendship  and  commerce  with 
other  nations.  In  order  to  maintain  the  principles  of  that  doctrine, 
she  will  proceed  in  all  cases,  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war,  in  common 
accord  with  the  United  States. 

“2.  The  Republic  of  Cuba  will  place  at  the  disposal  of  the 
United  States,  should  the  latter  so  desire,  part  of  the  shore  of  any 
bay  on  the  north  coast,  and  of  any  two  bays  on  the  south  coast  of 


228 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


Cuba;  such  territory  conceded  to  be  selected  by  the  United  States 
and  to  be  used  for  the  establishment  of  naval  and  coaling  stations, 
the  concessions  to  be  of  sufficient  area  to  permit  of  proper  defence 
and  sanitation. 

“3.  The  Republic  of  Cuba  will  put  herself  on  a war  footing 
whenever  the  United  States  shall  consider  her  assistance  necessary 
to  defend  or  protect  the  independence  of  the  States  which  constitute 
the  entire  American  continent.” 

This  elicited  no  opposition  and  very  little  of  adverse  criti- 
cism. Its  terms  included  the  cession  of  those  naval  and 
coaling  stations  which,  when  demanded  by  the  Platt  Amend- 
ment, became  a subject  of  general  refusal  and  condemnation. 
About  the  first  of  February  there  appeared  another  proposi- 
tion. This,  although  attacked  by  some  of  the  ultra-radicals, 
met  with  a general  approval  on  the  part  of  the  people.  It 
read  as  follows: 

“ 1.  That  the  Republic,  for  a period  of  two  years  after  the  estab- 
lishment of  independence,  will  conduct  its  foreign  affairs  through 
the  United  States;  will  make  no  treaty  with  any  other  nation  prej- 
udicial to  the  United  States;  and  will  accept  no  compromise  which 
might  give  rise  to  the  occupation  of  the  Island  or  to  intervention 
in  its  Customs. 

“2.  That  the  United  States,  for  a period  of  two  years  after  the 
establishment  of  independence,  may  occupy  forts  in  Cuba,  provided 
the  Cuban  flag  flies  with  the  American. 

“3.  That  Cuba  will  lease  to  the  United  States  two  coaling 
stations,  and  will  give  no  commercial  advantages  to  any  other 
nation  which  are  not  given  to  the  United  States. 

“4.  That  none  of  these  concessions  or  promises  is  to  be  taken 
to  imply  any  cessation  of  the  sovereignty  of  Cuba,  or  any  lessening 
of  her  complete  independence.” 

Had  the  United  States,  at  this  time,  adopted  the  policy 
of  non-interference,  there  is  every  reason  for  belief  that  the 
confusion  and  ill-feeling  engendered  by  the  subsequent  pro- 


THE  QUESTION  OF  « RELATIONS  ” 


229 


ceedings  would  have  been  avoided.  It  may  also  be  said  that 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  had  the  United  States 
left  the  Cubans  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  instructions 
given  them  on  Nov.  5, 1900,  the  Convention  would  have  sub- 
mitted an  “ opinion  as  to  what  the  relations  ought  to  be  ” be- 
tween the  two  countries  which  would  have  safeguarded 
American  interests  quite  as  effectively  as  the  Platt  Amend- 
ment. As  a friendly  neighbor,  grateful  for  that  which  the 
United  States  had  done  for  her,  Cuba  desired  the  establish- 
ment of  intimate  relations  with  the  American  people,  Yet, 
as  an  independent  and  sovereign  nation,  she  was  disposed 
to  protest  against  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  demand 
that  which  so  clearly  limited  her  independence.  She  wished 
to  exercise  her  right  to  give,  as  an  independent  nation,  by 
treaty  with  a friendly  power,  that  which  she  was  loth  to  yield 
in  response  to  a demand  from  a superior  force.  In  the 
one  case,  her  act  would  become  that  of  a sovereign  power; 
in  the  other,  she  would  confess  a measure  of  subjection  in- 
consistent with  the  initial  assertion  of  her  Constitution. 

But  the  American  administration  saw  fit  to  interfere  and 
did  so,  on  February  1.5,  in  a manner  which  offended  the 
Cubans  and  stirred  their  suspicions  of  American  good  faith. 
Whether  the  step  was  taken  upon  a basis  of  distrust  of  Cuban 
ability  to  formulate  a reasonable  opinion  upon  the  subject 
of  relations;  or  from  a desire  to  coerce  the  Cubans  into  some 
acknowledgment  of  the  rights  of  the  United  States  to  con- 
tinue, though  in  another  form,  its  guardianship  of  Cuban 
affairs;  or  whether  it  was  due  to  the  failure  of  the  Military 
Governor  to  measure  the  situation  with  exact  accuracy,  is 
not  readily  to  be  determined.  The  mistake  lay  in  inter- 
ference of  any  kind  at  so  critical  a moment,  and  the  results 
were  unfortunate  for  both  countries. 

On  February  9,  the  War  Department  sent  the  following 


230 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


instructions  to  General  Wood.  From  the  amount  of  argu- 
ment and  explanation  which  attends  the  brief  statement  of  the 
American  desires,  it  is  to  be  inferred  that  explanation  of 
the  American  attitude  was  regarded  as  necessary.  The 
communication  was  as  follows: 

War  Department. 

Washington,  Feb.  9,  1901. 

Sir:  As  the  time  approaches  for  the  Cuban  Constitutional  Con- 
vention to  consider  and  act  upon  Cuba’s  relations  with  the  United 
States,  it  seems  desirable  that  you  should  be  informed  of  the  views 
of  the  Executive  Department  of  our  Government  upon  that  sub- 
ject in  a more  official  form  than  that  in  which  they  have  been  com- 
municated to  you  hitherto.  The  limitations  upon  the  power  of 
the  Executive  by  the  resolution  of  Congress  of  April  20,  1898,  are 
such  that  the  final  determination  upon  the  whole  subject  may 
ultimately  rest  in  Congress,  and  it  is  impracticable  now  to  forecast 
what  the  action  of  Congress  will  be.  In  the  meantime,  until  Con- 
gress shall  have  acted,  the  military  branch  of  the  Government 
is  bound  to  refrain  from  any  committal,  or  apparent  committal, 
of  the  United  States  to  any  policy  which  should  properly  be  de- 
termined upon  by  Congress,  and,  at  the  same  time,  so  far  as  it  is 
called  upon  to  act  or  to  make  suggestions  bearing  upon  the  course 
of  events,  it  must  determine  its  own  conduct  by  reference  to  the 
action  already  taken  by  Congress,  the  established  policy  of  the 
United  States,  the  objects  of  our  present  occupation,  and  the  mani- 
fest interests  of  the  two  countries. 

The  joint  resolution  of  Congress  of  April  20,  1898,  which 
authorized  the  President  to  expel  the  Spanish  forces  from  Cuba, 
declared  — “ that  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  disposi- 
tion or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control 
over  said  Island  except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts  its 
determination,  when  that  is  accomplished,  to  leave  the  government 
and  the  control  of  the  Island  to  its  people.” 

The  treaty  of  peace  concluded  at  Paris  on  the  10th  of  Decern- 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


231 


ber,  1898,  and  ratified  by  the  Senate  on  the  6th  of  February,  1899, 
provides  in  the  first  article  that  — 

“As  the  Island  is,  upon  its  evacuation  by  Spain,  to  be  occupied 
by  the  United  States,  the  United  States  will,  so  long  as  such  occu- 
pation shall  last,  assume  and  discharge  the  obligations  that  may, 
under  international  law,  result  from  the  fact  of  its  occupation,  for 
the  protection  of  life  and  property.” 

It  contains  numerous  obligations  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  in  respect  of  the  treatment  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  territory 
relinquished  by  Spain,  such  as  the  provision  of  the  tenth  article, 
that  the  inhabitants  shall  be  secured  in  the  free  exercise  of  their 
religion;  of  the  eleventh  article,  that  they  shall  be  subject  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts,  pursuant  to  the  ordinary  laws  governing 
the  same,  and  of  the  ninth  article,  that  they  shall  retain  all  their 
rights  of  property,  including  the  right  to  sell  or  dispose  thereof, 
and  the  right  to  carry  on  their  industry’,  commerce,  and  professions. 
The  sixteenth  article  of  the  treaty  provides  that  the  obligations 
assumed  in  the  treaty  by  the  United  States  with  respect  to  Cuba 
are  limited  to  the  time  of  its  occupancy  thereof,  but  that  it  shall, 
upon  the  termination  of  such  occupancy,  advise  any  government 
established  in  the  Island  to  assume  the  same  obligations. 

Our  occupation  of  Cuba  has  been  under  the  binding  force 
both  of  the  resolution  and  the  treaty,  and  the  pacification  mentioned 
in  the  resolution  has  necessarily  been  construed  as  co-extensive  with 
the  occupation  provided  for  by  the  treaty,  during  which  we  were  to 
discharge  international  obligations,  protect  the  rights  of  the  former 
subjects  of  Spain,  and  cause  or  permit  the  establishment  of  a govern- 
ment to  which  we  could,  in  good  faith,  commit  the  protection  of 
the  lives  and  property  and  personal  rights  of  those  inhabitants 
from  whom  we  had  compelled  their  former  sovereign  to  withdraw 
her  protection.  It  is  plain  that  the  government  to  which  we  were 
thus  to  transfer  our  temporary  obligations  should  be  a government 
based  upon  the  peaceful  suffrages  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  represent- 
ing the  entire  people  and  holding  their  power  from  the  people,  and 
subject  to  the  limitations  and  safeguards  which  the  experience  of 
constitutional  government  has  shown  to  be  necessary  to  the  preser- 


232 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


vation  of  individual  rights.  This  is  plain  as  a duty  to  the  people 
of  Cuba  under  the  resolution  of  April  20,  1898,  and  it  is  plain  as  an 
obligation  of  good  faith  under  the  treaty  of  Paris.  Such  a govern- 
ment we  have  been  persistently  and  with  all  practicable  speed 
building  up  in  Cuba,  and  we  hope  to  see  it  established  and  assume 
control  under  the  provisions  which  shall  be  adopted  by  the  present 
convention.  It  seems  to  me  that  no  one  familiar  with  the  traditional 
and  established  policy  of  this  country  in  respect  to  Cuba  can  find 
cause  for  doubt  as  to  our  remaining  duty.  It  would  be  hard  to 
find  any  single  statement  of  public  policy  which  has  been  so  often 
officially  declared  by  so  great  an  array  of  distinguished  Americans 
authorized  to  speak  for  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  as 
the  proposition  stated,  in  varying  but  always  uncompromising  and 
unmistakable  terms,  that  the  United  States  would  not  under  any 
circumstances  permit  any  foreign  power  other  than  Spain  to  ac- 
quire possession  of  the  Island  of  Cuba. 

Jefferson  and  Monroe  and  John  Quincy  Adams  and  Jackson 
and  Van  Buren  and  Grant  and  Clay  and  Webster  and  Buchanan 
and  Everett  have  all  agreed  in  regarding  this  as  essential  to  the 
interests  and  the  protection  of  the  United  States.  The  United 
States  has,  and  will  always  have,  the  most  vital  interest  in  the 
preservation  of  the  independence  which  she  has  secured  for  Cuba, 
and  in  preserving  the  people  of  that  Island  from  the  domination 
and  control  of  any  foreign  power  whatever.  The  preservation  of 
that  independence  by  a country  so  small  as  Cuba,  so  incapable, 
as  she  must  always  be,  to  contend  by  force  against  the  great  powers 
of  the  world,  must  depend  upon  the  strict  performance  of  inter- 
national obligations,  upon  her  giving  due  protection  to  the  lives 
and  property  of  the  citizens  of  all  other  countries  within  her  borders, 
and  upon  her  never  contracting  any  public  debt  which  in  the  hands 
of  the  citizens  of  foreign  powers  shall  constitute  an  obligation  she 
is  unable  to  meet.  The  United  States  has,  therefore,  not  merely 
a moral  obligation  arising  from  her  destruction  of  Spanish  authority 
in  Cuba,  and  the  obligations  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a stable  and  adequate  government  in  Cuba,  but  it  has  a 
substantial  interest  in  the  maintenance  of  such  a government. 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


233 


We  are  placed  in  a position  where,  for  our  own  protection,  we 
have,  by  reason  of  expelling  Spain  from  Cuba,  become  the  guaran- 
tors of  Cuban  independence  and  the  guarantors  of  a stable  and 
orderly  government  protecting  life  and  property  in  that  Island. 
Fortunately  the  condition  which  we  deem  essential  for  our  own 
interests  is  the  condition  for  which  Cuba  has  been  struggling,  and 
which  the  duty  we  have  assumed  toward  Cuba  on  Cuban  grounds 
and  for  Cuban  interests  requires.  It  would  be  a most  lame  and 
impotent  conclusion  if,  after  all  the  expenditure  of  blood  and  treas- 
ure by  the  people  of  the  United  States  for  the  freedom  of  Cuba,  and 
by  the  people  of  Cuba  for  the  same  object,  we  should,  through  the 
Constitution  of  the  new  government,  by  inadvertence  or  otherwise, 
be  placed  in  a worse  condition  in  regard  to  our  own  vital  interests 
than  we  were  while  Spain  was  in  possession,  and  the  people  of 
Cuba  should  be  deprived  of  that  protection  and  aid  from  the 
United  States  which  is  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  their  in- 
dependence. It  was,  undoubtedly,  in  consideration  of  these 
special  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Cuba  that  the 
President  said  in  his  message  to  Congress  of  the  11th  of  April,  1898: 

“The  only  hope  of  relief  and  repose  from  a condition  which 
can  no  longer  be  endured  is  the  enforced  pacification  of  Cuba.  In 
the  name  of  humanity,  in  the  name  of  civilization,  in  behalf  of  en- 
dangered American  interests  which  give  us  the  right  and  the  duty 
to  speak  and  to  act,  the  war  in  Cuba  must  stop. 

“In  view  of  these  facts  and  of  these  considerations  I ask  the 
Congress  to  authorize  and  empower  the  President  to  take  measures 
to  secure  a full  and  final  termination  of  hostilities  between  the 
Government  of  Spain  and  the  people  of  Cuba,  and  to  secure  in  the 
Island  the  establishment  of  a stable  government,  capable  of  main- 
taining order  and  observing  its  international  obligations,  insuring 
peace  and  tranquillity  and  the  security  of  its  citizens  as  well  as  our 
own,  and  to  use  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States 
as  may  be  necessary  for  these  purposes.” 

And  in  his  message  of  Dec.  5,  1899: 

“This  nation  has  assumed  before  the  world  a grave  responsi- 
bility for  the  future  good  government  of  Cuba.  We  have  accepted 


234 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


a trust,  the  fulfilment  of  which  calls  for  the  sternest  integrity  of 
purpose  and  the  exercise  of  the  highest  wisdom.  The  new  Cuba 
yet  to  arise  from  the  ashes  of  the  past  must  needs  be  bound  to  us 
by  ties  of  singular  intimacy  and  strength  if  its  enduring  welfare  is 
to  be  assured.  Whether  those  ties  shall  be  organic  or  conventional, 
the  destinies  of  Cuba  are  in  some  rightful  form  and  manner  irrev- 
ocably linked  with  our  own,  but  how  and  how  far  is  for  the  future  to 
determine  in  the  ripeness  of  events.  Whatever  be  the  outcome, 
we  must  see  to  it  that  free  Cuba  be  a reality,  not  a name,  a perfect 
entity,  not  a hasty  experiment  bearing  within  itself  the  elements  of 
failure.  Our  mission,  to  accomplish  which  we  took  up  the  wager 
of  battle,  is  not  to  be  fulfilled  by  turning  adrift  any  loosely  framed 
commonwealth  to  face  the  vicissitudes  which  too  often  attend 
weaker  states  whose  natural  wealth  and  abundant  resources  are 
offset  by  the  incongruities  of  their  political  organization  and  the 
recurring  occasions  for  internal  rivalries  to  sap  their  strength  and 
dissipate  their  energies.” 

And  it  was  with  a view  to  the  proper  settlement  and  disposition 
of  these  necessary  relations  that  the  order  for  the  election  of  dele- 
gates to  the  present  Constitutional  Convention  provided  that  they 
should  frame  and  adopt  a Constitution  for  the  people  of  Cuba,  and 
as  a part  thereof  provide  for  and  agree  with  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  upon  the  relations  to  exist  between  that  Govern- 
ment and  the  Government  of  Cuba. 

The  people  of  Cuba  should  desire  to  have  incorporated  in  her 
fundamental  law  provisions  in  substance  as  follows: 

“1.  That  no  government  organized  under  the  Constitution  shall 
be  deemed  to  have  authority  to  enter  into  any  treaty  or  engagement 
with  any  foreign  power  which  may  tend  to  impair  or  interfere  with 
the  independence  of  Cuba,  or  to  confer  upon  such  foreign  power 
any  special  right  or  privilege,  without  the  consent  of  the  United 
States. 

“2.  That  no  government  organized  under  the  Constitution  shall 
have  authority  to  assume  or  contract  any  public  debt  in  excess  of 
the  capacity  of  the  ordinary  revenues  of  the  Island  after  defraying 
the  current  expenses  of  government  to  pay  the  interest. 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


235 


“ 3.  That  upon  the  transfer  of  the  control  of  Cuba  to  the  govern- 
ment established  under  the  new  Constitution  Cuba  consents  that 
the  United  States  reserve  and  retain  the  right  of  intervention  for 
the  preservation  of  Cuban  independence  and  the  maintenance  of  a 
stable  government,  adequately  protecting  life,  property,  and  individ- 
ual liberty,  and  discharging  the  obligations  with  respect  to  Cuba 
imposed  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  on  the  United  States  and  now  as- 
sumed and  undertaken  by  the  Government  of  Cuba. 

“4.  That  all  the  acts  of  the  Military  Government,  and  all  rights 
acquired  thereunder,  shall  be  valid  and  shall  be  maintained  and 
protected. 

“5.  That  to  facilitate  the  United  States  in  the  performance  of 
such  duties  as  may  devolve  upon  her  under  the  foregoing  provisions 
and  for  her  own  defence,  the  United  States  may  acquire  and  hold 
the  title  to  land  for  naval  stations,  and  maintain  the  same  at  certain 
specified  points.” 

These  provisions  may  not,  it  is  true,  prove  to  be  in  accord  with 
the  conclusions  which  Congress  may  ultimately  reach  when  that 
body  comes  to  consider  the  subject,  but  as,  until  Congress  has  acted, 
the  Executive  must  necessarily  within  its  own  sphere  of  action  be 
controlled  by  its  own  judgment,  you  should  now  be  guided  by  the 
views  above  expressed. 

It  is  not  our  purpose  at  this  time  to  discuss  the  cost  of  our  in- 
tervention and  occupation,  or  advancement  of  money  for  disarma- 
ment, or  our  assumption  under  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  the  claims  of 
our  citizens  against  Spain  for  losses  which  they  had  incurred  in 
Cuba.  These  can  well  be  the  subject  of  later  consideration. 

Very  respectfully, 

Elihu  Root, 

Maj.  Gen.  Leonard  Wood,  Secretary  of  War. 

Military  Governor  of  Cuba,  Havana,  Cuba. 

This  was  the  pica  of  an  able  lawyer  made  in  support  of 
the  ease  of  his  client.  Assuming  it  to  have  been  a fair  ex- 
pression of  the  views  of  the  administration,  a question  arises 
concerning  the  fairness  of  witlxholding  the  statement  until 


236 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


so  critical  a time.  This  may  be  answered  by  pleading  a 
supposition  that  the  subject  would  be  included  in  the  Con- 
stitution, yet  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  that  could  be  done  in 
the  face  of  the  previous  experience  and  the  definite  instruc- 
tions of  Order  No.  455.  The  communication  reached 
Havana  on  the  morning  of  February  15. 

The  Military  Governor  had  planned  a shooting  trip  on 
that  day.  Instead  of  submitting  the  Washington  proposals 
to  the  Convention,  beyond  a doubt  the  proper  course,  he 
summoned  the  Committee  on  Relations  to  accompany  him 
upon  the  railway  portion  of  his  expedition,  and  made  the 
communication  directly  to  this  group.  Cuban  courtesy 
forbade  these  gentlemen  to  display  the  resentment  which 
they  felt  at  the  informal  manner  in  which  a communication 
which  was  really  of  an  official  nature,  was,  in  the  words  of 
one  of  the  committee,  “ pitched  at  ” them.  They  were 
offended  both  by  the  manner  and  by  the  fact  of  an  inter- 
ference in  their  proceedings  which  they  rightly  regarded  as 
unwarranted.  An  immediate  change  was  manifest  in  the 
sentiment  of  the  Convention,  though  the  incident  might 
have  been  disregarded  had  it  not  been  followed,  a week 
later,  by  a second  interference  in  which  the  Convention  was 
again  officially  ignored.  Beyond  any  question,  the  proper 
course  for  this,  as  well  as  for  the  earlier  communication, 
was  its  formal  presentation  to  the  Convention  for  such 
action  as  that  body  might  see  fit  to  take  in  the  matter.  General 
Wood  forwarded  it,  as  a personal  communication,  to  the 
chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Relations,  Senor  Diego 
Tamayo,  a member  of  the  Military  Governor’s  Cabinet,  and 
generally  regarded  as  more  than  a little  influenced  by  his 
chief.  The  immediate  result  of  this  second  communication 
is  fairly  indicated  in  a report  submitted  by  the  Committee 


237 


TIIE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 

immediately  after  its  transmission  by  Senor  Tamayo  to  his 
associates. 

This  was  prepared  at  a night  session  on  February  26  and 
was  accepted  by  the  Convention  at  2 a.m.,  of  the  27th. 
Extracts  from  that  report  are  as  follows: 

(Translation.) 

“The  Constitutional  Convention,  following  the  orders  of  the 
American  Government,  as  published  in  the  Gaceta  of  this  Island 
on  the  26th  of  July  and  the  6th  of  November,  1900,  as  Civil  Orders 
Nos.  301  and  455,  and  the  instructions  of  the  Military  Governor  in 
his  speech  upon  opening  the  Convention,  comply  with  the  various 
requests  therein  contained;  namely:  to  frame  and  adopt  a Constitu- 
tion for  the  Island  of  Cuba;  to  state  its  opinion  concerning  the  rela- 
tions which  should  exist  between  the  United  States  and  Cuba;  to 
provide  for  the  election  of  officers  . . . and  for  the  transfer  of  the 
government  of  the  Island  to  such  officers.  . . . The  committee  to 
whom  this  honorable  task  (that  of  formulating  the  required  opinion) 
has  been  assigned  believed,  when  it  first  met,  that  the  work  would 
be  short  and  easy  of  accomplishment.  Toward  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  all  Cubans  maintain  sentiments  of  such  deep  grati- 
tude for  the  powerful  and  decisive  help  rendered  in  our  struggle  for 
separation  from  Spain,  and  to  create  for  ourselves  an  independent 
and  sovereign  state,  that  it  seemed  to  all,  that,  in  stating  the  desired 
‘opinion,’  we  could  only  declare  that  we  thought  the  United  States 
and  Cuba  should  forever  maintain  the  ties  of  friendship  most  inti- 
mate and  fraternal,  as  there  exists  no  possibility  of  conflict  between 
their  legitimate  interests;  neither  is  there  room  for  the  least  differ- 
ence between  their  rational  aspirations. 

“ But  no  sooner  had  the  Committee'on  Relations  been  organized 
than  the  Honorable  Governor  of  the  Island  demanded  a private 
interview,  during  which  he  made  known  a communication  from 
the  American  Secretary  of  War,  containing  the  terms  suggested 
and  recommended  by  the  American  Executive,  as  the  basis  of  the 
opinion  which  it  solicited.  From  that  moment,  the  committee 


238 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


was  obliged  to  proceed  with  greater  caution,  as  the  subject  had  to 
be  considered  from  another  point  of  view,  inasmuch  as  the  earlier 
instructions  (Orders  Nos.  301  and  455)  provided  for  the  free  for- 
mulation of  their  opinion  concerning  the  relations  which  should 
exist  between  the  two  countries.  But  the  receipt  of  the  said  com- 
munication, bearing  date  of  February  21,  indicated  that  something 
new  had  arisen  which  cannot  be  disregarded  by  the  committee. 

“We  are  the  delegates  of  the  people  of  Cuba.  Therefore  our 
primary  duty  lies  in  interpreting  the  will  and  serving  the  necessities 
of  our  people.  It  was  apparent  that  the  intimations  of  the  Ameri- 
can Executive  contained  only  the  expression  of  what,  in  his  judg- 
ment, the  people  of  Cuba  ought  to  desire  in  the  matter  of  future 
relations.  ...  It  is  clear  and  plain  that  this  is  sufficient  reason 
for  our  giving  them  (the  opinions  of  the  American  Executive)  a 
careful  consideration.  . . . But  we  have  a complete  right  to  accept 
or  reject  them,  to  select  from  them  that  which  we  think  fit,  to  add 
to  them  or  to  subtract  from  them,  or  to  substitute  for  them  others 
according  to  the  dictates  of  our  consciences,  holding  always  before 
us  our  duty  to  reconcile  all  that  may  be  a legitimate  interest  or  a 
rational  proposal  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  with  our  own 
highest  interests  and  sacred  rights. 

“The  undersigned  committee,  while  accepting  the  starting  point 
of  the  American  Executive  — which  provides  that  the  independence 
of  Cuba  shall  remain  absolutely  guaranteed  — is  of  the  opinion 
that  some  of  these  stipulations  are  not  acceptable,  inasmuch  as 
they  modify  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of  Cuba.  Our 
duty  consists  in  making  Cuba  independent  of  all  other  nations,  in- 
cluding the  great  and  noble  American  nation;  and  if  we  bind  our- 
selves to  ask  the  consent  of  the  United  States  to  our  international 
treaties;  if  we  allow  them  to  retain  the  right  to  intervene  in  our 
country  to  support  or  displace  administrations,  and  to  fulfil  rights 
which  only  concern  the  Cuban  Government;  and  if,  lastly,  we  con- 
cede to  them  the  right  to  acquire  and  maintain  any  title  over  any 
lands  whereon  they  may  establish  naval  stations,  it  is  plain  that  we 
should  appear  to  be  independent  of  the  rest  of  the  world,  but  surely 
we  should  never  be  so  with  relation  to  the  United  States.” 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


239 


While  this  document  was  of  considerable  length,  with 
generous  amplification  and  explanation  of  its  propositions, 
these  are  its  essential  features.  It  included  a quotation  of 
the  proposals  of  the  American  administration  which  are  here 
presented  in  company  with  the  tentative  proposals  sub- 
mitted in  response  by  the  Committee. 


THE  AMERICAN  PROPOSALS. 

1.  That  no  government  or- 
ganized under  the  Constitu- 
tion shall  be  authorized  to 
enter  into  any  treaty  or  com- 
pact with  any  foreign  Power 
which  shall  restrict  or  limit 
the  independence  of  Cuba,  or 
to  grant  to  any  foreign  Power 
any  rights  or  special  privileges 
without  the  consent  of  the 
United  States. 


2.  That  no  government  or- 
ganized under  the  Constitu- 
tion shall  have  power  to  as- 
sume or  to  contract  any  public 
debt  beyond  the  normal  capac- 
ity of  the  annual  revenues  for 
the  payment  of  current  ex- 
penses, the  payment  of  in- 
terest, and  provision  for  the 
extinguishment  of  the  debt. 

S.  That  in  the  transfer  of 
control  of  Cuba  to  the  new 
government  established  under 
the  new  Constitution,  it  is 
agreed  that  the  United  States 
shall  reserve  and  hold  the 
right  of  intervention  for  the 


THE  CUBAN  PROPOSALS. 

1.  The  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Cuba  shall  not 
enter  into  any  treaty  or  agree- 
ment with  any  foreign  Power 
or  Powers  which  might  com- 
promise or  limit  the  indepen- 
dence of  Cuba,  or  which  might, 
in  any  way,  authorize  any 
foreign  Power  or  Powers  to 
acquire,  through  colonization 
or  for  military  or  naval  pur- 
poses, any  lodgment,  authority 
or  right  over  any  portion  of 
Cuba. 

2.  The  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Cuba  will  not  per- 
mit its  territory  to  be  used  as  a 
base  of  war  operations  against 
the  United  States  or  any  other 
nation. 


3.  The  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Cuba  accepts  in 
its  entirety  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
of  the  10th  of  December,  1808, 
in  that  which  it  affirms  of  the 
rights  of  the  Cubans  as  well  as 
the  obligations  which  arc  tac- 


240 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


(the  AMERICAN  PROPOSALS.) 

preservation  of  the  indepen- 
dence of  Cuba,  and  the  main- 
tenance of  a stable  govern- 
ment which  shall  duly  protect 
life,  property,  and  individual 
liberty,  and  which  shall  fulfil, 
respecting  Cuba,  the  obliga- 
tions imposed  by  the  Treaty 
of  Paris  upon  the  United 
States  and  now  assumed  by 
the  Government  of  Cuba. 

4.  That  all  of  the  acts  of 
the  Military  Government,  and 
of  the  rights  acquired  through 
them,  shall  be  regarded  as 
valid,  and  be  maintained  and 
protected. 


5.  That,  for  the  better  en- 
abling of  the  United  States  to 
comply  with  such  duties  as  are 
imposed  upon  them  by  these 
stipulations  and  provisions, 
and  for  suitable  defence,  the 
United  States  shall  acquire  and 
hold  title  to  territory  for  the 
maintenance  of  naval  stations 
at  certain  specified  points. 


(the  CUBAN  PROPOSALS.) 
itly  imposed,  and  especially 
as  concerns  the  obligations  im- 
posed by  international  law, 
referring  to  the  protection  of 
life  and  property,  accepting  for 
itself  the  obligations  assumed 
by  the  United  States  in  this 
regard,  according  to  Articles 
I and  XVI  of  said  Treaty  of 
Paris. 

4.  The  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Cuba  shall  recog- 
nize as  legally  valid  the  acts  exe- 
cuted by  the  Military  Govern- 
ment, during  the  term  of  its 
occupation,  for  the  good  gov- 
ernment of  Cuba,  as  well  as 
the  rights  acquired  under  said 
acts,  and  in  conformity  with 
the  Joint  Resolution,  and  the 
second  section  of  the  United 
States  Army  Bill  of  1899-1900, 
known  as  the  Foraker  Bill,  and 
with  the  existing  laws  in  force 
in  the  country. 

5.  The  Government  of  the 
United  States  and  that  of  the 
Republic  of  Cuba  shall  regu- 
late their  commercial  relations 
by  means  of  a treaty  based  on 
reciprocity  with  a tendency 
toward  the  free  interchange  of 
their  natural  and  manufac- 
tured products,  and  which  will 
mutually  assure  them  ample 
special  advantages  in  their 
respective  markets. 

Coincident  with 


Thus  the  whole  situation  was  changed, 
this  unfortunate  step,  the  American  press  was  filled  with 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


241 


discussion  concerning  an  extra  session  of  Congress  for  the 
consideration  of  the  Cuban  question.  The  month  of  Feb- 
ruary was  a time  of  confusion,  misunderstanding,  and 
cross-purposes.  President  McKinley  was  insistent  upon  an 
immediate  settlement  of  the  Cuban  matter,  and  Congress 
was  anxious  for  a prompt  termination  of  its  session.  Al- 
though the  Cuban  Constitution  was  not  definitely  accepted  in 
its  final  and  completed  form  until  February  15,  its  general  out- 
line was  made  public  on  January  21,  and  it  was  known  that 
it  contained  no  reference  to  the  future  relations  of  the  two 
countries.  The  adjournment  of  Congress  was  due  on  March 
4.  The  Cubans  had  been  and  were  being  criticised  both 
for  undue  haste  and  for  unreasonable  delay  in  their  pro- 
ceedings. The  matter  was  discussed  in  Cabinet  conferences 
in  Washington,  and  these  conferences  resulted  in  the  sub- 
mission of  the  suggestions  which  have  been  quoted  in  the 
foregoing  paragraphs.  Senator  Platt,  of  Connecticut,  the 
Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Relations  with  Cuba, 
expressed  his  opinion  that  Congress  had  no  power  to  deal 
directly  with  the  Cuban  Constitution.  He  said,  “We  can 
neither  approve,  reject,  nor  in  any  way  amend  or  modify 
the  Cuban  Constitution  by  act  of  Congress.  . . . Cuba, 
being  a foreign  country,  is  privileged  to  establish  her  own 
government  without  let  or  hindrance.”  But  in  the  matter 
of  future  relations,  he  held  that,  although  Cuba  was  a foreign 
country,  the  United  States,  by  virtue  of  the  grounds  upon 
which  it  intervened  in  Cuban  affairs,  possessed  certain 
rights  and  privileges  in  the  Island,  and  that  it  was  in  duty 
bound,  in  the  interests  of  both  countries,  to  safeguard  those 
rights  and  privileges. 

From  his  particular  standpoint,  and  from  that  of  those 
who  supported  him,  there  can  be  no  question  of  the  correct- 
ness of  his  views.  By  its  own  act,  the  United  States  was 


242 


THE  QUESTION  OF  “ RELATIONS  ” 


pledged  to  the  establishment  of  Cuban  independence.  It 
was  also  virtually  pledged  to  the  establishment  of  a stable 
government  by  the  Cuban  people.  It  had  made  itself  the 
guarantor  of  a government  which  should  be  capable  of  pro- 
tecting life  and  property  in  the  Island.  It  had  assumed 
responsibilities  which  could  not  be  disregarded.  Stable 
government  and  security  of  life  and  property  are  not  possible 
of  full  assurance  by  the  mere  promulgation  of  laws  or  con- 
stitutions. The  point  upon  which  the  whole  controversy 
of  the  time  really  turns  is  whether  there  was  warrant  and 
justification  for  an  assumption  that  the  Cubans  could  not 
or  would  not,  by  their  own  conduct,  endorse  and  carry  out 
the  requisite  conditions. 

The  Cuban  view  of  the  matter  was  not  entirely  harmoni- 
ous, even  in  the  Convention.  So  far  as  demarkation  is 
possible,  it  may  be  said  that  a conservative  element  favored 
an  active  and  recognized  American  supervision  with  some 
measure  of  American  control.  The  radical  element  stood 
for  the  terms  of  their  Constitution  which  declared  Cuba  to 
be  “a  sovereign  and  independent  state.”  The  numerical 
strength  of  these  respective  groups  was  impossible  of  deter- 
mination by  estimate.  A plebiscite  was  urged  by  some, 
but  the  proposals  were  disregarded,  and  active  discussion 
continued.  The  situation  was  further  complicated  by  the 
knowledge,  which  promptly  reached  the  Island,  that  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Relations  with  Cuba  was  engaged  in 
the  preparation  of  a measure  which,  if  accepted  and  passed 
by  Congress  and  signed  by  the  President,  was  tantamount  to 
an  ultimatum.  It  was  known  that  this  measure  proposed 
to  make  the  withdrawal  of  American  authority  conditional 
upon  the  acceptance  of  terms  which  the  Cubans  regarded 
as  subversive  of  their  independence  as  a nation,  and  a direct 
violation  of  the  pledge  of  the  Joint  Resolution. 


Chapter  XV 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 

The  position  taken  at  this  time  by  the  American  authorities 
is  not  readily  to  be  understood  or  excused.  It  was  dis- 
tinctly inconsistent  and  illogical.  Having  instructed  the 
Cubans,  in  Order  No.  301,  to  include  in  their  Constitution 
the  terms  of  the  future  international  relations;  and,  later, 
by  Order  No.  455,  having  instructed  the  omission  of  those 
terms;  the  matter  was  definitely  taken  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  Cubans  by  American  action.  This  was  done  before  the 
Convention  had  been  allowed  a reasonable  time  for  con- 
sideration of  the  subject. 

An  amendment  to  the  Army  Appropriation  Bill  was  rushed 
through  both  houses  of  the  American  Congress  with  only 
an  hour  or  two  of  discussion.  No  excuse  whatever  appears 
for  the  summary  despatch  of  a measure  of  such  importance 
as  the  international  relations  of  two  countries  whose  future, 
politically  and  commercially,  demanded  the  closest  and 
most  amicable  of  ties.  It  is  safe  to  assume  that  the  situation 
was  not  a little  influenced  by  the  reports  and  opinions  of  the 
Military  Governor,  who  supposed  himself  to  be  in  close 
touch  with  Cuban  affairs  and  accurately  informed  regard- 
ing Cuban  opinion.  He  was  neither  in  harmony  nor  in 
touch  with  the  real  Cubnn  sentiment. 

A peculiar  incident  arose  at  this  time,  and  was  of  no  small 
influence  in  determining  the  attitude  and  action  of  the 
United  States  Congress.  On  February  2(5,  there  was  an 


244 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


interview  at  the  Palace,  in  Havana,  between  General  Wood 
and  General  Maximo  Gomez.  The  report  of  this  interview 
was  given  to  representatives  of  the  American  press  by 
General  Wood,  and  was  duly  telegraphed  by  them  to  the 
United  States.  That  report,  as  sent  and  published,  was  as 
follows : 

“Havana,  February  26.  General  Gomez  visited  Governor 
General  Wood  this  morning,  and  assured  him  that  the  stories  of 
unrest  and  dissatisfaction  at  the  continuance  of  the  United  States 
intervention  were  false,  and  that  he  had  been  misrepresented  in 
statements  to  the  effect  that  he  favored  an  immediate  withdrawal 
of  the  United  States  troops,  and  giving  Cuba  absolute  independence. 
If  they  withdrew  now  he  feared  bloodshed,  beyond  doubt.  Within 
sixty  days,  the  Cubans  would  be  fighting  among  themselves.  Gen- 
eral Gomez  added,  ‘If  the  Americans  were  to  withdraw  to-day,  I 
would  go  with  them.’  . . . General  Gomez  had  no  objection  to 
the  outline  of  the  future  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Cuba  as  recommended  by  the  United  States  Senate.” 

American  legislators  have  stated  that  this  message  was 
either  a determining  factor  or  a strong  influence  in  their 
vote  upon  the  Platt  Amendment.  Lacking,  admittedly,  an 
adequate  personal  familiarity  with  the  subject,  they  accepted 
this  alleged  statement  of  General  Gomez  as  the  expression 
of  a qualified  Cuban  opinion.  Gomez  was  known  as  the 
head  and  front  of  Cuba’s  struggle  for  national  independence, 
and  it  is  natural  that  his  statement  should  be  accepted  with- 
out question.  The  matter  turns  upon  the  accuracy  of  this 
submitted  report. 

In  Havana,  nothing  was  known  in  regard  to  it  until  the 
arrival  of  the  American  papers,  on  the  29th.  Those  con- 
tained the  report  from  which  the  above  extract  is  taken. 
A copy  was  shown  to  General  Gomez  at  his  house  and  the 
matter  translated  to  him.  In  a rage  of  indignation,  he 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


245 


denied  having  made  any  such  statement,  and  declared  the 
expressed  opinions  to  be  entirely  contrary  to  his  views.  A 
local  paper  {La  Discusion ) sent  a reporter  to  interview 
General  Wood.  That  official  declared  that  there  had  been 
an  error  in  the  reports  of  the  correspondents.  Yet  both  of 
those  who  sent  the  matter  obtained  their  information  at  the 
Palace,  and  both  sent  practically  the  same  statement.  As 
they  represented  rival  bureaus,  collusion  of  any  kind  is  im- 
probable. Gomez  refused  to  make  any  statement.  He 
stood  upon  his  dignity,  smote  his  breast,  and  declared  that 
he  was  “Maximo  Gomez.  I do  not  need  to  deny  such  a 
statement.”  This  attitude  was  quite  consistent  with  the 
general  character  of  the  stubborn  and  somewhat  irascible 
old  gentleman.  But  the  matter  was  not,  has  not  been,  and 
and  probably  never  will  be  quite  cleared  up.  That  it  had 
the  effect  of  influencing  American  votes  on  the  Platt  Amend- 
ment is  decidedly  more  certain  than  the  origin  of  the  report. 

The  measure  known  as  the  Platt  Amendment  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  United  States  Senate,  as  an  amendment  to  the 
Army  Appropriation  bill,  on  February  25.  The  Senate 
adopted  it,  on  the  27th,  by  a vote  of  43  to  20.  The  House 
signified  its  concurrence,  on  March  1,  by  a vote  of  159  to  134. 
The  text  of  the  bill  is  as  follows: 

“That,  in  fulfilment  of  the  declaration  contained  in  the  Joint 
Resolution,  approved  April  20,  1898,  entitled  ‘For  the  recognition 
of  the  independence  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  demanding  that  the 
Government  of  Spain  relinquish  its  authority  and  government  in 
the  Island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from 
Cuba  and  Cuban  waters,  and  directing  the  President  of  the 
United  States  to  use  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States 
to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect,’  the  President  is  hereby  au- 
thorized to  leave  the  government  and  control  of  the  Island  of  Cuba 
to  its  people  so  soon  as  a government  shall  have  boon  established 


246 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


in  said  Island,  under  a Constitution  which,  either  as  a part  thereof 
or  in  any  ordinance  appended  thereto,  shall  define  the  future  re- 
lations of  the  United  States  with  Cuba,  substantially  as  follows: 

“(1)  That  the  Government  of  Cuba  shall  never  enter  into  any 
treaty  or  other  compact  with  any  foreign  Power  or  Powers  which 
will  impair  or  tend  to  impair  the  independence  of  Cuba,  nor  in  any 
manner  authorize  or  permit  any  foreign  Power  or  Powers  to  obtain 
by  colonization  or  for  military  or  naval  purposes,  or  otherwise, 
lodgment  in  or  control  over  any  portion  of  said  Island. 

“ (2)  That  said  Government  shall  not  assume  or  contract  any 
public  debt,  to  pay  the  interest  upon  which  and  to  make  reasonable 
sinking-fund  provision  for  the  ultimate  discharge  of  which,  the 
ordinary  revenues  of  the  Island,  after  defraying  the  current  ex- 
penses of  government,  shall  be  inadequate. 

“(3)  That  the  Government  of  Cuba  consents  that  the  United 
States  may  exercise  the  right  to  intervene  for  the  preservation  of 
Cuban  independence,  the  maintenance  of  a government  adequate 
for  the  protection  of  life,  property,  and  individual  liberty,  and  for 
discharging  the  obligations  with  respect  to  Cuba  imposed  by  the 
Treaty  of  Paris  on  the  United  States,  now  to  be  assumed  and  under- 
taken by  the  Government  of  Cuba. 

“ (4)  That  all  acts  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba  during  its  mili- 
tary occupation  thereof  are  ratified  and  validated,  and  all  lawful 
rights  acquired  thereunder  shall  be  maintained  and  protected. 

“ (5)  That  the  Government  of  Cuba  will  execute,  and  as  far  as 
necessary  extend,  the  plans  already  devised  or  other  plans  to  be 
mutually  agreed  upon,  for  the  sanitation  of  the  cities  of  the  Island, 
to  the  end  that  a recurrence  of  epidemic  and  infectious  diseases 
may  be  prevented,  thereby  assuring  protection  to  the  people  and 
commerce  of  Cuba,  as  well  as  to  the  commerce  of  the  Southern 
ports  of  the  United  States  and  the  people  residing  therein. 

“ (6)  That  the  Isle  of  Pines  shall  be  omitted  from  the  proposed 
Constitutional  boundaries  of  Cuba,  the  title  thereto  left  to  future 
adjustment  by  treaty. 

“ (7)  That  to  enable  the  United  States  to  maintain  the  indepen- 
dence of  Cuba,  and  to  protect  the  people  thereof,  as  well  as  for  its 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


247 


own  defence,  the  Government  of  Cuba  will  sell  or  lease  to  the 
United  States  lands  necessary  for  coaling  or  naval  stations  at  cer- 
tain specified  points,  to  be  agreed  upon  with  the  President  of  the 
United  States. 

“ (8)  That  by  way  of  further  assurance  the  Government  of  Cuba 
will  embody  the  foregoing  provisions  in  a permanent  treaty  with 
the  United  States.” 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  Cubans  had  every 
reason  to  anticipate  some  such  step,  there  is  no  question 
that  the  adoption  of  this  measure  produced  widespread  dis- 
may among  them.  The  first  impulse  was  submission  through 
sheer  hopelessness  of  opposition  to  the  power  of  the  United 
States.  From  this  they  soon  recovered  and  began  that 
protracted  struggle  which  ended  in  reluctant  acceptance 
by  the  Constitutional  Convention.  Nor  was  the  struggle 
and  the  protest  which  followed  confined  to  Cuba  and  the 
Cuban  Convention.  The  American  press  was  filled  with  a 
vigorous  controversy.  The  originators  of  the  bill  were 
forced  to  become  its  defenders,  and  the  best  that  can  be  said 
of  the  defence  is  that  it  was  illogical.  Not  a few  who,  at 
the  time,  asserted  that  the  provisions  of  the  bill  were  a 
guarantee  of  Cuban  independence,  were  obliged,  later,  to 
admit  its  limitation  of  Cuban  independence,  and  its  estab- 
lishment of  an  indefinite  sort  of  American  suzerainty  over  the 
Island  of  Cuba.  It  became  necessary  for  die  defenders  of 
the  bill  to  explain  its  meaning  in  terms  for  which  its  oppo- 
nents could  find  no  basis  in  its  phraseology. 

The  argument  of  the  supporters  of  the  bill  rested,  in  some 
cases,  solely  in  political  partisanship.  In  others,  it  was 
based  upon  a groundless  belief  that  the  peace  which  had 
existed  for  nearly  three  years  in  the  Island,  was  due  to  the 
presence  of  the  American  troops,  and  that  a state  of  anarchy 
would  follow  the  withdrawal  of  die  United  States  forces. 


248 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


In  an  article  in  the  Independent,  Senator  Platt  stated  that 
“ In  no  instance  has  it  been  necessary  to  call  upon  our  troops 
to  repress  disorder,  but  it  has  been  because  of  their  presence 
there  that  the  necessity  has  not  existed.”  While  it  may  be 
admitted  that  the  presence  of  an  armed  force  was  desirable 
during  the  chaotic  period  of  the  first  six  months  of  the  year 
1899,  the  general  tenor  of  Mr.  Platt’s  comment  is  as  in- 
accurate as  it  is  unjust  to  the  Cubans,  who  had  shown  no 
more  disposition  toward  turbulence  or  disorder  than  had 
the  people  of  any  State  in  the  Union. 

Again,  in  the  World's  Work,  Senator  Platt  expressed  a 
similar  opinion.  He  said:  “With  no  army  to  repress  dis- 
order, it  is  certainly  within  the  limit  of  reasonable  proba- 
bility that  the  revolutionary  and  turbulent  party  may  at- 
tempt the  destruction  or  confiscation  of  Spanish  and  Cuban 
property  which  the  new  government  would  be  utterly  power- 
less to  prevent.”  It  is  most  unfortunate  that  Senator  Platt 
and  those  who  followed  his  line  of  reasoning,  and  supported 
his  bill,  should  have  been  so  lacking  in  competent  informa- 
tion regarding  the  Island  and  its  people.  To  those  who 
knew,  all  this  was  mere  bugaboo,  baseless  and  unwar- 
ranted. There  had  not  been  for  two  years  prior  to  the 
period  of  this  discussion  any  sign  of  either  “ revolutionary  or 
turbulent  party,”  and  the  American  authorities  were  doing 
no  little  boasting  with  regard  to  the  thorough  efficiency  of 
both  the  municipal  police  and  the  Rural  Guard  of  the  Island. 
These  together  made  an  armed  force  of,  approximately, 
2,500  men  for  the  suppression  of  disorder.  The  great  need 
of  the  Island  was  not  troops  to  maintain  order,  but  industrial 
prosperity  which  would  enable  people  to  live  without  taking 
that  which  was  not  their  own,  or  to  indulge  in  rioting  or 
strife  as  a result  of  hunger  and  distress.  The  argument  of 
potential  menace  to  the  peace  of  the  Island,  and  the  necessity 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


249 


for  Cuban  recognition  of  the  right  of  the  United  States  to 
interfere  in  insular  affairs,  was  without  justification,  unless 
the  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  Cuba  in  commercial 
affairs  produced  a condition  of  distress  of  which  anarchy 
and  disorder  came  as  the  legitimate  children. 

The  argument  in  favor  of  the  Platt  Amendment  was  based 
upon  an  hypothesis,  and  developed  in  policy  and  in  politics. 
Its  opponents  grounded  their  arguments  upon  a moral 
principle  of  national  righteousness  and  good  faith.  Some 
of  those  arguments  and  opinions  may  be  quoted,  as  follows : 

“To  impose  any  terms  upon  Cuba  is  a violation  of  the  pledge 
given  to  the  world  when  the  United  States  went  to  her  assistance.” 
— Baltimore  American.  (Rep.) 

“If  this  scheme,  in  defiant  violation  of  our  solemn  national 
pledge  and  every  consideration  of  equity  and  wise  public  policy, 
shall  be  successful,  the  United  States  will  stand  disgraced  among 
the  nations.”  — Columbia  (S.  C.)  State.  (Dem.) 

“Having  said  that  the  people  were  ‘free  and  independent,’  and 
that  of  right  they  ought  to  be  so,  let  us  not  descend  to  pettifogging 
now.  Let  us  not  dictate  to  the  ‘free  and  independent’  in  any 
particular.  Let  us  pursue  the  straight  and  narrow  path  of  common 
honesty.”  — Chicago  Times-Herald. 

“If  a nation  is  dishonored  when  it  breaks  faith,  coolly,  openly, 
and  for  the  sake  of  material  advantage,  then  the  United  States 
stands  before  the  world  dishonored.”  — Philadelphia  North 
American.  (Rep.) 

“The  resolutions  are  an  act  of  bad  faith  toward  a weak  people, 
who  must  either  yield  or  revolt.”  — Chicago  Journal.  (Rep.) 

“It  is  easy  enough  to  find  excuses  for  breaking  a national  promise 
when  the  desire  to  break  it  is  strong.  But  there  is  no  excuse  which 
could  lessen  the  odium  of  broken  faith.”  — Buffalo  Express.  (Rep.) 

These  quotations  are  fairly  illustrative  of  a vast  mass  of 
similar  matter  which  appeared  in  all  parts  of  the  United 
States.  The  outburst  was  confined  to  no  particular  party. 


250 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


Many  eminent  public  men,  of  both  parties,  voiced  regret, 
indignation,  and  protest  against  the  measure.  Its  sup- 
porters expressed  their  opinions  with  equal  vigor.  The 
leading  organs  of  the  administration,  though  they  asserted 
the  necessity  for  American  supervision  of  Cuban  affairs,  and 
insisted  upon  Cuba’s  official  and  constitutional  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  exercise  such 
supervision,  still  insisted  that  the  Platt  Amendment  in  no 
way  modified  or  abridged  the  independence  of  Cuba. 

The  news  of  the  passage  of  the  Platt  Amendment  was 
received  in  the  Island  with  something  of  consternation  and 
no  little  of  indignation.  In  its  issue  of  March  2,  La  Patria 
(Havana),  the  leading  organ  of  the  ultra-radicals,  stated 
the  situation  with  accuracy,  as  follows: 

“The  action  of  the  United  States  respecting  Cuba  continues  to 
be  the  theme  of  conversation  in  all  circles,  and  there  is  no  occasion 
to  hide  the  fact  that  a great  majority  have  received  it  with  dis- 
pleasure and  judge  it  harshly.” 

The  so-called  Conservative  element,  a small  minority  of 
the  population,  expressed  approval.  Some  urged  its  ac- 
ceptance, though  bitterly  opposed  to  it,  as  the  lesser  of  two 
evils.  The  alternative  of  acceptance  was  a continuance  of 
the  military  government  which  was  regarded  as  unwar- 
rantedly  autocratic  and  too  indifferent  to  Cuba’s  greatest 
welfare.  Opposition  to  the  measure  strengthened  with 
the  passing  days,  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  much  of  the 
public  manifestation  of  disapproval  was  “arranged”  by 
political  leaders. 

From  all  over  the  Island  there  came  telegrams  of  indigna- 
tion and  dissatisfaction.  Mass-meetings  and  parades 
shouted  “ Viva  Indcpcndencia!”  “ Aba jo  la  Enmicnda 
Platt!”  (“Down  with  the  Platt  Amendment!”)  The  in- 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


251 


sular  press  was  vigorous  in  its  denunciation.  Much  blame 
was  laid  upon  General  Wood,  and  there  is  much  ground 
for  belief  that  it  was  merited.  La  Discusion,  a leading 
Havana  daily,  printed  the  following  in  its  issue  of  March  9: 

“In  order  to  obtain  a vote  on  the  Platt  Amendment,  Congress 
was  made  to  believe  that  the  Cuban  Convention  would  accept  it; 
and  in  order  to  prevent  the  honest  portion  of  the  American  people 
from  demanding  that  the  Government  correct  the  error  committed, 
there  continues  to  be  affirmed  the  statement  that  the  Cubans  are 
disposed  to  agree  to  a shameful  and  perverted  mutilation  of  their 
independence  and  sovereignty.  But  this  policy  of  deceit  and  lies 
cannot  be  successful.” 

If  the  Wood-Gomez  interview  of  February  26  was  cor- 
rectly reported,  it  would  appear  that  Cuba’s  “grand  old 
man”  changed  his  mind  within  two  weeks.  In  a personal 
letter  to  a friend  in  Santo  Domingo,  under  date  of  March  9, 
General  Gomez  wrote: 

“This  demand  of  Platt,  thrown  in  the  face  of  this  heroic  people 
by  a great  and  powerful  nation,  must  cause  deep  moral  perturbation 
in  the  hearts  of  all  the  people  of  this  Island,  and  even  in  America, 
which,  during  the  trying  days  of  war,  regarded  us  with  pride,  and 
now  regard  us  with  covetous  eyes.” 

Naturally  and  necessarily,  the  Constitutional  Convention 
recognized  the  complete  change  in  the  situation.  Chrono- 
logically, the  instructions  of  the  United  States  to  the  Cuban 
Convention,  in  the  matter  of  the  mutual  relations  of  the 
two  countries,  stand  in  the  following  order: 

July  25,  1900.  Definite  instructions  to  include  a plan  of 
those  relations  in  the  Cuban  Constitution  “ as  a part  thereof.” 

Nov.  5 and  9,  1900.  Definite  instructions  to  exclude  the 
matter  of  relations,  and,  instead,  to  express  an  “ opinion  ” 
of  what  those  relations  “ought  to  be.” 


252 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


Feb.  15,  1901.  An  official  hint  of  what  the  Washington 
administration  would  like  to  have  included  in  that  opinion. 

Feb.  21,  1901.  A suggestion  of  what  the  Washington 
administration  thought  Cuba  ought  to  include  in  the  opinion. 

March  2,  1901.  The  Platt  Amendment,  which  ignored 
the  definite  instructions,  never  officially  superseded,  given 
to  the  Convention  at  the  time  of  its  assembly,  on  Nov.  5, 
1900,  and  which  took  from  the  Cubans  their  right  and  power 
of  independent  action  by  forcing  acceptance  of  the  terms 
laid  down  in  Washington,  with  no  alternative  save  that  of 
the  continuance  of  a military  government  which  had  already 
become  objectionable. 

The  situation  was  one  of  extreme  seriousness  for  the 
members  of  the  Convention.  More  than  once,  the  voluntary 
dissolution  of  the  body  w?as  imminent.  With  one  exception, 
the  members  declared  their  objection  both  to  the  terms  of 
the  Platt  Amendment  and  to  the  manner  in  which  those 
terms  were  imposed  upon  them  for  their  acceptance.  The 
isolated  exception  explained  his  position  by  declaring  his 
belief  that  Cuba  would  best  accept  such  measure  of  inde- 
pendence as  was  open  to  her  and  thus  terminate  the  period 
of  military  government.  Even  the  one  representative  of 
the  Conservative  Party  publicly  defined  his  position  in  an 
exhaustive  analysis  of  the  Amendment.  His  analysis  was 
tantamount  to  a rejection  of  the  terms  unless  subjected  to 
modification  in  some  of  the  essential  features,  and  unless 
compensation  be  given  to  the  Cubans  in  the  form  of  com- 
mercial advantages  in  the  American  market. 

During  the  month  of  March,  the  disposition  of  the  Con- 
vention to  reject  the  terms  of  the  Amendment  grew  con- 
tinually stronger.  There  appeared  a weakening  in  the 
imperative  attitude  of  Washington,  and  there  were  those 
who  assured  the  Cubans  that  the  act  was  neither  final  nor 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


253 


obligatory.  Members  of  the  Convention  declared  that  they 
were  so  informed  by  no  less  an  authority  than  the  Military 
Governor.  An  active  discussion  ensued  and  the  Convention 
Committee  on  Relations  drafted  and  submitted  a substitute 
measure.  This  definitely  rejected  the  clauses  referring  to 
the  power  of  the  United  States  to  intervene  in  Cuban  affairs, 
to  the  establishment  of  coaling  stations,  and  to  the  Isle  of 
Pines.  Individual  members,  Messrs.  Tamayo,  Nunez, 
Quilez,  Giberga,  and  Quesada,  submitted  substitute  pro- 
posals. 

A feature  of  the  period  was  the  cartoons  of  the  daily 
papers.  Many  of  these  were  distinctly  clever  in  conception, 
though  none  of  them  was  at  all  complimentary  either  to  the 
United  States  or  to  its  local  representative.  One  of  them, 
published  on  Good  Friday,  led  to  the  summary  suppression 
of  the  paper  which  issued  it  {La  Discusion)  by  an  arbitrary 
and  illegal  order  of  the  Military  Governor.  Its  title  was 
“The  Cuban  Calvary.”  Upon  the  central  cross  there  hung 
a figure,  representing  Cuba,  above  whose  head  there  was  a 
placard  inscribed  “ Pueblo  Cubano.”  (The  Cuban  people.) 
Upon  the  crosses  on  either  side,  General  Wood  appeared  as 
Dimas,  and  President  McKinley  as  Gestas.  In  the  fore- 
ground the  agonized  Mary  was  presented  as  an  agonized 
public  opinion.  Senator  Platt  (who  was  presented  as  Senator 
Thomas  Platt  of  New  York)  stood  as  Longinus,  the  Roman 
soldier,  presenting  upon  a spearhead  a sponge  marked 
“ Enmicnda  Platt.” 

From  the  standpoint  of  New  England  orthodoxy,  the 
cartoon  was  both  profane  and  blasphemous.  Rut  the 
Spanish  proverb  says  “ En  cada  tierra  su  uso  ” (In  each 
country  its  customs),  and  the  Spaniard  and  the  Cuban  do 
not  see  such  things  with  New  England’s  eyes,  and  are  not 
shocked  by  such  matters  as  many  American  people  are. 


254 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


Such  street  names  as  Christo,  Cruz  del  Padre,  San  Juan  de 
Dios,  and  Jesus  Peregrino,  are  by  no  means  uncommon. 
Jesus  del  Monte  is  a ward  of  Havana,  and  Calvario  is  a town 
in  its  suburbs. 

The  editor  of  the  paper  and  the  cartoonist  were  arrested 
by  the  personal  order  of  General  Wood,  and,  by  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  same  authority,  the  offices  of  the  paper  were 
closed  and  officially  sealed  by  the  police.  There  was  no 
appeal  to  law,  no  reference  to  that  legal  procedure  estab- 
lished by  American  authority.  A farcical  release  of  the 
alleged  culprits  followed  their  signature  of  a statement  that 
the  cartoon  was  strictly  political  and  not  personal.  On  the 
next  day,  Easter  Sunday,  the  same  paper  produced  a cartoon 
of  the  resurrection,  with  a compound  Wood-Weyler  figure 
issuing  from  the  tomb,  entitled  “That  which  we  least  ex- 
pected.” Their  point  of  view  was  that  Cuba’s  resurrection 
had  been  attended  by  an  unexpected  revival  of  Weylerism. 

Another  cartoon  depicted  the  McKinley  of  1898  and  the 
McKinley  of  1901.  The  former  was  bland  and  benevolent. 
This  was  inscribed  “ When  the  Joint  Resolution  said  that 
we  were  ‘ independent,’  it  was  the  noble  people  of  Abraham 
Lincoln  who  pronounced  the  sentence.”  The  McKinley 
of  1901  was  a scowling,  malignant  individual  who  sat  with 
his  feet  upon  his  desk,  and  presented  to  a figure  representing 
the  Cuban  people  a folio  marked  “Platt  Amendment.” 
The  inscription  attached  to  this  read,  “The  people  who  by 
their  force  now  desire  to  make  us  subjects,  are  the  people  of 
McKinley  (Emperor)  and  of  Platt.” 

Another  showed  the  Cuban  people  as  Prometheus,  chained 
to  the  rock  of  Intervention,  while  the  vulture  of  the  Platt 
Amendment  plucked  at  his  vitals.  Another  portrayed  a 
base-ball  field.  Senator  Platt  (always  shown  as  the  gentle- 
man from  New  York)  was  the  pitcher.  General  Wood 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


255 


figured  as  catcher,  and  President  McKinley  as  umpire. 
The  home  plate  was  the  Joint  Resolution.  The  ball  — as 
the  Platt  Amendment  — had  been  pitched,  and  struck 
toward  the  outfield  by  a Cuban  figure  wielding  a bat  marked 
“ Convention,”  and  the  batsman  was  shown  as  making  a 
rapid  pace  toward  first  base  — Independencia.  In  another. 
Uncle  Sam,  as  a highwayman,  with  the  pistol  of  the  Platt 
Amendment,  “holds  up”  Miss  Cuba,  and  takes  from  her 
the  Isle  of  Pines,  coaling  stations,  and  the  Cuban  Treasury, 
while  a long-tailed  rat  gnaws  the  torn  and  mutilated  Joint 
Resolution.  Others  were  clever  hits  at  special  steps  in  the 
proceedings,  but  many  of  them  were  unintelligible  and 
meaningless  except  to  those  who  possessed  a close  acquaint- 
ance with  the  history  of  the  time. 

The  most  unfortunate  immediate  result  of  the  American 
official  attitude,  and  the  acceptance  of  the  Platt  Amendment 
by  the  American  Congress,  was  a marked  increase  in  an 
already  well-defined  undercurrent  of  Cuban  bitterness  toward 
and  distrust  of  the  American  administration.  This  feeling 
was  almost  completely  limited  to  American  officialdom. 
Throughout  all  of  our  dealings  with  the  Island,  the  Cubans 
maintained  an  abiding  confidence  in  the  justness  and  the 
kindly  and  generous  intentions  of  the  American  people.  It 
was  President  McKinley  and  his  advisers,  and  General 
Wood,  upon  whom  was  laid  the  blame  for  an  act  which  the 
Cubans  regarded  as  unjust,  unworthy  of  a great  nation,  a 
violation  of  America’s  pledge,  and  a grievous  wrong  to  the 
Cuban  people. 

In  an  address  delivered  before  the  Georgia  Bar  Associa- 
tion, L.  Q.  C.  Lamar,  Esq.,  an  American  lawyer,  practising 
his  profession  in  Havana,  and  fully  conversant  with  the  im- 
mediate situation,  summarized  the  Cuban  objection  to  the 
Platt  Amendment  as  follows: 


256 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


“The  Cubans  objected  to  the  Platt  Amendment 

“Because;  in  their  opinion,  under  it  the  Cuban  people  were  not 
free  and  independent. 

“ Because ; the  Island,  being  fully  ‘pacified,’  the  United  States, 
in  violation  of  the  Joint  Resolution,  proposed  to  exercise  ‘sover- 
eignty, jurisdiction,  and  control’  over  it,  and  did  not  purpose  leav- 
ing the  ‘government  and  control  of  the  Island  to  its  people.’ 

“ Because ; it  compelled  the  Government  of  Cuba  to  consent  that 
the  United  States  might  intervene  for  the  determination  of  the 
question  of  Cuban  fidelity  to  the  terms  imposed  by  the  Treaty  of 
Paris,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that,  by  the  terms  of  the  same  treaty, 
the  obligations  of  the  United  States  were  limited  to  the  term  of  its 
occupancy. 

“ Because ; the  highest  judicial  body  in  the  United  States  had 
declared  that  the  President  wTas  lawfully  exercising  jurisdiction  in 
Cuba  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  inhabitants  of  the  Island  to 
establish  a government  of  their  own,  under  which,  ‘as  a free  and 
independent  people  they  might  control  their  own  affairs  without  . 
interference  by  other  nations.’ 

“ Because ; the  same  court  had  held  that  Cuba  was  ‘foreign  terri- 
tory,’ and  that,  as  between  the  United  States  and  Cuba,  that  Island 
was,  for  the  time,  held  in  trust  for  the  inhabitants  thereof,  ‘to 
whom  it  rightfully  belongs,  and  to  whose  exclusive  control  it  will 
be  surrendered  when  a stable  government  shall  be  established  by 
their  voluntary  action.’ 

“ Because ; by  the  terms  of  their  Constitution,  they  had  ‘as- 
sembled in  Constitutional  Convention  in  order  to  frame  and  adopt 
the  fundamental  law  of  their  organization  as  a free  and  indepen- 
dent state.’ 

“ Because ; it  was  suggested  by  American  authority  and  intro- 
duced as  a rider  to  an  army  appropriation  bill,  in  contravention  if 
not  in  flagrant  violation  of  the  rules  of  the  Senate  which  proposed 
and  passed  it. 

“Because;  it  was  passed  hastily  and  without  due  consideration, 
after  only  two  hours  of  debate,  and,  as  stated  on  the  floor  of  the 
Senate  by  one  of  its  members,  without  the  Congress  ever  having 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


257 


seen  or  read  the  Constitution  of  which  the  amendment  was  to  be- 
come a part. 

“ Because ; the  Convention  was  called  to  frame  and  adopt  a Con- 
stitution for  the  people  of  Cuba,  and  was  expressly  relieved,  by  the 
definite  instructions  of  the  American  authority,  from  making 
provisions  and  agreements  with  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  upon  future  relations  a part  of  their  Constitution. 

“ Because ; the  functions  of  the  Constitutional  Assembly  were 
limited  to  the  purposes  expressed  in  the  call  to  the  Convention, 
and  did  not  include  legislative  or  treaty-making  powers. 

“ Because ; it  compelled  them  to  change  their  Constitution  by 
omitting  the  Isle  of  Pines  from  their  constitutional  boundaries, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  said  Island  had  been,  for  nearly 
four  hundred  years,  recognized  by  Cubans,  Spaniards,  Americans, 
and  all  others  alike,  as  part  and  parcel  of  Cuba’s  territory,  politi- 
cally and  geographically.” 

These  and  other  objections,  expressed  in  similar  and  in 
different  phrases,  were  the  Cuban  answer  to  the  Platt 
Amendment. 


Chapter  XVI 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 

The  month  of  March,  1901,  was  a time  of  serious  political 
confusion  in  the  Island.  The  Cubans  came  slowly  to  a full 
realization  of  the  position  in  which  they  had  been  placed. 
Definite  terms  were  offered  them  by  the  Platt  Amendment, 
and  upon  their  acceptance  of  those  terms  depended  the 
withdrawal  of  American  authority.  Acceptance  meant  to 
them  the  sacrifice  of  that  sovereign  independence  for  which 
many  had  given  their  lives  and  for  which  many  others  had 
fought  and  suffered.  Rejection  meant  the  indefinite  post- 
ponement of  even  the  shadow  of  independence,  and  the  in- 
definite continuance  of  a government  which  was  growing 
ever  more  and  more  objectionable. 

“The  declaration  of  the  purposes  of  this  Government  in 
the  resolution  of  April  20,  1898,”  said  President  McKinley 
in  his  inaugural  address,  immediately  after  the  passage  of 
the  Platt  Amendment,  “ must  be  made  good.”  To  the  Cu- 
bans, that  “ declaration  of  purposes  ” admitted  of  only  one 
meaning  — Cuban  independence.  They  were  told  that  the 
offensive  measure  did  not  modify  their  independence.  On  the 
contrary.  President  McKinley,  Senator  Platt,  and  their  sup- 
porters, declared  that  the  measure  was  a guarantee  of  Cuban 
independence.  They  asserted  that  coaling  stations  were 
necessary  to  protect  Cuba  against  possible  foreign  invasion. 
The  Cubans  and  their  American  supporters  declared  this  to 
be  a subterfuge  unworthy  of  a great  people.  They  were 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLAIT  AMENDMENT  259 


satisfied  with  the  assurance  of  protection  which  rested  in 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Had  the  Platt  Amendment  asked 
for  coaling  stations  on  Cuba’s  coasts  “for  the  protection  of 
the  southern  ports  and  harbors  of  the  United  States,”  they 
would  have  been  granted  gladly  and  freely.  No  indepen- 
dence could  exist  where  there  was  coercion  to  obtain  coaling 
stations,  or  the  acknowledgment  of  the  right  of  intervention 
in  Cuban  affairs.  Again  and  again,  dissolution  of  the 
Convention  was  imminent. 

Washington  became  uneasy.  The  independent  press  of 
the  United  States  voiced  its  indignation.  Men  prominent 
in  public  life  declared  the  measure  an  outrage  and  a blot 
upon  the  history  of  the  country.  The  administration  was 
forced  into  the  ignoble  position  of  seeking,  through  its 
mouthpieces,  to  explain  into  the  measure  a meaning  which 
its  terms  denied.  On  April  3,  the  Secretary  of  War  sent  the 
following  despatch  to  General  Wood: 

“ Wood,  Havana: 

“You  are  authorized  to  state  officially  that  in  the  view  of  the 
President  the  intervention  described  in  the  third  clause  of  the  Platt 
Amendment  is  not  synonymous  with  intermeddling  or  interference 
with  the  affairs  of  the  Cuban  Government,  but  the  formal  action 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  based  upon  just  and  sub- 
stantial grounds,  for  the  preservation  of  Cuban  independence,  and 
the  maintenance  of  a government  adequate  for  the  protection  of 
life,  property,  and  individual  liberty,  and  adequate  for  discharging 
the  obligations  with  respect  to  Cuba  imposed  by  the  treaty  of  Paris 
on  the  United  States.  Elihu  Root, 

“ Secretary  of  War.” 

But  the  Cubans  persisted  in  considering  only  the  letter 
of  the  measure,  and  declined  to  accept  this  explanation  of 
its  intents  and  purposes.  Their  argument  was  that  an  agree- 
ment of  such  moment  should  mean  what  it  said  and  say 


2G0  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


what  it  meant.  This  message  was  shown  to  members  of 
the  Havana  press,  and  called  out  the  following  editorial 
from  La  Patria,  a vigorous  organ  of  the  ultra-radical  element 
in  the  Convention: 

“ A WORTHLESS  DOCUMENT. 

“The  Secretary  of  War,  the  Honorable  Mr.  Elihu  Root,  has 
addressed  a communication  to  General  Wood,  in  which  he  says  in 
substance,  that  having  heard  of  the  bad  impression  caused  by  the 
Platt  Amendment,  especially  the  third  clause  of  said  resolution,  in 
which  the  United  States  ask  that  their  right  to  intervene  in  Cuba 
be  recognized,  he  solicits  General  Wood  to  make  it  clear  to  the 
delegates  that  it  must  be  understood  that  the  American  Govern- 
ment will  avail  itself  of  that  right  only  in  very  grave  cases  and  for 
very  weighty  and  justifiable  reasons. 

“General  Wood  has  attached  so  much  importance  to  this  declara- 
tion, that  after  having  imparted  the  terms  of  Mr.  Root’s  letter  con- 
fidentially to  several  persons,  he  has  addressed  a cablegram  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  asking  his  permission  to  transmit  the  letter  as  an 
official  communication,  to  the  Constitutional  Convention. 

“We  very  much  fear  that  all  his  pains  will  be  in  vain.  Mr. 
Root’s  interpretation  cannot  have  more  authority  than  the  text 
of  the  bill  itself  and  this  is  unequivocal.  Mr.  Root  can  say  what  he 
pleases:  the  positive  fact  is,  that  to  concede  to  the  United  States 
the  right  to  intervene  in  Cuba,  whenever  the  American  Government 
shall  so  determine,  is  a blow  aimed  at  Cuba’s  independence  and 
sovereignty,  and  it  would  so  impair  the  influence  and  authority 
of  the  Cuban  Government  that  would  exist  subject  to  the  exercise 
of  this  right,  that  it  is  inconceivable  that  any  government  could  be 
constituted  under  these  conditions,  with  any  degree  of  decorum 
and  efficiency.  Therefore,  the  problem  does  not  change  in  the 
least,  with  the  above-mentioned  declarations  of  President  McKin- 
ley’s Secretary  of  War. 

“On  the  other  hand,  even  if  that  declaration  modifies  the  Platt 
Amendment  — which  it  does  not  — what  weight  should  we  attach 
to  that  letter  of  Mr.  Root,  after  what  we  have  seen  with  regard  to 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT  261 


Order  No.  455  ? The  latter,  which  includes  the  address  of  General 
Wood  on  the  inaugural  occasion  of  the  Constitutional  Convention, 
modified  Order  No.  301,  in  the  matter  of  the  relations  which  should 
exist  between  the  United  States  and  Cuba.  And  now,  when  it  has 
been  discovered  that  it  is  not  enough  for  the  aims  and  purposes  of 
their  political  plans  that  the  Convention  should  express  its  views, 
with  regard  to  said  relations,  it  is  said  that  Order  No.  301  is  the 
one  to  be  regarded  as  valid,  and  that  the  modification  contained 
in  No.  455  is  of  no  importance  whatever. 

“The  same  thing  will  occur  with  Mr.  Root’s  letter.  Even  if 
it  changed  the  terms  and  provisions  of  the  third  clause  of  the  Platt 
Amendment  — and  we  have  already  said  that  it  does  not  vary 
them  in  the  least  — the  day  the  letter  is  invoked  in  support  of  an 
interpretation  which  shall  be  favorable  to  Cuba’s  interest,  it  will 
be  said,  and  with  reason,  that  a letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War 
cannot  modify  or  change  a law  of  Congress. 

“And  we  must  not  forget  that  if  documents  are  to  be  invoked 
and  cited  it  is  not  possible  to  conceive  of  any  one  more  explicit 
than  the  Joint  Resolution  and  the  memorandums  of  the  Treaty  of 
Paris.  In  spite  of  all  their  emphatic  declarations,  we  see  how  little 
the  American  imperialists  heed  them. 

“They  interpret  these  documents  in  such  a manner,  that  having 
declared  before  the  world  that  they  ‘would  not  exercise  control, 
dominion,  or  sovereignty’  in  Cuba,  and  that  ‘once  the  pacification 
of  Cuba  having  been  secured,  they  would  turn  over  the  government 
to  its  people,’  now  they  demand,  before  they  carry  out  their  part 
of  the  contract,  that  the  Isle  of  Pines  shall  be  given  to  them;  that 
they  be  given  naval  stations,  and  that  the  right  of  the  United  States 
Government  to  intervene  in  our  territory,  to  uphold  or  dislodge 
governments,  shall  be  recognized;  and  this  is  the  most  important 
act  of  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  and  control  that  any  nation  or 
people  can  exercise  over  another. 

“In  view  of  all  these  reasons,  we  believe  that  Mr.  Root’s  letter 
will  not  produce  any  effect  whatever  upon  the  Convention.  After 
having  heard  it,  those  who  will  vote  in  its  favor  are  precisely  those 
who  would  have  voted  for  it  anyway,  even  before  said  letter  had 


262  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


arrived;  and  there  is  not  a single  opponent  to  this  measure,  which 
so  rudely  attacks  Cuba’s  rights,  who  can  be  induced  to  accept  it, 
because  of  the  crafty  and  worthless  explanation  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  which  in  nothing  changes  its  form  or  spirit,  and  leaves  it 
as  objectionable  as  it  was  before,  to  all  who  persist  in  defending 
the  absolute  independence  and  sovereignty  of  the  Island  of  Cuba. 

“For  the  latter,  this  letter  will  not  be  considered  anything  else 
than  a worthless  document;  and  unfortunately,  an  attempt  has  been 
made  to  reduce  other  documents  of  far  greater  importance  and 
authority,  to  the  same  worthless  state.” 

During  the  months  of  March  and  April,  various  officials, 
among  them  General  Miles  and  Senators  Proctor  and 
Cockrell,  went  to  Cuba,  ostensibly  as  private  citizens  travel- 
ling for  their  own  pleasure  or  interest,  but  recognized  by  the 
Cubans  as  emissaries  of  the  Government  in  Washington. 
Their  explanations  were  received  with  the  customary  Cuban 
courtesy,  but  they  carried  no  conviction  to  Cuban  minds. 
All  the  forces  and  machinery  of  government  were  brought 
into  play  in  support  of  the  position  taken. 

The  Convention  went  into  secret  session.  The  delegates 
conferred  by  mail,  by  telegraph,  and  in  person,  with  their 
constituents.  Except  in  the  ranks  of  the  numerically  insig- 
nificant Conservative  party,  there  was  nowhere  manifest 
any  disposition  to  accept  the  terms.  They  were  even  de- 
clined by  the  only  representative  of  that  party  in  the  Con- 
vention, Senor  Giberga,  unless,  in  compensation  for  their 
acceptance,  concessions  were  made  in  the  American  tariff 
on  Cuban  products.  One  member,  Senor  Quilez,  proposed 
acceptance  as  the  lesser  of  two  evils.  The  press  of  the  Island 
denounced  the  bill,  and  public  manifestations  continued. 
Notwithstanding  all  this  outburst  of  public  opinion,  the 
tourist-emissaries  and  the  Military  Governor  persisted  in 
reporting  to  Washington  and  to  the  American  people,  that 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT  263 


the  terms  would  be  accepted.  The  warrant  for  these  re- 
ports was  nowhere  evident.  All  save  one  or  two  of  the 
thirty-one  members  of  the  Convention  had  publicly  ex- 
pressed their  opposition  to  it;  with  few  exceptions,  the  press 
of  the  Island  denounced  it.  A part  of  an  editorial  in  La 
P atria,  on  April  9,  read  as  follows: 

“It  can  be  said  to-day  that  the  Platt  Amendment  is  already 
practically  rejected  by  the  Convention;  because,  not  even  in  the 
softened  form  in  which  it  appears  in  Dr.  Tamayo’s  proposition; 
nor  with  the  economic  reforms  and  explanations  which  Senor 
Giberga  has  added  to  it;  nor  in  the  disguise  in  which  it  appears  in 
Senor  Quesada’s  proposal;  nor  in  the  paraphrase  of  the  original 
resolution  which  Senor  Quilez  offers  us,  has  it  been  able  to  secure 
more  than  a very  limited  number  of  votes.” 

This  was  unquestionably  a fair  presentation  of  the  state 
of  public  opinion  at  the  time. 

The  discussions  in  the  Convention  began  to  assume 
definite  form  about  the  middle  of  the  month.  No  disposi- 
tion whatever  was  manifest  to  accept  the  Amendment.  The 
opposition  to  it  was  strong  and  intense.  In  doubt  of  its 
finality,  substitute  measures  were  submitted  for  consideration, 
and  suggestions  were  made  that  a commission  be  sent  to 
Washington  for  conference  with  the  administration.  On 
March  17,  I sent  the  following  cablegram  to  the  New  York 
Herald,  in  my  capacity  as  its  special  correspondent.  It 
accurately  presented  the  situation  on  that  date. 

“The  week  opens  with  a strong  disposition  on  the  part  of  a 
large  majority  of  the  members  of  the  Convention  to  vote  immediately 
for  the  rejection  of  the  Platt  Amendment.  A question  has  arisen, 
however,  regarding  the  terms  of  the  Amendment.  The  delegate's 
are  not  certain  whether  it  is  final  and  in  the  nature  of  an  ultimatum, 
or  is  open  to  modification  by  the  President.  Conflicting  statements 
have  been  made  by  the  Military  Governor  concerning  its  finality. 


2G4  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


Some  members  of  the  Convention  are  disposed  to  submit  proposals 
substantially  modifying  the  terms  of  the  Amendment  if  it  is  not 
absolute  and  final. 

“The  idea  is  growing  that  the  Amendment  is  a violation  of  the 
Joint  Resolution,  an  unwarranted  dictation  of  conditions  to  a free 
and  independent  people,  and  an  exercise  of  sovereignty,  jurisdic- 
tion, and  control’  over  them.  It  is  suggested  that  the  question 
be  submitted  for  determination  by  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court.  The  principal  question  at  the  present  time3  however,  re- 
gards the  finality  of  the  Platt  Amendment,  and  the  advisability  of 
submitting  the  same  to  President.  McKinley  because  of  a lack  of 
confidence  in  General  Wood.” 

On  March  28,  through  the  same  channels,  the  situation 
was  summarized  as  follows: 

“There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  present  situation  in  Cuba 
shows  a stronger  disposition  not  to  accept  the  Platt  Amendment 
than  has  existed  at  any  time  within  the  last  two  weeks.  It  is  quite 
evident  that  the  terms  are  not  acceptable  to  the  Cubans.  Members 
of  the  Convention  are  publicly  expressing  their  opinion  to  that 
effect.  The  impression  is  growing  that  it  will  be  better  to  continue 
the  objectionable  Military  Government  rather  than  surrender  all 
the  advantages  without  compensation  (through  tariff  concessions 
on  Cuban  products).  This  opinion  is  extending,  particularly 
among  the  industrial  and  commercial  classes.” 

April  opened  with  stormy  agitation  both  in  Cuba  and  in 
the  United  States.  The  New  York  Sun,  once  an  ardent 
advocate  of  Cuban  independence,  was,  at  this  time,  as  an 
organ  of  the  administration,  urging  Cuban  acceptance  of 
the  American  terms  under  the  menace  of  more  drastic  action 
by  the  next  Congress.  The  Cleveland  Leader  (Republican) 
called  the  Cubans  “ungrateful,  treacherous,  irresponsible, 
savage,  ignorant,  and  as  yet  unworthy.”  The  Philadelphia 
Times  (Democratic)  declared  that  this  “conspiracy  for  the 
retention  of  Cuba  is  the  most  infamous  of  all  that  have  been 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT  265 


hatched  out  of  our  new  imperialism.”  Vigorous  and  often 
unbridled  expressions  were  used  on  both  sides  of  the  contest. 
Many  annexationists  even  joined  the  opposition,  in  the  hope 
that  their  ends  would  be  served  and  annexation  be  precipi- 
tated by  rejection  of  the  terms. 

On  April  6,  the  Giberga  compromise  measure,  proposing 
tariff  concessions  in  compensation  for  acceptance,  was  re- 
jected by  the  Convention.  On  the  same  day,  the  Quilez 
motion  to  accept  the  Amendment  was  rejected  by  a vote  of 
twenty-four  to  two,  Quilez  and  Giberga  voting  in  the  affirma- 
tive. At  the  session  of  April  1,  it  was  voted  not  to  send  a 
commission  to  Washington.  The  decision  was  based  upon 
an  unofficial  telegram  from  that  city  that  such  a commission 
would  not  be  received,  as  the  authorities  had  no  power  to 
modify  the  conditions  of  the  Platt  Amendment.  But  the 
proposition  continued  under  consideration,  and  met  with 
increasing  approval.  The  immediately  disturbing  problem 
was  whether  or  not  the  Amendment  should  be  definitely  re- 
jected before  sending  such  a commission.  At  the  session 
on  April  9,  the  Convention  voted  to  reconsider  the  decision 
of  April  1.  The  result  was  a vote  of  twenty  to  nine  in  favor 
of  a commission.  A proposal  that  such  a commission  should 
first  confer  with  the  Military  Governor  was  disapproved 
through  fear  of  further  misunderstanding  with  that  official. 
The  next  day  matters  went  into  the  air  again  on  the  strength 
of  new  despatches  from  Washington,  asserting  that  it 
could  be  stated  on  “unquestionable  authority”  that  Presi- 
dent McKinley  had  decided  not  to  negotiate  with  a com- 
mission from  the  Convention  on  any  basis  outside  of  the 
terms  of  the  Platt  Amendment,  and  that  he  would  not  con- 
sider any  modification  of  that  law. 

On  April  12,  a motion  was  presented  to  send  a commission 
to  Washington,  after  a categorical  rejection  of  the  Platt 


266  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


Amendment.  The  proposition  was  somewhat  confused 
and  some  who  opposed  the  Amendment  voted  against  the 
motion.  It  was  carried  by  a vote  of  eighteen  to  ten.  This 
was  construed  by  some  as  the  equivalent  of  a vote  of  rejec- 
tion of  the  Amendment,  though  it  was  not  so  intended.  Its 
object  was  a determination  of  the  conditions  under  which 
a commission  should  be  sent.  It  was,  however,  indicative, 
though  not  accurately  so,  of  the  sentiment  of  the  Convention. 
It  is  doubtful  if  more  than  three  or  four  members  would  have 
voted  for  an  outright  acceptance,  but  some  of  those  who 
favored  rejection  hesitated  about  committing  the  Conven- 
tion to  such  an  extreme  measure  as  a definite  rejection  at 
that  time.  The  vote  was  rather  one  of  non-acceptance  than 
of  rejection,  and  was  tantamount  to  a vote  to  table  the 
measure.  On  April  13,  the  following  resolution  was  adopted : 

“Whereas,  the  opinion  of  the  Convention  respecting  the  Platt 
Amendment  having  been  already  declared,  further  action  shall 
be  suspended  while  a committee  of  five  members  shall  be  sent  to 
Washington  to  indicate  to  the  Government  there  the  desires  of  the 
Cuban  people,  and  to  endeavor  to  find  a basis  for  the  establishment 
of  political  and  commercial  relations  satisfactory  to  both  countries, 
the  committee  to  make  a report  to  the  Convention  for  its  final 
action.” 

It  will  be  noted  that  although  the  compromise  measures 
submitted  by  Messrs.  Quesada  and  Giberga,  both  of  which 
proposed  the  inclusion  of  provisions  for  commercial  relations, 
were  rejected  by  overwhelming  majorities,  the  same  idea 
reappeared  in  the  foregoing  resolution.  Overtures  for  the 
inclusion  of  a commercial  treaty  as  a part  of  or  as  an  adjunct 
to  the  Platt  Amendment,  were  to  form  a definite  part  of  the 
mission  of  the  representatives.  At  the  meeting  on  the  15th, 
the  following  gentlemen  were  appointed  as  members  of  the 
commission;  Senors  Mendez  Capote,  Diego  Tamayo, 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT'  AMENDMENT  267 


Leopoldo  Berriel,  Pedro  Gonzales  Llorente,  and  Rafael 
Portuondo.  Dr.  Berriel  being  unable  to  go,  his  place  was 
filled  by  the  appointment  of  Gen.  Pedro  Betancourt.  On 
the  day  following  the  choice  of  the  Convention,  La  Discusion 
stated,  editorially: 

“The  Assembly  declines  to  maintain  further  political  relations 
with  the  American  Government  through  the  Governor  whose  failure 
is  now  recognized,  and  who  assured  the  President  that  the  Assembly 
would  accept  the  Platt  Amendment,  which  caused  such  firm  opposi- 
tion among  the  Cuban  people,  and  such  indignant  protest  from 
many  elements,  and  which  was  only  accepted  by  some  who  favor 
it  unwillingly  through  the  recognition  of  the  fatality  of  superior 
force.” 

General  Wood  was  summoned  to  Washington  at  a time 
coincident  with  the  trip  of  the  Commission.  This  was  far 
from  gratifying  to  the  members  of  the  Commission  and  their 
friends,  inasmuch  as  it  was  held  that  the  presence  of  the 
Military  Governor  would  tend  to  restrain  free  expression  of 
opinion  on  the  part  of  the  delegates.  Both  parties  sailed  on 
April  20,  though  by  different  routes,  and  the  scene  of  special 
interest  was  transferred,  for  the  time,  to  Washington.  The 
delegates  were  received  with  every  possible  courtesy  by  the 
authorities.  A number  of  senators  and  representatives  had 
been  called  to  the  city  to  meet  them,  not,  it  was  thought,  as  a 
matter  of  courteous  attention,  but  for  the  purpose  of  con- 
vincing them  of  the  hopelessness  of  their  mission. 

The  Commission  arrived  in  Washington  on  the  24th  of 
April.  At  noon  on  the  25th,  accompanied  by  Secretary 
Root  and  Assistant  Secretary  Sanger,  a call  was  made  at  the 
White  House  for  a brief  exchange  of  courtesies  with  the 
President,  who  referred  them  to  Secretary  Root  for  all  dis- 
cussion of  the  business  of  their  errand.  On  the  afternoon 
of  the  same  day  a long  discussion  was  sustained  with  Mr. 


2G8  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


Root,  at  the  War  Department.  The  conference  was  secret 
and  the  details  have  never  been  made  public,  although  they 
have  been  a topic  of  much  dispute  and  frequent  agitation. 
It  is  known  that  the  Secretary  urged  and  reiterated  the 
arguments  which  had  already  been  advanced  by  the  sup- 
porters of  the  measure.  It  is  known  that  the  Commission 
urged,  as  an  equivalent  for  acceptance,  the  much-needed 
concessions  in  the  American  tariff  on  Cuban  products.  The 
delegates  remained  in  Washington  for  four  days,  during 
which  dinners,  lunches,  and  receptions  were  given  them. 
Further  discussions  were  held  with  the  Secretary  of  War  in 
his  capacity  as  the  representative  of  the  President.  Directly, 
Mr.  McKinley  had  little  to  say  upon  the  subject  of  their 
errand.  Even  the  Washington  correspondents  were  unable 
to  extract  from  the  delegates  any  information  concerning 
the  results  of  their  mission.  Their  lips  were  sealed  until  a 
report  was  made  to  their  associates  in  Havana.  Various 
assertions  were  published  from  such  fragments  as  could  be 
gathered.  The  New  York  Herald,  probably  came  as  near 
the  mark  as  any  when  it  declared  that  the  Cubans  would 
return  to  Cuba  carrying  the  assurance  of  President  McKinley 
that,  following  their  acceptance  of  the  Platt  Amendment  and 
the  establishment  of  a government,  a treaty  of  reciprocity 
would  be  effected  with  the  Island.  It  is  certain  that  no 
encouragement  whatever  was  given  them  that  the  terms  of 
the  Platt  Amendment  would  or  could  be  modified  in  any 
way.  They  were  told  that  changes  in  the  tariff  could  only 
be  made  by  Congress,  and  that  reciprocity  treaties  required 
the  ratification  of  the  Senate,  not  then  in  session,  and  that 
such  a treaty  could  not  be  negotiated  with  Cuba  until  after 
the  establishment  of  a Cuban  Government.  They  were  also 
told,  in  very  positive  terms,  that  the  establishment  of  such 
a government  must  be  preceded  by  Cuba’s  acceptance  of 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT  269 


the  Platt  Amendment.  They  took  away  with  them  an 
analysis  of  the  measure,  as  interpreted  by  Secretary  Root, 
but  were  given  to  understand  that  the  ultimatum  of  the  Platt 
Amendment  was  a decision  in  which  there  would  be  no 
change  and  from  which  there  would  be  no  withdrawal. 
After  a few  days  of  entertainment  in  New  York,  they  re- 
turned to  Cuba  to  submit  a report  of  their  wrork. 

Between  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Platt  Amendment 
by  the  American  Congress,  and  the  return  of  the  Commission 
from  Washington,  a considerable  change  had  taken  place 
in  the  Cuban  view  of  that  instrument.  Its  first  effect  was  a 
wide-spread  resentment  and  an  outburst  of  indignant  dis- 
approval. But  the  pace  of  manifestation  of  this  resentment 
and  disapproval  was  too  extreme  for  long  continuance. 
The  Cuban,  after  his  first  volatile  outbreak  has  passed,  is  a 
notable  philosopher.  Long  years  of  enforced  submission  to 
the  inevitable  have  left  their  stamp  upon  him.  Once  as- 
sured that  he  has  neither  choice  nor  alternative,  he  accepts 
the  situation  with  such  grace  as  is  possible.  The  first 
vociferous  protest  against  the  terms  of  the  Platt  Amend- 
ment gradually  died  away  and  was  followed  by  an  increasing 
tendency  to  accept  the  conditions  imposed  upon  them. 
The  motives  for  this  change  were  many  and  various.  But  it 
cannot  be  said  that  the  disposition  to  accept  rested  in  any 
idea  that  the  conditions  were,  in  themselves,  acceptable. 
The  unyielding  front  of  the  administration  and  its  supporters 
convinced  many  of  the  hopelessness  of  continued  opposition. 
The  desire  for  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  American 
authority  and  for  Cuban  assumption  of  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment was  a factor  which  operated  in  a change  of  view  with 
others.  This  attitude  was  illustrated  in  the  case  of  Enrique 
Villuendas,  who  had  been  one  of  the  most  uncompromising 
opponents  of  the  Amendment  in  the  Convention.  Early  in 


270  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


May,  in  an  address  to  his  constitutents,  he  said:  “There  is 
no  use  in  objecting  to  the  inevitable.  It  is  either  annexation 
or  a Republic  with  the  Amendment.  I prefer  the  latter.” 
The  hope  of  modified  terms  had  been  shattered  by  the 
cabled  reports  of  the  Washington  conferences,  and  the 
delegates  returned  to  find  the  Cuban  people  in  a more  sub- 
missive mood.  But  the  general  attitude  was  still  far  from 
one  of  approval. 

The  month  of  May  was  spent  in  secret  discussion  in  the 
Convention,  and  in  conference  with  constituencies  through- 
out the  country.  Pressure  was  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
Convention  through  the  channels  of  the  local  administration. 
The  exact  nature  and  form  of  this  pressure  will  only  be 
known  to  historians  of  some  later  day,  when  those  who  were 
involved  in  it  or  cognizant  of  it  shall  have  related  the  story 
of  the  time.  At  present  there  is  no  way  of  verifying  the 
charges  and  allegations  that  were  made  of  assurances  of 
political  favor  and  preferment,  of  deals  made  by  party 
leaders,  and  of  other  methods  common  in  the  ramifications 
of  the  politics  of  all  countries.  Some  of  the  conventionales 
yielded,  though  with  reluctance  in  the  majority  of  cases, 
while  others  remained  stubborn  and  persistent  in  their 
attitude  of  objection  and  protest. 

To  some  of  the  articles  of  the  Amendment  there  had  never 
been  any  objection.  The  notably  objectionable  features 
were  expressed  in  the  clauses  relating  to  intervention,  coal- 
ing stations,  and  the  Isle  of  Pines.  The  first  article  was 
substantially  identical  with  the  propositions  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Relations,  submitted  on  February  26.  The  second 
article  was  regarded  as  superfluous  because  its  provisions  were 
entirely  in  harmony  with  Articles  LIX,  XCIII,  and  CV  of  the 
Cuban  Constitution.  Article  III  was  offensive  as  being  a con- 
tradiction of  Article  I,  and  contrary  to  the  opening  declara- 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT  271 


tion  of  the  Cuban  Constitution  that  “the  people  of  Cuba 
are  hereby  constituted  a sovereign  and  independent  State.” 
Article  IV  was  acceptable  to  some  but  was  opposed  by  others, 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  a modification  of  the  provisions 
of  Article  XVI  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris.  Article  V encountered 
no  active  opposition.  Article  VI  was  objected  to  because  it 
alienated  a portion  of  Cuba’s  territory  and  violated  the 
second  clause  of  Article  I of  the  Cuban  Constitution.  Article 
VII  was  notably  objectionable  as  constituting,  by  its  terms,  an 
American  protectorate  over  the  Island.  As  for  Article  VIII, 
Cuba  was  quite  ready  to  effect  any  treaty  which  might  be 
desired  by  the  United  States  so  long  as  such  a treaty  did  not 
affect  the  integrity  of  Cuban  territory  or  restrict  Cuba’s 
political  sovereignty. 

The  discussions  of  the  month  of  May  were  an  effort  to 
read  the  objectionable  clauses,  especially  Articles  III,  VI,  and 
VII,  in  the  light  of  their  interpretation  in  Washington.  The 
Commission  stated  to  their  associates  that  they  had  been 
informed  by  Secretary  Root  that  the  United  States  would  not 
interfere  in  Cuban  affairs  except  in  the  case  of  an  attack  by 
some  foreign  power,  or  in  the  event  of  the  existence  of  a 
state  of  anarchy;  that  the  United  States  desired  three  coaling 
stations  for  the  maintenance  of  Cuban  independence  as 
against  foreign  powers,  and  for  the  protection  of  the  southern 
ports  of  the  United  States;  and  that  there  was  nothing  in 
the  Amendment  which  restricted  the  establishment  of  diplo- 
matic relations  with  other  countries.  They  also  announced 
that  the  President  had  assured  them  of  the  due  consideration 
of  their  desires  for  advantageous  commercial  relations  with 
the  United  States. 

No  unquestionable  report  has  ever  been  published  con- 
cerning the  assurances  of  either  Mr.  McKinley,  or  of  Mr. 
Root  as  the  representative  of  Mr.  McKinley,  upon  this 


272  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


matter  of  commercial  advantages.  There  is  no  question 
that  the  Commissioners,  whether  justified  or  not,  were  im- 
pressed with  the  belief  that  they  were  practically  assured, 
in  Washington,  that  concessions  would  be  granted  them  in 
the  American  tariff  on  Cuban  products.  The  disputed 
point  has  not  yet  been  more  adequately  covered,  publicly, 
than  it  was  in  an  article,  written  by  Senator  O.  H.  Platt,  in 
the  North  American  Review  for  August,  1902.  He  says: 

“ When  the  United  States  required  of  Cuba  that  her  Constitution 
should  contain  guarantees  which  should  forever  place  her  in  a 
position  of  intimate  relations  with  us,  it  was  universally  understood 
that  we,  on  our  part,  would  aid  her  by  providing  such  reciprocal 
commercial  advantages  as  would  enable  her  to  be  self-reliant  and 
self-supporting.” 

In  this  statement,  the  Senator  would  appear  to  be  both 
inaccurate  and  illogical.  Excepting  in  the  original  call  for 
the  Convention  (Civil  Order  No.  301),  superseded  by  later 
instructions  (Civil  Order  No.  455),  the  United  States  had 
nowhere,  not  even  in  the  Platt  Amendment  itself,  “ required 
of  Cuba  that  her  Constitution  should  contain  guarantees, 
etc.,  etc.”  Nor  was  it  “universally  understood  that  we 
should  aid  her  by  providing  reciprocal  commercial  advan- 
tages.” It  was  “universally  understood”  that  commercial 
relations  were  to  remain  in  abeyance,  and  to  depend  upon 
the  possible  establishment  of  treaty  relations  with  the  new 
government.  For  many  months,  it  was  “universally” 
denied  by  the  administration  and  its  supporters  that  any 
such  inducement  had  been  given,  either  directly  or  indirectly, 
to  the  Cuban  Commission.  The  fact  that  such  relations 
were  denied  to  Cuba  by  the  next  session  of  the  American 
Congress  would  seem  to  be  an  effective  answer  to  the  propo- 
sition of  a “universal  understanding”  of  America’s  purpose 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT  273 


to  effect  an  exchange  of  commercial  advantages  for  an 
acceptance  of  such  conditions  as  those  imposed  by  the  Platt 
Amendment.  The  Senator  further  comments  upon  the 
incident,  as  follows: 

“ While  we  did  not  ask  of  Cuba  in  form  that  she  should  not  enter 
into  commercial  arrangements  with  other  countries  to  our  dis- 
advantage, the  natural  currents  of  trade  made  it  a practical  im- 
possibility for  her  to  do  so,  and  a Commission  sent  to  us  from  her 
Constitutional  Convention  returned  with  the  just  expectation  that 
a compliance  with  our  desires  as  to  her  constitutional  guarantees 
would  be  followed  by  the  establishment  of  mutual  trade  relations 
which  would  prove  to  be  of  great  economic  advantage  to  her.  The 
Constitutional  Convention  asked,  as  a return  for  their  acceptance 
of  the  provisions  which  we  had  requested,  that  there  should  be 
some  promise  given  by  the  United  States  of  the  establishment  of 
advantageous  relations  with  us.  In  the  nature  of  things,  such  a 
promise  was  impossible,  but  the  Convention  was  asked  to  act  in 
the  premises  and  to  trust  the  United  States.” 

If  the  words  “ demands  ” and  “ demanded  ” be  substituted 
for  the  words  “desires”  and  “requested,”  it  is  probable  that 
the  case  is  accurately  stated  in  Senator  Platt’s  article.  They 
were  asked  to  “ act  in  the  premises  and  to  trust  the  United 
States.”  It  is  evident  that  their  confidence  in  the  good  will 
and  the  power  of  the  American  administration  led,  or  misled, 
them  into  a belief  that  an  assurance  which  was  tantamount 
to  a promise  had  been  made  to  the  Commission.  It  is  un- 
fortunate that  this  draft  on  the  good  faith  of  the  United 
States  was  not  promptly  honored. 

The  discussion  of  the  matter  in  the  Cuban  Convention 
lasted  until  the  end  of  May.  On  the  28th  of  that  month  the 
Amendment  was  accepted  by  a vote  of  fifteen  to  fourteen, 
the  deciding  vote  being  cast  by  Mendez  Capote,. the  President 
of  the  Convention,  who,  in  a public  speech  a few  weeks  be- 


274  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


fore,  had  declared  that  acceptance  of  the  Amendment  would 
“make  it  impossible  to  establish  in  Cuba  a government 
stable,  strong,  and  orderly.”  He  also  declared  that  if  the 
third  article  were  to  be  accepted,  there  would  be  “ born  a 
government  resting  upon  a supposition  of  incapacity.” 
But  the  acceptance  voted  was  in  a modified  form,  and  sub- 
ject to  certain  “explanations.”  The  meeting  was  decidedly 
stormy,  and  one  member,  Senor  Tamayo,  declared  that 
those  who  voted  in  favor  of  the  acceptance  were  enemies 
to  their  country.  The  Convention  compelled  retraction  of 
the  statement.  Juan  Gualberto  Gomez,  one  of  the  most 
forceful  members  of  the  body,  denounced  as  perjurers  all 
who  voted  acceptance,  inasmuch  as  they  had  sworn  to  pre- 
pare a constitution  for  an  independent  republic. 

The  majority  report,  upon  which  the  vote  was  taken,  after 
quoting  Article  I of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  the  Joint  Resolution, 
and  the  terms  of  the  Platt  Amendment,  proceeded  with  the 
following  “ explanations  ” : 

“Inasmuch  as  Secretary  Root,  being  authorized  by  President 
McKinley,  says  that  the  Platt  law  has  for  its  object  the  guaranteeing 
of  the  independence  of  Cuba,  and  does  not  mean  interference  with 
its  government,  or  the  exercise  of  a protectorate  or  of  sovereignty, 
and  also  that  intervention  will  only  take  place  when  independence 
is  endangered  by  outside  powers  or  grave  interior  disturbances 
creating  anarchy,  and  inasmuch  as  Secretary  Root  has  said  that  the 
naval  stations  will  not  be  used  for  vantage  points  of  intervention,  but 
only  to  protect  Cuba  against  foreign  powers,  we  report  as  follows: 

“That,  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  the  Platt  law  in  its  preamble 
says  it  is  a fulfilment  of  the  Joint  Resolution,  and  has  been  adopted 
by  Congress  with  the  principal  object  of  establishing  independence, 
we  do  propose  to  the  Convention  to  accept  the  following  as  an  appen- 
dix to  the  Constitution.” 

The  first,  second,  fourth,  and  fifth  clauses  of  the  Platt 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT  275 


Amendment  are  quoted  in  their  entirety.  The  third  clause 
has  the  following  addition: 

“It  being  understood  that  the  United  States  have  the  right  to 
intervene  to  prevent  the  action  of  a foreign  power  or  disturbances 
causing  a state  of  anarchy,  and  that  the  intervention  shall  always 
be  the  act  of  the  United  States,  and  not  of  isolated  agents.  The 
intervention  shall  suppose  neither  sovereignty  nor  a protectorate, 
and  shall  last  only  sufficiently  long  to  establish  normal  conditions. 
Said  intervention,  it  is  also  understood,  shall  not  have  the  right  to 
interfere  in  the  Government,  but  only  the  right  to  preserve  inde- 
pendence.” 

An  addition  to  the  sixth  clause  says  that  the  ownership 
of  the  Isle  of  Pines  shall  be  settled  by  a future  treaty. 

An  addition  to  the  seventh  clause  says: 

“It  shall  be  understood  that  the  naval1  stations  do  not  give  the 
United  States  the  right  to  intervene  in  the  interior  government, 
but  are  established  with  the  sole  purpose  of  protecting  American 
waters  from  foreign  invasion  directed  against  Cuba  or  the  United 
States.  Cuba  will  sell  or  lease  the  necessary  land  at  points  to  be 
agreed  upon  later.” 

An  addition  to  the  eighth  clause  says  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Cuba  suggests  at  the  same  time  a treaty  of  commerce 
based  upon  reciprocity. 

The  accepted  report  was  also  made  to  include  a letter 
addressed  to  Secretary  Root  by  Senator  Platt,  a copy  of 
which  had  been  given  to  Mendez  Capote  while  the  Com- 
mission was  in  Washington.  The  letter  was  as  follows: 

“I  am  in  receipt  of  your  letter  of  this  date  (April  20),  in  which 
you  say  that  the  members  of  the  Commission  of  the  Cuban  Consti- 
tutional Convention  fear  that  the  provisions  relative  to  intervention, 
made  in  the  third  clause  of  the  Amendment  which  has  come  to  bear 
my  name,  may  have  the  effect  of  preventing  the  independence  of 
Cuba,  and  in  reality  establish  a protectorate  or  suzerainty  by  the 


276  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT 


United  States;  and  you  request  that  I express  my  views  on  the 
questions  raised.  In  reply  I beg  to  state  that  the  Amendment  was 
carefully  prepared  with  the  object  of  avoiding  any  possible  idea  that 
by  the  acceptance  thereof  the  Constitutional  Convention  will  thereby 
establish  a protectorate  or  suzerainty,  or  in  any  manner  whatsoever 
compromise  the  independence  or  sovereignty  of  Cuba;  and  speak- 
ing for  myself  it  seems  impossible  that  such  an  interpretation  can 
be  given  to  the  clause.  I believe  that  the  Amendment  should  be 
considered  as  a whole;  and  it  ought  to  be  clear  on  reading  it  that 
its  well-defined  purpose  is  to  secure  and  safeguard  Cuban  inde- 
pendence and  set  forth  at  once  a clear  idea  of  the  friendly  disposi- 
tion of  the  United  States  toward  the  Cuban  people,  and  the  express 
intention  on  their  part  to  aid  them  if  necessary  in  the  maintenance 
of  said  independence.  These  are  my  ideas:  and  although,  as  you 
say,  I cannot  speak  for  the  entire  Congress,  mv  belief  is  that  such  a 
purpose  was  well  understood  by  that  body.” 

This  act  of  the  Convention  encountered  the  disapproval 
of  the  authorities  in  Washington.  After  several  conferences 
between  the  President,  Secretary7  Root,  and  Senator  O.  II. 
Platt  and  Senator  Spooner,  it  was  decided  at  a Cabinet 
meeting  to  notify  the  Convention  that  its  action  could  not 
be  regarded  as  a satisfactory  compliance  with  the  American 
requirements.  Instructions  were  therefore  telegraphed  to 
General  Wood  to  inform  the  Convention  that  it  could  not 
proceed  with  the  work  of  establishing  a government,  and 
that  the  troops  would  not  be  withdrawn  until  the  Platt 
Amendment  had  been  accepted  without  qualifications.  It 
was  after  this  fashion  that  the  United  States  made  known 
to  the  Cubans  that  to  which  Senator  Platt  refers  as  “ de- 
sires ” and  “ requests.” 

Necessarily,  the  matter  was  reopened  by  the  Convention, 
and  two  weeks  more  were  spent  in  argument  and  discussion. 
On  June  12,  a motion  for  unqualified  acceptance  was  voted  on, 
and  sixteen  votes  were  cast  in  the  affirmative  against  eleven 


ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT  277 


in  the  negative.  One  vote  had  been  gained  for  the  affirma- 
tive — Senor  Ferrer,  who  gave  as  his  reason  that  acceptance 
seemed  “the  best  solution  of  the  problem.”  Four  members 
absented  themselves,  or  were  unavoidably  absent.  The 
long-disputed  measure,  unacceptable  to  the  Cubans,  had 
been  imposed  upon  the  Convention,  and,  so  far  as  their  ac- 
ceptance was  concerned,  it  became  morally  binding  upon 
the  new  government  to  endorse  the  action. 


Chapter  XVII 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS 

In  the  spring  of  1901,  a Commission,  consisting  of  repre- 
sentative Cuban  planters  and  merchants,  was  sent  to  Wash- 
ington to  present  the  needs  of  the  industries  of  the  Island, 
and  to  request  consideration  of  their  relief  through  a read- 
justment of  the  commercial  relations  between  Cuba  and  the 
United  States.  Unfortunately  for  the  enterprise,  the  visit 
of  the  Commissioners  was  coincident  with  the  activities  of 
the  discussion  of  political  relations,  and  their  errand  was 
overshadowed  by  a question  which  the  United  States  regarded 
as  the  more  important  issue. 

At  about  this  same  period,  also,  the  Military  Governor 
publicly  admitted  the  disastrous  condition  of  the  Island’s 
industries.  On  his  arrival  in  Washington,  April  25,  it  was 
announced  by  the  press  that  he  had  declared  to  the  President, 
in  very  positive  terms,  that  “the  conditions  in  the  Island 
demanded  that  something  be  done  toward  modifying  the 
duty  imposed  by  the  United  States  on  Cuban  imports,  and 
he  made  a formal  recommendation  that  the  duty  on  sugar 
and  tobacco  be  reduced.  His  recommendation  was  made 
so  strongly  that  it  is  said  the  President  will  urge  upon  Con- 
gress that  some  legislation  be  enacted  looking  to  such  re- 
duction.” 

The  same  point  of  industrial  stress  and  impending  disaster 
was  also  made  a leading  feature  of  the  errand  of  the  Com- 
mission from  the  Constitutional  Convention,  and,  whether 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS  279 


justified  or  not  in  so  doing,  the  delegates  returned  to  Cuba 
with  a belief  that  an  arrangement  had  been  effected  which 
would  insure  immediate  attention  to  the  industrial  and  com- 
mercial needs  of  the  Island. 

The  agitation  which  followed  led  to  the  inauguration  of  a 
definite  campaign  whose  object  was  to  secure  a more  favor- 
able entry  of  Cuban  products,  particularly  sugar,  into  the 
markets  of  the  United  States.  The  sugar  planters  as  in- 
dividuals, and  the  Cuban  Planters  Association  ( Circulo  de 
Hacendados)  had  been  at  work  for  many  months  in  such 
directions  as  it  was  possible  for  them  to  exert  influence. 
The  tobacco  interest  had  been  urging  its  claims  through 
other  channels.  During  the  month  of  August,  the  Associa- 
tion of  Tobacco  Buyers  and  the  Cigar  Makers  Union  held 
meetings  and  prepared  memorials  from  their  point  of  view. 

The  Military  Governor  also  became  actively  concerned, 
and,  with  funds  appropriated  from  the  insular  treasury, 
employed  agents  in  the  United  States  and  in  Cuba  to  carry 
on  an  energetic  propaganda.  October  opened  with  a 
general  exhibition  of  popular  interest  throughout  the  Island. 
The  third  day  of  October  was  made  a general  holiday,  and 
people  of  all  classes,  bankers,  merchants,  planters,  employers 
and  employes,  united  in  public  demonstrations.  A pro- 
cession numbering  15,000  men  paraded  the  streets  of  Havana, 
and  marched  to  the  Palace,  where  a committee  presented  a 
petition  to  the  Military  Governor,  requesting  the  reduction 
of  the  United  States  tariff  on  sugar  and  tobacco.  In  San- 
tiago, the  Chamber  of  Commerce  called  a public  meeting 
at  which  it  was  reported  eight  thousand  were  present,  to  en- 
dorse a similar  memorial.  Similar  meetings  were  held  in 
other  cities.  Telegrams  were  sent  to  Washington  from  cities 
and  towns  in  all  parts  of  the  Island,  urging  the  necessity 
for  prompt  attention  to  Cuba’s  economic  condition. 


280 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS 


During  the  months  of  October  and  November,  the  move- 
ment gathered  strength  and  became  more  coherent.  On 
November  24,  there  gathered  in  Washington  a group  of 
Cuban  merchants,  manufacturers,  and  planters.  On  the 
26th,  they  called  upon  the  President  to  pay  their  respects  and 
to  announce  officially  their  mission.  Several  days  were 
spent  in  conference  with  members  of  the  Cabinet  and  promi- 
nent members  of  Congress.  They  were  accorded  a courteous 
reception,  but  were  given  little  or  no  encouragement  to  be- 
lieve that  their  requests  would  receive  any  immediate 
attention. 

Close  upon  the  heels  of  this  committee,  General  Wood 
appeared,  ostensibly  to  discuss  with  the  Secretary  of  War  the 
steps  to  be  taken  in  the  pending  transfer  of  the  Cuban 
Government.  Whether  or  not  that  was  the  actual  object  of 
his  visit,  it  is  certain  that  every  possible  use  was  made  of 
his  presence  to  advance  the  interests  of  the  Cuban  cause, 
into  which  the  President  had  plunged  with  characteristic 
vigor. 

The  annual  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  appeared 
during  the  last  week  in  November.  In  that  report,  Mr.  Root 
urged  the  wisdom  and  the  necessity  of  granting  tariff  con- 
cessions to  the  products  of  the  Island.  He  rested  his  argu- 
ment in  a special  manner  upon  the  ground  of  moral  obliga- 
tion and  public  policy.  He  said: 

“Aside  from  the  moral  obligation  to  which  we  committed  our- 
selves when  we  drove  Spain  out  of  Cuba,  and  aside  from  the  ordinary 
considerations  of  commercial  advantage  involved  in  a reciprocity 
treaty,  there  are  the  weightiest  reasons  of  American  public  policy 
pointing  in  the  same  direction;  for  the  peace  of  Cuba  is  necessary 
to  the  peace  of  the  United  States;  the  health  of  Cuba  is  necessary  to 
the  health  of  the  United  States;  the  independence  of  Cuba  is  neces- 
sary to  the  safety  of  the  United  States.  The  same  considerations 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS  281 


which  led  to  the  war  with  Spain  now  require  that  a commercial 
arrangement  be  made  under  which  Cuba  can  live.  The  condition 
of  the  sugar  and  tobacco  industries  in  Cuba  is  already  such  that 
the  earliest  possible  action  by  Congress  upon  this  subject  is  de- 
sirable.” 

In  his  annual  message  to  Congress  at  its  opening  session, 
a few  days  later,  President  Roosevelt  placed  himself  squarely 
on  the  side  of  the  Cuban  claimants.  His  views  followed 
the  same  line  as  that  taken  by  Secretary  Root,  and  a similar 
argument  was  used  regarding  moral  obligations  and  public 
policy.  The  President  said: 

“Elsewhere  I have  discussed  the  question  of  reciprocity.  In  the 
case  of  Cuba,  however,  there  are  weighty  reasons  of  morality  and 
of  national  interest  why  the  policy  should  be  held  to  have  a peculiar 
application,  and  I most  earnestly  ask  your  attention  to  the  wisdom, 
indeed  to  the  vital  need,  of  providing  for  a substantial  reduction 
in  the  tariff  duties  on  Cuban  imports  into  the  United  States.  Cuba 
has  in  her  Constitution  affirmed  what  we  desired,  that  she  should 
stand,  in  international  matters,  in  closer  and  more  friendly  relations 
with  us  than  with  any  other  power;  and  we  are  bound  by  every 
consideration  of  honor  and  expediency  to  pass  commercial  measures 
in  the  interest  of  her  material  well-being.” 

The  pro-Cuban  forces  were  thus  drawn  up  for  the  coming 
struggle,  and  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War  de- 
clared themselves  allies  of  Cuba.  Their  action  involved 
the  endorsement  and  the  support  of  the  administration’s 
following  among  the  press. 

The  opposing  force  which  appeared  in  greatest  prominence 
was  the  lobby  organized  by  the  beet  sugar  producers  of  the 
United  States.  Forewarned  by  the  agitation  of  the  pre- 
ceding months,  and  apprehensive  of  legislative  action  which 
would  affect  their  industry,  the  American  beet  sugar  in- 
terests of  the  country  organized,  and  established  in  Wash- 


282  STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS 


ington  one  of  the  most  aggressive  and  persistent  lobbies 
which  had  been  seen  in  many  years.  This  organization 
drew  to  itself  as  allies  the  cane  sugar  producers  of  Louisiana 
and  the  tobacco  growers  of  various  States.  It  was  also 
generally  understood  that  it  received  strong  support  from 
the  Hawaiian  sugar  industry,  and,  at  the  least,  a fair  measure 
of  encouragement  from  various  interests  in  other  lines  which 
feared  that  a reduction  of  tariff  rates  on  Cuban  products 
might  be  used  as  a precedent  for  a general  attack  on  the  tariff. 

There  was  an  early  development  of  the  fact  that  the 
Fifty-seventh  Congress,  standing  as  its  majority  did  for  the 
policy  of  protection  to  American  industries,  was  opposed  to 
action  in  the  case  of  Cuba.  It  feared  that  tariff  concessions 
or  a reciprocity  treaty  of  any  kind,  with  Cuba  or  any  other 
country,  would  be  a letting  down  of  the  bars  through  which 
unnumbered  industrial  evils  would  enter.  At  its  opening. 
Congress  was  arrayed  upon  the  side  of  Cuba’s  opponents, 
and  in  opposition  to  the  expressed  views  of  the  Chief  Execu- 
tive. The  attitude  of  this  opposition  is  fairly  presented  in 
the  following  published  interview  with  one  of  the  leaders  of 
the  House  of  Representatives.  Mr.  Sereno  E.  Payne,  of 
New  York,  Chairman  of  the  House  Committee  on  Ways 
and  Means,  said: 

“If  we  revised  our  tariff  law  to  allow  Cuban  sugar  to  come  in 
free,  or  at  a reduced  rate,  we  would,  by  reason  of  the  ‘most  favored 
nation’  clause,  have  to  admit  sugar  at  the  same  rate  from  every 
nation  with  which  we  have  a treaty.  That  would  mean  practically 
the  same  reduction  to  all  sugar-producing  countries.  On  the  other 
hand,  Cuba  has  no  government  with  which  we  can  make  a recip- 
rocal arrangement,  and  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  our  people  are 
going  to  give  her  a reduction  on  her  sugar,  tobacco,  and  spirits 
without  getting  something  in  return.  But  with  whom  are  we  to 
treat  in  negotiating  a reciprocity  arrangement?” 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS 


283 


During  their  interviews  with  the  officials,  the  Cuban 
visitors  were  assured  that  no  action  in  their  case  wras  possible 
for  the  Executive  beyond  that  of  earnest  recommendation  to 
Congress.  They  were  told  that  power  to  act  rested  in  Con- 
gress and  in  Congress  alone.  There  was  no  treaty-making 
power  in  Cuba.  The  only  government  was  our  own,  and 
it  was  manifestly  impossible  to  make  a treaty  with  our- 
selves. The  War  Department  doubtless  had  power  to  change 
the  Cuban  tariff  in  any  way  it  saw  fit.  The  tariff  under 
which  the  Government  of  Intervention  acted,  was  of  Ameri- 
can installation,  and  it  had  been  both  changed  and  modified. 
But  power  to  change  the  American  tariff  rested  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  under  the  Constitution,  as  a measure 
affecting  the  national  revenues.  General  Wood  returned 
to  Cuba  at  this  time,  leaving  as  a parting  shot  the  declara- 
tion that  “ unless  something  is  done  at  once  to  afford  relief 
to  the  planters,  bankruptcy  will  befall  the  greater  number 
of  them.  They  will  not  be  able  to  pay  the  money  they  have 
borrowed  to  make  the  present  crop.  They  cannot  keep 
their  laborers  employed,  and  the  latter  will  be  reduced  to 
beggary  or  brigandage.  The  situation  is  already  desperate. 
It  may  become  revolutionary.” 

The  interest  of  General  Wood  in  the  matter  was  almost 
vital,  and  his  position  was  somewhat  critical.  The  historian 
of  a few  years  later  will  measure  his  ability  as  an  adminis- 
trator, not  by  the  amount  of  money  expended  for  educational 
purposes,  nor  by  the  number  of  miles  of  streets  which  were 
swept  each  day,  but  by  the  general  welfare,  industrial  as 
well  as  sociological,  economic  as  well  as  sanitary,  of  the 
Cuban  people. 

Interest  in  the  pending  contest  soon  became  national. 
The  press  of  the  country  plunged  into  an  animated  campaign 
in  which  party  lines,  and  even  respect  for  party  policies, 


284  STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS 


were  generally  obliterated.  Republican,  Democratic,  and 
Independent  papers  throughout  the  United  States  demanded 
prompt  and  favorable  action  in  the  matter  of  Cuba’s  needs. 
No  more  than  a limited  number  of  papers  of  any  note  or 
standing  in  the  country  placed  themselves  in  opposition. 
Congress,  however,  before  its  adjournment  for  the  holidays, 
remained  obdurate  and  persistent  in  its  indifference.  Two 
points  were  made  plain  by  the  developments  of  the  month 
of  December.  One  of  these  was  that  a hard  and  protracted 
fight  was  impending.  The  other  was  that  Congress,  the 
press,  and  the  people  were  broadly  destitute  of  adequate 
information  regarding  the  actual  situation  in  the  Island  of 
Cuba,  and,  as  well,  regarding  the  special  lines  of  industry 
concerned  in  and  affected  by  the  controversy. 

As  the  case  stood,  the  arguments  were  — for  the  plaintiff, 
Cuba,  that  if  concessions  were  not  granted  in  the  existing 
tariffs  on  her  products,  the  Island  would  be  immediately 
and  hopelessly  ruined,  industrially,  financially,  and  govern- 
mentally.  The  argument  for  the  defendant,  the  American 
beet  sugar  industry,  was,  that  if  such  concessions  were  made, 
a promising  American  enterprise  would  be  strangled  in  its 
infancy.  Three  interests  were  concerned: 

First  — Special  groups  of  American  citizens.  These  were 
represented  by  producers  of  sugar,  whether  from  cane  or 
from  beet,  within  the  established  boundaries  of  the  United 
States,  including  Hawaii  and  Porto  Rico. 

Second  — The  people  of  Cuba,  for  whom  the  United  States, 
by  its  own  act  and  recognition,  had  become  sponsor  in  the 
various  departments  of  their  social,  political,  and  economic 
life. 

Third — The  people  of  the  United  States  as  a whole. 
This  interest  involved  their  opportunity  to  purchase  sugar, 
from  any  and  all  sources,  at  the  cheapest  possible  price. 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS  285 


It  also  involved  the  moral  obligation  of  these  people  to 
create  in  the  Island  of  Cuba  such  conditions  as  would  make 
it  possible  for  the  Cubans  to  establish  “ a stable  government 
capable  of  maintaining  order,  insuring  peace  and  tran- 
quillity, and  the  security  of  its  citizens  as  well  as  our  own.” 
Such  an  establishment  was  impossible  except  upon  a basis 
of  the  reasonable  prosperity  of  the  Cuban  people.  Unless 
such  a government  should  be  established,  the  United  States 
would  become  responsible  for  failure  to  justify  its  own  inter- 
ference between  Spain  and  her  West  Indian  colony. 

Upon  the  reassembling  of  Congress,  on  Jan.  6,  1902, 
after  the  holiday  recess,  it  became  evident  that  some  of  the 
House  leaders,  at  least,  had  “ heard  from  their  constituents.” 
It  was  also  evident  that,  although  convinced  that  public 
opinion  demanded  favorable  action  upon  the  Cuban  matter, 
these  gentlemen  were  “of  the  same  opinion  still,”  and  that 
action,  if  undertaken,  would  be  only  half-hearted,  and  every 
effort  be  made  to  protract  investigation  and  postpone  de- 
cision. The  beet  sugar  lobby  adopted  and  pursued  the 
questionable  policy  of  threatening  the  defeat  of  various 
members  at  the  coming  elections,  and  both  sides  prepared 
for  the  coming  struggle. 

Questions  were  raised  concerning  the  moral  and  legal 
responsibility  of  the  United  States  for  the  industrial  welfare 
of  tire  Island.  One  side  of  tire  case  was  stated  by  Senator 
Burrows,  of  Michigan,  a strenuous  opponent  of  Cuban 
reciprocity.  lie  said,  with  more  of  wit  than  logic,  “ We 
rushed  in  there  (to  Cuba)  and  drove  away  the  man  who  was 
beating  his  wife,  but  we  did  not  agree  to  support  the  children.” 
Senator  Platt,  of  Connecticut,  with  more  of  logic  than  wit, 
declared  that,  “ No  man  is  bound  to  adopt  a child,  as  we 
have  adopted  Cuba;  but  having  adopted  a child,  he  is  in  all 
ways  bound  to  provide  for  it.” 


286 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS 


The  hearing  before  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee  be- 
gan on  the  fifteenth.  Nine  days  were  consumed,  and  the 
results  are  published  in  a volume  of  752  pages.  The  argu- 
ments and  the  statements  of  the  various  parties  to  the  con- 
troversy were  heard  by  the  majority  of  the  committee  with 
every  evidence  of  indifference  and  boredom.  Cuba  had 
no  energetic  advocate  in  the  body,  and  the  investigation  was 
largely  carried  on  by  members  who  sought  to  support  an 
opposition  argument  rather  than  to  draw  out  facts.  The 
Cuban  representation  was  badly  organized,  or  rather  it  was 
not  organized  at  all,  and  their  case  was  inadequately  pre- 
sented. The  general  attitude  of  the  committee  was  partisan 
and  hostile  rather  than  broad-minded  and  judicial. 

The  month  of  February  saw  a marked  change  in  the 
attitude  of  the  House  leaders.  The  clamor  of  the  press 
throughout  the  country,  the  expression  of  public  and  private 
opinion,  the  gloomy  reports  and  urgent  petitions  from  the 
Island,  and  the  persistent  pressure  of  the  administration, 
made  it  plain  to  the  obstructionist  leaders  that  favorable 
action  was  imperative,  and  they  effected  a reluctant  and 
half-hearted  change  of  front.  This  complicated  the  situa- 
tion. There  was  no  claim  of  change  of  opinion  upon  the 
main  issue.  The  move  was  made  on  distinctly  political 
grounds.  The  press  might  clamor,  and  the  public  might 
demand  upon  the  ground  of  general  welfare  and  national 
honor.  These  might  have  their  weight,  but  they  met  with 
no  response  until  it  became  evident  that  there  was  serious 
danger  of  antagonism  between  the  House  and  the  adminis- 
tration, and  darkening  menace  of  a split  in  the  party.  Then 
the  leaders  yielded,  though  most  ungraciously.  This  made 
matters  exceedingly  awkward  for  those  who,  thus  far,  had 
followed  their  leaders.  Should  they,  sheep-like,  still  follow, 
or  should  they  continue  to  stand  upon  the  ground  which 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS  287 


they  had  been  led  to  take  by  those  who  then  deserted  them  ? 
It  was  the  inevitable  outcome  of  following  narrow  policies 
rather  than  broad  principles.  Upon  one  hand,  they  faced 
the  dreaded  opposition  to  their  leaders  in  their  newly  taken 
position.  On  the  other  hand,  they  faced  the  loss  of  their 
own  self-respect  and  the  respect  of  their  fellows. 

The  changed  front  of  the  leaders,  several  of  whom  were 
members  of  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee,  made  it  pos- 
sible for  that  committee,  by  a party  vote  and  without  the 
assistance  of  their  Democratic  associates,  to  draft  a bill  in 
favor  of  a concession  to  Cuba.  Ordinarily,  the  presentation 
of  such  a bill  by  the  majority  of  the  committee  would  insure 
its  passage  by  a party  vote  in  the  House.  But  the  com- 
plicated situation,  created  by  the  surrender  of  the  position 
previously  held  by  the  House  leaders,  made  the  fate  of  the 
bill  doubtful  as  a distinct  party  measure  for  which  there 
could  be  claimed  the  credit  presumably  attached  to  satis- 
factory legislation. 

A campaign  was  instituted  within  the  party.  The  Cuban 
question  ceased  to  be  a question  of  Cuba.  The  Island  and 
its  interests,  the  United  States  and  its  interests,  the  honor 
of  the  country,  and  public  opinion,  were  all  submerged  as 
mere  incidents  in  the  larger  problem  of  holding  the  party 
together.  The  daily  papers  were  full  of  stories  of  the  struggle. 
Conferences  were  held,  influence  was  exerted  in  various 
ways,  members  of  the  Senate  took  an  unofficial  hand.  The 
defection  from  the  “insurgent”  ranks  came  slowly  and  grad- 
ually, but  it  came.  Meanwhile,  Cuba,  the  original  cause, 
stood  outside  the  gates  in  suffering  expectancy;  the  press 
poured  out  columns  of  vigorous  criticism  and  even  denuncia- 
tion— Republican  and  Democratic  press  alike,  regardless  of 
party;  while  all  over  the  country  there  were  heard  indi- 
vidual threats  to  remember  the  incident  at  the  next  election. 


288  STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS 


If  the  system  of  Congressional  procedure  had  made  it 
possible  to  submit  to  the  House  of  Representatives,  as  a 
body,  the  direct  proposition  of  concessions  or  no  concessions, 
reciprocity  or  no  reciprocity,  there  is  hardly  room  for  doubt 
that  a very  considerable  majority  of  the  body  would  have 
declared  in  favor  of  such  a measure.  The  extent  of  the 
concession,  or  the  basis  of  a reciprocity  treaty,  is  uncertain, 
but  it  is  probable  that  it  would  have  been  in  the  vicinity  of 
thirty  to  forty  per  cent.  Under  the  methods  employed, 
such  a vote  was  not  to  be  had.  The  Senate,  seemingly  at 
the  time  more  ready  to  act  than  the  House,  was  debarred 
from  active  interference  by  the  rule  of  Congressional  courtesy. 
Senators  and  House  leaders  were  frequently  called  to  the 
White  House  for  consultation.  As  the  days  passed,  Cuba’s 
prospects  darkened.  Sugar  prices  showed  a constant 
downward  tendency,  influenced  by  an  enormous  surplus 
supply  of  European  beet  sugar.  The  opposition  became 
more  and  more  coherent,  more  and  more  stubborn  and  un- 
yielding. The  details  of  the  struggle  are  too  long  and  too 
complex  for  inclusion  here.  The  first  three  weeks  of  March 
were  a repetition  of  the  month  of  February  — endless  dis- 
cussion without  definite  results. 

At  a party  conference  on  the  night  of  March  18,  action 
was  taken  on  the  question  of  presenting  to  the  House  the 
majority  report  of  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee,  known 
as  the  Payne  bill.  This  conference  vote  was  not  upon  the 
measure  itself,  but  upon  the  expediency  of  presenting  such 
a measure  for  action  in  the  House.  The  resolution  was 
accepted  by  a vote  of  eighty-five  to  thirty-one. 

The  next  day,  March  19,  Chairman  Payne,  of  the  Ways 
and  Means  Committee,  introduced  in  the  House  the  follow- 
ing bill,  entitled  “To  provide  for  reciprocal  trade  relations 
with  Cuba”: 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS 


289 


“That  for  the  purpose  of  securing  reciprocal  trade  relations 
with  Cuba,  the  President  is  hereby  authorized,  as  soon  as  may  be 
after  the  establishment  of  an  independent  government  in  Cuba, 
and  the  enactment  by  said  government  of  immigration  and  exclu- 
sion laws  as  fully  restrictive  of  immigration  as  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  said  government  with 
a view  to  the  arrangement  of  a commercial  agreement  in  which 
reciprocal  and  equivalent  concessions  may  be  secured  in  favor  of 
the  products  and  manufactures  of  the  United  States  by  rates  of 
duty  which  shall  be  less  by  an  amount  equivalent  to  at  least  twenty 
per  cent  ad  valorem,  upon  such  products  and  manufactures,  than 
the  rates  imposed  upon  the  like  articles  when  imported  into  Cuba 
from  the  most  favored  of  other  countries,  and  shall  not  be  greater 
than  the  rates  imposed  by  the  United  States  upon  the  like  articles 
imported  from  Cuba;  and  whenever  the  Government  of  Cuba  shall 
enact  such  immigration  and  exclusion  laws,  and  shall  enter  into  such 
commercial  agreement  with  the  United  States  and  shall  make 
such  concessions  in  favor  of  the  products  and  manufacturers  thereof 
as  aforesaid,  and  which  agreement,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Presi- 
dent, shall  be  reciprocal  and  equivalent,  he  shall  be  authorized  to 
proclaim  such  facts,  both  as  to  the  enactment  of  such  immigration 
and  exclusion  laws  and  the  making  of  such  agreement,  and  there- 
after, until  the  first  day  of  December,  1903,  the  imposition  of  the 
duties  now  imposed  by  law  on  all  articles  imported  from  Cuba,  the 
products  thereof,  into  the  United  States  shall  be  suspended,  and  in 
lieu  thereof  shall  be  levied,  collected,  and  paid  upon  all  such  articles 
imported  from  Cuba  eighty  per  cent  of  the  rate  of  duty  now  levied 
upon  like  articles  imported  from  foreign  countries. 

“The  President  shall  have  power,  and  it  shall  be  his  duty, 
whenever  he  shall  be  satisfied  that  either  such  immigration  or 
exclusion  laws  or  such  agreement  mentioned  in  this  act  are  not 
being  fully  executed  by  the  Government  of  Cuba  to  notify  such 
government  thereof,  and  thereafter  there  shall  be  levied,  collected, 
and  paid  upon  all  articles  imported  from  Cuba  the  full  rate  of  duty 
provided  by  law  upon  articles  imported  from  foreign  countries.” 


290 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS 


This  was  a compromise  measure,  and  few  if  any  were 
satisfied  with  it.  Its  meagre  provision  was  a disappoint- 
ment to  the  general  public.  It  broke  the  policy  for  which 
many  of  Cuba’s  opponents  and  half-hearted  friends  had 
been  standing,  and  accomplished  little  or  nothing  that 
would  be  of  material  benefit  to  either  country. 

On  March  31,  the  Payne  bill  was  favorably  reported  in 
the  House  from  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee.  On 
April  8,  it  was  taken  up  by  a vote  of  177  to  80. 

In  the  main,  the  supporters  of  the  movement  for  reciprocity 
with  Cuba  stood  upon  the  plane  of  moral  obligation.  In 
the  main,  its  opponents  stood  upon  the  maintenance  of  a 
policy  which  they  held  to  be  a principle  — the  doctrine  of 
protection  to  home  industries. 

A vote  was  taken  on  the  bill  with  the  Sibley  Amendment 
providing  a time  limit,  and  the  Morris  Amendment  providing 
the  abolition  of  the  “ differential.”  This  was  approved  by  a 
vote  of  247  to  52,  forty-three  Republicans  and  nine  Demo- 
crats voting  against  it.  The  bill  then  went  to  the  Senate 
for  its  action. 

While  the  matter  had  been  under  formal  deliberation, 
first  by  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee  and  later  by  the 
House,  it  had  been  under  an  active  though  informal  con- 
sideration by  the  members  of  the  Senate.  Conferences 
between  the  President  and  the  Senate  leaders  had  been 
frequent,  and  personal  conferences  between  Senators  and 
Representatives  had  been  of  almost  daily  occurrence.  There 
were  many  throughout  the  country  who  hoped  and  believed 
that  the  Senate  was  prepared  to  and  would  act  promptly 
upon  the  question  and  increase  the  petty  twenty  per  cent 
proposed  by  the  House  bill.  In  tlfis  they  were  disappointed. 

At  the  time  of  the  sending  of  the  Cuban  reciprocity  bill 
from  the  House  to  the  Senate,  the  latter  body  was  engaged 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS  291 


in  an  active  struggle  over  the  Philippines  self-government 
bill,  and  the  Cuban  measure  was  held  pending  the  deter- 
mination of  that  contest.  An  active  controversy  was  also 
in  process  regarding  the  Isthmian  Canal,  and  between  those 
and  the  routine  work  of  the  Senate,  the  Cuban  bill  failed  to 
come  up  for  direct  consideration. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  the  session,  every  possible 
effort  was  made  by  certain  members  of  Congress  to  befog 
the  issue,  to  delay  and,  if  possible,  to  prevent  action.  These 
men  were  numbered  among  the  leaders  in  both  Houses.  In 
the  lower  House  the  issue  was  delayed  for  four  months,  and 
was  endlessly  tangled  before  the  passage  of  a confused  and 
unsatisfactory  measure.  The  Senate  repeated,  in  effect,  the 
experience  of  the  House.  A group  of  “insurgents”  fought 
for  delay,  only  too  successfully,  and  added  to  the  general 
confusion.  Before  the  beginning  of  February,  there  had 
been  urgent  calls  upon  the  President  for  a special  message. 
Two  or  three  times,  the  President  was  reported  as  being  on 
the  eve  of  issuing  such  a message,  but  he  was  induced  to 
withhold  it.  With  the  opening  days  of  June,  Senate  ac- 
tion seemed  so  improbable  that,  on  the  thirteenth,  a special 
message  was  sent.  It  was  little  more  than  a routine  repeti- 
tion of  arguments  that  had  been  thoroughly  threshed  out 
during  the  campaign.  Ultra-administration  organs  pro- 
nounced it  a “ringing  message,”  and  declared  that  it  cleared 
the  air  by  lifting  the  whole  question  to  a high  moral  plane. 
In  fact,  it  lifted  the  question  no  higher  than  it  had  been  for 
months,  and  the  political  atmosphere  remained  quite  as 
murky  as  ever.  Eighteen  Republican  senators,  led  by  Sen- 
ator Burrows,  of  Michigan,  had  joined  the  beet  sugar  ranks, 
and  stood  immovable.  Compromise  efforts  and  measures 
failed,  and  the  question  was  raised  whether  there  was  not 
on  foot  a definite  purpose  to  starve  Cuba  into  annexation. 


292  STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS 


On  the  1st  of  July,  the  long  session  of  the  Fifty-seventh  Con- 
gress adjourned  without  final  action  on  the  Cuban  reciprocity 
bill.  Commenting  editorially  upon  the  matter,  the  Review 
of  Reviews  ably  presented  the  case  for  the  public,  by  saying: 

“Congress,  in  the  opinion  of  the  best  intelligence  and  judgment 
of  the  country,  was  guilty  of  one  great  sin  of  omission  in  failing 
to  live  up  to  the  moral  obligation  of  the  United  States  to  do  some- 
thing for  the  economic  relief  of  Cuba.  It  would  have  been  nothing 
more  than  decent  to  have  admitted  all  Cuban  crops  of  the  present 
year  to  the  ports  of  the  United  States  duty  free.  We  had  taken 
control,  and  had  spent  Cuba’s  revenues  freely  in  reconstructing 
matters  according  to  our  own  ideas.  It  was  due  to  our  self-respect 
to  give  the  new  Cuban  Government  a handsome  send-off.  Economic 
prosperity,  as  every  one  knew,  was  essential  both  to  the  success  of 
Cuba’s  experiment  in  home  rule,  and  to  the  establishment  of 
permanently  satisfactory  relations  between  Cuba  and  the  United 
States.  Certain  Western  agricultural  interests,  creditably  eager  to 
promote  the  development  of  the  American  beet  sugar  industry, 
were  used  as  a cats-paw  by  a designing  combination  which,  in 
turn,  had  power  enough  in  Washington  to  prevent  any  action 
whatever.  The  situation  became  a very  complicated  and  involved 
one;  but  its  outlines  will  be  clear  in  due  time.” 

The  notably  weak  point  in  this  comment  lies  in  the  asser- 
tion that  “every  one  knew”  that  “economic  prosperity  was 
essential  both  to  ” the  success  of  Cuba’s  new  government  and 
to  the  establishment  of  desirable  relations  between  the  two 
countries.  If  these  facts  were  so  clearly  realized,  it  is  most 
unfortunate  that  they  should  have  been,  for  three  years,  so 
persistently  ignored.  It  is  unfortunate  that  those  who  urged 
them  encountered  only  opposition,  and  sometimes  obloquy, 
and  drew  upon  themselves  the  antagonism  of  the  adminis- 
tration press,  and  the  local  administrator  in  Cuba.  That 
the  economic  needs  of  the  Island  were  neglected  from  the 
very  beginning  is  shown  by  all  the  testimony  of  competent 


STRUGGLE  FOR  TARIFF  CONCESSIONS 


293 


observers,  by  the  reports  of  the  Cuban  Secretary  of  Agricul- 
ture, by  the  comments  and  statements  of  the  insular  press, 
and  by  the  entire  history  of  the  period  of  occupation.  Again 
and  again  the  Military  Governor  asserted  that  the  Island 
was  prosperous  and  the  people  contented.  The  Secretary 
of  War  visited  the  Island  and  presented  the  same  report  on 
his  return.  The  complaints  of  the  Cuban  press,  printed  in 
Spanish,  were  seldom  available  for  American  readers.  Visit- 
ors to  the  Island  saw  the  well-swept  streets  of  Havana,  and 
listened  to  glowing  reports  of  educational  establishment, 
sanitation,  and  the  decrease  of  yellow  fever,  and  went  home 
to  declare  that  all  was  well,  without  having  had  even  a 
glimpse  of  the  real  Cuba. 

The  congressional  sin  of  failure  to  act  at  this  juncture  was 
more  pardonable  than  the  sin  of  the  administration  in  Cuba, 
in  its  omission  to  do  that  which  might  have  been  done  to 
prevent  the  crisis  which  resulted  from  its  neglect  of  Cuba’s 
economic  needs.  That  sin  was  glaring,  and  inevitably  rose 
to  threaten  us.  A fair  measure  of  industrial  prosperity  is 
the  only  basis  for  national  content,  the  touchstone  of  suc- 
cessful administration,  the  very  groundwork  of  social  and 
political  stability.  Cuba,  at  the  close  of  America’s  rule  in 
the  Island,  was  poorer,  financially  and  industrially,  than  she 
had  been  in  earlier  days  when  revolt  followed  revolt  for  the 
improvement  of  her  economic  condition.  We  spent  Cuba’s 
revenues  with  liberal  hand  along  lines  of  vast  importance, 
but  upon  a scale  which  was  not  imperative,  and  which  might 
have  been  modified  until  the  burden  entailed  by  their  estab- 
lishment could  have  been  easily  carried  by  the  profits  of  gen- 
eral industry.  The  failure  of  Congress  to  relieve  a situation 
for  which  we  and  our  agents  were  so  largely  responsible,  is 
only  less  lamentable  and  only  less  blameworthy  than  our 
failure  to  avert  the  situation. 


Chapter  XVIII 


INDUSTRY  AND  COMMERCE 

Industrial  prostration  and  commercial  stagnation  were 
the  inevitable  results  of  warfare  conducted  on  the  ruthless 
lines  of  the  struggle  between  Spain  and  her  rebellious  colony. 
Figures  are  not  available  upon  which  it  is  safe  to  base  state- 
ments of  trade  losses,  or  to  essay  comparisons.  Official 
figures  may  be  quoted,  but  there  is  no  guarantee  whatever 
of  the  correctness  of  those  figures.  The  methods  pursued 
in  the  custom  houses  of  the  Island,  during  the  Spanish 
regime,  were  such  that  no  reliance  can  be  placed  on  even 
the  published  official  reports.  From  all  obtainable  reports 
and  statements,  only  one  inference  is  possible.  That  is, 
that  the  methods  of  Spanish  administration  in  Cuba’s 
custom  houses  were  nothing  other  than  well-organized  cor- 
ruption. No  secret  was  made  of  it.  By  a recognized  and 
established  collusion  between  the  importer  and  the  employes 
and  officials  in  the  custom  house,  coffee,  upon  which  the  duty 
was  $12.15  per  100  kilos,  might  come  in  as  corn  as  $2.40  per 
100  kilos.  A piano,  upon  which  the  duty  was  fixed  at  $115, 
might  come  in  as  an  organ,  at  half  its  proper  valuation  and 
a lower  rate  of  duty.  Lace  might  come  in  as  cotton  goods, 
and  sheet  copper,  at  $14  per  100  kilos,  might  come  in  as 
sheet  iron  at  $2.90.  False  entry  and  undervaluation  make 
it  impossible  to  state  with  accuracy  the  precise  extent  of 
Cuban  importation  in  the  days  of  Spanish  control.  The 
same  applies  in  only  a less  degree  regarding  exports. 


INDUSTRY  AND  COMMERCE 


295 


In  round  figures,  the  exports  for  1893  and  1894  may  be 
given  as  $100,000,000,  and  the  imports  as  $60,000,000.  It 
is  probable  that  the  imports  are  more  greatly  undervalued 
than  the  exports,  but  the  facts  in  either  case  are  impossible 
of  determination. 

Evidence  of  this  corruption  in  the  custom  houses  lies  in 
the  fact  that  under  the  honest  administration  of  that  de- 
partment by  General  Bliss,  there  was  obtained  an  annual 
revenue  of  $15,000,000  to  $16,000,000,  whereas  under  the 
old  system  and  a higher  rate  of  duty,  a fairly  prosperous 
Cuba,  making  larger  purchases,  obtained  only  some 
$12,000,000  from  the  same  source  of  revenue.  This  could 
only  result  from  corruption  in  the  Cuban  custom  houses 
and  falsified  entries  at  the  port  of  shipment,  whether  in 
Europe  or  America. 

As  a result  of  the  war,  the  exports  of  the  Island  fell  off 
about  one-half  for  the  year  1896,  and  the  imports  were  re- 
duced about  one-third,  yet,  according  to  the  figures  given, 
the  balance  of  trade  was  still  in  favor  of  the  Island.  The 
commerce  for  the  term  of  American  occupation  is  given  by 
the  Collector  of  Customs,  General  Bliss,  as  follows: 


IMPORTS  EXPORTS 

1899  $74,845,186.00  $49,3*7,724.00 

1900  69,887,547.00  51,363,498.00 

1901  67,751,911.00  66,502,533.00 

1902  (5  mos.,  19  days) £5,157,800.00  23.133,719.00 

Total  $237,041,944.00  $190,327,474.00 


This  statement  shows  an  apparent  balance  of  trade 
against  the  Island  of  $47,314,470.  This  should  be  reduced 
by  the  sum  of  $3,016,542,  which  represents  the  balance  in 
shipments  of  coin  and  bullion.  The  debit  balance  in  mer- 
chandise shipments  for  the  period  of  intervention  is,  there- 


296 


INDUSTRY  AND  COMMERCE 


fore,  $44,297,928.  The  merchandise  exports  and  imports 


were: 

IMPORTS 

EXPORTS 

1899  

. . . $66,308,185.00 

$44,173,280.00 

1900  

. . . 66,464,467.00 

48,925,846.00 

1901  

. . . 66,582,776.00 

63,278,744.00 

1902  (5  mos.,  19  days) . . . 

. . . 24,367,192.00 

23,046,822.00 

Total  

. . .$223,722,620.00 

$179,424,692.00 

These  figures  are  interesting  and  suggestive.  The  im- 
portation figures,  notwithstanding  the  dire  poverty  of  the 
Island,  particularly  during  1899,  are  above  those  shown 
during  the  years  of  the  Spanish  regime.  The  table  of  ex- 
ports shows  an  increase  of  nearly  fifty  per  cent  during 
the  occupation.  This  is  accounted  for  almost  exclusively 
by  the  increased  output  of  raw  sugar.  The  crop  of  1898- 
1899  yielded  335,668  tons,  while  that  of  1901-1902  approxi- 
mated 800,000  tons.  This  increase  was  due  entirely  to  in- 
dividual initiative  and  enterprise,  and  not  at  all  to  govern- 
mental influence  beyond  the  fact  of  the  establishment  of 
peace.  That  January,  1900,  saw  the  people  of  the  Island 
in  better  condition  than  they  were  twelve  months  before  is 
unquestionable.  In  January,  1899,  thousands  were  being 
cared  for  as  objects  of  charity.  A year  later,  they  were 
maintaining  themselves  as  best  they  could  by  their  own 
labor.  Gradually  they  pulled  themselves  into  a position  of 
somewhat  precarious  self-maintenance.  So  remarkable  a 
change  was  effected  within  a few  short  months  that  it  be- 
came customary  for  those  who  saw  the  rehabilitation  which 
Cuban  industry  effected,  to  boast  of  what  the  United  States 
had  done  toward  the  industrial  reconstruction  of  the  Island. 
But  so  far  as  the  great  mass  of  the  Cuban  peasantry  was 
concerned,  their  reestablishment  reached  the  point  of  mere 
maintenance,  and  there  stopped.  More  was  impossible 


INDUSTRY  AND  COMMERCE 


297 


from  lack  of  means  and  facilities.  Compared  with  their 
condition  in  1894,  when  protest  against  oppressive  conditions 
led  to  armed  revolt,  they  were,  in  1899,  in  a far  more  evil 
state.  To  that  great  power  which  had  relieved  them  from 
the  heavy  hand  of  Spain  they  looked  for  the  realization  of 
their  hopes  for  industrial  freedom  and  prosperity. 

Sugar  and  tobacco  have  long  been  the  great  wealth-pro- 
ducing crops  of  Cuba.  The  production  of  these,  notably 
sugar,  was  seriously  interrupted  during  the  war  period. 
The  sugar  crop  fell  from  1,054,214  long  tons  for  the  season 
of  1893-94,  and  1,004,264  in  1894-95,  to  225,221  in  1895-96, 
and  212,051  in  1896-97,  and  305,543  in  1897-98.  Inas- 
much as  a large  percentage  of  the  cost  of  sugar  production 
is  represented  by  labor,  it  is  quite  within  bounds  to  say  that 
Cuba,  with  a population  of  little  more  than  one  and  a half 
millions,  was  a loser  of  more  than  $100,000,000,  during 
those  three  seasons,  from  this  cause  alone.  Upon  the  same 
basis  of  a normal  average  production,  the  following  three 
seasons  show  a further  loss  of  nearly  another  $100,000,000. 
These  figures  are  given  as,  approximately,  the  sum  which, 
under  normal  conditions,  would  have  been  paid  to  the 
people  of  the  Island  for  their  labor  and  their  services  in  the 
various  departments  of  sugar  production  alone  during  the 
war  period  and  the  three  years  of  Intervention. 

While  the  great  mass  of  the  Island  people  were  prostrate, 
and  many  of  them  utterly  helpless,  a few  estates  had  been 
able  to  continue  their  operations,  and  these  were  in  the  be- 
ginning of  the  grinding  season  at  the  time  of  the  American 
occupation.  Peace  conditions  enabled  others  to  essay  the 
cleaning  up  of  their  devastated  fields  and  the  repair  of  their 
partially  wrecked  machinery.  This  made  a call  for  laborers, 
and  in  some  sections  the  supply  was  a long  way  from  sufficient. 


298 


INDUSTRY  AND  COMMERCE 


This  was  notably  the  case  in  the  raining  areas  of  Santiago 
province. 

Stocks  of  merchandise  had  been  greatly  depleted  during 
the  period  of  the  blockade,  and,  after  the  signing  of  the 
protocol,  merchants  generally  waited  the  developments  of 
the  new  order  of  things  before  replenishing  their  shelves  and 
warehouses.  The  provision  for  Spanish  evacuation  and 
American  control,  and  the  issuance,  in  December,  1898,  of 
the  new  tariff  schedule,  effecting  a very  considerable  reduction 
in  the  former  rates,  opened  the  door  to  a greatly  increased 
importation.  Notwithstanding  the  general  poverty  and 
distress  on  the  Island,  trade  conditions,  as  such,  were  quite 
active.  The  presence  of  a large  body  of  American  troops, 
scattered  throughout  the  Island,  and  of  several  thousand 
civilians,  tourists,  and  department  clerks,  made  a demand 
for  merchandise  of  various  kinds.  The  commerce  of  the 
Island  was,  and  still  is,  almost  exclusively  in  the  hands  of 
Spaniards.  The  merchants  had  suffered  loss  by  interrup- 
tion to  their  business,  but  it  is  a striking  fact  that  there  was 
not  a commercial  failure  of  any  note  during  either  the  war 
period  or  the  term  of  Intervention. 

The  new  tariff  schedule,  established  by  virtue  of  military 
authority,  effected  a material  reduction  in  the  Cuban  tariff 
with  no  small  advantage  to  merchants  and  producers  in 
the  United  States.  Regarding  the  former  Spanish  tariff, 
Commissioner  Porter  stated  in  his  report  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  under  date  of  Nov.  15,  1898: 

“The  Spanish  tariff  was  made  by  Spaniards,  for  Spain,  in  the 
interests  of  the  Spanish.  That  seems  to  be  the  only  principle  in 
it.  On  any  other  theory,  it  was  inexplicable.  ...  Its  rates  were 
full  of  inequalities,  and  were  not  levied  on  any  sound  principle, 
but  on  the  ‘heads  Spain  wins  and  tails  Cuba  loses’  idea,  which 
prevails  in  the  whole  fiscal  fabric.” 


INDUSTRY  AND  COMMERCE 


299 


The  new  tariff  was  issued,  under  executive  order  from 
Washington,  under  date  of  Dec.  13,  1898.  It  was  based 
upon  the  result  of  the  investigations  of  Mr.  Porter,  and  while 
it  was  admittedly  faulty  and  unsuitable,  it  was  without  doubt 
the  best  that  could  be  done  in  the  available  time.  By  its 
provisions,  a material  reduction  was  effected. 

This  tariff  was,  necessarily,  merely  provisional.  Sundry 
minor  modifications  were  effected  from  time  to  time  to  meet 
the  exigencies  of  special  cases.  Under  an  order  issued  in 
Washington  on  March  31,  1900,  a new  tariff  went  into 
effect  on  June  15,  1900.  Concerning  the  new  schedule. 
Colonel  Bliss,  Collector  of  Customs,  in  his  report  dated 
August  6,  says: 

“This  tariff  is  a modification  of  the  one  promulgated  to  go  into 
effect  on  the  first  day  of  January,  1899,  and  differs  in  no  way  from 
the  latter  as  concerns  the  principles  of  its  construction.  For  the 
most  part,  the  changes  introduced  were  for  the  purpose  of  obviating 
difficulties  which  had  arisen  in  the  application  of  the  previous 
tariff,  removing  ambiguities,  etc. 

“The  tariff  which  was  prepared  to  go  into  operation  at  the 
beginning  of  the  military  occupation  of  Cuba  was,  naturally  and 
properly  under  the  circumstances,  a translation  of  the  pre-existing 
Spanish  tariff,  with  such  modifications  in  the  rates  of  duty  as  were 
suggested  and  demanded  by  the  existing  conditions  of  the  Island. 
The  principal  change,  therefore,  consisted  in  a general  reduction 
of  duties,  combined  with  the  abolition  of  the  previous  differential 
in  favor  of  Spanish  trade.  The  classification  which  prevailed 
under  the  Spanish  regime  was  in  general  ndheml  to  under  the 
American  administration  of  the  customs  service.  'Phis  course 
was  the  proper,  since  the  power  to  classify  is  really  the  power  to 
make  a tariff,  and  were  any  other  course  pursued,  it  could  !*•  justly 
charged  against  the  customs  administration  that  it  was  assuming 
the  power  which  had  l>ecn  intrusted  to  those  who  prepared  the 
tariff.  Rut  it  required  very  little  exjKTience  to  show  that  the 


300 


INDUSTRY  AND  COMMERCE 


original  tariff  was  devised  to  meet  conditions  and  to  facilitate 
practices  and  methods  of  business  which  were  not  supposed  to  be 
allowed  under  the  new  administration;  that  the  tariff  of  which 
its  successor  was  a literal  translation  was  so  constructed,  — perhaps 
inadvertently,  — as  to  enable  customs  officials  to  defraud  and 
plunder  importers,  on  the  one  side,  and  the  Government  on  the 
other.  It  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  an  engine  for  fraud  more  in- 
geniously constructed,  and  such  was  its  use,  whatever  may  have 
been  the  motives  which  originally  inspired  it.  It  was  so  devised  as 
to  permit  and  encourage  fraud  in  varying  degrees,  by  the  various 
officials  of  the  Custom  House,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest. 
This  machinery,  with  all  its  possibilities  of  crime,  was  placed  in 
the  hands  of  an  American  administration  composed  of  an  extremely 
limited  personnel,  and  upon  which  was  imposed  the  responsibility 
that  the  engine  should  no  longer  be  worked  as  one  of  crime  and 
oppression,  while  at  the  same  time  many  of  its  complicated  parts 
had  to  be  operated  by  those  who  could  so  use  it,  and  who  could  not 
be  altogether  prevented  if  they  so  desired.” 

The  provisions  of  the  new  schedule  gave  to  the  United 
States  a virtual  monopoly  of  Cuban  trade  in  fresh  beef, 
pork,  eggs,  flour,  coal,  coal  oil,  machinery,  railroad  iron, 
and  various  other  articles  of  important  consumption  in  the 
Island  of  Cuba.  Upon  many  other  lines,  such  as  cattle, 
rice,  wines,  salt,  preserved  fruits,  dried  beef,  cottons,  linens, 
woolens,  silk,  shoes,  and  hats,  the  rates  stood  at  points  which 
practically  barred  the  United  States  merchants  and  pro- 
ducers from  even  a reasonable  competition  with  the  coun- 
tries of  Europe  and  South  America.  The  changes  which 
were  effected  in  the  Cuban  tariff  during  the  term  of  American 
occupation  produced  no  change,  properly  attributable  to 
the  tariff,  either  in  the  gross  imports  of  the  Island,  or  in 
the  gross  amount  of  trade  with  the  United  States.  The 
total  imports  of  merchandise  for  the  years  of  the  occupation 
are  given  upon  a preceding  page  in  this  chapter.  The 


INDUSTRY  AND  COMMERCE 


301 


trade  with  the  United  States,  coin  and  bullion  included,  ap- 


pears as  follows: 

EXPORT  TO  U.  S.  IMPORT  FROM  U.  S. 

1899  $34,381,738.00  $37,188,597.00 

1900  33,571,994.00  32,248,595.00 

1901  50,016,318.00  28,469,251.00 

1902  (5  mos.,  19  days)  16,631,002.00  11,217,080.00 


The  duties  imposed  under  the  tariff  of  June,  1900,  were  the 
equivalent  of  twenty-one  and  a half  per  cent  on  an  ad  valorem 
basis.  About  the  first  of  March,  1901,  a commission  was 
appointed  for  the  purpose  of  drafting  a more  suitable  tariff 
schedule,  based  upon  the  need  of  a revenue  of  some  $15,000,- 
000  a year  from  the  customs  service,  and  yet  having  due  re- 
gard for  the  industrial  and  commercial  welfare  of  the  Island. 
The  report  of  this  board  was  presented  in  September,  but 
it  was  not  acted  upon  by  the  authorities.  It  was  held  that 
in  view  of  the  impending  transfer  of  governmental  control 
the  matter  should  be  left  for  determination  by  the  Cuban 
government  after  its  establishment. 

Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  disastrous  fall- 
ing off  in  the  amount  of  sugar  produced  in  the  Island  during 
the  war  period.  Coincident  with  this  there  was  a marked 
reduction  in  the  market  price  of  that  commodity.  Manipu- 
lation of  the  European  beet  sugar  output,  under  a system 
of  tariffs  and  bounties,  enabled  an  organization  known  as 
the  “ Kartel  ” to  place  its  sugars  in  the  world’s  markets  at  a 
figure  which  was  below  the  actuul  cost  of  production.  With 
that  sugar  Cuba  was  obliged  to  compete.  Her  market 
was  the  United  States,  and  prices  in  that  market  were  based 
on  Hamburg  quotations  of  European  beet  sugar.  This, 
naturally,  added  to  the  generul  stringency  of  the  conditions 
of  the  Island.  The  United  States  was  not  directly  respon- 
sible for  the  misfortunes  which  fell  upon  the  Cuban  sugar 


302 


INDUSTRY  AND  COMMERCE 


planter  as  a result  of  artificial  trade  conditions  on  the  Con- 
tinent of  Europe.  Yet  responsibility  did  rest  with  the 
United  States  to  establish,  in  its  own  interest  as  well  as  in 
that  of  Cuba,  those  favorable  economic  conditions  which 
are  so  distinctly  the  basis  of  sound  and  healthy  government. 

It  was  recognized  by  careful  observers  and  students  that 
Cuba’s  political  difficulties  would  be  most  readily  solved 
through  the  channels  of  industrial  activity  and  prosperity. 
There  was  grave  question  whether  they  could  be  solved 
along  any  other  lines.  The  attention  of  the  government 
was  frequently  called  to  the  fact.  In  a memorial  addressed 
to  President  McKinley,  in  November,  1899,  by  representa- 
tives of  the  Planters  and  Farmers  Association  of  Cuba 
( Circulo  de  Haccndados  y Agricultores),  there  appears  the 
following  statement: 

“If  the  sugar  industry  is  rehabilitated  in  Cuba;  if  the  work  in 
tobacco  plantations  is  revived;  if  the  mining  industry  is  again 
manned,  then  and  at  that  time,  but  not  before,  the  pacification  of 
the  Island,  which,  to  the  honor  and  glory  of  the  United  States, 
was  the  purpose  of  the  Joint  Resolution  of  Congress,  approved  by 
you  on  April  20,  1898,  will  be  consummated. 

“ No  student  of  history  or  close  observer  of  contemporary  events, 
can  ignore  for  a moment  that  at  the  very  bottom  of  the  troubles 
between  Cuba  and  Spain  the  violation  by  the  latter  of  the  economic 
laws,  as  eternal  and  sure  in  their  action  as  the  laws  of  nature,  was 
always  to  be  found  as  a factor  of  the  greatest  prominence.” 

Many  presentations  of  a similar  tenor  were  made  during 
and  prior  to  the  first  year  of  occupation.  None  of  them 
would  appear  to  have  got  beyond  the  point  of  “considera- 
tion.” During  the  entire  period  of  intervention  there  appears 
to  have  been  an  almost  total  disregard  of  the  difficulty  of 
establishing  a successful  and  enduring  government  over  a 
poverty-stricken  people.  A prosperous  people  will  endure 


INDUSTRY  AND  COMMERCE 


303 


without  complaint  a vast  amount  of  governmental  iniquity 
and  oppression.  A poor  and  hungry  people  will  be  discon- 
tented under  a government  which  may  be  in  all  ways  morally 
and  mechanically  perfect.  The  contemplation  of  an  ideal 
administration  is  little  satisfactory  to  a ragged  citizen  with 
an  empty  stomach.  In  ignoring  this  fundamental  fact, 
the  United  States  committed  its  most  serious  error  in  its 
experience  in  the  Island  of  Cuba. 


Chapter  XIX 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 

That  the  United  States  had  the  power  to  effect  radical 
changes  in  the  existing  legal  system  of  Cuba,  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  such  changes  were  made.  The  legal  or  moral 
right  to  interfere  in  any  way  with  the  established  laws  of  a 
land  which  our  Supreme  Court  declared  to  be  “foreign 
territory,”  beyond  the  point  of  necessity  for  the  immediate 
maintenance  of  law  and  order  and  the  protection  of  life  and 
property,  has  been  called  in  question.  Yet  this  right  was 
assumed,  and  the  assumption  was  endorsed  by  the  adminis- 
tration at  Washington. 

The  maladministration  of  the  laws  in  force  in  the  Island, 
under  the  Spanish  regime,  gave  rise  to  a belief  that  the  evil 
lay  in  the  laws  themselves.  In  an  address  before  the  Ohio 
Bar  Association,  on  July  12,  1899,  the  Hon.  William  Wirt 
Howe  made  the  following  statement: 

“The  student  of  Spanish  jurisprudence  is  impressed  with  the 
learning  and  the  juristic  ability  which  it  displays.  There  is  no 
trouble  in  this  respect.  It  is  a noble  system.  But  the  contrast 
between  the  splendid  science  of  the  system  and  the  moral  quality 
of  its  administration  in  the  Spanish  colonies,  is  something  very 
pathetic.” 

The  Spanish  system  of  jurisprudence  is,  like  all  such 
systems,  the  result  of  development.  Walton,  in  his  Civil 
Law  in  Spain  and  Spanish  America  (page  22),  summarizes 
the  history  of  Spanish  law  under  six  headings: 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


30.5 


The  Primitive  Period,  Sixteenth  Century  B.C.  to  414  A.D. 

The  Visigoth  Epoch,  414  to  687  A.D. 

The  Hispano-Gothic  Period,  687-700  to  711  A.D. 

The  Saracenic  Invasion,  711  to  1255  A.D. 

The  re-establishment  of  Roman  Laws,  1255  to  1810. 

The  Modern  Epoch,  1810  to  1900. 

With  the  establishment  of  her  vast  colonial  interests, 
during  the  early  years  of  the  sixteenth  century,  it  became 
necessary  for  Spain  to  provide  laws,  and  legal  processes  for 
the  new  territory  which  had  been  acquired  by  conquest  and 
by  discovery. 

In  1524,  there  was  issued  a royal  decree  of  which  the 
following  was  a part: 

“Considering  the  great  benefits  and  advantages  which,  by  the 
grace  of  God,  we  have  received,  and  every  day  do  receive,  from 
the  increase  and  growth  of  the  Kingdom  and  dominions  of  our 
Indies;  and  being  well  advised  of  the  obligation  and  duty  towards 
them  which  this  imposes  upon  us,  we  are  solicitous,  on  our  part 
(with  God’s  assistance),  to  devise  suitable  means  by  which  such 
great  kingdoms  and  dominions  may  be  governed  and  ruled  in  a 
proper  manner.” 

This  appears  as  a sort  of  preamble  to  a decree  establishing 
a body  known  as  the  Council  of  the  Indies.  Walton’s  Civil 
Law  in  Spain  and  Spanish  America  (page  520)  says:  “The 
Council  of  the  Indies  had  supreme  jurisdiction  over  all  the 
colonics;  all  the  laws  and  ordinances  of  viceroys  and  gov- 
ernors were  subject  to  its  approval;  and  it  had  power  to 
frame  laws.”  Until  1661,  the  laws  of  Cuba  and  the  Spanish 
colonies  in  general  were  the  laws  of  Spain  supplemented 
by  an  assortment  of  decrees,  ordinances,  and  regulations, 
issued  by  the  Crown,  by  the  Council,  and  by  the  Church. 
In  that  year  these  were  compiled  and  published.  A better 
digested  edition  was  issued  in  1681.  This  was  known  as 


306 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


the  Compilation  of  the  Laws  of  the  Indies.  ( Recopilacion 
de  Leyes  de  los  Reynos  de  las  Indies.) 

This  formed  the  basis  of  Cuban  law  until  the  beginning 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  when  the  revolution  of  that  period 
established  the  constitutional  Cortes  in  Spain.  Constitu- 
tionalism in  Spain  has  had  a somewhat  erratic  career,  but 
its  influence  has  marked  the  legal  as  well  as  the  political 
history  of  that  nation  and  its  colonies  for  the  last  century. 
By  the  short-lived  Spanish  constitutions  of  1812  and  1820, 
Cuba  was  nominally  granted  representation  in  the  Cortes  at 
Madrid.  A nominal  representation  was  also  granted  by 
the  Constitution  of  1876.  None  of  these  was  of  any  real 
benefit  to  the  Island. 

Although  Cuba  remained  a subject  colony,  her  prolonged 
agitations,  her  many  protests,  and  her  occasional  revolts 
were  by  no  means  barren  of  results.  To  those  measures, 
and  notably  to  the  Ten  Years’  War,  is  due  the  legal  reform 
in  Cuba  which  has  been  effected  during  the  last  quarter 
of  a century.  On  May  23,  1879,  the  Spanish  Penal  Code 
was  extended  to  Cuba.  The  Mortgage  Law  was  extended 
May  1,  1880.  To  do  away  with  certain  undesirable  features, 
and  to  bring  the  law  into  fuller  harmony  with  the  provisions 
of  the  Civil  Code,  this  code  was  modified  on  July  14,  1893. 
The  Monarchical  Constitution  was  applied  to  the  Island 
April  7,  1881.  The  Law  of  Civil  Procedure  followed, 
Sept.  25,  1885,  and  on  Jan.  28,  1886,  the  Commercial  Code 
was  put  into  effect.  This  was  followed,  on  Oct.  18,  1888, 
by  the  Law  of  Criminal  Procedure,  and  on  July  31,  1889, 
the  last  of  the  group,  the  Civil  Code,  was  also  extended  to 
the  Island,  and  the  laws  of  Cuba  then  became,  in  general, 
the  same  as  those  of  the  Peninsula,  with  the  exception  of 
such  minor  modifications  as  became  necessary  to  fit  them 
to  a Colonial  instead  of  a Crown  government. 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


307 


By  the  decree  of  April  7,  1881,  the  Spanish  Constitution 
of  1876  was  applied  to  Cuba.  Under  this,  nominally,  the 
Cubans  possessed  all  the  rights  of  Spanish  citizenship. 
This  Constitution  included  provisions  which  are  practically 
the  equivalent  of  a Bill  of  Rights  and  the  Habeas  Corpus. 
It  provided  that  no  inhabitant  of  Cuba  might  be  arrested 
except  in  the  cases  and  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law. 
Within  twenty-four  hours  of  the  arrest,  the  prisoner  must  be 
discharged  or  surrendered  to  the  judicial  authorities;  there- 
upon a judge  having  jurisdiction  must,  within  seventy-two 
hours,  order  either  the  discharge  of  the  prisoner  or  his 
commitment  to  jail.  Within  the  same  limit  of  time,  the 
prisoner  must  be  informed  of  the  decision  in  his  case.  No 
citizen  could  be  committed  except  upon  the  warrant  of  a 
judge  having  jurisdiction.  Dwelling-houses  and  mails 
were  to  be  held  inviolate  without  due  process  of  law.  Con- 
fiscation of  property  was  prohibited,  as  was  expropriation 
for  public  use  unless  just  compensation  had  previously  been 
made.  Religious  freedom  was  established,  though  the 
Roman  Catholic  religion  was  declared  the  religion  of  the 
State.  Article  XII  provided  that  every  Cuban,  like  every 
Spaniard,  had  the  right  to  express  freely  his  opinions,  orally 
or  in  writing  or  through  the  press,  without  censorship;  the 
right  to  assemble  peaceably,  to  form  associations,  to  petition, 
individually  or  in  combination  with  others,  the  King,  the 
Cortes,  and  the  authorities.  Cubans  were  given  right  to 
hold  public  office,  according  to  individual  merit  and  capacity. 
The  constitutional  rights  were  guaranteed  by  laws  passed 
in  support  of  the  Constitution.  The  laws  provided  remedies, 
civil  and  criminal,  for  their  infringement  by  judges  or  other 
authorities. 

While  it  all  appears,  to  the  lay  mind,  to  be  greatly  in- 
volved, it  is  nevertheless  the  fact  that  the  legal  structure, 


308 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


as  a whole,  stands  without  superior  in  the  history  of  juris- 
prudence. Spanish  Law  contains  much  which  does  not 
favorably  impress  those  to  whom  the  operations  of  the  sys- 
tem known  as  the  Common  Law  are  more  familiar.  But 
it  is  to  be  remembered  that  it  is  a system  which  was  familiar 
to  the  people  and  to  the  practitioners  in  Cuba.  To  supplant 
it  bodily  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States  would  have  been 
an  act  quite  without  warrant  and  assuredly  productive  of  a 
state  of  utter  confusion.  Of  the  laws  of  Cuba,  it  is  probably 
enough  to  say  that,  upon  our  assumption  of  the  control  of 
the  Island,  we  found  an  established  code  which  was  as  well 
adapted  to  the  needs  and  conditions  of  the  Island  as  the 
Common  Law  of  England  is  to  that  country,  excepting  its 
need  of  such  changes  as  were  necessary  to  separate  it  from 
the  institution  of  Spain.  Many  changes  have  been  intro- 
duced, many  laws  repealed,  and  many  modified.  It  is  an 
open  question  among  authorities  whether  or  not  there  has 
been  either  right  or  wisdom  in  a large  number  of  these 
changes.  Even  more  severe  criticism  is  passed  upon  the 
manner  in  which  these  changes  have  been  made.  It  will 
be  noted  that  it  is  only  within  a brief  period  that  those  laws 
have  been  applied  to  the  Island.  Prior  to  that,  law  in  Cuba 
was  little  other  than  a jumble  of  special  decrees  and  ordi- 
nances, subject  to  overrule  at  any  time  by  the  will  or  whim 
of  military  governors.  In  no  small  measure,  the  period  of 
American  occupation  has  been  a reversion  to  the  original 
method  with  the  exception  that  the  existing  legal  system 
was  an  immeasurable  improvement  upon  that  of  twenty 
years  ago. 

Immediately  following  the  establishment  of  American 
authority  in  Santiago  province,  there  was  issued  General  Order 
No.  101,  dated  from  the  Executive  Mansion,  Washington, 
July  13,  1898.  A paragraph  of  that  order  reads  as  follows: 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


309 


“Though  the  powers  of  the  military  occupant  are  absolute  and 
supreme,  and  immediately  operate  upon  the  political  condition  of 
the  inhabitants,  the  municipal  laws  of  the  conquered  territory, 
such  as  affect  private  rights  of  person  and  property  and  provide 
for  the  punishment  of  crime,  are  considered  as  continuing  in  force, 
so  far  as  they  are  compatible  with  the  new  order  of  things,  until 
they  are  suspended  or  superseded  by  the  occupying  belligerent,  and 
in  practice  they  are  not  usually  abrogated,  but  are  allowed  to  re- 
main in  force  and  to  be  administered  by  the  ordinary  tribunals, 
substantially  as  they  were  before  the  occupation.  This  enlightened 
practice  is,  so  far  as  possible,  to  be  adhered  to  on  the  present  occa- 
sion. The  judges  and  the  other  officials  connected  with  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice  may,  if  they  accept  the  supremacy  of  the 
United  States,  continue  to  administer  the  ordinary  law  of  the  land, 
as  between  man  and  man,  under  the  supervision  of  the  American 
Commander-in-Chief.  The  native  constabulary  will,  so  far  as 
may  be  practicable,  be  preserved.  The  freedom  of  the  people  to 
pursue  their  accustomed  occupations  will  be  abridged  only  when 
it  may  be  necessary  to  do  so.” 

Upon  the  assumption  of  full  control  of  the  Island,  on 
Jan.  1,  1899,  General  Brooke  issued  a proclamation  in 
which  the  following  paragraph  appears: 

“The  civil  and  criminal  code  which  prevailed  prior  to  the 
relinquishment  of  Spanish  sovereignty  will  remain  in  force,  with 
such  modifications  and  changes  as  may  from  time  to  time  be  found 
necessary  in  the  interests  of  good  government.” 

Although  not  so  stated,  this  order  presumably  established 
all  the  laws  then  existing,  subject  to  changes  made  when 
change  seemed  necessary  or  desirable.  Otherwise,  Cuba 
has  had  no  laws  except  the  Civil  and  the  Criminal  codes, 
supplemented  by  the  military  authority  of  the  Governor 
General.  The  tenor  of  General  Brooke’s  proclamation, 
drafted  by  the  authorities  in  Washington,  was  an  endorse- 


310 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


ment  and  combination  of  the  President’s  order  of  July  13, 
1898. 

The  place  occupied  in  all  this  by  that  autonomous  govern- 
ment which  was  proclaimed  in  November,  1897,  is  some- 
what indefinite.  Such  a government  was  proclaimed  by 
Spain,  and,  after  a peculiar  process  of  general  elections, 
was  inaugurated  in  May,  1898.  Its  Constitution,  if  it  ever 
had  one,  was  never  ratified  by  the  Cortes,  as  prescribed  by 
the  Spanish  Decree.  But  the  representatives  of  a presum- 
ably organized  autonomous  government  met,  made  speeches, 
passed  laws,  and  adjourned.  No  session  was  held  after  the 
signing  of  the  protocol,  and  General  Blanco  dissolved  the 
chambers  in  October,  1898.  The  experience  of  the  autono- 
mous government  was  manifestly  irregular,  and  its  acts 
have  been  ignored. 

During  the  Spanish  regime , the  Supreme  Court  of  Cuba 
was  at  Madrid.  This  relation  terminated  with  the  relin- 
quishment of  Spanish  sovereignty  in  the  Island.  On  April 
14,  1899,  there  was  issued  Civil  Order  No.  41,  whose  open- 
ing paragraph  is  as  follows: 

“A  Supreme  Court  is  hereby  created,  which  shall  sit  in  the 
capital  of  the  Island,  and  which  shall  have  and  shall  exercise  juris- 
diction throughout  Cuban  territory.  No  other  court  or  tribunal 
shall  have  the  same  title,  character,  or  category.” 

Other  paragraphs  provided  for  the  personnel  of  the  court, 
for  its  functions,  and  for  the  functions  of  its  various  officers 
and  for  their  salaries.  Civil  Order  No.  92,  dated  June  26, 
declares  the  grounds  upon  which  appeal  may  be  taken  to 
the  higher  court  and  the  processes  necessary  in  such  appeal. 

Civil  Order  No.  80,  June  15,  provided  for  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  Audievcias , one  in  each  of  the  six  provinces  of 
the  Island.  These  exercised  civil  and  criminal  jurisdiction 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


311 


within  the  boundaries  of  their  special  territory.  This  was  a 
reestablishment  of  the  Spanish  system,  with  the  exception 
that,  under  that  system,  only  the  Audiencias  of  Havana, 
Matanzas,  and  Santa  Clara  possessed  jurisdiction  in  civil 
matters;  Havana  having  civil  jurisdiction  over  Pinar  del 
Rio;  Matanzas  over  Santa  Clara;  and  Santiago  over  Puerto 
Principe.  The  new  law  gave  equal  powers  to  all.  The 
order  provided  for  the  constitution  of  the  courts,  the 
attributes,  and  the  salaries  of  officials  and  employes. 

Below  the  Audiencias  came  the  Courts  of  First  Instance. 
These  were  regulated  by  Civil  Order  No.  205,  under  date 
of  Oct.  28,  1899.  The  next  in  order  are  the  Municipal 
Courts,  and  below  them  the  Correctional  or  Police  Courts 
established  in  Havana,  by  General  Ludlow,  with  excellent 
results  though  without  proper  authority.  The  Correctional 
Court  in  Havana  was  given  legal  status  by  General  Wood, 
several  months  after  its  institution  by  General  Ludlow,  and 
similar  courts  were  established  in  other  cities. 

That  a fundamental  change  in  the  existing  laws  was  con- 
sidered during  the  earlier  days  of  American  occupation,  is 
indicated  by  the  report  of  General  Brooke,  under  the  cap- 
tion of  Laws,  dated  Dec.  20,  1899.  It  is  there  said  that: 

“The  difference  in  the  system  of  laws  found  existing  here  and 
that  practised  in  the  United  States,  and  the  difference  of  language, 
prevented  any  immediate  radical  change. 

“To  have  introduced  the  American  system  at  once  would  have 
produced  chaos  in  the  courts,  for  neither  the  judges  nor  the  lawyers 
could  have  understood  or  practised  it.  The  changes,  therefore, 
have  been  marie  in  most  important  matters  just  as  rapidly  as  the 
necessity  therefor,  or  advantage  thereof,  could  be  marie  understood 
by  the  Cuban  people.  The  most  important  unfinished  work  in 
this  respect  is  the  Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus,  which  hns  been  under 
consideration  for  some  time.  It  is  contended  by  the  Cuban  lawyers 


312 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


that  the  remedies  covered  by  this  writ  are  already  provided  for  in 
their  laws,  but  under  a different  form  — a method  of  appeal, 
instead  of  by  summary  proceedings.  It  is  believed,  however,  that 
the  method  of  procedure  in  this  respect  may  yet  be  changed,  and 
that  this  can  be  done  without  material  conflict  with  the  existing 
system.  In  any  such  change  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  effect 
it  will  have  upon  the  general  system  of  law  now  in  force.” 

The  consideration  of  the  question  of  radical  change  is 
also  indicated  in  the  report,  dated  Sept.  30,  1899,  of  Lieut. - 
Col.  E.  S.  Dudley,  Judge  Advocate  on  the  staff  of  the  Mili- 
tary Governor.  He  there  says: 

“Radical  changes  in  the  law  which  might  be  made  in  territory 
wholly  subject  to  the  United  States,  with  a view  to  the  introduction 
of  American  systems  of  law  or  procedure,  cannot  well  be  made  in 
a country  which  we  are  holding,  as  a friendly  territory,  under 
belligerent  rights  acquired  through  our  war  with  Spain,  with  the 
object  of  enabling  a stable  government  to  be  established.  It  is 
necessary  to  consult  the  views  of  the  representatives  of  the  people 
who  are  to  form  the  new  government,  as  to  such  changes,  and  to 
act  in  accordance  with  what  will  be  for  the  best  interest  of  their 
future,  setting  aside  our  own  personal  views;  for  they  have  grown 
up  under  an  entirely  different  system  of  government  from  our  own, 
are  accustomed  to  their  own  laws  and  methods  of  procedure,  and 
it  is  not  easy  to  change  the  entire  customs  of  a people,  even  for  the 
better,  until  they  are  educated  to  the  necessity  therefor  and  the 
wisdom  of  doing  it.  It  is  necessary,  also,  before  such  changes  are 
made,  to  consider  the  effect  upon  the  entire  system  of  laws,  as  some 
proposed  changes,  if  many  in  number,  would  result  in  the  necessity 
for  a complete  change  of  the  system,  and  for  that  the  people  are 
not  yet  prepared. 

“We  must  have  regard  to  the  race  of  men,  their  education,  cus- 
toms, conditions  under  which  they  were  born  and  have  lived,  and 
the  ideas  with  which  they  are  imbued.  Thus  it  wall  be  seen  that 
in  Cuba  it  is  better  to  ‘make  haste  slowly’  than  to  enforce  laws 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


313 


antagonistic  to  the  people,  and  which  they  will  not  appreciate  until 
educated  to  it.” 

It  would  appear  that  the  views  of  General  Brooke  and  his 
Judge  Advocate  were  not  fully  endorsed  by  the  succeeding 
administration.  It  is  possible  that  Secretary'  of  Justice 
Gener  found  favor  in  the  sight  of  his  chief  by  reason  of  his 
expression  of  more  radical  views.  In  his  report  dated  Oct. 
31,  1900,  that  official  says: 

“With  the  disappearance  of  the  secular  sovereignty  of  Spain, 
all  our  judicial  institutions  were  disorganized,  as  they  had  their 
roots  imbedded  in  the  said  sovereignty.  . . . The  political  order 
of  things  which  for  four  centuries  prevailed  in  Cuba  having  been 
essentially  modified,  the  sovereignty  that  served  as  a foundation 
having  been  destroyed,  the  necessity  of  modifying  legal  procedure 
became  and  continues  to  be  absolutely  needed.  ...  If  here  the 
colonial  laws  should  be  left  intact,  if  the  old  judicial  regime  were 
adhered  to,  it  would  result  that  the  revolution  would  be  exclusively 
limited  to  the  expulsion  of  Spain  from  Cuba.  ...  If  this  were  the 
case  the  people  would  not  receive  from  the  revolution  all  the  benefits 
to  which  they  are  entitled,  inasmuch  as  in  essence  the  laws  of  the 
vanquished  regime  would  continue  to  exist.  The  effects  of  the 
Cuban  revolution  and  of  the  war  that  the  United  States  engaged 
in  against  Spain,  . . . must  of  necessity  be  felt  in  all  parts  of  our 
legal  life,  as  the  revolution  in  Cuba  was  not  solely  for  the  purpose 
of  putting  one  government  in  the  place  of  another,  one  bureaucracy 
in  the  place  of  another  bureaucracy,  but  was  for  the  purpose  of 
establishing  some  institutions  in  the  place  of  other  ones.” 

“Therefore,  the  undersigned  Secretary  believes  that,  without 
detriment  to  what  at  the  proper  time  the  future  government  of 
Cuba  may  decide  upon,  the  one  which  at  the  present  time  rules 
the  destinies  of  the  country  should  not  neglect  to  fulfil  its  mission 
of  modifying  or  reforming  the  laws  that  required  to  be  modified  or 
reformed.” 


314 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


While  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  personal  jealousy  and 
partisan  politics  entered  into  the  question,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  the  extent  of  the  legal  reform  essayed  by  the  Military 
Governor  and  his  Secretary  of  Justice  brought  on  the  serious 
antagonism  of  a considerable  number  of  the  members  of 
the  insular  bar,  and  led  to  a controversy  which  resulted  in 
the  issuance  of  Civil  Order  No.  500.  This  abolished  an 
association  of  long  establishment,  known  as  the  College  of 
Lawyers.  The  suppression  of  this  institution  met  with 
both  approval  and  condemnation. 

The  faults  and  the  abuses  of  the  Spanish  methods  of  pro- 
cedure were  many  and  flagrant.  Judges  sat  in  offices  at 
their  places  of  residence,  and  the  clerk  of  any  special  judge 
might  live  at  the  opposite  end  of  the  city,  likewise  perform- 
ing the  duties  of  his  office  at  his  residence.  The  system  of 
fees,  instead  of  fixed  salaries,  to  both  judge  and  clerk,  left 
law  and  legal  proceedings  quite  a matter  of  commerce,  with 
a judgment  to  plaintiff  or  defendant  according  to  the  amount 
of  the  fees  extractable  from  either  or  both.  Commenting 
upon  this  point,  Judge  Advocate  Dudley  says,  in  his  re- 
port dated  Sept.  30,  1899: 

“Much  of  the  corruption  which  existed  in  the  courts  under  the 
Spanish  regime  was  due  to  the  system  of  payment  of  municipal 
judges,  and  the  subordinate  clerks  or  employees  of  all  courts, 
especially  in  criminal  cases,  by  fees  instead  of  salaries.  The  de- 
mand for  fees  outside  of  the  legitimate  allowances  was  so  habitual 
that  it  became  a ‘custom  of  the  country,’  and  in  important  matters 
payment  thereof  was  necessary  to  secure  prompt  transaction  of 
business.  The  methods  of  collection  of  such  illegal  fees  had, 
through  long  years  of  use,  attained  the  highest  point  of  perfection, 
and  it  was  difficult  to  say  what  official  was  free  from  it.  It  was  so 
customary  that  the  thought  of  moral  wrong  does  not  seem  to  have 
attached  to  it,  and  it  will  probably  only  disappear  under  new 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


315 


methods  of  procedure  and  education  as  to  moral  principles  of 
right  and  wrong  in  money  matters.  The  system  of  government 
at  a distance  by  Spain,  through  officials  who  apparently  used  their 
offices  for  personal  purposes  and  to  attain  private  wealth,  has  left 
its  effect  on  these  people  who  have  for  centuries  lived  under  it,  and 
it  will  probably  take  some  years  to  completely  change  the  wrong 
ideas  with  which  many  office  holders  seem  to  have  become  imbued.” 

An  important,  and  in  many  ways' desirable  change  was 
made  by  the  issuance  of  the  following: 

Civil  Order  No.  523. 

Headquarters  Department  of  Cuba. 

Havana,  December  31,  1900. 

The  Military  Governor  of  Cuba,  upon  the  recommendation  of 
the  Secretary  of  Justice,  directs  the  publication  of  the  following 
order : 

I.  From  and  after  the  first  day  of  February,  1901,  all  Court 
Recorders,  Officials,  and  Clerks  in  the  Courts  of  First  Instance  and 
Instruction  of  this  Island,  shall  cease  in  their  functions,  and  shall 
be  replaced  in  their  respective  positions  by  Court  Recorders, 
Assistant  Court  Recorders,  and  Clerks,  who  shall  be  named  for  the 
purpose,  according  to  the  list  inserted  at  the  end  of  this  order. 

II.  The  salaries  that  shall  be  paid  will  be  those  specified  in  the 
said  list,  and  will  be  paid  by  the  General  Treasury  of  this  Island. 

III.  The  Court  Recorders  and  Assistant  Court  Recorders  shall 
be  appointed  by  the  Department  of  Justice,  after  the  examination 
of  presented  certificates  of  comparative  qualifications  during  a 
period  of  twenty  days.  The  clerks  shall  be  appointed  by  the  re- 
spective Judges  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  proper  Court 
Recorders. 

IV.  Candidates  for  the  positions  of  Court  Recorder  or  Assistant 
Court  Recorder  shall  present  their  certified  petitions  to  the  proper 
Judges,  who  will  forward  them  on  the  day  following  that  on  which 
the  period  for  receiving  certificates  of  competitive  examinations 
closes,  to  the  Department  of  Justice  in  a sealed  and  registered 


316 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


envelope,  together  with  a report  as  to  the  physical,  moral,  and 
intellectual  conditions  of  each  candidate. 

V.  For  the  occupancy  of  said  positions  there  shall  be  preferred 
indiscriminately  candidates  who  possess  diplomas  of  Lawyers  or 
Notaries  or  who  have  performed  or  are  still  performing  the  duties 
of  Court  Recorders. 

VI.  The  provisional  appointments  of  Court  Recorders  or  As- 
sistant Court  Recorders  shall  be  made  by  the  Department  of  Justice 
after  hearing  the  opinion  of  the  proper  Judges,  or  by  the  latter, 
after  due  authorization  from  the  said  Department. 

VII.  The  Records,  both  civil  as  well  as  criminal,  which  are 
to-day  in  charge  of  Court  Recorders  shall  be  distributed  among 
the  Court  Recorders  that  may  be  appointed,  in  the  most  equitable 
form  in  accordance  with  the  opinion  of  the  proper  Judge. 

VIII.  From  and  after  the  first  day  of  February,  1901,  the 
Administration  of  Justice  in  all  Courts  of  First  Instance  and 
Instruction  of  this  Island  shall  not  entail  the  payment  of  any  fees 
whatsoever. 

IX.  From  and  after  the  first  day  of  February,  1901,  the  “Juzgado 
de  Guardia”  of  Havana  shall  consist  of  a special  personnel  exclu- 
sively dedicated  to  the  duties  thereof,  appointed  by  the  Department 
of  Justice  according  to  the  provisions  contained  in  the  attached 
list,  who  shall  receive  the  salaries  specified  therein  and  which  will 
be  paid  by  the  General  Treasury  of  this  Island. 

X.  From  and  after  the  first  day  of  February,  1901,  the  four 
Courts  of  First  Instance  and  Instruction  and  that  of  “ Guardia ” 
of  Havana,  shall  be  installed  in  one  building  which  will  be  furnished 
by  the  Government;  for  which  installation  and  maintenance,  in- 
cluding salaries  of  employes,  the  necessary  amount  will  be  allotted 
in  accordance  with  provision  made  in  attached  list. 

XI.  From  and  after  the  first  day  of  February,  1901,  the  Judges 
of  First  Instance  and  Instruction  of  Havana  shall  not  receive  the 
sums  allotted  for  house  rent,  and  the  Court  Recorders  who  at  the 
present  time  have  salaries  assigned  by  the  Government  shall  cease 
enjoyment  thereof. 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


317 


XII.  The  Secretary  of  Justice  is  hereby  authorized  to  secure 
a building  possessing  the  necessary  conditions  to  install  therein 
the  four  Courts  of  First  Instance  and  Instruction  and  that  of 
“ Guardia”  Havana,  and  to  recommend  to  the  Military'  Governor 
the  conditions  for  the  lease  of  said  building,  in  accordance  with 
the  attached  list,  as  well  as  the  estimate  of  the  alterations  and 
repairs  that  may  have  to  be  made  thereon,  the  cost  of  which  shall 
not  exceed  four  thousand  dollars,  consulting  with  the  Secretary  of 
Public  Works  as  to  the  preparation  of  said  estimate. 

XIII.  This  order  shall  go  into  effect  from  the  date  of  its  publi- 
cation in  the  Official  Gazette  of  Havana,  and  on  the  same  day  the 
period  granted  for  the  presentation  of  certificates  of  qualifications 
to  which  paragraph  III  refers  shall  also  commence. 

XIV.  All  legal  rulings  that  may  be  antagonistic  to  the  provisions 
contained  in  this  order  are  hereby  declared  to  be  null  and  void. 

XV.  The  Department  of  Justice  shall  decide  all  matters  of  doubt 
that  may  arise  in  the  enforcement  of  this  order,  and  will  institute 
the  proper  measures  for  the  canying  out  thereof. 

H.  L.  Scott, 

Adjutant  General. 

Yet,  notwithstanding  the  changes  effected,  some  of  mani- 
fest and  some  of  doubtful  benefit,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
after  three  years  of  full  American  control  of  all  such  matters 
so  little  was  accomplished,  in  fact,  that  the  Cuban  people 
were  quite  as  reluctant  as  ever  to  take  their  cases  to  court. 
In  no  other  department  of  the  life  of  the  Island,  excepting 
the  industrial,  was  so  little  really  accomplished  as  in  that  of 
such  supreme  importance  as  the  Department  of  Law  and 
Justice. 

Of  change  in  the  laws,  of  amplification,  modification,  and 
of  the  creation  of  new  laws,  there  was  an  abundance.  Some 
of  these  changes  were  effected  on  the  ground  of  “military 
necessity.”  Yet  it  is  to  be  remembered  that,  although  the 
administration  was  nominally  a military  government,  there 


318 


LAW  AND  JUSTICE 


was  no  martial  law,  and  civil  law  had  been  proclaimed  as 
the  law  of  the  land. 

Some  justification  for  our  manipulation  of  Cuban  laws 
might  have  existed  had  the  work  been  done  under  the  super- 
vision of  duly  competent  legal  minds.  Presumably,  the 
changes  were  effected  at  the  instance  of  the  Cuban  Secretary 
of  Justice,  and  such  orders  generally  opened  with  the  state- 
ment that  they  were  issued  upon  the  recommendation  of 
that  official.  In  some  cases,  it  is  probable  that  the  Secretary 
was  the  instigator.  In  the  majority  of  instances,  that 
official  was  the  tool  and  instrument  of  the  military  adminis- 
trator. If  that  authority  disapproved  an  existing  law,  he 
effected  its  repeal  or  its  modification.  If  he  desired  to  do 
that  which  required  a law,  and  none  existed  suitable  to  his 
purposes,  he  issued  the  law,  through  the  Department  of 
Justice,  and  closed  its  statement  with  the  declaration  that 
“All  provisions  of  codes,  laws,  decrees,  or  orders  in  conflict 
with  this  order,  are  hereby  repealed  and  revoked.” 


Chapter  XX 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 

THE  ISLE  OF  PINES 

Article  VI  of  the  Platt  Amendment  declares  that  “The 
Isle  of  Pines  shall  be  omitted  from  the  boundaries  of  Cuba 
specified  in  the  Constitution,  the  title  and  ownership  thereof 
to  be  left  to  future  adjustment  by  treaty.” 

The  basis  of  America’s  gossamer  claim  to  the  Isle  of  Pines, 
the  ownership  of  which  is  thus  to  be  determined,  rests  in  a 
distorted  interpretation  of  the  letter  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris. 
In  its  reference  to  the  cession  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  that 
instrument  defines  by  lines  of  latitude  and  longitude  the 
territory  ceded.  In  its  reference  to  the  West  Indian  territory, 
it  is  less  explicit.  Article  I declares  that  “Spain  relinquishes 
all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  and  title  to  Cuba.”  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  in  the  minds  of  the  Commissioners  this  re- 
linquishment included  the  chain  of  islands  and  keys  which 
almost  surrounds  the  main  Island,  and  which  has  always 
been  held  and  regarded  as  part  and  parcel  of  Spain’s  Cuban 
colony.  Presumably,  Article  I disposes  of  the  Cuban  area. 
Article  II  refers  to  Porto  Rico,  and  states  that  “Spain  cedes 
to  the  United  States  the  Island  of  Porto  Rico  and  other 
Islands  now  under  Spanish  sovereignty  in  the  West  Indies.” 
So  runs  the  instrument  in  its  English  form.  In  its  Spanish 
version,  the  phrase  reads  “ Porto  Rico  and  the  other  Islands.” 
No  reasonable  ground  exists  for  any  doubt  that  the  Islands 
thus  referred  to  were  Mona,  Vicquez,  and  Culebra,  all  of 


320 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


them  in  Porto  Rican  waters.  It  is  a fair  supposition  that  if 
the  American  Commissioners  had  laid  claim  to  that  which 
had  always  been  held  and  regarded  as  part  and  parcel  of 
Cuba’s  territory,  such  area  would  not  have  been  surrendered 
without  vigorous  protest  and  prolonged  discussion.  There 
is  no  ground  whatever  for  any  belief  that  American  owner- 
ship of  the  Isle  of  Pines  even  entered  the  minds  of  the  Com- 
missioners, either  Spanish  or  American.  Yet,  under  this 
reference  to  the  “other  Islands  under  Spanish  sovereignty 
in  the  West  Indies,”  interested  parties  set  up  the  claim  to 
the  Isle  of  Pines.  Such  an  interpretation  would  also  give 
to  the  United  States  Cayo  Romano,  Cayo  Coco,  the  Jardines 
de  la  Reina,  and  all  the  hundreds  of  small  islands  of  the 
Cuban  coast,  a step  never  intended  by  any  of  the  parties 
to  the  relinquishment  of  Cuba  and  the  cession  of  Porto  Rico 
and  “other  islands.”  The  total  area  of  these  many  small 
islands  is  greater  than  that  of  the  Isle  of  Pines.  But  they 
are  worthless,  strategically,  and  practically  valueless  in- 
dustrially. The  census  of  1899  gives  the  Isle  of  Pines  a 
population  of  “2,990  Cubans,  195  Spaniards,  and  14  others.” 
A few  score  of  Americans  have  since  been  induced  to  settle 
there  upon  representations  that  it  was  American  territory, 
and  would  remain  under  American  jurisdiction. 

No  alternative  appears  between  cession  and  no  cession 
by  the  Treaty  of  Paris.  That  there  was  no  such  cession 
is  established  by  the  Platt  Amendment  itself.  Cession 
would  have  made  it  American  territory,  and  alienation  by 
such  a process  would  have  been  impossible.  Yet  the  claim 
was  made  and,  for  a time,  some  of  the  authorities  in  Wash- 
ington were  disposed  to  stand  by  it.  Their  contention  was 
seriously  weakened  by  the  acts  of  General  Wood,  at  the 
time  of  the  American  withdrawal  from  Cuba.  Among  the 
documents  of  the  ceremony  of  transfer  there  appeared  a 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


Si  1 


communication  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  marked  “ Letter 
D.”  This  contained  the  following  passage:  “It  is  under- 
stood by  the  United  States  that  the  present  government 
( i.e . the  Military)  of  the  Isle  of  Pines  will  continue  as  a de 
facto  government  pending  the  settlement  of  the  title  to  said 
island,  etc.,  etc.”  To  this,  President  Palma  replied  as 
follows:  “It  is  understood  that  the  Isle  of  Pines  is  to  con- 
tinue de  facto  under  the  jurisdiction,  of  the  Government  of 
the  Republic  of  Cuba,  etc.,  etc.”  General  Wood  either 
failed  to  notice  or  saw  fit  to  disregard  this  definite  contradic- 
tion of  his  instructions  from  Washington,  and  upon  his  de- 
parture he  made  no  provision  whatever,  by  local  representa- 
tion or  otherwise,  for  a continuance  of  the  American  au- 
thority. The  Cuban  Republic  proceeded  to  administer 
the  affairs  of  the  Isle  of  Pines  as  it  did  the  affairs  of  the 
main  Island. 

Politically,  geographically,  and  legally,  by  several  centuries 
of  legal  and  political  affiliation,  the  Isle  of  Pines  belongs  to 
Cuba  as  Nantucket  belongs  to  the  United  States,  and  as 
the  Isle  of  Wight  belongs  to  England.  It  is  in  no  way  to 
our  credit  that  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  filch  it  from  her. 
Without  the  expenditure  of  a vast  amount  of  money,  it  is 
strategically  worthless,  and  there  exists  neither  legal  nor 
moral  ground  upon  which  we  can  lay  claim  to  it  without  lay- 
ing ourselves  open  to  charges  of  “criminal  aggression”  so 
vigorously  reprobated  by  Mr.  McKinley. 

The  island  lies  some  fifty  miles  from  the  southern  coast  of 
Cuba,  almost  directly  southward  from  Havana.  It  is  sepa- 
rated from  the  mainland  by  a stretch  of  shallow  water  dotted 
with  coral  keys  and  mangrove  islets.  So  shallow  are  these 
intervening  waters  Unit  people  of  the  region  declare  that 
cattle  have  actually  crossed  on  foot  between  the  island  and 
the  mainland.  Its  area  is  given  as  840  square  miles.  It 


322 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


is,  in  effect,  two  islands  connected  by  a marshy  area.  The 
northern  section  is  broken  and  hilly  while  the  southern 
section  is  a somewhat  sandy  level.  The  possible  products 
are  similar  to  those  of  the  mainland.  There  are  mineral 
springs  of  some  medicinal  virtue,  and  a marble  quarry  of 
some,  though  probably  not  of  great  value.  There  are 
sponge  fisheries  and  large  tracts  of  fertile  land.  The  cli- 
mate is  delightful. 

CHURCH  AND  CHURCH  PROPERTY  QUESTIONS 

Among  the  legacies  left  to  the  Government  of  Intervention, 
the  Church  property  question  was  one  of  notable  difficulties. 
The  incoming  government  found  various  buildings  occupied 
and  used  for  State  purposes,  upon  which  the  Church  held 
claims.  The  matter  is  not  a little  complicated,  involving 
as  it  does  points  of  Spanish  law  which  have  no  parallel  in 
American  jurisprudence.  Prior  to  the  nineteenth  century 
there  appears  to  have  been  no  question  regarding  the  titles 
of  property  held  by  the  Church.  During  the  opening  years 
of  that  century,  the  property  held  by  the  monastic  orders 
in  Spain  was  confiscated  by  the  State.  The  order  of  con- 
fiscation related  to  Spain’s  peninsula  territory,  and  not  to 
her  insular  possessions. 

About  the  year  1837,  Captain  General  Miguel  Tacon,  in 
the  furtherance  of  certain  plans,  raked  up  the  Spanish  con- 
fiscation act  and  sought  to  apply  it  to  the  holdings  of  monas- 
tic orders  in  Cuba.  In  November  and  December  of  1841, 
Valdes,  then  Governor  of  the  Island,  seized  these  properties, 
and  diverted  them  to  the  uses  of  the  State.  The  more  im- 
portant of  these  seizures  included  the  Convent  of  the  Fran- 
ciscans, since  and  now  used  as  the  Custom  House  in  Havana; 
the  Convent  of  the  Dominicans,  which,  at  the  time  of  the 
American  occupation,  was  used  by  the  Institute  and  the 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


323 


University  of  Havana;  the  Convent  of  the  Augustinians, 
used  as  the  Academy  of  Sciences;  and  the  Convent  of  San 
Ysidro,  used  by  the  Spanish  as  a military  barracks,  and,  at 
first,  as  a relief  station  by  the  Americans,  and  later,  by  the 
authority  of  General  Ludlow,  as  a training  school  for  orphan 
girls.  There  were  also  various  other  real  estate  holdings,  as 
well  as  funds,  claims,  and  censos. 

This  action  was  contested  by  the  Church  authorities, 
through  Madrid  and  Rome,  on  the  ground  that  the  order 
under  which  the  seizure  was  made  did  not  apply  to  the 
Island  of  Cuba.  In  1845,  a report  of  the  action  was  sub- 
mitted to  Isabel  II,  then  Queen  of  Spain,  who  is  said  to 
have  expressed  great  surprise  and  to  have  ordered  the  resto- 
ration of  the  property.  But  the  order  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  put  into  the  form  of  a royal  decree  or  law,  and  was 
non-effective.  To  the  royal  instructions  the  local  authori- 
ties in  Cuba  replied  that  such  restoration  was  then  impos- 
sible, for  two  reasons: 

(1)  Because  a large  part  of  the  property  had  been  sold 
and  had  passed  into  the  hands  of  third  parties. 

(2)  Because  other  parts  had  been  converted  to  public 
uses,  such  as  custom  houses,  etc.,  and  their  use  for  those 
purposes  was  necessary  to  the  State. 

The  matter  dragged  on  as  a subject  of  correspondence 
for  several  years.  In  1849  or  1850,  a commission  was  ap- 
pointed, two  members  of  which  were  chosen  by  the  Pope, 
and  two  by  the  Spanish  Crown.  The  purpose  of  this  com- 
mission was  the  equitable  adjustment  of  the  claims  of  the 
Church.  In  1851,  they  drew  up  a document  known  as  the 
concordat,  or  agreement,  upon  the  findings  and  conclusions 
of  which  all  subsequent  relations  have  been  based.  Phis 
was  approved  by  both  parties  on  March  7,  1852.  It  became, 
in  the  nature  of  a treaty  or  contract,  of  legally  binding  force. 


324 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


All  subsequent  legislation  relating  to  Church  property  in 
dispute,  and  to  Church  claims  for  indemnity,  has  rested  on 
this  concordat.  The  document  covered  not  only  insular 
but  peninsular  Church  property,  and  included  clauses  having 
direct  reference  to  the  property  in  Cuba.  Among  these 
stands  Article  38,  which  revokes  the  earlier  order  of  con- 
fiscation, and  orders  the  colonial  authorities  to  restore  to 
the  Church  the  property  remaining  unsold  and  not  converted 
to  public  Uses,  and  to  make  valuation,  according  to  canon 
law,  of  the  portion  sold  or  converted  to  public  uses,  and  to 
issue  three  per  cent  bonds  of  the  consolidated  debt  of  Spain, 
in  satisfaction  of  the  appraisement. 

The  first  part  of  this  law  was  duly  complied  with  by  the 
restoration  of  the  specified  portion.  The  colonial  authori- 
ties objected  to  the  second  provision  on  the  ground  that 
such  bonds  were  non-negotiable  in  the  Island  of  Cuba  and 
that  their  issuance  would  be  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of 
Cuban  holders.  In  answer  to  this,  there  was  issued,  on 
Nov.  26,  1852,  a Royal  Cedula  which  provided,  in  lieu  of 
the  issue  of  such  bonds,  an  order  for  a valuation  of  the  sold 
and  appropriated  property,  the  valuation  to  be  acceptable 
to  both  parties,  the  Church  and  the  State,  and  a separate 
funded  debt  instituted  whose  income  should  be  turned  over 
annually  to  the  Bishop,  for  the  maintenance  of  public  wor- 
ship and  the  support  of  the  clergy.  By  this  act,  it  was  held 
that  the  Spanish  authorities  had  definitely  and  legally  recog- 
nized the  indebtedness  of  the  State  to  the  Church.  All 
further  sale  of  the  property  was  stopped,  it  being  admitted 
that  such  property  was  only  held  in  trust,  the  Church  to 
derive  an  income  therefrom  until  such  time  as,  should  it 
so  elect,  the  Government  should  obtain  full  title  by  the  pay- 
ment to  the  Church  of  die  full  sum  of  the  appraisal.  The 
financial  obligation  assumed  by  the  Government  under  this 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


325 


provision  was  duly  and  regularly  paid  by  the  Spanish  authori- 
ties up  to  the  date  of  the  Spanish  evacuation,  on  Jan.  1, 
1899.  Naturally,  under  the  new  order,  with  the  definite 
termination  of  the  political  affiliation  between  Church  and 
State,  these  payments  ceased  with  the  American  occupation, 
although  the  new  government,  pending  legal  determination 
of  the  matter,  continued  to  hold  and  use  the  properties  in- 
volved, as  State  buildings  surrendered  with  other  edifices 
by  the  Government  of  Spain. 

Such  was  the  state  of  the  case  when  the  American  Govern- 
ment took  possession  of  the  Island.  The  option  lay  for  that 
Government  to  continue  the  annual  payments  to  the  Bishop, 
a sum  amounting  to  $250,000  to  $300,000  per  annum,  or  to 
meet  the  original  obligation  by  paying  to  the  Church  a lump 
sum  which  would  represent  the  present  value  of  the  proper- 
ties. The  matter  remained  a subject  of  discussion  and  con- 
sideration until  Aug,  15,  1900,  when  Civil  Order  No.  321 
was  issued,  making  provision  for  a commission  of  three  “to 
investigate,  and  report  upon  the  claims  of  property  and 
property  rights  of  every  kind  and  nature  made  by  the  Bishop- 
ric of  Havana.”  On  October  10,  another  commission  was 
appointed  for  the  same  work  in  the  Archbishopric  of  Santiago 
de  Cuba. 

Upon  this  matter,  as  upon  so  many  others,  there  arises 
the  question  of  justification  for  American  interference  with 
an  affair  which  involved  interests  of  importance  to  the 
Cubans,  and  which  was,  rightfully,  for  Cuban  determination. 
It  is  true  that  the  Church  authorities  were  urgent  for  its 
adjustment,  but  their  special  motive  for  this  urgency  lay 
in  their  belief  that  they  would  obtain  more  liberal  terms  of 
settlement  from  American  than  from  Cuban  authority. 

The  commission  for  the  district  of  Havana  reached  its 
conclusions  during  the  year  1901,  and  its  findings  were 


326 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


accepted  by  the  Church  authorities  and  the  Military  Gover- 
nor. The  Government  paid  to  the  Church  the  sum  of 
$868,657.81  for  the  discharge  of  censos  and  capellanias,  for 
the  payment  of  back  rent  from  Jan.  1,  1899,  and  for  sundry 
reimbursements.  The  property  occupied  by  the  State  was 
valued  at  $1,499,550,  and  it  was  agreed  that  the  State  should 
pay  upon  this  a rental  at  the  rate  of  five  per  cent  with  the 
option  of  purchasing  at  the  appraised  value  within  five  years. 

The  agreement  regarding  the  Santiago  property  was 
reached  on  Jan.  11,  1902,  and  settlement  was  effected  sub- 
stantially upon  the  same  basis  as  that  provided  for  the 
Havana  district;  $82,579.16  was  paid  in  adjustment  of  the 
various  outstanding  claims.  The  rate  of  interest  to  be  paid 
as  rental  for  the  property  used  by  the  Government  was  fixed 
at  three  per  cent  instead  of  five  per  cent,  as  in  the  Havana 
district.  This  was  by  reason  of  the  lesser  value  and  utility 
of  the  properties  involved.  The  valuation  of  these  properties 
was  fixed  at  $535,000,  with  a five-year  option  of  purchase  at 
the  sums  fixed  as  the  value  of  the  various  holdings. 

Two  parties  to  these  conclusions  appear  to  have  been 
quite  satisfied  with  the  outcome.  These  were  General 
Wood  and  the  Church  authorities.  From  much  that  was 
said  after  the  American  withdrawal  there  is  reason  for  in- 
ference that  some  portion  of  the  Cuban  people  and  Cuban 
leaders  were  less  pleased,  and  desire  was  manifested  in  some 
quarters  to  discover  means  of  invalidating  the  contract. 
This  desire  was  defeated  by  Article  IV  of  the  Platt  Amend- 
ment. The  satisfaction  of  the  Church  is  indicated  by  the 
following  extract  from  the  Catholic  News: 

“That  Bishop  Sbarretti  has  been  successful  in  this  mission  is 
apparent  from  the  tangible  results  achieved  in  Havana.  He  has 
happily  arranged  an  understanding  regarding  the  status  of  the 
Church  in  Cuba  under  the  new  order  of  civil  affairs,  at  once  satis- 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


327 


factory  to  religion  and  to  the  Government  interests.  The  drastic 
marriage  law  enacted  by  General  Brooke,  whereby  a Catholic 
priest  was  disqualified  to  give  legal  force  to  the  bond  of  wedlock, 
has,  through  the  energetic  and  patient  efforts  of  the  Bishop,  been 
repealed  by  the  Military  Governor,  General  Wood,  and  a measure 
that  is  highly  satisfactory  to  the  Church  substituted. 

“But  a problem  of  still  greater  moment  was  the  restoration  of 
property  belonging  to  the  Church,  but  which  had  been  sequestered 
by  the  Spanish  during  the  civil  war  that  obtained  in  Spain  and 
her  colonies  after  the  death  of  Ferdinand  VII.  The  happy  solution 
of  this  intricate  problem  had  engaged  the  attention  of  Bishop 
Sbarretti  from  the  date  of  his  entrance  upon  his  duties  in  Havana. 
So  forcibly  and  intelligently  did  the  prelate  present  the  claims  of 
the  Church  that  President  McKinley,  shortly  before  his  lamented 
death,  recognized  the  Bishop’s  contention  and  ordered  justice  to 
be  meted  out  to  the  Catholic  Church  in  the  diocese  of  Havana.” 

The  attitude  of  the  Cuban  people,  as  a whole,  has  not  of 
late  been  notably  cordial  toward  the  Church  as  an  institu- 
tion. This  is  due  in  large  measure  to  the  close  relations 
which  existed  between  the  Church  authorities  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Spanish  Government.  The  Bishop  of 
Havana  was  a member  of  the  Governor  General’s  council. 
The  condemnation  of  the  acts  and  attitude  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Church  in  Cuba,  has  come  from  Homan 
Catholics  themselves  and  not  from  Protestants,  of  whom 
there  were  only  an  insignificant  number  in  the  Island.  The 
priests  were,  with  few  exceptions,  Spaniards,  without  sym- 
pathy for  the  Cuban  people  and  not  responsive  to  their 
aspirations.  To  the  Cubans,  they  stood  as  the  personifica- 
tion of  ignorance,  cupidity,  and  indifference  to  their  holy 
office.  In  treating  of  this  feature  of  the  life  of  the  Island, 
Mr.  Charles  M.  Pepper*  calls  attention  to  the  manifestation 
of  Cuban  feeling  as  shown  in  Cuban  theatres.  He  says: 

*Ttmurrrow  in  Cuba,  p.  ^49. 


328 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


“The  popular  conception  is  shown  in  the  theatres.  In  the  best 
of  the  plays  the  foibles  of  the  cures  or  parish  clergy  are  received  by 
cultivated  audiences  as  suggestive  of  something  grosser.  In  the 
low  variety  theatres  the  grossness  of  the  stage  representation  makes 
the  suggestion  unnecessary.  The  escapades  of  the  cures  are  a 
stock  subject.  . . . The  slanders  and  the  insinuations  of  the  scoffer 
are  ignored  where  holy  living  enforces  the  respect  due  to  the  holy 
office.  A representation  of  Catholic  priests  or  of  Protestant  clergy- 
men such  as  finds  favor  in  Havana  would  be  flat  and  dull  to  a 
depraved  American  audience  because  of  their  consciousness  of  its 
falsity.  In  the  Havana  variety  theatres  the  sauce  comes  from  the 
truthfulness  of  the  suggestions.” 

The  following  appeared  in  a Cuban  newspaper,  El  Grito 
de  Yarn,  in  December,  1898: 

“Cuba,  like  all  of  Latin  America,  has  been  the  refuge  of  the 
Spanish  clergy  expelled  from  their  dioceses,  the  filon  of  ambitious 
prelates.  Here  they  have  come  in  totality,  least  of  all  to  preach 
the  dogma,  to  make  Catholic  propaganda,  to  moralize.  They  have 
shown  their  desire  for  domination.  For  hope,  they  have  substi- 
tuted lucre  and  usury;  for  charity,  tyranny;  the  god  of  the  majority 
of  priests  has  been  the  vile  metal.  In  their  time  of  power  they  were 
not  seeking  to  save  souls  or  to  administer  the  sacraments,  but  to 
make  money,  to  dominate,  to  collect  dues.  Not  to  educate,  but  to 
prostitute.” 

During  the  war,  Te  Deums  were  sung  in  the  churches  for 
Spanish  victories,  and  Cubans  openly  asserted  that  priests 
betrayed  the  secrets  of  the  confessional  to  the  prejudice  of 
the  Cuban  cause,  and,  in  individual  cases,  such  betrayal 
was  held  responsible  for  the  imprisonment  and  execution  of 
Cuban  patriots.  These  complaints  and  the  alleged  attitude 
of  the  priesthood  find  parallel  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  and 
as  in  both  Cuba  and  the  Philippines  the  complainants  are 
at  least  nominal  adherents  of  the  Roman  Catholic  faith, 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


329 


some  weight  must  be  given  them,  and  no  charge  of  sectarian 
prejudice  can  lie  against  their  rehearsal. 

The  attitude  of  the  Church  authorities  toward  the  Govern- 
ment of  Intervention  was  diplomatic.  It  was  not  in  any 
way  openly  hostile,  nor  was  there  any  manifestation  of 
friendliness  or  evidence  of  desire  or  purpose  to  cooperate  in 
the  establishment  of  the  new  institution.  The  attitude  was 
rather  tentative,  tinged  with  some  suspicion  and  an  air  of 
watchfulness.  All  political  and  financial  relations  were, 
of  course,  immediately  severed. 

Prior  to  the  revolution,  a few  Protestant  missions  had 
been  maintained  in  different  parts  of  the  Island,  but  they 
had  secured  no  more  than  a very  weak  and  limited  hold 
upon  a very  small  number  of  the  people.  Coincident  w'itli 
the  military  occupation,  there  appeared  a number  of  Protes- 
tant missionaries  and  a fairly  ready  hearing  was  given  to 
some  of  them  in  the  early  days.  This  was  doubtless  attrib- 
utable to  a certain  reaction  and  to  the  harmony  of  Protestant 
church  methods  with  the  prevailing  sentiment  of  political 
republicanism.  While  some  impetus  has  doubtless  been 
given  to  Protestantism  by  the  experience,  its  permanence  is 
somewhat  doubtful.  The  situation  presents  no  comparison 
with  that  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  'Hie  Filipinos,  men  as 
well  as  women,  are  notably  loyal  in  their  adherence  to  the 
Church  as  an  institution,  and  notably  faithful  in  their  ob- 
servance of  its  services  and  ceremonies.  'Ilie  men  of  Cuba 
manifest  a strong  tendency  toward  agnosticism  and  free- 
thought.  Whether  this  is  the  result  of  an  intellectual  process 
or  a form  of  mere  poll-parrotisrn  w ill  be  determined  largely 
by  the  future  course  of  the  Church.  A faithful  and  earnest 
priesthood,  commanding  respect  and  reverence,  would  un- 
questionably win  many  of  them  back  to  the  arms  of  the 
Church.  In  the  main,  the  Cuban  women  maintain  their 


330 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


attachment  to  the  Church  and  observe  its  ceremonials. 
The  Church  is  by  no  means  a defunct  organism  in  Cuba. 
Its  revivification  will  depend  primarily  upon  the  wisdom  and 
the  righteousness  of  its  local  representatives. 

Something  of  Cuban  opinion  regarding  this  question  at 
the  time  of  the  withdrawal  of  American  authority,  is  in- 
dicated in  the  following  extract  winch  appeared  in  one 
Cuban  paper  of  prominence  (El  Mundo,  Havana),  and  was 
copied  by  another  (La  Lucha,  Havana): 

“ The  clergy  has  lost  in  Cuba  the  power  that  it  had  — our 
people  feel  a repugnance  against  the  cassock  — and  the  recollection 
of  all  the  evils  which  it  committed  in  our  country  is  latent.  The 
clergy  in  Cuba  were  guerillas,  spies,  informers;  it  tried  in  the 
schools  to  teach  the  children  to  hate  their  parents  if  the  latter  were 
Cubans,  and  the  soil  on  which  they  were  born  if,  born  in  Cuba, 
they  had  Spanish  parents.  Within,  their  colleges  are  immoral; 
managed  by  bad  men  who  have  no  more  knowledge  than  to  pervert, 
and  who,  cloaked  with  the  sacred  mantle  of  hypocrisy,  still  find 
fools  whom  they  can  exploit  by  means  of  unworthy  fables. 

“Our  people  do  not  need  the  priest  at  all;  they  are  all  right 
without  him.  ‘Catholicism’  — says  La  Discusion  in  an  article 
which  is  said  to  have  been  written  by  a high  functionary  of  the 
government  — ‘has  a temple  in  every  Cuban  home,’  but  these  are 
temples  without  priests,  temples  where  the  most  beautiful  image 
is  virtue.  In  these  temples  the  children  learn  their  moral  duties, 
which  the  priest  in  the  school  would  upset.” 

Some  indication  of  the  general  attitude  a year  later  lies 
in  the  favor  shown  to  proposals  to  tax  Church  property. 

CUBAN  RAILWAYS 

Cuba  was  no  laggard  in  the  adoption  of  steam  railways 
as  a means  of  transportation,  though  her  system  is  still 
small  and  incomplete.  In  1837,  Governor  General  Miguel 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


331 


Tacon  granted  a concession  for  the  Puerto  Principe  and 
Nuevitas  line.  Tliis  was  not  opened,  however,  until  1851. 
I am  told,  though  I have  been  unable  to  verify  the  state- 
ment, that  the  line  from  Havana  to  Guines  was  in  operation 
before  that  date.  The  Matanzas  and  Sabanilla  road  was 
opened  in  1854.  At  the  time  of  the  American  occupation, 
Cuba  had  seventeen  public  lines  and  .one  hundred  and  seven 
private  lines.  The  latter  are  constructed  and  used  for  the 
transportation  of  sugar  cane  in  the  vicinity  of  the  large 
centrales,  or  grinding  mills.  These  private  roads  repre- 
sented, on  Jan.  1,  1899,  an  investment  of  $12,000,000  for 
equipment  and  9G5  miles  of  track.  The  public  lines 
covered  1,135  miles,  with  a valuation  of  $58,000,000. 

Nine-tenths  of  Cuba’s  public  railway  system,  on  Jan.  1, 
1899,  was  in  the  western  half  of  the  Island.  The  two  great 
eastern  provinces,  Puerto  Principe  and  Santiago,  were 
destitute  of  railways,  with  the  exception  of  four  short  lines 
of  a total  length  of  a little  more  than  one  hundred  miles. 
These  reached,  from  coast  harbors,  the  inland  cities  of 
Puerto  Principe,  Holguin,  San  Luis,  and  Guantanamo. 
The  military  line,  constructed  for  military  purposes  along 
the  Jucaro-Moron  trocha,  was  of  little  value  for  commercial 
purposes.  The  war  left  the  railways  of  the  Island  in  bad 
condition,  and  many  of  the  Cuban  and  Spanish  stockholders 
were  ready  to  part  with  their  holdings.  American  investors 
looked  the  properties  over,  but  decided  that  the  prices  asked 
were  entirely  unreasonable,  and  declined  to  purchase.  An 
English  company,  operating  as  the  Western  Railway  of 
Havana,  Ltd.,  owned  the  one  hundred  mile  line  from  Havana 
to  Pinar  del  Rio.  Another  English  company  bought  up 
the  system  known  as  the  United  Railways  of  Havana,  which 
covers,  generally,  the  territory  for  a hundred  miles  or  so  to 
the  eastward  of  Havana;  and  another  English  organization 


332 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


secured  the  Cuba  Central  Railway  which  occupies  a portion 
of  the  field  eastward  of  the  United  Railways  area.  These 
companies  did  something  in  the  way  of  reconstruction  and 
improvement,  but  nothing  in  the  way  of  extension. 

The  important  feature  in  the  department  of  transporta- 
tion, during  the  period  of  intervention,  was  the  construction 
of  a fine  from  Santa  Clara,  where  it  made  connection  with 
the  western  systems,  eastward  to  Santiago  on  the  southeast 
coast,  and  to  Nipe  Bay  on  the  northeast  coast.  This  enter- 
prise was  inaugurated  by  and  was  carried  on  under  the 
immediate  supervision  of  Sir  William  Van  Horne,  formerly 
at  the  head  of  the  Canadian  Pacific  Railway.  The  com- 
pany holds  a New  Jersey  charter.  In  its  inception,  the  work 
encountered  the  Foraker  Law,  which  prohibited  the  granting 
of  any  concessions  during  the  term  of  American  occupation. 
It  has  been  asserted  that  the  work  was  an  evasion  of  that 
law.  This  is  not  accurately  the  case.  The  company  asked 
for  no  concession,  and  in  all  ways  complied  with  the  existing 
law.  The  Foraker  Law  prohibited  new  public  enterprises 
dependent  for  their  existence  upon  government  or  municipal 
franchise.  It  was  not  and  could  not  be  operative  as  against 
private  enterprises.  The  Cuba  Company  therefore  pur- 
chased a continuous  strip  of  land  some  four  hundred  and 
fifty  miles  in  length  and  thirty  metres  in  width,  taking  legal 
titles  thereto,  and  proceeded  with  the  construction  of  a rail- 
way upon  the  land  thus  acquired.  This  it  could  do  under 
the  laws  of  the  Island  relating  to  the  construction  of  private 
lines.  It  was  the  installation,  though  on  larger  scale,  of  a 
private  line  under  the  same  law  as  that  governing  the  line  of 
the  United  Fruit  Company,  with  its  twenty-nine  milesof  track, 
seven  locomotives,  and  three  hundred  cars,  and  the  system 
on  the  Terry  estate,  with  its  sixty-five  miles  of  road,  sixteen 
locomotives,  and  seven  hundred  cars.  A revocable  license 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


333 


was  obtained  which  gave  the  right  to  cross  streams  and  high- 
ways, subject  to  modification  or  revocation  by  any  succeed- 
ing government.  Upon  its  surface,  the  enterprise  was  little 
better  than  a gigantic  speculation  with  a doubtful  foundation. 
Although  this  was  not,  perhaps,  a technical  violation  of  the 
Foraker  Law,  there  was  involved  a certain  juggling  with 
that  instrument,  with  and  by  the  connivance  of  the  authori- 
ties in  Washington.  The  work  was,  very  rightly,  regarded 
as  of  vast  importance  to  the  Island.  Several  millions  of 
dollars  were  put  into  immediate  and  active  circulation  at  a 
time  when  money  was  scarce,  and  in  an  area  which  had 
suffered  disastrously  by  the  processes  of  the  war.  The  law 
was  certainly  stretched  to  its  utmost,  although  it  was  un- 
doubtedly stretched  to  the  great  advantage  of  the  Island. 

The  existing  laws  gave  the  company  no  right  of  expro- 
priation. Obstacles  were  encountered  in  the  shape  of  land 
owners  who  refused  to  sell  except  at  extortionate  figures. 
Areas  were  encountered  to  which  no  owners  could  be  found, 
and  other  areas  of  doubtful  and  complicated  title.  News- 
papers attacked  the  enterprise,  some  of  them  hoping  to  be 
paid  for  silence  or  approval.  Petty  politicians  essayed 
similar  methods.  But  the  company  proceeded  with  its 
work,  overcoming  both  opposition  and  obstacles,  until  it 
finally  won  an  almost  unqualified  support  throughout  the 
entire  length  of  the  line.  On  Feb.  7,  1002,  there  was  issued 
from  the  headquarters  of  the  Military  Governor  an  order 
known  as  No.  34.  This,  by  virtue  of  the  power  of  that 
government  to  make  or  to  unmake  laws  in  what  was  held 
to  be  the  interest  of  Cuba,  created  a new  railroad  law  for 
the  Island.  The  merits  of  the  law  are  beyond  doubt,  and  it 
has  been  approved  by  competent  authority.  It  was  drafted 
by  able  Cuban  and  American  lawyers,  and  was  passed  upon 
and  endorsed  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  It  is  both  concise 


334 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


and  comprehensive.  It  safeguards  both  public  rights  and 
private  interests.  The  objection  to  the  creation  of  so  im- 
portant a law  at  a time  so  shortly  preceding  the  transfer  of 
government  is  offset  by  the  advantage  accruing  to  the  Island 
under  its  provisions.  It  gave  to  legitimate  and  officially 
approved  railway  lines,  anywhere  in  the  Island,  the  right  of 
legal  expropriation,  and  under  this  provision  the  Cuba 
Company  was  enabled  to  complete  the  construction  of  a 
railway  system  which  opened  to  settlement  and  to  productive 
cultivation  an  area,  previously  of  little  value,  of  twelve  to 
fifteen  million  acres,  or  nearly  one-half  of  the  entire  Island. 

There  was  also  issued  a law  which  established  a Board  of 
Railway  Commissioners.  Its  members  were  the  Secretaries 
of  Public  Works,  of  Finance,  and  of  Agriculture.  Its  busi- 
ness was  the  determination  of  all  matters  relating  to  the 
insular  railways.  As  the  result  of  an  investigation  carried 
on  by  the  Board,  and  upon  its  recommendation  to  that 
effect,  there  was  issued,  on  April  28,  1902,  Civil  Order  No. 
118.  This  regulated  an  exceedingly  confused  railway  tariff 
system  by  prescribing  maximum  rates  of  transportation  for 
freight  and  passengers.  The  freight  schedule  is  too  long 
and  too  complex  for  inclusion  here.  Passenger  rates  were 
established  as 

1st  class  3d  class 

From  1 to  75  kilometres  distance  . . 3.64  cts.  1.82  cts. 

“ 76  kilometres  upward 2.72  “ 1.36  “ 

(The  kilometre  is  practically  five-eighths  of  a mile.) 

The  former  rates  varied  widely,  but  their  range  may  be 
given  as  from  seven  to  twelve  cents  per  mile  for  first-class 
passage.  The  new  rate  still  left  the  charge  at  a fairly  liigh 
figure,  being  nearly  six  cents  per  mile  for  short  trips  and 
about  four  and  one-third  cents  for  long  runs.  Naturally, 
the  sweeping  reduction  called  out  the  protest  of  railway 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS  335 

officials.  The  reduction  order  was  supplemented  by  the 
following : 

Havana,  April  28,  1902. 

I,  Leonard  Wood,  Military  Governor  of  Cuba,  by  virtue  of  the 
authority  vested  in  me,  direct  the  publication  of  the  following  order: 

1.  That  the  foregoing  order  of  the  Railroad  Commission  of  the 
Island  of  Cuba,  fixing  maximum  rates,  shall  take  effect  on  the  twelfth 
day  of  May,  1902,  and  shall  not  be  superseded  or  suspended  by  or 
pending  any  appeal  therefrom,  or  from  any  part  thereof. 

2.  That  upon  an  appeal  under  the  authority  of  the  Railroad 
Law,  Order  No.  34,  Headquarters  Department  of  Cuba,  February 
7,  1902,  the  Supreme  Court  shall  not  be  deemed  to  have  jurisdiction 
to  pass  upon  the  power  of  the  Military  Governor  to  enact  said  law, 
or  undo  the  validity  of  the  provisions  of  the  law  itself,  under  which 
the  Railroad  Commissioners  have  acted  in  fixing  rates  and  under 
which  appeal  is  taken. 

The  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  upon  such  appeal  is 
limited  to  passing  upon  the  validity  and  propriety  of  the  action  of 
the  Railroad  Commissioners  in  the  exercise  of  the  powers  conferred 
upon  them  by  the  law,  and  does  not  extend  to  questioning  the 
existence  of  those  powers.  Leonard  Wood, 

Miliiarxj  Guvertior. 

The  customary  form  for  the  publication  of  such  instru- 
ments had  long  been  “The  Military  Governor  of  Cuba 
directs  the  publication  of  the  following  order,”  etc.  Some 
Cuban  comment  was  made  to  the  effect  that  good  taste  would 
have  suggested  a continuance  of  that  form.  Nor  was  the 
subjection  of  tire  Supreme  Court  to  the  mandate  of  the 
Military  Governor  entirely  overlooked.  Quiet  reference 
was  made,  in  private  conversation,  to  the  royal  deem'  of 
Ferdinand  VII,  of  May  28,  1825.  The  managers  of  the 
Cardenas  & Jucaro  and  of  the  Matanzas  railways  sent 
telegrams  of  protest  to  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
to  which  the  following  reply  was  received: 


336 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


Department  of  War. 

Washington,  May  15,  1902. 

Sirs:  Your  telegram  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  dated 
May  12,  1902,  has  been  sent  to  this  Department.  The  order  of 
which  you  complain,  No.  118,  April  28,  1902,  has  been  con- 
sidered and  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

It  is  the  result  of  a determination  which,  as  far  as  this  Government 
is  concerned,  is  decisive,  as  the  Government  has  exercised  and  will 
exercise  the  power  to  regulate  reasonably  the  tariffs  *of  the  railroads 
of  Cuba. 

The  United  States  does  not  entertain  the  purpose  of  submitting 
the  question  as  to  whether  this  power  exists  or  not  to  the  Cuban 
courts. 

In  order  that  it  may  be  determined  whether  the  law  drawn  up 
by  virtue  of  the  exercising  of  this  power  is  really  reasonable.  Order 
118,  authorizing  its  revision,  has  been  published. 

Of  course  after  the  establishment  of  the  Cuban  Government  the 
latter  can  take  whatever  decision  it  may  choose  with  regard  to  the 
confirmation  and  exercise  of  said  power. 

Very  respectfully,  E.  Root, 

Secretary  of  War. 

This  peremptory  assertion  of  the  intention  of  the  inter- 
vening government  to  stand  upon  its  right  to  exercise  such 
“sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  and  control”  as  might  suit  its 
own  purposes,  notwithstanding  the  declaration  of  the  Joint 
Resolution,  was  also  a subject  of  Cuban  comment.  The 
regulation  of  railway  rates  was,  in  itself,  a desirable  measure, 
but  inasmuch  as  the  Government  of  Intervention  was  to  be 
so  soon  withdrawn,  and  a Cuban  government  installed,  it 
was  thought  that  the  measure  was  unduly  “ sovereign  ” in 
tone,  and  that  the  terms  in  which  its  endorsement  was  ex- 
pressed were  unduly  curt  and  despotic. 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


337 


JAI  ALAI  AND  THE  FORAKER  LAW 

A Congressional  enactment,  generally  known  as  the 
“Foraker  Law,”  prohibited  the  granting  of  “any  property, 
franchise,  or  concession  of  any  kind  whatever  by  any  mili- 
tary or  other  authority  whatsoever  while  Cuba  is  under 
occupation  by  the  United  States.”  This  law,  which  pro- 
hibited any  new  franchises  or  concessions,  should  also  have 
prevented  the  recognition  and  completion  of  franchises  or 
concessions  which  remained  inchoate  at  the  time  of  Spanish 
withdrawal.  It  was  used  as  an  argument  for  the  refusal 
to  recognize  the  claims  of  Messrs.  Dady  & Co.,  in  the  matter 
of  the  Havana  sewering  and  paving  contract,  and  also  in  the 
matter  of  the  De  Armas  contract  for  a municipal  loan. 
Both  of  these  parties  held  inchoate  concessions. 

Yet  in  two  other  cases  which  stood  in  the  same  general 
condition,  as  inchoate  franchises  or  concessions  in  which 
further  action  was  suspended  by  the  Foraker  Law,  a dif- 
ferent course  was  followed.  One  of  these  cases,  that  known 
as  the  Jai  Alai,  became,  after  American  withdrawal,  the 
subject  of  an  active  controversy.  The  other,  known  as  the 
Castaneda  concession,  appeared,  though  much  less  promi- 
nently. 

Because  of  their  prominence,  and  because  of  their  bearing 
upon  an  important  issue,  a review  of  these  cases  is  pertinent 
here.  The  history  of  the  Jai  Alai  case  is  as  follows: 

In  April,  1898,  one  Tomas  Mazzantini,  a noted  bull- 
fighter, applied  to  the  authorities  of  Havana  for  a concession 
to  erect  in  that  city  a fronton,  or  court,  for  the  public  exhibi- 
tion of  a Basque  game  of  ball  bearing  some  resemblance,  in 
its  manner  of  play,  to  the  game  of  racquets.  The  proper 
title  of  the  game  is  Pelota,  although  reference  is  commonly 
made  to  it  as  Jai  Alai,  which  simply  means  a merry-making. 


338 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


The  application  was  approved  by  the  Ayuntamiento  of 
Havana,  but  the  approval  lacked  the  necessary  ratification 
of  the  higher  authorities  at  the  time  of  the  American  occu- 
pation. The  measure  was,  therefore,  at  that  time  and  at 
the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Foraker  Law,  inchoate  and 
invalid.  Early  in  1900,  Senor  Basilio  Zarasqueta,  as 
attorney  for  Mazzantini,  made  application  for  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  contract,  or  concession.  This  was  granted  by 
the  Municipal  Council  on  March  16,  1900.  But  there  was 
still  needed  the  approval  of  the  Civil  Governor  of  the  province, 
and  that  of  the  Military  Governor,  to  give  the  concession  a 
legal  effect.  The  Civil  Governor,  Senor  Emilio  Nunez, 
saw  no  objection  to  it  and  forwarded  it  to  the  military’ 
authorities.  It  was  submitted  to  the  Judge  Advocate,  Col. 
E.  S.  Dudley,  for  his  opinion  on  its  legality.  The  report  of 
that  official  closes  with  the  following  paragraphs: 

“It  was  undoubtedly  the  intention  of  the  ‘Foraker  Amendment’ 
to  prevent  the  granting  of  any  such  rights,  extending  over  a term  of 
years,  until  such  time  as  military  government  ceased  and  the  per- 
manent government  could  act.  The  prohibition  thereof  extends 
to  ‘franchises  or  concessions  of  any  kind  whatever’  by  any  military 
or  other  authority  whatever. 

“The  approval,  therefore,  of  this  application  can  not  be  recom- 
mended.” 

This  was  on  Feb.  22,  1901.  On  the  26th  of  that  month, 
it  was  sent  back  to  Col.  Dudley  bearing  two  endorsements 
by  H.  L.  Scott,  Adjutant-General.  These  were  signed  by 
Colonel  Scott,  “ By  direction  of  the  Military  Governor,” 
and  gave  expression  to  a general  consent  and  approval  by 
that  official.  Colonel  Dudley  returned  it  with  his  second 
endorsement,  as  follows: 

“Respectfully  returned.  It  is  not  possible  to  recommend  ap- 
proval of  any  act  which  concedes  the  use  of  public  property  to 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


339 


individual  use,  or  use  of  a private  corporation,  whether  a monopoly 
or  not.  The  concession  was  never  completed  by  the  ratification  of 
the  Spanish  Governor-General,  as  herein  asked  of  the  Military 
Governor.  The  concession  for  the  use  of  this  property  for  ten  years 
still  remains,  notwithstanding  the  restrictions  of  the  proposed 
endorsement.” 

A slight  modification  was  effected  in  the  instrument, 
and  it  was  again  sent  to  Colonel  Dudley  with  a somewhat 
urgent  message  of  approval  by  the  Military  Governor. 
But  the  Judge  Advocate  was  obdurate  and  returned  it  for 
the  third  time.  His  endorsement  closed  thus:  “I  find  no 
reason  for  changing  my  opinion  given  in  this  matter  Feb. 
25,  1901,  and  Feb.  28,  1901.” 

It  then  developed  that,  for  some  reason,  the  Military 
Governor  had  made  himself  a special  advocate  in  tire  case. 
Under  date  of  April  8,  1901,  he  sent  a portion  of  the  docu- 
ments and  a partial  statement  of  the  case  to  Hon.  Elihu 
Root,  Secretary  of  War,  as  “personal  enclosures,”  asking 
that  official’s  “personal  views”  in  the  case.  Mr.  Root 
referred  the  matter  to  Mr.  Charles  E.  Magoon,  law  officer 
of  the  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs.  In  his  report,  Mr.  Magoon 
called  the  attention  of  the  Secretary  to  tire  fact  that  only  a 
portion  of  the  papers  had  been  submitted.  The  only  ques- 
tion referred  to  Washington  by  General  Wood  concerned 
the  right  of  the  municipality  of  Havana  to  rent  a piece  of 
ground  belonging  to  the  city,  for  the  erection  of  a “ fronton , 
or  hand-ball  court,  wherein  the  public  are  to  be  permitted 
to  play  hand-ball  upon  payment  of  a fee.”  To  tins  there 
was  no  legal  objection,  and  upon  this  point  only  Mr.  Magoon 
gave  Ids  opinion  in  approval.  In  some  way,  Mr.  Magoon 
was  misled,  either  by  the  phraseology  of  the  application  or 
by  some  explanation  of  it,  regarding  the  purpose  of  the 
building.  It  wus  not,  as  he  states,  a building  for  “ use  of 


340 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


the  public  on  payment  of  a fee.”  It  was  a structure  into 
which  the  public  was  admitted  on  payment  of  a fee,  for  the 
purpose  of  watching  and  betting  on  a game  played  by  pro- 
fessionals. It  had  no  other  purpose  whatever. 

Meanwhile,  it  is  of  interest  to  note  that  before  the  matter 
was  submitted  to  Colonel  Dudley,  the  building  was  in  process 
of  erection,  and  when  the  question  was  •submitted  to  Wash- 
ington, the  game  had  been  in  operation  for  nearly  two 
months,  with  all  those  attendant  features  which  led  the 
Cuban  Senator,  Manuel  Sanguilly,  one  of  Cuba’s  leading 
statesmen,  to  denounce  the  institution,  in  a speech  in  the 
Senate,  on  Jan.  7,  1904,  as  a “social  cancer,  whose  results 
are  the  moral  and  material  ruin  of  many  persons,  the  cause 
of  commercial  failures,  and  of  the  suicides  of  fathers  of 
families  and  youths  of  brilliant  promise.”  Thus  did  a 
distinguished  Cuban  Senator  denounce  an  institution  of 
which  an  American  Military  Governor  became  the  chief 
promoter. 

But  the  concessionaires  were  not  satisfied  with  a verbal 
statement  of  official  approval  and  the  establishment  of  the 
game.  They  clamored  for  a full  legal  recognition.  This 
involved  an  official  establishment  of  the  inchoate  concession, 
and  an  official  endorsement  of  a game  which,  although  it 
was  a display  of  marvellous  skill  and  charged  with  thrilling 
excitement,  was  no  more  than  the  basis  for  an  extensive  and 
ruinous  gambling  system.  An  attempt  has  been  made  to 
minimize  and  explain  away  this  feature  by  parallels  with 
betting  on  baseball  and  horse-racing.  No  such  parallel  lies. 
The  Jai  Alai  Company  was  itself  the  proprietor  of  the  bet- 
ting, and  the  beneficiary  from  it.  It  was  from  its  commis- 
sions on  the  bets  made,  to  which  it  held  a monopoly,  that  its 
enormous  dividends  were  derived. 

The  matter  dragged  in  suspense  until  April  26,  1902, 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


341 


about  one  month  before  the  American  withdrawal.  Under 
that  date  Senor  Manuel  Otaduy,  the  president  of  the  Jai  Mai 
Company,  addressed  to  the  Military  Governor  a letter  closing 
with  the  following  expression:  “This  is  an  act  of  justice 
which  I trust  to  procure  at  your  hands.”  The  letter  was  a 
request  for  the  official  recognition  and  definite  legal  estab- 
lishment of  the  Mazzantini  concession.  Although  the 
game  had  been  going  on  for  more  than  a year,  the  con- 
cessionaires realized  that  they  were  not  legally  protected 
either  in  the  exclusive  concession  for  which  they  applied 
or  in  the  gambling  feature  which  this  letter  declared  to  be 
“a  part  of  the  spectacle  and  without  which  it  (the  game) 
could  have  no  reason  to  be.” 

This  recognition  and  authority  was  given  under  date  of 
May  7,  1902,  in  a communication  signed  “By  order  of  the 
Military  Governor,  H.  L.  Scott,  Adjutant-General,”  this 
being  the  customary  form  for  all  official  documents  and 
communications.  This  reply  informed  Mr.  Otaduy  that 
the  papers  in  the  case  had  been  examined,  their  provisions 
and  processes  approved,  and  that  “the  rights  acquired  by 
your  company  arc  protected  by  the  laws  in  force.” 

It  has  been  denied  that  this  constituted  an  illegal  grant 
of  a concession.  Two  facts  have  an  important  bearing  on 
this  point.  One  is  that  the  Jai  Alai  Company,  advised  by 
lawyers  fully  conversant  with  the  Spanish  codes,  realized, 
up  to  April  26,  1902,  that  its  concession  was  still  inchoate  and 
invalid.  Otherwise,  they  would  not  then  have  demanded, 
“ as  an  act  of  justice,”  its  completion  by  official  recognition. 
The  other  is  that  in  spite  of  an  earnest  desire  to  rid  their 
land  of  the  pernicious  institution,  Cuba’s  legislators  have 
been  unable  to  sec  any  way  by  which  they  could  suppress 
it  without  violating  Article  IV  of  the  Platt  Amendment. 
On  Jan.  1,  1899,  the  Jai  Alai  Company  held  an  inchoate 


342 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


concession.  On  May  20,  1902,  it  held  a concession  which 
the  Military  Governor  declared  to  be  “ protected  by  the  laws 
in  force.”  This,  in  general  outline,  is  the  story  of  the  Jai 
Alai.  The  affair  created  a considerable  scandal,  al- 
though neither  the  legal  nor  the  moral  issues  involved  were 
definitely  determined. 

The  other  alleged  infraction  of  the  Foraker  Law  appeared 
in  the  matter  of  an  inchoate  concession  for  an  electric  fight 
system  in  the  City  of  Havana,  bought  by  and  assigned  to 
one  Tiburcio  Castaneda.  It  never  attained  the  public 
interest  which  attached  to  the  Jai  Alai  matter,  and  all  that 
need  be  said  about  it  here  is  that  at  the  time  of  American 
occupation  no  one  would  have  claimed  validity  for  either 
the  Giberga  or  the  Fuentes  concessions,  afterward  owned  by 
Castaneda,  and  for  which  he  asked  official  approval.  Had 
they  been  valid  concessions,  reference  or  appeal  to  the 
American  Military  Governor  would  have  been  superfluous. 
On  May  20,  1902,  Mr.  Castaneda  was  engaged  in  construct- 
ing his  system.  Cuban  effort  to  stop  his  operations  was 
met  and  defeated  by  Article  IV  of  the  Platt  Amendment, 
which,  as  in  the  Jai  Alai  matter,  protected  vested  rights 
acquired  under  laws  and  orders  issued  by  the  Government  of 
Intervention. 

REVENUES  AND  EXPENDITURES 

For  several  reasons,  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  there  has  not 
yet  been  submitted  a summary  of  total  receipts  and  expendi- 
tures of  Cuban  funds  which  can  be  accepted  as  a precise 
and  accurate  statement  of  our  trusteeship.  No  complete 
debit  and  credit  account  has  been  prepared  which  includes 
all  receipts  and  payments  up  to  the  day  of  American  with- 
drawal, with  a fine  drawn  to  show  the  exact  balance  trans- 
ferred when  the  Cubans  assumed  control  of  an  institution 
which  Secretary  Root  described  as  a “going  concern.” 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


343 


During  the  ceremonies  on  May  20,  1902  (See  Chap.  XII), 
General  Wood  informed  President  Palma  that  “the  public 
civil  funds,  amounting  to  $689,191.02,  are  transferred  sub- 
ject to  such  claims  and  obligations  properly  payable  out  of 
the  revenues  of  the  Island  as  may  remain.”  The  receipt  of 
this  sum  was  acknowledged  by  President  Palma.  This 
statement  is  open  to  no  other  inference  than  that  the  sum 
mentioned  represented,  at  least  approximately,  the  balance 
of  our  Cuban  account,  the  surplus  remaining  in  the  hands 
of  a trustee  who  was  surrendering  his  stewardship.  Tins, 
however,  was  far  from  the  fact,  and  the  statement  has  been 
the  cause  of  tangles  which  would  have  been  avoided  by  a 
more  business-like  presentation.  This  appears  to  have  been 
merely  the  sum  on  hand  in  the  Treasury  at  Havana,  and  left 
out  entirely  a sum  of  $1,186,775.85,  afterward  reported  as 
“in  the  hands  of  collectors  and  disbursing  officers.” 

On  pages  135  and  136  of  the  annual  report  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  for  the  year  1902,  there  appears  the  following  sum- 
mary of  total  revenue  and  expenditure: 

REVENUES 


July  18,  1898,  to  June  30,  1899: 


Customs  

$7,228,460.00 

Postal  

151,585.40 

Internal  

347,431.89 

Miscellaneous  

234,345.00 

$7,901,832.55 

Fiscal  year  1900: 

Customs  

Postal  

258,148.03 

Internal  

Miscellaneous  

17,380,275.37 

Fiscal  year  1901 : 

Customs  

Postal  

Internal  

Miscellaneous  

17,101,000.00 


344  VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 

July  1,  1901,  to  May  19,  1902: 

Customs  $13,402,917.15 

Postal  335,956.61 

Internal  688,581.67 

Miscellaneous  260,519.79 

14,687,975.22 


$57,197,140.80 


EXPENDITURES  ' 

State  and  government  $2,780,781.16 

Justice  and  public  instruction 11,108,187.46 

Finance  990,586.71 

Customs  service  2,912,326.06 

Postal  service  1,625,762.03 

Quarantine  694,024.81 

Census  380,393.44 

Auditor  312,758.42 

Treasurer  581,700.10 

Rural  guard  and  administration 5,253,244.58 

Agriculture,  industry,  and  commerce 1,121,699.28 

Public  buildings,  works,  ports,  and  harbors 5,833,607.90 

Jucaro  and  San  Fernando  Railroad 57,338.51 

Barracks  and  quarters  2,525,483.78 

Charities  and  hospitals 4,124,986.60 

Sanitation  9,706,258.20 

Municipalities  (other  than  charities  and  hospitals  and  sanita- 
tion)   4,477,177.52 

Miscellaneous  918,714.72 


Total  $55,405,031.28 

Revenues  $57,197,140.80 

Expenditures  55,405,031.28 


Excess  of  revenues  over  expenditures $1,792,109.52 


But  even  this  statement  is  not  complete.  The  nominal 
balance  of  $1,792,109.52  is  subject  to  certain  debits  and 
credits,  among  them  a “trust  fund”  of  $90,533.11,  of  which 
$80,900.14  was  postal  money  order  funds,  and  none  of 
which  is  properly  to  be  included  in  a statement  of  available 
assets.  There  is  also  a debit  item  in  the  form  of  current 
liabilities,  outstanding  on  May  20,  which,  so  far  as  I have 
been  able  to  learn  from  authoritative  sources,  has  never 
been  made  up. 

From  all  that  I have  been  able  to  learn,  I am  disposed  to 


VARIOUS  QUESTIONS 


345 


accept  the  figures  of  $57,197,140.80  as  a correct  statement 
of  total  receipts.  For  a statement  of  the  exact  amount  left 
to  the  Cuban  Government  as  an  unencumbered  cash  balance 
on  the  day  when  it  began  business  on  its  own  account, 
there  should  be  added  to  the  $55,405,031.28  an  unknown 
sum  which  may  be  small  or  which  may  be  considerable. 
It  would  have  been  better  had  the  account  been  brought  to 
a state  which  would  have  warranted  a probate  court  in  dis- 
charging an  administrator  from  the  duties  and  responsibili- 
ties devolving  upon  him.  As  trustees  of  the  Island  of  Cuba, 
pending  a pledged  transfer  to  a Cuban  Government,  we 
handled  more  than  $57,000,000.  We  should  have  rendered 
an  account  of  our  stewardship  to  the  last  cent. 


Chapter  XXI 


CUBA  LIBRE  Y INDEPENDIENTE 

This  experiment  of  the  United  States  in  colonial  govern- 
ment was  far  from  a failure,  and  perhaps  equally  far  from 
an  unqualified  success.  Much  was  accomplished  winch 
will  be  of  lasting  benefit  to  the  Island  of  Cuba.  The  mis- 
takes that  were  made  were,  in  the  main,  individual.  A 
fundamental  error  undoubtedly  lay  in  the  manner  in  which 
state-building  was  entrusted  to  hands  untrained  in  the 
work  and  imperfectly  qualified  for  it.  Yet,  in  spite  of  all 
that  lies  open  to  criticism  or  to  condemnation,  it  is  entirely 
beyond  question  that,  when  it  withdrew  on  May  20,  1902, 
the  United  States  left  in  Cuba  an  immeasurably  better  and 
surer  foundation  for  a Cuban  Republic  than  any  upon  which 
the  Cubans  could  have  built  had  they  succeeded,  without 
American  aid,  in  expelling  the  Government  of  Spain. 

This  book  would  be  incomplete  without  a brief  comment 
on  the  structure  which  the  Cubans  have  erected  on  the 
foundation  thus  laid.  At  the  time  of  the  withdrawal,  there 
were  many  predictions  of  Cuban  disaster  and  an  early  re- 
turn of  American  authority,  to  assume  a permanent  control 
over  a people  incapable  of  proper  conduct  of  their  own 
affairs.  There  were  even  predictions  of  anarchy  to  come 
before  the  topmasts  of  the  homeward-bound  American 
transports  had  sunk  below  the  horizon  line. 

Of  Cuba’s  experience  during  the  elapsed  period,  nowr 
somewhat  more  than  two  years,  it  may  be  said  that  it  has, 


CUBA  LIBRE  Y INDEPENDIENTE 


347 


in  its  success,  surpassed  the  expectations  of  her  most  ardent 
friends,  and  that  it  has  completely  refuted  the  arguments 
of  critics  and  doubters.  The  Cuban  Government  has  not 
been  ideal,  and  there  has  been  much  in  its  processes  which 
is  open  to  criticism  and  even  to  censure.  But  precisely  the 
same  is  to  be  said  of  any  and  all  governments,  past  or  present. 
The  histories  of  Rome,  France,  England,  or  the  United 
States  are  by  no  means  so  clean  that  they  are  unassailable. 
Cuba  has  done  well,  wonderfully  well,  and  her  officials  and 
her  people  are  alike  deserving  of  high  commendation. 

Peace  and  order  have  prevailed  in  the  Island  with  perhaps 
even  less  of  interruption  than  during  the  Intervention.  This 
is  due  in  part  to  the  fact  that  the  Cubans  are  a peace-loving 
and  orderly  people,  indisposed  to  turbulence,  and  in  part 
to  their  attention  to  that  police  protection  which  is  a neces- 
sary institution  in  all  communities.  The  sanitary  work 
established  during  the  Intervention  has  been  so  continued 
and  maintained  that  the  mortality  list  rivals  in  its  low  per- 
centage the  records  of  the  most  healthful  lands.  The 
school  system,  although  a heavy  financial  burden,  has 
shown  no  decadence. 

In  the  Department  of  Public  Works,  even  American  energy 
has  been  outstripped.  The  report  of  the  secretary  of  that 
department,  for  Cuba’s  first  full  fiscal  year,  shows  that  the 
American  authorities,  during  the  entire  term  of  the  Inter- 
vention, constructed  sixty  miles  of  new  country  roads. 
During  their  first  year,  the  Cubans  built  forty-nine  miles, 
with  forty  miles  more  in  process  of  construction.  The 
Americans  built  thirty-nine  bridges  of  all  classes  during 
their  occupation.  During  her  first  year,  Cuba  built  twenty 
bridges,  and  prepared  plans  for  twenty-five  more.  The 
records  of  the  Island  show  that  the  work  done  has  been  done 
more  economically  than  similar  work  was  done  under  Ameri- 


348 


CUBA  LIBRE  Y INDEPENDIENTE 


can  direction,  and  that  it  has  been  done  quite  as  effectively. 
Two  factors  have  prevented  an  even  wider  achievement. 
These  are  lack  of  money,  and  shortage  in  the  labor  supply. 

A consideration  of  Cuba’s  financial  situation  and  policies 
presents  many  difficulties  because  of  seeming  incongruities. 
I refer  above  to  a lack  of  money.  Yet  out  of  a total  revenue 
only  a little  exceeding  $35,000,000,  for  two  years,  Cuba 
stored  up  in  her  national  cash  box  several  millions  of  dollars. 
Her  Congress  has  manifested  no  disposition  to  plunge  into 
extravagant  expenditure,  and  no  effort  has  been  made  to 
raid  the  Treasury.  The  general  economy  of  administration, 
and  the  treasury  accumulation,  are  attributable  in  large 
measure  to  the  personal  ideas  and  the  personal  opinions  of 
President  Palma.  It  was  his  belief  that  Cuba’s  general 
credit  would  be  strengthened  by  a surplus  on  hand.  He 
believed  also  in  the  wisdom  of  a comfortable  balance  for 
use  in  case  of  an  emergency. 

The  national  credit  was  a matter  of  moment.  A con- 
siderable sum  was  wanted  for  the  discharge  of  certain 
special  obligations.  These  were  in  the  form  of  bonds 
issued  by  the  revolutionary  government,  and  an  agreement 
made  by  that  government  to  pay  the  soldiers  of  the  revolu- 
tion for  their  time  and  services.  These  bonds,  known  as 
the  ’96  bonds,  with  accrued  interest,  represented  an  obliga- 
tion of  about  $3,000,000.  The  obligation  to  her  soldiery 
has  not  yet  reached  a full  determination. 

When  General  Gomez  decreed  the  industrial  paralysis 
of  the  Island,  thousands  of  laborers  were  deprived  of  all 
means  of  livelihood.  It  was  then  proposed  and  agreed  that 
all  who  joined  the  insurgent  ranks  should  receive  payment  for 
their  services  at  a rate  corresponding  to  the  daily  wage  rate 
for  labor  on  the  plantations.  This  was  set  at  one  dollar  per 
day.  Our  own  experience  in  the  various  wars  in  which  we 


CUBA  LIBRE  Y INDEPENDIENTE 


349 


have  been  engaged  leaves  us  in  no  position  to  reflect  on  the 
purchased  patriotism  of  the  Cuban  warriors.  An  agree- 
ment had  been  made  to  pay  them,  and  they  wanted  their 
money.  Many  of  them  were  in  great  need  of  it.  One  of 
the  first  matters  given  important  consideration  by  the 
Cuban  Congress  was  the  question  of  the  pay  of  the  army 
from  the  proceeds  of  a national  loan.  But  there  was  much 
confusion  regarding  the  number  entitled  to  such  pay,  and 
the  amount  rightfully  due  the  claimants.  The  original 
proposition  was  a total  sum  of  about  $23,000,000  which 
should  constitute  a full  and  final  discharge  of  all  obligations. 

A commission  was  appointed  to  review  and  revise  the 
army  lists,  and  to  determine  the  amount  rightfully  due  the 
individual  claimants.  Gen.  Maximo  Gomez  was  appointed 
as  the  head  of  this  commission.  It  can  only  be  regarded  as 
a national  misfortune  and  a most  serious  error  that  the 
commission  should  have  departed  from  the  terms  of  the 
original  proposal  to  make  the  sum  of  about  $23,000,000 
cover  all  claims  in  full.  This  was  generally  regarded  as 
ample  and  even  liberal.  It  had  been  accepted  as  satisfactory 
by  the  claimants  themselves.  The  returns,  as  submitted 
by  the  Gomez  commission,  showed  a gross  indebtedness 
of  about  $57,000,000,  based  on  a payment  of  one  dollar  per 
day  to  privates,  and  an  almost  extravagant  payment  to 
officers.  The  claims  were,  moreover,  computed  in  American 
gold.  This  was  utterly  without  justification.  The  terms 
of  the  original  agreement  involved  a payment  in  Spanish 
silver,  worth,  at  a fair  estimate,  seventy  cents  on  the  dollar 
in  American  gold.  Upon  that  basis,  the  value  of  the  claims 
would  have  approximated  $39,000,000  in  American  gold. 
Cupidity  was  excited,  and  the  idea  of  dividing  the  sum 
originally  proposed  disappeared  entirely. 

A national  loan  of  $35,000,000  had  been  under  eonsidera- 


350 


CUBA  LIBRE  Y INDEPENDIENTE 


tion  for  many  months,  and  taxes  to  meet  the  interest  and  to 
provide  for  the  gradual  payment  of  the  body  of  the  loan  were 
imposed  before  the  loan  was  made.  It  was  also  decided  to 
use  the  entire  proceeds  of  the  loan  for  the  partial  payment 
of  the  soldiers’  claims.  On  Feb.  .12,  1904,  the  banking 
house  of  Speyer  & Co.  contracted  for  the  $35,000,000  loan, 
the  price  paid  being  ninety  and  one  half,  the  interest  rate 
being  five  per  cent.  The  proceeds  of  this  are,  at  the  time 
when  this  is  written,  in  process  of  distribution  as  a partial 
payment,  and  the  method  of  extinguishing  the  unadjusted 
balance  is  under  consideration. 

Cuba’s  financial  position  may  be  briefly  summarized. 
She  has  paid  her  bills;  accumulated  a very  considerable 
treasury  surplus;  and  has  incurred  no  national  debt  beyond 
her  power  of  ready  provision  for  it. 

For  her  economic  development,  it  may  be  said  that  there 
has  been  steady  and  gradual  improvement.  The  key  to 
this  is  found  in  a comment  by  Senor  Rafael  Montoro,  Cuba’s 
Minister  to  England,  in  an  article  published  over  his  signa- 
ture in  Harper's  Weekly  for  June  20,  1903.  He  there  said: 
“The  producing  classes  are  striving  zealously  to  overcome 
adverse  conditions  of  the  market.  Throughout  the  country 
there  prevails  an  earnest  purpose  to  reconquer  wealth  de- 
spite all  these  adverse  conditions.”  Cuban  success  in  this 
direction  is  perhaps  best  indicated  by  a table  of  the  produc- 
tion of  raw  sugar,  the  most  important  crop  of  the  Island. 
Her  largest  crops,  prior  to  the  revolution,  were  those  of 
1894  and  1895.  The  output  of  those  and  the  succeeding 
years  stand  as  follows: 


TONS 

TONS 

1894  

1,054,214 

1897  

212,051 

1895  

1,004,264 

1898  

305,543 

1896  

225,221 

1899  

335,668 

CUBA  LIBRE  Y INDEPENDIENTE 


351 


TONS 

TONS 

1900  

. . . . 300,073 

1903  

940,000 

1901 

615,000 

1904  

1,089,735 

1902  

....  850,000 

While  other  lines  of  productive  industiy  show  no  such 
percentage  of  increase,  there  has  been  a general  improve- 
ment. Among  the  causes  of  this  improvement  there  may 
be  noted  the  immigration  of  a considerable  number  of 
American  settlers  who  have  bought  land,  usually  in  com- 
paratively small  tracts,  and  in  a majority  of  cases  for  the 
production  of  fruit  and  vegetables.  It  is  estimated  that, 
prior  to  the  last  revolution,  there  had  been  American  invest- 
ment in  the  Island  to  the  amount  of,  approximately,  $50,000,- 
000.  Estimates  of  investment  during  the  period  of  inter- 
vention increase  this  to  about  $80,000,000.  Later  invest- 
ment will  not  materially  increase  this  amount,  as  most  of 
the  purchases  have  been  on  a comparatively  small  scale. 
The  general  condition  of  the  market  has  offered  no  induce- 
ment to  investors  in  sugar  land  and  new  mills,  a line  calling 
for  investment  on  considerable  scale.  No  data  are  available 
for  quotation,  but  it  is  doubtful  if  more  than  a few  millions 
of  dollars  have  been  placed  in  Cuba  since  the  American 
withdrawal. 

Viewing  her  economic  situation  broadly,  while  it  cannot 
be  said  that  Cuba  has  yet  touched  that  prosperity  which  is 
rightfully  hers  by  reason  of  her  soil  and  climate,  there  has 
been  marked  improvement  in  her  condition,  and  a notable 
brightening  of  her  prospects  for  the  future. 

In  his  annual  report  for  1901,  Mr.  Root,  then  Secretary 
of  War,  made  use  of  the  following  expression:  “The  same 
considerations  which  led  to  the  war  with  Spain  now  require 
that  a commercial  arrangement  be  made  under  which  Cuba 
can  live.”  In  his  message  to  Congress,  in  December,  1901, 


352 


CUBA  LIBRE  Y INDEPENDIENTE 


President  Roosevelt  said:  “In  the  case  of  Cuba,  there  are 
weighty  reasons  of  morality  and  of  national  interest  why 
the  policy  (of  reciprocity)  should  be  held  to  have  a peculiar 
application,  and  I most  earnestly  ask  your  attention  to  the 
wisdom,  indeed  to  the  vital  need,  of  providing  for  a sub- 
stantial reduction  in  the  tariff  duties  on  Cuban  imports  into 
the  United  States.”  Notwithstanding  this  vigorous  attitude 
of  the  administration,  the  Fifty-seventh  Congress  failed  to 
take  action  in  the  matter  of  either  concessions  or  reciprocity. 
This  incident  has  been  reviewed  elsewhere. 

But  the  agitation  for  special  commercial  relations  with 
Cuba  persisted,  and  President  Roosevelt  did  not  abandon  a 
cause  to  which  he  had  definitely  committed  himself.  A 
treaty  was  drafted  during  the  winter  of  1902-3,  and  was 
duly  ratified  by  both  countries.  But  the  measure  was 
modified  by  the  introduction  of  a clause  which  provided  that 
the  treaty  should  not  take  effect  until  “ approved  by  Con- 
gress.” The  necessary  approval  was  not  given  during  the 
session.  During  the  ensuing  months,  Mr.  Roosevelt  de- 
cided to  call  an  extra  session  for  the  sole  purpose  of  dealing 
with  the  suspended  treaty.  The  call  was  issued,  Congress 
convened,  and,  on  November  10,  listened  to  the  reading  of  a 
special  message  urging  legislation  which  should  give  effect 
to  the  Cuban  treaty.  The  result  was  tersely  summarized 
in  a despatch  sent  by  the  Washington  correspondent  of  the 
New  York  Herald,  on  December  16,  and  published  in  that 
paper  on  the  following  day.  It  said: 

“After  two  years  of  almost  constant  struggle  and  persistent 
effort  on  the  part  of  President  Roosevelt  and  his  administration, 
and,  at  the  last  moment,  the  lashing  of  the  party  whip  on  the  eve 
of  a national  election,  Cuba  gets  her  small  meed  of  justice. 

“The  bill  putting  into  effect  the  reciprocity  treaty  which  was 


CUBA  LIBRE  Y INDEPENDIENTE 


353 


passed  by  the  House  during  the  extraordinary  session  was  finally 
passed  by  the  Senate  this  afternoon  by  a vote  of  57  to  18.” 

The  treaty  became  effective  at  midnight  of  Dec.  27,  1903. 
Anticipating,  as  a result  of  the  treaty,  an  injurious  curtail- 
ment of  national  revenue,  Cuba’s  Congress  was  at  that  time 
considering  an  increase  in  her  tariff  rates,  and,  on  Jan.  12, 
1904,  a bill  was  passed  authorizing  the  Cuban  President  to 
raise  the  duties  by  an  amount  not  exceeding  tliirty  per  cent 
of  the  existing  rates.  A decree  in  accordance  with  this 
act  was  promulgated  on  February  5,  and  became  operative 
on  February  8.  While  Cuba  had  every  possible  right  to 
take  such  a step,  and  was  entirely  justified  in  doing  so,  the 
action  encountered  a considerable  criticism  from  an  Ameri- 
can group  which  was  evidently  disposed  to  a belief  that  Cuba 
was  morally  bound  to  give  attention  to  American  interests 
even  in  preference  to  her  own.  As  a matter  of  fact,  the  tariff 
increase  gave  additional  advantages  to  the  United  States. 

During  1903,  the  “Naval  Stations  Treaty,”  provided  for 
in  the  Platt  Amendment,  was  concluded,  and  the  United 
States  proceeded  to  occupy  bases  at  Guantanamo,  on  the 
southeast  coast,  and  Bahia  Honda,  on  the  northwest  coast. 
Almost  on  the  eve  of  its  conclusion,  a treaty  regarding  the 
Isle  of  Pines,  by  which  the  island  was  recognized  as  Cuban 
territory,  was  suspended  for  further  investigation  and  con- 
sideration. Various  minor  treaties,  of  a routine  nature 
were  concluded  during  1903  and  1904. 

I have  thus  sketched,  as  briefly  as  it  seemed  possible  to  do, 
an  era  fraught  with  momentous  importance  to  the  people 
of  Cuba.  It  was  also  a time  of  no  insignificant  meaning  to 
the  United  States.  That  mistakes  were  made,  and  that 
friction  arose  from  time  to  time,  was  inevitable.  But  the 
good  that  was  done  will  live,  while  the  ills  and  evils  will  be 
dissipated  and  forgotten.  Cuba  is  our  near  neighbor,  and 


354 


CUBA  LIBRE  Y INDEPENDIENTE 


the  people  of  the  Island  and  those  of  the  mainland  will  be 
drawn  into  even  closer  relations  of  personal  and  commercial 
friendship  with  the  passing  years.  Cuba  is  now  our  ward, 
our  protege.  The  day  may  come,  it  is  my  belief  that  it  will 
come,  when  Cuba  will  become  politically  merged  under  the 
flag  of  the  United  States.  If  asked  to  say  when  I look  for 
that  event,  I reply  with  the  familiar  Spanish  phrase  — 
Quien  Sabe? 

But  whether  that  day  comes  soon  or  late,  no  right-think- 
ing American  can  do  otherwise  than  wish  the  newr  Republic, 
toward  whose  establishment  the  United  States  has  contrib- 
uted so  largely,  long  life  and  prosperity  in  endless  measure. 

Salut,  Senorcs,  y Adios. 


INDEX 


A 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  55 
Administrative  system,  6 
Agricultural  relief,  131 
American  Congress,  63,  64 

— investment  in  Cuba,  351 
Annexation,  354 

Army,  Cuban,  88,  115  et  seq. 

Pay  of,  349 

— of  Occupation,  86 

— Spanish,  88 
AsamUea , 108,  117,  122 
Autonomy,  32,  47,  310 

B 

Ballou,  M.  M.,  15 
Beet  sugar  lobby,  282 
Belligerent  rights,  47,  50,  62,  64,  65 
Bill  of  Rights,  78,  79 
Black  Warrior  case,  59 
Blanco,  Gen.,  46,  85 
Bliss,  Gen.  Tasker  II.,  90,  91,  136, 
169 

Blockade,  35 
Bolivar,  Simon,  9 

Brooke,  Gen.  John  R.,  1 16, 133,  130, 
139,  144,  145,  309,311 
Buchanan,  Jamas,  58 
Burrows,  Senator,  285,  291 

C 

Cabinet,  Culwn,  132,  133,  140 
Caml»on,  Jules,  75,  78 
Campos,  Gen.,  34,  37,  41,  44 
Cartoons,  253 

Costaficda,  Concession,  342 


Castellanos,  Gen.,  86,  153 
Castillo,  Canovas  del,  46 
Cemeteries,  127 
Census,  129 

Cespedes,  Carlos  Manuel,  19,  20 
Church,  Attitude  of  329 

— Influence  of,  6 

Church  property  question,  322  et  seq. 
Cisneros,  Salvador,  36 
Clay,  Henry,  56 
Cleveland,  President,  62 
Colonial  policy,  Spanish,  32 
Commerce,  Cuban,  138,  171,  186, 
206,  295  et  seq.  301 

— House  of,  2 

— Regulation  of,  2 

— Restrictions  on,  18 
Commission,  Economic,  278,  280 

— Evacuation,  78 

— Railway,  334 

— to  Washington,  266,  268 
Congress,  Cuban,  197 
Conspiracy  of  1823,  9 

Black  Eagle,  10 

1848,  12 

Constituent  Assembly,  36 
Constitution,  Cuban,  217  et  seq. 

— Spanish,  28,  307 
Constitution  of  1869,  19 
1895,  80 

— Signing  of,  221 

Constitutional  Convention,  172,  207 
el  seq. 

on  " Relations,"  237 

Convention,  Constitutional,  172,  207 
et  seq. 


356 


INDEX 


Council  of  the  Indies,  305 
Crittenden,  Col.,  Execution  of,  12 
Cuba,  1840-1850,  11 

— Administrative  system,  6 

— American  investment  in,  351 

— British  occupation  of,  8,  9 

— Debts  of,  81,  82,  83,  94,  95 

— Politics  in,  32 

— Republic  of,  36,  346  et  seq. 

— Spanish  exploitation  of,  7 
Cuba  Company,  332 

Cuban  army,  43,  88,  115  et  seq. 
Pay  of,  349 

— Assembly,  118 

— bonds,  348 

— Cabinet,  132,  133,  140 

— Congress,  197 

— Constitution,  217  et  seq. 

— finances,  94,  124,  125,  348 

— Government,  347 

— loan,  350 

— ports  opened  to  trade,  9 
Cubans,  Ambition  of,  8 

— Character  of,  121 
Custom  House,  90,  91 
regulations,  178 

Spanish  methods  in,  294 

Customs  Tariffs,  78,  165,  166 

D 

Dady,  M.  J.  & Co.,  152  et  seq. 
Decree  of  1825,  10;  of  1878,  28 
Dudley,  Judge  Advocate,  312,  314, 
338 

E 

Economic  Commission,  278,  280 

— conditions,  31,  96,  97,  99,  168, 

169,  188,  205,  284,  292,  293, 
296,  351 

Education,  Board  of,  132 
Election,  for  Constitutional  Conven- 
tion, 210 

— Municipal,  163  et  seq. 


Election,  National,  179,  182  et  seq. 
English  occupation,  8 
Evacuation  Commission,  78 
Everett,  Edward,  59 
Expenditures,  137,  170,  171,  186 
205,  342  et  seq. 

Exports,  138,  171,  186,  206,  295,  301 

F 

Ferdinand  VII,  Order  of,  10 
Filibustering,  12,  25 
Finances,  Cuban,  124,  125 
Finlay,  Dr.  Carlos,  151 
Fish,  Secretary,  Letter  of,  18,  22 
Foraker  Law,  129,  130,  337,  et  seq. 
Forsyth,  Secretary  of  State,  57 
Frye,  Alexis  E.,  132,  141,  142,  145 

G 

Garcia,  Gen.  Calixto,  119 
Gener,  Secretary  of  Justice,  160,  213 
Gomez,  Maximo,  33,  34,  36,  38,  116, 
117,  119,  et  seq.,  180,  244,  245, 
251 

policy  and  proclamations,  39 

et  seq. 

Gorgas,  Major  William,  173 
Government  established,  102,  200 
Governors,  Spanish,  7 
Grant,  President,  61 
Greble,  Major  E.  St.  John,  136,  148 
Guiamara,  Assembly  at,  20 

II 

Haciendas  Comuneras,  192 
Hanna,  Lt.  M.  E.,  142 
Havana,  123,  152  et  seq.  175,  176 
— Lottery,  90 

Harvard,  Surgeon  Major  Valery,  150 
Herald,  N.  Y.,  Extract  from,  63 
Howe,  William  Wirt,  304 


INDEX 


357 


I 

Immigration  law,  196 

Imports,  138,  171,  186,  206,  295,  301 

Independence,  53,  68 

— not  desired,  16 
Intervention,  United  States,  22 

— Opinions  on,  50  et  aeq. 
“Invasion,”  42 

Isle  of  Pines,  319  et  aeq. 

J 

Jai  Alai,  337  et  aeq. 

Jails,  159 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  54,  56 
Jimaguayu,  36 
Joint  resolution,  74 
Junta  in  New  York,  33,  37 
Justice,  Department  of,  159,  161 

L 

Dadd,  Major  Eugene  F.,  125,  136 
La  LHacuaion , 169 
Lamar,  L.  Q.  C.,  255 
Im  Patria,  260,  263 
I.aws  and  legal  processes,  95,  157, 
176,  192  et  aeq.,  304  et  aeq. 
Lawton,  Gen.  Henry  \V.,  78 
Lee,  Gen.  Fitzhugh,  86,  87 
Lopez,  Narciso,  12 

— expeditions,  12 

Ludlow,  Gen.  William,  136,  150, 
154,  157 

M 

Macco,  Antonio,  33,  34,  36,  37 

— Jose,  34 

Madison,  President,  54 
Mngoon,  Charles  E.,  339 
Maine,  The,  66 
Mnrriage  laws,  127,  128,  178 
Marti,  Jose,  33,  36,  119 
Mnrtinl  law,  34,  43 
Maso,  Hartolome,  34,  36,  182 
Md  'ullngh,  John  II.,  123 


McGivney  & Rokeby,  156 
McKinley,  President,  45,  64,  67,  69, 
71,74 

on  intervention,  52 

message,  72,  73 

Monetary  system,  125 
Monroe  Doctrine,  10,  54 
Mortgage  Extension  Act,  109,  110 
Mosquitoes,  150,  173 
Municipal  administration,  149 

— elections,  163  et  aeq. 

— finances,  175 

— government,  163,  174 

— reconstruction,  79,  112  et  seq. 

— system,  112 

Municipalities,  Suppression  of,  191 

N 

Neely,  Charles  F.,  167 
Nogueira  case,  162 

O 

Olmstead,  Victor  II.,  129 
Olney,  Secretary,  29 
Ostend  Manifesto,  60 

P 

Pacificoa,  35 

Palma,  Tomas  Estrada,  29,  33,  37, 
48,  62,  180,  181,  199,  343 
Pardons,  158,  177 
Paris  Commission,  80 

— Treaty,  80,  81,  226 
Paso  Caballo  case,  162 
Payne  Bill,  288  et  aeq. 

— Sereno  E.,  282 
Peace  Commission,  80 

— Treaty  of,  80.  81 

— Proposal  for,  75 

— terms  proposed,  67  et  aeq. 

Penal  institutions,  115 
Pernlojo,  llattle  of,  37 

Pepper,  Charles  M.,  35,  327,  328 


358 


INDEX 


Platt,  Senator  O.  H.,  241,  248,  272, 
273,  285 

Letter  of,  275 

— Amendment,  245 
Police  Courts,  158 

— Havana,  123 
Political  agitation,  34,  38 

— parties,  32,  34,  38,  163 
Pomeroy  on  intervention,  50 
Porter,  Robert  P.,  99,  117,  120, 

298 

Postal  department,  91 

— service,  92 

Post-office  cases,  167,  193  et  seq. 
Proclamation  of  Jan.  1,  1899,  101 
Protocol,  76,  77 

R 

Railways,  Cuban,  330  et  seq. 
Railway  law,  190,  333 

— rates,  178,  334,  335 
Rathbone,  Estes  G.,  91,  167,  195 
Reciprocity  with  United  States,  3, 

32,  352 

Reconcentration,  44 

— Results  of,  88,  89 
Reconstruction,  79,  84,  94,  97,  103 
Reed,  Surgeon  Major  Walter,  151 
Reform,  Demand  for,  9 
“Relations,”  Question  of,  209,  213, 

224  et  seq. 

Relief  work,  45,  87,  89, 104, 105, 148 
Republic  of  1868,  20,  21 
1895,  36 

Revenues,  137,  170,  171,  186,  205, 
342  et  seq. 

Review  of  Reviews,  Extract  from,  292 
Revolt  of  1717,  8 
1836,  10 

1895,  1,  33,  31,  35,  42,  119 

Revolts,  19th  century,  17 
Revolt,  Causes  of,  1,2,  15 

— motives  of  participants,  36,  37 
Roosevelt,  President,  Letter  of,  200 


Roosevelt,  Theodore,  Message  of, 
281,  352 

Root,  Secretary,  222,  267,  270,  339 

*-  Letter  of,  230,  259,  336,  351 

Report  of,  280 

Rubens,  Horatio  S.,  65 
Rural  guard,  124,  177 

S 

Saco,  Prediction  by,  14 
Sbarretti,  Bishop,  326 
Sagasta,  Praxades,  46 
Sanger,  Lt.  Col.  J.  P.,  129 
Sanitation,  80,  89,  90,  150,  151,  156, 
173 

Santiago,  79 

School,  Correctional,  149 

— establishment,  132,  142,  145  et 

seq. 

— system,  Spanish,  143 

Senate  committee  on  Cuba,  61,  62 

on  Maine,  66 

Sewering  and  Paving,  152  et  seq. 

Slavery,  27 

Spaniards,  165 

Spanish  army,  42,  88 

Spanish  Commission  of  1865,  17 

Spain,  Colonial  policy  of,  2,  32 

— transfers  sovereignty,  86 
Stevenson,  Minister  to  England,  57 
Sugar,  31,  168,  297,  301,  350 
Supreme  Court,  177,  310 

T 

Tacon,  Gen.  Miguel,  10 
Tariffs,  165,  166,  299 

— Cuban,  353 

— Spanish,  3,  298 

— Gen.  Bliss  on,  300 
Taxation,  114,  126 

— Direct,  5 

— Spanish  system  of,  4 et  seq. 

Teller  Amendment,  74,  75 


INDEX 


359 


Ten  Years’  War,  1,  15,  19,  23  et 

seq.  30 

Times,  New  York,  Extract  from,  13 
Trade,  Spanish  restriction  of,  2,  3,  9 
Treaty  of  Zanjon,  27  et  seq. 
Triscomia  case,  162 

U 

United  States,  Attitude  of,  46  et  seq. 

Blockade  by,  35 

Congress,  63,  64 

“Good  offices”  of,  22,  24 

Intervention,  22 

Policy  of,  109,  135,  189 

Reciprocity  with,  3,  32,  352 

Recognition  asked,  20 

V 

Valmaseda  proclamation,  21 
Van  Buren,  Secretary,  56 
Vedado  contract,  161 
Virginius  affair,  25,  26 


W 

Walton,  on  Spanish  law,  304,  305 
War,  Possible  avoidance  of,  69  et  seq. 

— with  Spain,  75 

— end  of,  83 

Ways  and  Means  Committee,  286, 
288 

Webster,  Daniel,  58 
W'eyler,  Gen.,  21,  44,  46 
Wheaton  on  Intervention,  50 
Wilson,  Gen.  James  II.,  87,  93,  124, 

131 

Wood,  Gen.  Leonard,  78,  133,  136, 
139,  141,  142,  145,  150,  155, 
167,  169,  172,  177, 189, 190, 192, 
236,  243,  244,  245,  257,  278, 
280,  283,  339,  343 

Y 

Yellow  fever,  151,  173 

Z 

Zanjon,  Treaty  of,  27  et  seq. 


The  United  States  and  Porto  Rico 

With  Special  Reference  to  the  Problems  Arising 

out  of  our  Contact  with  the  Spanish-American 

Civilization. 

By  Leo  S.  Rowe,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Political  Science  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Pennsylvania,  President  of  the  American  Academy  of 
Political  and  Social  Science,  Member  of  the  Commission  to  Revise 
and  Compile  the  Laws  of  Porto  Rico  (1900-1901),  Chairman  of  the 
Porto  Rican  Commission  (1901-1902).  Crown  8vo.  280  pages. 
Price,  $1.30  net ; by  mail,  $1.40. 

The  growing  responsibilities  which  the  United  States  is  assuming 
on  the  American  continent  make  necessary  a better  understanding 
of  Spanish-American  institutions.  Through  the  acquisition  of 
Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines  the  relation  of  the  Spanish-American 
civilization  to  that  of  the  United  States  has  become  an  important 
question  of  national  policy.  In  California  and  New  Mexico, 
Spanish-American  traditions  were  soon  overwhelmed  by  the  flood 
of  immigration  from  the  East.  In  Porto  Rico  political  institutions 
cannot  be  suddenly  and  radically  changed ; the  adaptation  to  Amer- 
ican standards  must  be  gradual.  Professor  Rowe’s  book  treats  of 
the  successive  steps  in  this  process  of  adaptation.  It  contains  an 
analysis  of  the  salient  characteristics  of  the  Spanish-American 
civilization  and  a suggestive  comparison  with  the  institutions  of 
the  United  States. 

“ . . . cannot  fail  to  prove  of  great  value  to  all  who  have  occasion  to  inform 
themselves  concerning  the  Spanish  colonial  legal  system  as  modified  since  the 
American  occupation  of  the  island.  Dr.  Rowe  has  also  included  in  his  volume  a 
very  useful  discussion  of  those  problems  in  civil  government  which  confronted  the 
American  administration  from  the  first.  The  reader  will  gain  from  the  work  a 
broader  conception  and  a fuller  appreciation  of  the  ability  displayed  by  the 
representatives  of  the  Washington  Government  in  approaching  these  new  and 
extremely  difficult  problems.” — Review  of  Reviews. 

“ It  is  a pleasure  to  recommend  to  all  students  of  our  new  territorial  problems 
the  treatise  on  ‘ The  United  States  and  Porto  Rico.’  . . . Professor  Rowe’s  book 
is  the  most  discerning,  clear,  comprehensive,  and  helpful  treatise  thus  far  written  on 
the  legal  and  political  problems  that  we  annexed  with  our  island  dependencies.”  — 
Record-Herald. 

“ . . . written  from  the  standpoint  of  a student  of  political  history.  . . . 
Throughout  the  volume  the  legal  and  governmental  side  is  emphasized,  and  while 
some  description  of  the  people  and  their  characteristics  is  found,  this  is  always  sub- 
sidiary to  the  main  idea  of  showing  what  our  government  had  to  face  in  re-orga- 
nizing legal  and  civic  forms,  as  well  as  the  degree  of  progress  so  far  made.  It  is  a 
very  valuable  and  suggestive  book.”  — Chicago  Evening  Post. 


LONGMANS,  GREEN,  & CO.,  NEW  YORK 


Actual  Government  as  Applied  under  American 
Conditions. 

By  Albert  Bushnf.ll  Hart,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  History  in 
Harvard  University,  author  of  “Formation  of  the  Union,”  &c.,  &c. 
With  6 Colored  Maps  and  n other  Illustrations  and  Diagrams; 
Suggestions  for  Students;  a Select  Bibliography  of  American  Gov- 
ernment; General  Chapter  References  and  an  Index  (15  pages). 
Crown  8vo.  $2.00. 

In  considering  the  actual  workings  of  the  American  government 
the  author  of  this  book  believes  that  the  real  kernel  is  to  be  found 
in  that  personal  interest  and  personal  action  which  vitalizes  govern- 
ment. He  discusses  not  only  the  machinery  but  the  operations  of 
government  on  the  ground  that  functions  are  more  important  than 
details  of  governmental  organization,  and  lays  stress  upon  the  pur- 
pose, extent,  division,  exercise,  and  limitations  of  governing  power. 

The  Theory  and  Practice  of  the  English  Government. 

By  Thomas  Francis  Moran,  Professor  of  History  and  Economics 
in  Purdue  University.  Crown  8vo.  Net,  $1.20.  By  mail,  $1.32. 

The  Evolution  of  Modern  Liberty. 

By  George  L.  Scherger,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  History,  Armour 
Institute  of  Technology.  Crown  8vo.  Net,  $1.10.  By  mail,  $1.20. 
An  investigation  of  the  origin  and  development  of  the  principles 
of  modern  liberty  as  contained  in  the  Bills  of  Rights  prefixed  to 
the  Constitutions  of  the  American  States,  and  in  the  French 
Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man  and  of  the  Citizen,  drawn  up  by 
the  Constituent  Assembly  in  1789.  The  history  of  such  ideas  as 
those  of  the  natural  liberty  and  equality  of  men,  the  sovereignty  of 
the  people,  the  compact  theory,  the  right  of  resistance  to  oppression, 
religious  liberty,  and  others,  is  traced  from  their  origin  to  the  end 
of  the  eighteenth  century. 

Political  Theories  of  the  Ancient  World. 

By  Westel  W.  Willoughby,  Ph.D.,  Associate  Professor  of  Poli- 
tical Science  in  Johns  Hopkins  University.  Crown  8vo.  $2.00. 

“ . . . The  author’s  learning  and  reading  are  very  wide,  and  his  method  pains- 
taking ...  as  an  analytic  compendium  the  work  stands  by  itself  and  will  be 
found  useful.  ...”  — The  Nation. 

“ In  this  book  Professor  Willoughby  has  made  an  important  addition  to  the 
literature  of  the  history  of  political  theories  . . . has  the  real  importance  of  both 
meeting  a want  and  at  the  same  time  creating  one.” — American  Historical  Review. 

The  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 

By  M.  P.  Follf.tt.  With  an  Introduction  by  Albert  Bushnell  Hart, 
Ph.D.  Crown  8vo.  $1.75. 

Contents:  I.  Genesis  of  the  Speaker’s  Tower.  II.  Choice  of  the  Speaker.  III.  The 
Personal  Element  of  the  Speakership.  IV.  The  Speaker’s  Parliamentary  Prerogatives. 
V.  The  Speaker’s  Vote.  VI.  Maintenance  of  Order.  VII.  Dealing  with  Obstruction. 
VIII.  Power  through  the  Committee  System.  IX.  Power  through  Recognition.  X. 
Power  as  a Political  Leader.  XI.  The  Speaker’s  Place  in  Our  Political  System.— 
Appendices. — Index. 


LONGMANS,  GREEN,  & CO.,  NEW  YORK 


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